Judgment Viney Mittal, J. 1. The defendant is in appeal. 2. The plaintiff field a suit for specific performance pleading that the parties had entered into an agreement dated July 14. 1975 whereby defendant, Hukam Chand, had agreed to sell 16 kanals of land situated in village Gondhi, Tehsil Ballabgarh for a total sale consideration of Rs. 24,000/-. At the time of the execution of the agreement Rs. 2500/- were paid as earnest money. The land in question was already under mortgage for a sum of Rs, 15,000/- with Ganga Lal, father of the plaintiff. It was agreed between the parties that the aforesaid mortgage amount shall be paid by the plaintiff and as such the aforesaid amount was to be adjusted towards the sale consideration. Prior to the agreement, the defendant had raised a loan of Rs. 3,000/- from one Prem Parkash. It was stipulated in the agreement that although the defendant had repaid the aforesaid loan but there was an entry existing qua the attachment of the land for repayment of the loan. Consequently, the parties had agreed that the defendant was to get the aforesaid revenue record corrected and the sale deed was to be executed within one month thereafter. On August, 16, 1976 a further amount of Rs. 740/- was paid towards the sale consideration. 3. On March 29, 1982, the plaintiff served a legal notice through his counsel. The aforesaid legal notice Ex .P1 is on the record. In the aforesaid legal notice, it was mentioned by the plaintiff that although the aforesaid revenue entry of attachment qua the loan of Prem Parkash had been got corrected by the defendant but still the defendant had not got the sale deed executed. Accordingly, the defendant was asked to execute the sale deed on April 16, 1982. The defendant chose not to give reply to the said notice. Thereafter, on July 20, 1985 another legal notice was got served by the plaintiff upon the defendant. !n the aforesaid legal notice, the plaintiff stated that he had come to know that the defendant had not got the revenue entry corrected. Consequently the defendant was asked to get the revenue entry corrected and get the sale deed executed. Ultimately, on October 12, 1985, the suit for specific performance was filed by the plaintiff. 4. Defendant appeared and contested the suit. Consequently the defendant was asked to get the revenue entry corrected and get the sale deed executed. Ultimately, on October 12, 1985, the suit for specific performance was filed by the plaintiff. 4. Defendant appeared and contested the suit. Besides taking some technical pleas, a plea with regard to suit being barred by limitation was also taken. However, on merits . of the controversy, the defendant denied the execution of the agreement and receipt of any earnest money. 5. The learned trial Court on the basis of the evidence available on the record held that the agreement in question was executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff and that he had received the earnest money. The other stipulations contained in the agreement were also upheld. However, learned trial Court found that since the plaintiff had served the earlier legal notice Ex.P1 on March 29, 1982 in which it had been admitted that the revenue record stood corrected, therefore, the limitation would commence from the aforesaid date and since the suit has been filed on October 12, 1985, therefore, the suit was barred by limitation. On the basis of the aforesaid findings qua the suit being barred by limitation, the suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed, 6. The matter was taken up in appeal by the plaintiff. The learned first appellate Court re-examined the evidence on the record. On the basis of the Jarnabandi Ex.P5, a copy whereof had been obtained by the plaintiff on July 18, 1985 and also taking into consideration the statement of defendant, Hukam Chand, who had appeared as DW1 where in he had admitted during cross-examination that the suit land was still shown to be under attachment, the first Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the suit filed by the plaintiff could not be treated to be barred by limitation. All other findings recorded by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff were also upheld. Consequently, the appeal filed by the plaintiff was allowed and as a result thereof the suit was decreed, 7. The defendant has chosen to file the present regular second appeal. 8. At this stage, it may be noticed that the present regular second appeal was filed by the plaintiff in the year 1988 under the provision of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1980. The defendant has chosen to file the present regular second appeal. 8. At this stage, it may be noticed that the present regular second appeal was filed by the plaintiff in the year 1988 under the provision of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1980. A full Bench of this Court in the case of Ghanpat v. Ram Devi A.I.R, 1978 Punjab and Haryana 137 had taken a view that in view of the aforesaid Local Law (Punjab Courts Act), the amended provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1976, were not applicable to the second appeals filed in this Court. Accordingly, no substantial question of law was framed nor the aforesaid regular second appeals were admitted on any such substantial question of law. However, the Hon ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Kulwant Kaur and Ors. v. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by LRs and Ors. (2001-2) 128 P.L.R. 492 (S.C) has held that after the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure in the year 1976 thereby amending section 100, section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act had become redundant and repugnant to the Central Act i.e Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, was to be ignored and, therefore, the second appeal shall only lie to this Court under Section 100 of the amended Code of the Civil Procedure on the substantial question of law. 9. In view of the law laid down by the "Apex Court in Kulwant Kaurs (supra) during the course of arguments, the following substantial question of law was found to have arisen in the present regular second appeal. As to whether the suit filed by the plaintiff on October 12, 1985 could be treated to be beyond limitation in view of the legal notice Ex. P1 served by the plaintiff on March 29, 1982? 10. Shri Lokesh Sinhal. learned Counsel for the defendant appellant has vehemently argued that since in the notice Ex.P1 dated March 29, 1982, the plaintiff himself had admitted that the revenue entry stood corrected, therefore, the limitation for filing the civil suit had accrued to the plaintiff on the aforesaid date. P1 served by the plaintiff on March 29, 1982? 10. Shri Lokesh Sinhal. learned Counsel for the defendant appellant has vehemently argued that since in the notice Ex.P1 dated March 29, 1982, the plaintiff himself had admitted that the revenue entry stood corrected, therefore, the limitation for filing the civil suit had accrued to the plaintiff on the aforesaid date. On that basis, it has been pointed out that the present suit has been filed on October 12, 1985 and, therefore, having been filed beyond the period of three years from the date of service of the notice, the suit was barred by limitation. . 11. On the other hand, Shri A.P. Bhandari, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has, with equal vehemence, argued that the defendant could not take up the plea of limitation inasmuch as the legal notice Ex.P1 could not be taken to be starting point of limitation. Shri Bhandari has pointed out that the defendant himseif appeared as DW1 and in his cross examination had admitted that the suit land was still shown to be under attachment for a decree in favour of Prem Parkash for a sum of Rs. 5,000/-. The defendant has further admitted that he had not got the entry of attachment removed from the revenue record. Shri Bhandari has relied upon Ex.P5 Jarnabandi for the year 1982-83 which clearly showed that the entry regarding the attachment of the suit land still subsisted and the aforesaid copy of the jamabandi had been obtained on July 18, 1985. 12. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties. 13. No doubt in the notice Ex, P1 sent-by the plaintiff on March 29, 1982, it was stated by him that the .revenue entry qua the attachment had been got corrected by the defendant and, therefore, he was called upon by the plaintiff to get the sale deed executed and for that purpose had requested to execute the sale deed on April, 16, 1982. However, the plaintiff served subsequent legal notice on July 20, 1985. However, the plaintiff served subsequent legal notice on July 20, 1985. The aforesaid fact was clarified and it was noticed that the entry qua the attachment of the land still subsisted, In his statement, Hukam Chand defendant clearly admitted during his cross examination that the suit land was still shown to be under attachment under the decree in favour Prem Parkash and further that he had not taken any steps for getting the entry corrected in the revenue record. Further copy of Jamabandi for the year, 1982-93 Ex P5 is a clincher which shows that the entry qua the attachment of the suit land still subsisted. It was duly noticed by the learned first appellate Court that the copy of the Jamabandi had been obtained on July 18, 1985. In these circumstances, when there was specific stipulation in the agreement itself that the sale deed was to be executed within one month of the correction of the revenue record, then obviously the limitation for the filing of the suit cannot be taken to have commenced. In these circumstances, the suit filed by the plaintiff on October 12, 1985 could not have been taken to be barred by limitation. 14. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the substantial question of law raised by the defendant appellant has to be answered against him. 15. No other point has been urged. 16. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the present appeal being deviate of any merit is dismissed.