( 1 ) HEARD Sri Sashi Nandan, senior Advocate assisted by Sri Anurag jauhari, Advocate on behalf of the petitioner, and Sri Sanjeev Singh, Advocate on behalf of respondent No. 2. ( 2 ) THE Bank of Baroda, Fatehpur Main branch though its Branch Manager (respondent No. 2), which is a banking company duly constituted under the Banking companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings), Act, 1970, filed a civil suit in the judgeship of Fatehpur in the year 1995 for a money decree of Rs. 28,41,263/-, against the principal borrower, Sri Guru Bachan singh as well as against the guarantor Sri prem Jeet Singh Gujral. The suit was registered as Original Suit No. 84 of 1995. During the pendency of the said suit proceedings, a Tribunal was constituted under Section 3 of the recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the 1993 Act) at Jabalpur. Accordingly the proceedings were transferred to the said Tribunal at Jabalpur. However, a Tribunal was constituted at allahabad, the proceedings were therefore, transferred to the Tribunal at Allahabad under Section 31 of the 1993 Act. ( 3 ) THE Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery tribunal at Allahabad by means of the order dated 16th June, 2003 dismissed the suit filed by the Bank. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Presiding Officer debts Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad the respondent-bank filed an appeal under section 20 of the 1993 Act. The appeal was numbered as Appeal No. 323 of 2003. The debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad by means of the Judgment and order dated 3rd June, 2005 has allowed the appeal so filed by the respondent-bank and has remanded the matter for reconsideration to the debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad. The said order of remand of the Debt Recovery Appellate tribunal, Allahabad has been challenged by means of the present writ petition. ( 4 ) ON behalf of the petitioner various pleas and grounds have been raised for the purposes of challenging the aforesaid judgment and order of remand passed by the debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, allahabad. ( 5 ) HOWEVER, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the order of remand passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, allahabad at this stage, inasmuch as the honble Supreme Court of India in its recent judgment in the case of Mangla Prasad tamoli (D) by L. Rs. ( 5 ) HOWEVER, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the order of remand passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, allahabad at this stage, inasmuch as the honble Supreme Court of India in its recent judgment in the case of Mangla Prasad tamoli (D) by L. Rs. v. Narvdeshwar Mishra (D) by L. Rs. reported in (2005) 2 All WC 1305 : ( AIR 2005 SC 1964 ) Paras 13, 14 and 15 (of All WC): (Paras 14 to 16 of AIR) has held as follows :"13. When we put to the learned counsel as to how, he could in the present appeal filed in the year 1999, challenge the order of remand made by the Judgment of the High court on January 18, 1966 in Second Appeal no. 3033 of 58, the learned counsel drew our attention to the decision of this court in Kshitish Chandra Bose v, commissioner of Ranchi, (1981) 2 SCR 764 : ( AIR 1981 SC 707 ) as authority for the proposition that an order of remand by the High court being an Interlocutory Judgment. which did not terminate the proceedings, it is open to the aggrieved Party to challenge it after the final judgment. This Court in satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, (1960) 3 SCR 590 : ( AIR 1960 SC 941 ), under similar circumstances, took th view that an order of remand was an interlocutory judgment which did not terminate the proceedings and hence could be challenged in an appeal from the final order. This view was again reiterated in K. C. Bose ( AIR 1981 SC 707 at p. 709) (Para 6) (supra) wherein it is observed (p. 767) :"mr. Sinha appearing for the respondent was unable to cite any authority of this Court taking a contrary view or overriding the decisions referred to above. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that it is open to the appellant to assail even the first judgment of the High Court and if we hold that this judgment was legally erroneous then all the subsequent proceedings, namely, the order of remand, the order passed after remand, the appeal and the second Judgment given by the High Court in appeal against the order of remand would become non est. "14. "14. Having considered the questions urged by the learned counsel, which appear to be backed by the two decisions of this court, in the background of the facts of the case before us, we are satisfied that the appellant are entitled to succeed on both counts. 15. The trial Court and the first appellate court had held that the suit for redemption brought by the plaintiff was premature and rightly dismissed it. It is the High Court, by its judgment dated 18-1-1966 in Second appeal No. 3033/58, which took an erroneous view that because of the plaintiffs advocate had stated that he would not seek delievery of possession before stipulated time (26-1-1968 ). the suit could be continued. It was on this wrong understanding of the legal position that the remand order dated January 18, 1966, came to be made by the High Court pursuant to which the appeal and further proceedings continued. If this remand order was bad in law, then all further proceedings consequent thereto would be non-est and have to be necessarily set aside. That the appellants are entitled to urge this point even at this point of time, is supported by the authority of this Court in Gangadhar ( AIR 1958 SC 770 ) (supra ). " ( 6 ) IN view of the judgment of the Honble supreme Court the order of remand being an interlocutory order of the Court, which has not terminated the proceedings, and hence can always be challenged in an appeal from the final order by the petitioner after final judgment. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, it shall be open to the petitioner to challenge the order of remand in an appeal from the final order as an when cause for same arises. ( 7 ) IT has been pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that the Presiding Officer Debt recovery Tribunal, Allahabad has fixed today as the date for final hearing after remand. In the facts and circumstances of the case it is provided that petitioner may make a request to the Presiding Officer, Debts recovery Tribunal, Allahabad for adjournment of the case to some other date so as to enable them to produce a copy of the order passed today before the Presiding Officer, d. R. T. , Allahabad. In the facts and circumstances of the case it is provided that petitioner may make a request to the Presiding Officer, Debts recovery Tribunal, Allahabad for adjournment of the case to some other date so as to enable them to produce a copy of the order passed today before the Presiding Officer, d. R. T. , Allahabad. On such request being made to the Court has not room to doubt that the Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery tribunal, Allahabad shall consider the request of the petitioner sympathetically. However, such adjournment may be granted for a week only. Petition dismissed. .