Markandey Katju, C.J.: Heard Mr.T.R.Mani, learned senior counsel for the first respondent in the writ appeal - M/s.Mahalaxmi Inn Private Limited, and Mr.R.Thiagarajan, learned senior counsel for the appellant in the writ appeal - K.Chandrasekaran and the learned Government Pleader. 2. It appears that W.P.No.7023 of 2004 (out of which the present W.A.No.1504 of 2005 arises) was filed by M/s.Mahalaxmi Inn Private Limited (respondent No.1 in this appeal) for a mandamus directing the District Collector, Chennai, as well as the present appellant to remove and relocate forthwith the hoarding boards put by the appellant herein at the street junction of Chamiers Road and Turnbulls Road, Chennai. This writ petition was disposed off by the learned single Judge on 22.3.2004 by the following order: " The writ petitions are filed for the relief of issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the first and second respondents to remove and relocate forthwith the hoarding boards, put up by the second respondent in each writ petition at the street junction of the Chamiers Road and Turnbulls Road. (2) Learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent submitted that the representation of the petitioner dated 16.1.2004 would be disposed of by the first respondent in accordance with law and reasonable time may be given. (3) Having regard to the submission made by the learned Additional Government Pleader, the first respondent is directed to dispose of the representation of the petitioner dated 16.1.2004 in accordance with law within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (4) With the above direction, the writ petitions are disposed of. No costs. Consequently, W.P.M.Ps., are closed. 3. A perusal of the above order shows that the learned single Judge had only directed the District Collector, Chennai, to dispose off the representation of the writ petitioner dated 16.1.2004 within twelve weeks in accordance with law. Since the order was not complied with, Contempt Petition No.807 of 2004 was filed by the writ petitioner. 4. 3. A perusal of the above order shows that the learned single Judge had only directed the District Collector, Chennai, to dispose off the representation of the writ petitioner dated 16.1.2004 within twelve weeks in accordance with law. Since the order was not complied with, Contempt Petition No.807 of 2004 was filed by the writ petitioner. 4. During the pendency of the said Contempt Petition No.807 of 2004, the District Collector, Chennai passed an order dated 1.11.2004 to the following effect: "With reference to your application cited, I have to state that the hoardings erected by private advertising agencies near your landed property could not be removed as the Advertising agencies have filed a batch of writ petitions before the Hon’ble High Court of Chennai, which are numbered as W.P.No.19056 of 2003, 19057 of 2003 etc., totally 10 writ petitions besides a P.I.L. in W.P.No.24154 of 2003 have been filed against the rules and norms fixed by the Government as per Government of Tamil Nadu Notification dated 4.6.2003 in granting licenses/renewal of existing licenses to the concerned advertising agencies. In view of the undertaking given by the learned Advocate General before the Hon’ble High Court of Chennai in the matter of removal of existing hoarding which violated the norms/rules prescribed by the Government in the said notification, no final order could be passed by this office pending the outcome of the result of the abovesaid writ petitions. I further wish to state that appropriate action will be taken on your representation for removing/regularizing the said hoardings as soon as the above cases are disposed off." 5. A perusal of the above order of the District Collector, Chennai, shows that instead of finally disposing off the writ petitioner’s representation dated 16.1.2004, the District Collector, Chennai, had only observed that in view of the pendency of certain writ petitions in the Madras High Court no final order could be passed by him. In our opinion, this attitude of the District Collector, Chennai cannot be appreciated. He should have finally disposed off the representation of M/s.Mahalaxmi Inn Private Limited dated 16.1.2004 one way or the other. It was not proper for him to refuse to decide that representation despite clear direction by this Court in W.P.No.7023 of 2004 dated 22.3.2004. 6. In our opinion, this attitude of the District Collector, Chennai cannot be appreciated. He should have finally disposed off the representation of M/s.Mahalaxmi Inn Private Limited dated 16.1.2004 one way or the other. It was not proper for him to refuse to decide that representation despite clear direction by this Court in W.P.No.7023 of 2004 dated 22.3.2004. 6. Since the said order dated 22.3.2004 was not complied with, a Contempt Petition being Contempt Petition No.807 of 2004 was filed by M/s.Mahalaxmi Inn Private Limited (as stated above) alleging that the representation had not been disposed off, despite the order dated 22.3.2004 passed by this Court. In that contempt proceedings, the learned single Judge by order dated 15.7.2005 observed as follows: “This Court is not satisfied in the way in which the matter has been dragged on for several years. Counter is also filed by the District Collector, whose attitude has not been appreciated by this Court for more than one occasion. This Court is once again directing the District Collector and Tahsildar to remove the two hoardings at No.112, Chamiers Road, Nandanam, Chennai-600 035 on or before 1.8.2005.” 7. With profound respect to the learned single Judge, we are of the opinion that he was not justified in giving a direction to the District Collector and Tahsildar to remove the two hoardings at No.112, Chamiers Road, Nandanam, Chennai in the aforesaid contempt proceedings. 8. In contempt proceedings, the Court can either punish for contempt or discharge the notice for contempt, but the Court can certainly not give directions as if it was hearing a writ petition. The scope of contempt petition is limited and a Judge cannot go beyond that scope. 9. Mr.R.Thiagarajan, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that in pursuance of the directions of the learned single Judge dated 15.7.2005 in Contempt Petition No.807 of 2004, the hoardings of the appellant has been removed. 10. By order dated 4.8.2005 in W.A.No.1504 of 2005 read with C.A.No.18 of 2005, we directed as follows: “Since we are of the opinion that the learned single Judge in contempt proceedings could not have given a direction for removal of hoardings, we stay the operation of the order dated 15.7.2005 passed in Contempt Petition No.807 of 2004 and direct that status quo ante prevailing prior to the order dated 15.7.2005 shall be restored. If the appellant’s hoarding was existing on the date of the order i.e., 15.7.2005, it shall be restored forthwith. This order will be subject to further orders in these two connected appeals. Notice.” 11. Mr.T.R.Mani, learned senior counsel for the first respondent in the writ appeal, viz, M/s.Mahalaxmi Inn Private Limited submitted that in the order dated 4.8.2005 we should not have directed restoration of the appellant’s hoarding which were existing prior to 15.7.2005, particularly without giving hearing to the first respondent/ M/s.Mahalaxmi Inn Private Limited. 12. In this connection we may mention that it is a well settled principle of law that restitution is obligatory on the appellate Court once it finds that the order of the Court below is illegal. In this connection the Supreme Court in Binayak Swain v. Ramesh Chandra, (1967)1 S.C.J. 793: A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 948, vide para.4 observed thus: “ We are of the opinion that the appellant is entitled to restitution notwithstanding anything which happened subsequently as the right to claim restitution is based upon the existence or otherwise of a decree in favour of the plaintiff at the time when the application for restitution was made. The principle of the doctrine of restitution is that on the reversal of a decree, the law imposes an obligation on the party to the suit who received the benefit of the erroneous decree to make restitution to the other party for what he has lost. This obligation arises automatically on the reversal or modification of the decree and necessarily carries with it the right to restitution of all that has been done under the erroneous decree; and the Court in making restitution is bound to restore the parties, so far as they can be restored, to the same position they were in at the time when the Court by its erroneous action had displaced them from.” 13. Similarly in Kavita Trehan v. Balsara Hygiene Products Limited, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 441, the Supreme Court quoted the following observation of the Privy Council in Jai Berhan v. Kedar Nath Marwari, 44 M.L.J. 735: A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 269: L.R. 499 I.A.351: “It is the duty of the Court under Sec.144, C.P.C., to” place the parties in the position which they would have occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed. “ Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved.” 14. In para.15 of the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court observed: “Sec.144, C.P.C., incorporates only a part of the general law of restitution. It is not exhaustive. See Gangadhar v. Raghubar Dayal, A.I.R. 1975 All .102 (F.B.) and State of Andhra Pradesh v. M/s.Manickchand Jeevraj and Company, Bombay, A.I.R.1973 A.P. 27. The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every Court and will be exercised whenever the justice of the case demands. It will be exercised under inherent powers where the case did not strictly fall within the ambit Sec.144. Sec.144 opens with the words” where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose . . . .. “ The instant case may not strictly fall within the terms of Sec.144; but the aggrieved party in such a case can appeal to the larger and general powers of restitution inherent in every Court.” 15. Thus the duty to grant restitution is not limited to Sec.144, C.P.C., It is the inherent power and duty of the Court to grant restitution wherever the lower Court has committed a mistake. 16. In view of the above decisions of the Supreme Court we see no reason to recall our direction to restore the appellant’s hoarding existing on 15.7.2005. 17. According to the Latin maxim “Actus Curiae neminem gravabit”, i.e., an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. According to this maxim, if the Court has made a mistake it should be corrected. In our opinion the learned single Judge who was hearing the contempt proceedings clearly committed mistake in his order dated 22.3.2004 by giving a direction for removing the hoardings. 18. According to this maxim, if the Court has made a mistake it should be corrected. In our opinion the learned single Judge who was hearing the contempt proceedings clearly committed mistake in his order dated 22.3.2004 by giving a direction for removing the hoardings. 18. The above maxim “Actus Curiae neminem gravabit” has been referred to in several decisions of the Supreme Court e.g., Shakuntala Bai v. Narayan Das, (2004)5 S.C.C.772 (vide Para.10.1); Karnataka Rare Earth v. Senior Geologist, Department of Mines and Geology, (2004)2 S.C.C.783 (vide para.10); Rajesh D.Darbar v. Narasingh Rao Krishnaji Kulkarni, (2003)7 S.C.C.219 (vide para.6); Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra v. Pramod Gupta, (2003)3 S.C.C.272 (vide para.31); Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, (2003)8 S.C.C.319 (vide paras 40 and 41); Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P., (2003)8 S.C.C.559 vide para.10); South Eastern Coal Fields Limited v. State of M.P., (2003)8 S.C.C.648 (vide paras 26 to 28); Jayalakshmi Coehlo v. Oswald Joseph Coehlo, (2001)4 S.C.C.181 (vide para.13); and O.N.G.C. v. Association of Natural Gas Consuming Industries, (2001)6 S.C.C.627 (vide para. 12). 19. Moreover, even if we accept the submission of Mr.T.R.Mani, learned senior counsel for the first respondent that we should not have directed restoration of the appellant’s hoarding by order dated 4.8.2005 without giving an opportunity of hearing to the first respondent, we have now given him a hearing, and hence the first respondent can have no grievance now on this account. 20. We have already observed above that in contempt proceedings the Court can either punish for contempt or discharge the notice for contempt, but the Court can certainly not give directions as if it was hearing a writ of mandamus. In contempt proceedings, the scope is limited, and Judges must exercise restraint and not go beyond the scope of contempt jurisdiction. 21. The Supreme Court in Director of Education, Uttaranchal and others v. Ved Prakash Joshi and others, (2005)5 Supreme 116 , ob served: “The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the Court passing the judgment or order. Right or wrong the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the Court would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt of Court one cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance of which is alleged. Right or wrong the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the Court would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt of Court one cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance of which is alleged. In other words, it cannot say what should not have been done or what should have been done. It cannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional direction or delete any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and indefensible.” 22. A perusal of the above observation of the Supreme Court shows that the Supreme Court has clearly held that a Judge exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot give additional directions, but that is precisely what the learned single Judge has done in his order dated 15.7.2005. [Italics supplied] 23. It may be noted that by order dated 22.3.2004 in W.P.No.7023 of 2004, this Court had only directed that the representation of M/s.Mahalaxmi Inn Private Limited be decided by the District Collector. There was no direction by this Court in the said writ petition to remove the hoardings. However such a direction has been given in the contempt petition which, in our opinion, was beyond the scope of contempt jurisdiction. This direction in the order dated 15.7.2005 to remove the hoardings was clearly illegal and unsustainable. It is because of that order dated 15.7.2005 that the appellant’s hoardings have been removed. Hence, in our opinion, restitution is necessary. We therefore reiterate our order dated 4.8.2005 and direct that the hoardings shall be restored forthwith. 24. Mr.T.R.Mani, learned senior counsel appearing for M/s.Mahalaxmi Inn Private Limited, the first respondent in the appeal, submitted that though no doubt ordinarily restitution should be granted, but there are some exceptions to the rule and that is that if such restitution will be in violation of the law or against some statutory provision, then restitution should not be granted. 25. In our opinion it has yet to be determined whether setting up of such hoarding or continuing of such hoarding will be in violation of the law or not. 25. In our opinion it has yet to be determined whether setting up of such hoarding or continuing of such hoarding will be in violation of the law or not. In this connection we may mention that Supreme Court in Narayana Bhat v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 1736, observed (vide para.12) that till the application for licence for setting up the hoarding is disposed off, the existing hoarding shall not be removed. 26. No doubt setting up a hoarding or continuing a hoarding requires grant of licence under Sec.326C(2) of the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919. Ordinarily no hoarding can be erected or continued unless under Sec.326C(2). However in view of the observation of the Supreme Court in para.12 of Narayana Bhat v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 1736, the existing hoarding cannot be removed until the disposal of the appellant’s application for the licence. 27. We are pained to note that despite filing of the application by the appellant on 14.5.2001 pursuant to the Supreme Court order, that application has not yet been decided by the District Collector, Chennai although it has been pending for more than four years. Also, it is surprising that the District Collector Chennai has not complied with the order of the Court dated 22.3.2004. It is unfortunate that such a senior officer like the District Collector is sitting over the matter and not disposing of the said application nor complying with the High Court’s order. Had that application been decided expeditiously and the order of the Court dated 22.3.2004 complied with the controversy with which we are faced would not have arisen. 28. We are also surprised to see the order of the District Collector, Chennai dated 1.11.2004. Instead of deciding the representation dated 16.1.2004 and complying with the High Court’s order dated 22.3.2004, as well as disposing off the application of the appellant for a licence one way or the other, he has only dilly-dallied with the matter and practically defied the order of this Court dated 22.3.2004. This kind of attitude of a senior officer of the Government cannot be appreciated. 29. In our opinion the order of the learned single Judge dated 15.7.2005 was clearly illegal and it caused injury to the appellant since his hoardings were removed. Hence it is the duty of the Court to rectify its mistake and grant restitution. 30. This kind of attitude of a senior officer of the Government cannot be appreciated. 29. In our opinion the order of the learned single Judge dated 15.7.2005 was clearly illegal and it caused injury to the appellant since his hoardings were removed. Hence it is the duty of the Court to rectify its mistake and grant restitution. 30. We, therefore, direct the District Collector, Chennai to dispose off the application of the appellant dated 14.5.2001 for grant of licence under Sec.326C(2) of the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act on or before 15.9.2005. The Collector will also simultaneously decide the application of M/s.Mahalaxmi Inn Private Limited dated 16.1.2004 by a common order after hearing both parties concerned and pass a speaking order in accordance with law. The parties can raise all such factual and legal pleas as they wish to raise before the District Collector, Chennai. 31. Both the parties shall appear before the District Collector with copy of this order on 15.8.2005 and no separate notices need be issued to them by the District Collector. 32. If the District Collector rejects the application of the appellant, then of course the appellant will have to remove his hoarding, subject to any stay or final order to be passed in appeal/revision/writ petition against that order. 33. C.A.No.18 of 2005 is allowed and the direction in the order dated 15.7.2005 to remove the hoardings is set aside. However contempt petition No.807 of 2004 and W.A.No.1504 of 2005 shall be listed again before us on 20.9.2005, so that we are satisfied that the District Collector, Chennai has complied with the orders of this Court.