Research › Search › Judgment

Bombay High Court · body

2005 DIGILAW 13 (BOM)

JAMSHED N. GUZDAR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

2005-01-11

B.N.SRIKRISHNA, G.P.MATHUR, K.G.BALAKRISHNAN, R.C.LAHOTI, S.V.PATIL

body2005
Judgment SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, J. ( 1 ) THE constitutional validity of the Bombay city Civil Court and Bombay Court of Small Causes (Enhancement of Pecuniary jurisdiction and Amendment) Act, 1986 (Maharashtra Act 15 of 1987) (for short "the 1987 Act"), which received assent of the President on 4-5-1987, the maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1986 (Maharashtra Act 17 of 1986) (for short "the 1986 Act"), which received the assent of the President on 28-2-1986, and the correctness of the Full Bench decision of the High Court of Madhya pradesh striking down the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Letters Patent Appeals Samapti) Adhiniyam, 1981 (for short "the Adhiniyam") abolishing letters patent appeals as invalid are under challenge in these matters. Civil Appeal No. 2452 of 1992 ( 2 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order of the Division Bench of the high Court of Maharashtra made in Writ Petition No. 738 of 1992. The appellant herein filed writ petition by way of public interest litigation questioning the constitutional validity of the 1987 Act. In addition to challenging the constitutional validity of the aforementioned Act, he also sought, for declaration that the notification dated 20-8-1991 issued by the State of Maharashtra as illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 19 (l) (g) of the Constitution of india. The High Court, after dealing with the rival contentions, dismissed the writ petition by the impugned judgment upholding the validity of the 1987 Act and deferring the implementation of the notification dated 20-8-1991 till 2-10-1992. After the impugned judgment was delivered, the appellant orally sought for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 132 (1) read with Article 134-A of the Constitution of India. This appeal is by certificate granted by the High Court under Article 132 (1) read with Article 134 of the Constitution of India. ( 3 ) ALTHOUGH the 1987 Act received the Presidential assent on 4-5-1987, it was not implemented for over four years between 4-5-1987 to 20-8-1991 for want of infrastructure and other requirements at the Bombay City Civil Court. The High Court of Bombay had indicated to the Government that before the said act could be brought into force, the City Civil Court should be adequately equipped to handle the transfer of jurisdiction. The High Court of Bombay had indicated to the Government that before the said act could be brought into force, the City Civil Court should be adequately equipped to handle the transfer of jurisdiction. The High Court in 1988 had categorically stipulated that minimum 110 Judges would be necessary as a precondition for the transfer of jurisdiction to the City Civil Court for the implementation of the said Act. The High Court had indicated the requirements such as requisite number of Court halls, Judges, chambers, residences, books and staff, etc. It appears there were several representations both for and against the implementation of the Act. On 20-8-1991, the State of Maharashtra issued the notification to bring the 1987 Act into force with effect from 1-5-1992. Contending that there was no necessary infrastructure and other requirements were not satisfied to take care of the transfer of jurisdiction to deal with the cases and that there was no legislative competence for passing such Act by the legislature of the State of Maharashtra, Writ Petition No. 738 of 1992 was filed, as already indicated above, challenging the constitutional validity of the 1987 Act as well as the aforementioned notification of 20-8-1991 bringing the 1987 Act into force with effect from 1-5-1992. On 15-4-1992, rule was issued and permission was given for intervention among others to the Bombay Bar association, the Bombay Incorporated Law Society, the Indian Merchants' chamber and the Bombay City Civil and Sessions Court Bar Association. After hearing the arguments at considerable length and dealing with the rival contentions, the Division Bench of the High Court passed the impugned judgment on 29-4-1992 in terms already mentioned in the beginning of this judgment. Civil Appeals Nos. 2592 and 2530 of 1992 ( 4 ) THESE two appeals are filed by the Bombay City Civil and Sessions court Bar Association and the State of Maharashtra respectively aggrieved by the second part of the judgment dated 29-4-1992 passed in Writ Petition No. 738 of 1992 i. e. deferring the implementation of the notification dated 20-8-1991. TCs Nos. 8-11 of 1989 ( 5 ) A Writ Petition No. 1953 of 1987 was filed by one Jaimini B. Chinai challenging the constitutional validity of the 1986 Act. TCs Nos. 8-11 of 1989 ( 5 ) A Writ Petition No. 1953 of 1987 was filed by one Jaimini B. Chinai challenging the constitutional validity of the 1986 Act. While issuing rule, the high Court stayed the implementation of the said Act observing that certain questions raised in the writ petition were of substantial nature having far- reaching consequences and were of public importance. The State of Maharashtra filed a Transfer Petition No. 685 of 1988 in this Court seeking transfer of the said writ Petition No. 1953 of 1987 to this Court. This Court, by order dated 24-3- 1988, ordered for transferring the said petition to be heard along with Civil appeals Nos. 1222-24 of 1985 filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh against the full Bench judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court which held the adhiniyam to be unconstitutional as they involved identical issues of legislative competence. ( 6 ) SOME other writ petitions were filed in the High Court seeking declaration that the 1986 Act i. e. the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1986 (Act 17 of 1986) is ultra vires the Constitution and null and void in law. Transfer petitions Nos. 685-88 of 1989 were filed before this Court seeking transfer of writ petitions to this Court. This Court passed order withdrawing the writ petitions which were pending in the High Court of Bombay for being heard along with Civil Appeals Nos. 1222-24 of 1985 filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh. These transfer petitions were numbered as Transfer Case (C) Nos. 8-11 of 1989. The grounds raised in the writ petitions to challenge the constitutional validity of the 1986 Act are that the said Act is beyond the competence of the State legislature and is also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; in the statement of Objects and Reasons, it is stated that the 1986 Act is on the lines of the Adhiniyam. The Adhiniyam had been declared ultra vires and beyond the competence of the State Legislature by a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High court in the case of Balkrishna Das vs. Perfect Pottery Co. The Adhiniyam had been declared ultra vires and beyond the competence of the State Legislature by a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High court in the case of Balkrishna Das vs. Perfect Pottery Co. Ltd. , Jabalpur and others, 1985 MPLJ 32 (FB) = AIR 1985 MP 42 ; the 1986 Act which deals with the organisation and general jurisdiction of High Court is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature having regard to Entries 77 and 78 of List 1, entry 11-A of List III, Entry 95 of List I, Entry 65 of List III and Entry 46 of List iii and the 1986 Act is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the constitution of India. Further that a right of appeal is a substantial right and one appeal on facts and law is a necessary ingredient of the system of justice. Moreover, abolition of letters patent appeals denies the litigants, on the original side of the High Court, the benefit of appeals statutorily provided for under various Central statutes such as the Contempt of Courts Act, the Companies Act, the Arbitration Act, etc. Civil Appeals Nos. 1222-24 of 1985 ( 7 ) THESE appeals are filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh questioning the validity and correctness of the impugned judgment dated 27-8-1984, [1985 m. P. L. J. 32 (FB)] passed by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. ( 8 ) COMPANY Petition No. 5 of 1983 was filed by respondents 4-17 under sections 397-398 of the Companies Act, 1956. The Company Judge substantially dismissed the said company petition. However, the learned Judge granted relief under section 398 (1) (b) by directing proportionate representation on the Board of directors. Three Company Appeals Nos. 4, 5 and 7 of 1983 were filed, aggrieved by the order made in the company petition. In view of the provisions of the adhiniyam abolishing Letters Patent Appeals in the High Court, respondent 2 filed slp (C) No. 16066 of 1983 against the aforementioned decision of the Company judge. Later, the said SLP was withdrawn. The Division Bench of the High Court referred the question of maintainability of appeals to the Full Bench in view of the provisions of the Adhiniyam abolishing Letters Patent Appeals. Earlier, a division Bench had upheld the validity of the Adhiniyam. Later, the said SLP was withdrawn. The Division Bench of the High Court referred the question of maintainability of appeals to the Full Bench in view of the provisions of the Adhiniyam abolishing Letters Patent Appeals. Earlier, a division Bench had upheld the validity of the Adhiniyam. The Full Bench of the high Court, by a majority of 2 : 1 declared the Adhiniyam to be ultra vires the constitution by its judgment dated 27-8-1984. Hence, the State of Madhya pradesh is in appeal before this Court challenging the validity and correctness of the impugned judgment passed by the Full Bench of the High Court. ( 9 ) IT may be stated here itself, in all these matters, the principal question that arises for consideration relate to the legislative competence of the State legislatures of Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh in passing the enactments. Further, in Civil Appeal No. 2452 of 1992, in addition to challenging the constitutional validity of the 1987 Act, it is contended that even if the validity of the Act is upheld for want of infrastructure and necessary facilities, it cannot be brought into force unless the State Government satisfies that there are sufficient number of Court halls and other infrastructure mentioned including the requisite number of Judges available to discharge their functions in the City Civil Court. ( 10 ) THE contention of Mr. T. R. Andhyarujina, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 2452 of 1992 and Transferred Cases (C) Nos. 8-11 of 1989 was that the 1987 Act affected the "constitution and organisation of the High Court" by abolishing original civil jurisdiction of the High Court and as such it was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature because such a legislation is within the exclusive legislative competence of Parliament under Entry 78 List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. In his submissions on this point, he traced the history of working of High Court and city Civil Court and letters patent jurisdiction of High Court. In support of his submissions, he cited a few decisions. In his submissions on this point, he traced the history of working of High Court and city Civil Court and letters patent jurisdiction of High Court. In support of his submissions, he cited a few decisions. Alternatively, he urged that even if the 1987 Act was intra vires having regard to lack of infrastructure including requisite Judges in City Civil Court it was an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of statutory power vested in the Government to bring into operation the 1987 Act and hence the government notification dated 20-8-1991 bringing into operation the 1987 Act was illegal. He also added that the said notification was issued by the Government under pressure for collateral and extraneous reasons only to appease a section of agitating lawyers who went on hunger strike, etc. Elaborating his submission on point No. 1, he submitted that it is only the parliament which has the exclusive legislative competence under Entry 78 of List i to make a law relating to "the constitution and organisation of the High Courts". The State Legislature has, however, the concurrent legislative powers to legislate in respect of the constitution and organisation of all Courts excepting the supreme Court and the High Courts as per Entry 11-A of List III; prior to 3-1-1977, the State had exclusive legislative competence to constitute and organise courts other than the Supreme Court and the High Courts under Entry 3 of List II which was amended to transfer it to Entry 11-A in List III by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the general jurisdiction of a Civil Court as opposed to its special jurisdiction in respect of a particular subject-matter relates to the constitution of a Court and flows from the very Act constituting it. Thus, the general jurisdiction of the High court is the subject covered by Entry 78 of List I falling within the exclusive legislative competence of Parliament. On the other hand, the general jurisdiction of a Court other than the Supreme Court and the High Court is a subject that was under Entry 3 of List II prior to the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. On the other hand, the general jurisdiction of a Court other than the Supreme Court and the High Court is a subject that was under Entry 3 of List II prior to the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. He also contended that the State Legislature has also the legislative competence to make laws conferring special jurisdiction on Courts or taking away such special jurisdiction from Courts in respect of subjects in Lists II and iii by virtue of Entry 65 or Entry 46 respectively; this, however, is not general jurisdiction of Court arising from its constitution. He cited the decision of State of Bombay vs. Narothamdas Jethabhai and another, 1951 SCR 51 to show how the scheme relating to jurisdiction of Court was explained. ( 11 ) THE learned Senior Counsel also urged that "constitution" of a Court of law necessarily includes its general jurisdiction. No Court can be constituted without jurisdiction; jurisdiction and constitution of a Court are inseparable; otherwise it would be an ineffective institution in name only; the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word "constitution" of a Court is sufficiently wide to include the jurisdiction of a Court. In common parlance also, if a Court is to be constituted, it must necessarily be constituted with its heart and soul, namely, its jurisdiction. Consequently, a law in its true content and purport relating to the jurisdiction of the High Court can only be made by Parliament. The 1987 Act abolishes the general civil jurisdiction of the High Court affecting its constitution, therefore, it was beyond the competence of the State Legislature inasmuch as the constitution and organisation of the High Courts is vested in the union Parliament. The learned Senior Counsel drew our attention to the scheme of the constitution of Courts under the Government of India Act, 1935 and submitted that the scheme under that Act relating to the constitution and organisation of the High Courts was different. The Provincial Legislature had the exclusive legislative competence to make law relating to the constitution and organisation of all Courts except the Federal Court (under Entry 2 of List II of the Provincial List ). Consequently, the Provincial Legislature had the legislative competence to constitute a Court including a High Court and to legislate in respect of its jurisdiction. The Provincial Legislature had the exclusive legislative competence to make law relating to the constitution and organisation of all Courts except the Federal Court (under Entry 2 of List II of the Provincial List ). Consequently, the Provincial Legislature had the legislative competence to constitute a Court including a High Court and to legislate in respect of its jurisdiction. This being the position, this Court in Narothamdas jethabhai (supra) upheld the validity of the Act as validly made under Entry 1 List II of the Government of India Act, 1935. He also drew our attention to certain passages in the case of Narothamdas Jethabhai (supra) relating to the word "constitution" of a Court. He stated that the words "constitution of Court" as explained in Narothamdas Jethabhai (supra) was followed in a subsequent judgment of this Court in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee representing undertrial Prisoners vs. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 731 . Thus, according to him, Parliament alone could make law abolishing the general original civil jurisdiction of an existing High Court as it directly and substantially related to its constitution which is a subject falling in exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament under Entry 78 of List I of the Constitution. He took pains to explain as to the scope and ambit of different entries in the three lists touching the subject in,, controversy and reason for the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act of 197,6 in relation to Entry 3 of List II as amended and creating a new Entry 11-A in List III. According to him the change was brought about deliberately so that parliament alone should be given the power under the scheme of the Constitution to make legislation which substantially affected the constitution and organisation of the higher judiciary. According to him, several other provisions of the constitution also support this view. For instance, Article 230 read with Entry 79 of List I gives Parliament the exclusive competence to deal with "extension of the jurisdiction of a-High Court to and exclusion of jurisdiction of a High Court from, in Union Territory". He also referred to Articles 216, 217, 221, 222, 223 and 224 to show that the President of India and the Government of India alone have powers in respect of the matters stated in those articles to secure a unified higher judiciary in matters provided in these articles. He also referred to Articles 216, 217, 221, 222, 223 and 224 to show that the President of India and the Government of India alone have powers in respect of the matters stated in those articles to secure a unified higher judiciary in matters provided in these articles. ( 12 ) ALTHOUGH the 1987 Act on its face purports to state that it is only enhancing the general jurisdiction of the Bombay City Civil Court, in effect it abolishes the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay in entirety. The Government of India has taken the same stand as the appellant. In geetika Panwar vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others, (2002) 99 DLT 840 (FB) the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court has taken the view which supports the case of the appellant. Subsequently, accepting the position, Parliament has made a law in regard to the High Court of Delhi. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the 1987 Act cannot be held to be constitutionally valid even on the principle of pith and substance of the legislation. ( 13 ) ON ground No. 2, the learned Senior Counsel reiterated that for want of necessary infrastructure including the requisite number of Judges in the City civil Court, it was an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of statutory power vested in the Government to bring into operation the 1987 Act by issuing the impugned notification dated 20-8-1991. Facts and figures are also given in this regard relating to number of civil suits pending as on 31-12-2002 in the City civil Court even at the existing limits of pecuniary jurisdiction i. e. Rs. 50,000. According to him the City Civil Court has been unable to cope with the load of its existing criminal jurisdiction. The High Court also specifically stated that 110 judges were required for City Civil Court in addition to necessary infrastructure if the Act is to be brought into force. In the absence of infrastructure and the required number of Judges, Civil Court cannot cope with the workload and it cannot be functional. ( 14 ) THE learned Senior Counsel on ground No. 3 submitted that because of the agitation by a section of lawyers, the notification dated 20-8-1991 was issued out of pressure and other considerations which according to him cannot be sustained. ( 14 ) THE learned Senior Counsel on ground No. 3 submitted that because of the agitation by a section of lawyers, the notification dated 20-8-1991 was issued out of pressure and other considerations which according to him cannot be sustained. If it is allowed to stand, it will lead to difficulty and anomalous situation resulting in greater hardship to the litigants and even administration of justice will suffer. Instead of a speedy disposal, the cases may be pending considerably for a long time in City Civil Court. ( 15 ) MR. K. K. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Bombay city Civil and Sessions Court Bar Association, made submissions supporting the impugned judgment upholding the constitutional validity of the 1987 Act. According to him, Entry 77 in List I deals with the constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court. Entry 78 deals with only constitution and organisation of the High Courts and not with jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts. Jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts are dealt with as a separate topic, namely, "administration of justice" under Entry 11-A of the Concurrent List which was originally in Entry 3 of the State List. According to him, the general jurisdiction of the High Courts thus falls under "administration of justice" covered by Entry 11-A in the Concurrent List. He further submitted that Entry 95 of the Union List, Entry 65 of the State List and entry 46 of the Concurrent List refer to special jurisdiction of Courts with respect to the matters contained in the respective lists. Entry 95 of List I deals with the power of Parliament to confer jurisdiction and powers of all the Courts except the supreme Court with respect to any of the matters in List I. Entry 65 of List II deals with the power of the State Legislature to confer jurisdiction and powers of all the Courts excepting the Supreme Court with respect to the matters contained in the State List. Similarly Entry 46 in the Concurrent List deals with the power and jurisdiction of all the Courts excepting the Supreme Court with respect to all the matters contained in the Concurrent List. One of the items in the Concurrent list is the Civil Procedure Code under Entry 13. Similarly Entry 46 in the Concurrent List deals with the power and jurisdiction of all the Courts excepting the Supreme Court with respect to all the matters contained in the Concurrent List. One of the items in the Concurrent list is the Civil Procedure Code under Entry 13. ( 16 ) ACCORDING to him the State Legislature has the power and legislative competence to confer general jurisdiction on all the Courts except the Supreme court under Entry 11-A in the Concurrent List under the caption "administration of justice". Thus, passing of the 1987 Act was within the competence of the State legislature. The State Legislature was the sole repository of power to confer jurisdiction on all the Courts excepting the Supreme Court under Entry 3 of the state List prior to the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 and thereafter both Parliament as well as the State Legislature have power to confer general jurisdiction on all the Courts including the High Courts under Entry 11-A of the Concurrent List. The learned counsel submitted that the subject relating to constitution and organisation of High Courts does not include jurisdiction and powers of the High Court; it is only with reference to establishment or constitution of the High Court having regard to Articles 2, 3 and 4 and other relevant articles of the Constitution. He added that the expression "administration of justice" has a wide meaning and includes administration of civil as well as criminal justice and is a complete and self-contained entry. The words "administration of justice" are of the widest amplitude and are sufficient to confer upon the State Legislature the right to regulate and provide for entire machinery connected with the administration of justice in the State. The State legislature being an appropriate body to legislate in respect of the administration of justice and to invest all Courts within the State including the High Court with general jurisdiction and powers in all matters civil and criminal it must follow that it can invest the High Court with such general jurisdiction and powers including territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and also to take away such jurisdiction and powers from the High Court. Conferring unlimited jurisdiction on Civil Court or taking away the same from the High Court does not amount to dealing with the constitution and organisation of the High Court. Conferring unlimited jurisdiction on Civil Court or taking away the same from the High Court does not amount to dealing with the constitution and organisation of the High Court. Under Entry 11-A list III, the State Legislature was empowered to confer jurisdiction and powers upon all Courts within the State including the High Court. ( 17 ) ENTRY 46 of the Concurrent List deals with the special jurisdiction in respect of the matters in List III. One of the items in the said list at Serial No. 13 is the Civil Procedure Code on the commencement of the Constitution. The 1987 act deals with the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Courts as envisaged by sections 6 and 9 of the Civil Procedure Code and as such the State Legislature was competent to legislate under Entry 13 of List III. In support of his submission, the learned counsel relied on a few decisions. ( 18 ) MR. U. U. Lalit, learned Senior Counsel for the State of Maharashtra, while supporting the impugned judgment submitted that there is an anomaly created by, or deficiency found in section 3 of the 1986 Act inasmuch as section 3 of the said Act read with section 9 of the 1987 Act fails to make any provision for appeal against a decree or order passed after the commencement of the Act in any suit or other proceedings pending in the High Court since before the commencement of the Act. He sought ten days' time to have instructions from the State of Maharashtra in this regard. Thereafter, on the basis of Letter no. He sought ten days' time to have instructions from the State of Maharashtra in this regard. Thereafter, on the basis of Letter no. 37-PF 2131097 dated 17-12-2004 of the Principal Secretary and RLA, State of Maharashtra, IA No. 10 is filed seeking permission to place on record the said letter indicating the willingness of the State of Maharashtra to take necessary steps to make legislative amendment to section 3 of Maharashtra Act 17 of 1986, relevant portions of which read : "with reference to the above subject, I have to state that you are hereby given instructions to make a statement before the Hon'ble Supreme court that the State of Maharashtra will take necessary steps to make legislative amendment to section 3 (1) of Maharashtra Act 17 of 1986 [the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeal) Act, 1986] to make a provision for appeal against the judgment, order and decree passed on the appointed date by the High Court and thereafter as may be indicated in the judgment of the Supreme Court. " ( 19 ) MR. Mohan Parasaran, Additional Solicitor General, urged that being conscious of the importance of the institutions of the Supreme Court and the high Courts the Constitution did not confer any power on the State Legislature to legislate or tinker with their jurisdiction; therefore, law passed by the State legislature concerning the jurisdiction of the High Courts having wider ramifications affecting or taking away other jurisdictions already vested in the high Courts would be ultra vires of the State Legislature; the powers in this regard lie only with Parliament; the expression "administration of justice" has to be so construed so as to exclude the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the high Courts from its purview. ( 20 ) DR. N. M. Ghatate, learned Senior Counsel for the State of Madhya pradesh (appellant in CAs Nos. 1222-24 of 1985) made additional submissions supporting the constitutional validity of the Adhiniyam. He contended that the view taken by the Bombay High Court in upholding the constitutional validity of the 1987 Act is correct. Provisions of the 1986 Act being similar to the adhiniyam, constitutional validity of the Adhiniyam may be upheld and the Full bench judgment of the High Court may be reversed. He contended that the view taken by the Bombay High Court in upholding the constitutional validity of the 1987 Act is correct. Provisions of the 1986 Act being similar to the adhiniyam, constitutional validity of the Adhiniyam may be upheld and the Full bench judgment of the High Court may be reversed. ( 21 ) WE have carefully considered the rival contentions advanced on behalf of the parties and the Additional Solicitor General. ( 22 ) THE British Parliament passed the Indian High Courts Act, 1861 empowering "her Majesty" to erect and establish a High Court of Judicature at bombay by way of Letters Patent (section 1 ). Section 9 of the Act provided that the High Courts to be established under that Act shall have and exercise inter alia, civil jurisdiction, original, appellate and all such powers and authority for and in relation to the administration of justice as Her Majesty may by such letters Patent grant and direct subject to some limitations. ( 23 ) BY virtue of the abovesaid Act, a Letters Patent was issued on 26-6-1862 establishing the High Court in the Presidency of Bombay. Clause 12 of the said Letters Patent conferred ordinary original civil jurisdiction on the High court. The Bombay High Court has been exercising original jurisdiction within the limits of Greater Bombay. ( 24 ) IT is necessary to give certain background facts relating to the Bombay city Civil Court Act, 1948 (for short "the 1948 Act" ). The 1948was passed by the Provincial Legislature of Bombay on 10-5-1948 with a view to "establishing an additional Civil Court for Greater Bombay". The said Act came into force on 16-8-1948. At about the same time the Bombay Legislature also passed the Letters Patent (Amendment) Act, 1948 (Act 41 of 1948) amending clause 12 to exclude the original jurisdiction of the High Court as regards cases which fall within the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court and City Civil courts. The relevant provisions of the 1948 Act are set out below : "1. (D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) It shall come into force on such date as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint in this behalf. 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) It shall come into force on such date as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint in this behalf. 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. The State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, establish for Greater Bombay a Court, to be called the Bombay City civil Court. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, such Court shall have jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature not exceeding fifty thousand rupees in value, and arising within Greater Bombay, except suits or proceedings which are cognizable (a) by the High Court as a Court of Admiralty or Vice-Admiralty or as a Colonial Court of Admiralty, or as a Court having testamentary, intestate or matrimonial jurisdiction, or (b) by the High Court for the relief of insolvent debtors, or (c) by the High Court under any special law other than the Letters patent; or (d) by the Small Cause Court: provided that the State Government may, from time to time, after consultation with the High Court, by a like notification extend the jurisdiction of the City Court to any suits or proceedings which are cognizable by the High Court as a Court having testamentary or intestate jurisdiction or for the relief of insolvent debtors. 4. [power of State Government to enhance jurisdiction of City Court. ] deleted by Maharashtra Act 46 of 1977, section 3. xxx xxx xxx xxx 12. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, the High Court shall not have jurisdiction to try suits and proceedings cognizable by the City court: provided that the High Court may, for any special reason, and at any stage remove for trial by itself any suit or proceeding from the City court. " ( 25 ) BY section 3 of the Letters Patent (Amendment) Act, 1948, clause 12 of the Letters Patent was amended. The amended portion reads : ". . " ( 25 ) BY section 3 of the Letters Patent (Amendment) Act, 1948, clause 12 of the Letters Patent was amended. The amended portion reads : ". . the High Court shall not have such original jurisdiction in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court at Bombay or the bombay City Civil Court. " ( 26 ) UNDER section 4 of the 1948 Act, power was conferred on the provincial Government to enhance pecuniary jurisdiction not exceeding Rs. 25,000 by issuing notification in that behalf. The validity of the 1948 Act was questioned before the Bombay High Court in the case of Mulchand Kundanmal jagtiani vs. Raman Hiralal Shah, AIR 1949 Bom. 197. The Division Bench of the high Court upheld the validity of the Act. Thereafter on 28-1-1950, the provincial Government issued a notification under section 4 of the 1948 Act enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court not exceeding rs. 25,000. ( 27 ) EXERCISING power under section 4 of the 1948 Act, the Provincial government of Bombay issued Notification No. 2346/50 which reads : "in exercise of the powers conferred by section 4 of the Bombay City civil Court Act, 1948 (Act 40 of 1948) the Government of Bombay is pleased to invest with effect from and on the date of this notification, the city Civil Court with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of suits and other proceedings of a civil nature not exceeding twenty-five thousand rupees in the value and arising within Greater Bombay subject however to the exceptions specified in section 3 of the said Act. " ( 28 ) THE Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Narottamdas jethabhai vs. Aloysious Pinto Phillips, AIR 1951 Bom. 180 declared the said aforesaid notification issued under section 4 as ultra vires the Provincial legislature. This Court in appeal in State of Bombay vs. Narottamdas Jethabhai (supra) upset the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court and upheld the validity of the notification enhancing the jurisdiction to Rs. 25,000 rejecting the contention that the 1948 Act itself was ultra vires the Provincial legislature by reason of it being an encroachment upon the field of legislation reserved for the Centre under the Government of India Act, 1935. 25,000 rejecting the contention that the 1948 Act itself was ultra vires the Provincial legislature by reason of it being an encroachment upon the field of legislation reserved for the Centre under the Government of India Act, 1935. The maharashtra Civil Court (Enhancement of Pecuniary Jurisdiction and amendment) Act, 1977 (Act 46 of 1977) was passed whereby the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court was enhanced from Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 50,000. The same was not challenged. The 1987 Act was enacted whereby unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction came to be conferred upon the City Civil Court and the State government was empowered to issue a notification for implementation of the said Act. The High Court of Bombay dismissed Writ Petition No. 738 of 1992 filed by the present appellant in CA No. 2452 of 1992 having regard to various aspects and in particular relying on the decision of this Court in Narottamdas (supra ). It may be noted that the validity of the 1948 Act was upheld by the division Bench of the High Court of Bombay as early as in 1949. Notification issued enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 25,000 was upheld by this Court reversing the judgment of the bombay High Court in Narottamdas (supra ). Further, by Act 46 of 1977, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court was enhanced from Rs. 25,000 to rs. 50,000, the validity of which was not challenged. Thus, from time to time, the pecuniary jurisdiction of City Civil Court was enhanced. Such enhancement of jurisdiction was either challenged unsuccessfully or not challenged. In particular, it may be kept in mind that the very contention which is sought to be advanced now had been advanced before this Court in Narottamdas (supra) which was rejected. On earlier occasions enhancement of pecuniary jurisdiction of City Civil Court was upheld. By the 1987 Act the pecuniary jurisdiction of city Civil Court was further enhanced from Rs. 50,000 to unlimited value. The high Court of Bombay was established in 1862 in the Presidency Town of bombay having civil as well as criminal jurisdiction under the Letters Patent. In 1948, the criminal jurisdiction of the High Court was taken away and vested in the Sessions Court. The Bombay High Courtwas having original pecuniary jurisdiction above Rs. 50,000 till the 1987 Act came into force. In 1948, the criminal jurisdiction of the High Court was taken away and vested in the Sessions Court. The Bombay High Courtwas having original pecuniary jurisdiction above Rs. 50,000 till the 1987 Act came into force. The High Court will continue to have even after implementation of the 1987 Act the original jurisdiction in admiralty, testamentary, insolvency and company jurisdiction apart from its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. ( 29 ) IN the State of Maharashtra as far as the lower judiciary is concerned, the original civil jurisdiction is vested in (a) Civil Judge, Junior Division, and (b) civil Judge, Senior Division. Civil Judges, Senior Division, are appointed for almost all the towns and cities in Maharashtra State excluding Greater Bombay. They have unlimited jurisdiction. The Civil Judges, Junior Division, have got pecuniary jurisdiction upto Rs. 25,000. The District Courts are having appellate jurisdiction up to Rs. 50,000 and beyond Rs. 50,000, an appeal is provided to the high Court. Civil Judges, Senior Division, in cities like Thane, Pune, Nagpur, nasik, Aurangabad, etc. are having unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction. Only the city Civil Court which has been established for Greater Bombay was having limited jurisdiction upto Rs. 50,000 and under the 1987 Act, the disparity has been removed by conferring unlimited jurisdiction on City Civil Court like its counterparts in other cities and towns. Similarly, the jurisdiction of the Small cause Court is enhanced from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 25,000 like Civil Judge, Junior division in other cities. The 1987 Act is prospective. Therefore, all the suits filed prior to the implementation of it shall continue to remain with High Court. ( 30 ) BY Maharashtra Act 46 of 1977, the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court was raised to Rs. 50,000 in value arising within Greater Bombay. By the 1987 act, section 3 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948 was amended deleting the words "not exceeding Rs. 50,000 in value". As a result of the same, the City civil Court could exercise unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction. Although the 1987 act was passed in 1987, the State Government did not issue notification to enforce it till 20-8-1991 appointing 1-5-1992 to be the date on which the provisions of the 1987 Act shall come into force. 50,000 in value". As a result of the same, the City civil Court could exercise unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction. Although the 1987 act was passed in 1987, the State Government did not issue notification to enforce it till 20-8-1991 appointing 1-5-1992 to be the date on which the provisions of the 1987 Act shall come into force. By virtue of the said notification, all suits and other proceedings of civil nature arising within Greater bombay subject to exceptions contained in section 3 were required to be filed in the City Civil Court at Bombay. This resulted in the position that suits and other civil proceedings of civil nature filed in the High Court under clause 12 of the letters Patent would not be received and tried on the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. In Transferred Cases (C) Nos. 8-11 of 1989, constitutional validity of the 1986 Act i. e. "maharashtra High Court (Hearing of writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1986" was challenged as being beyond the competence of the State Legislature and also violative of Article 19 of the Constitution. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons to this Act, it is clearly stated that the Act is "on the lines of the madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Letters Patent Appeals Samapti) adhiniyam, 1981". Under clause 15, except in certain cases specified in the said clause, appeals lie from judgment of a Single Judge to a Division Bench of the high Court. By the notification dated 27-5-1987, 1-7-1987 was notified as appointed day from which the 1986 Act would come into force. The 1986 Act was enacted considering it expedient to provide for hearing of writ petitions by the Division Bench and for abolition of Letters Patent Appeals in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. Section 3 of the 1986 Act reads : "3. The 1986 Act was enacted considering it expedient to provide for hearing of writ petitions by the Division Bench and for abolition of Letters Patent Appeals in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. Section 3 of the 1986 Act reads : "3. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent for the high Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated 28-12-1865 and in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, no appeal, arising from a suit or other proceeding (including the applications referred to in section 2) instituted or commenced, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall lie to the High Court from a judgment, decree or order of a Single Judge of the High Court made on or after the commencement of this Act, whether in the exercise of the original or appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), all such appeals pending before the High Court, on the date immediately preceding the date of commencement of this Act, shall be continued and disposed of by that Court, as if this Act had not been passed. " ( 31 ) BY virtue of section 3, appeals from orders of Single Judge to Division bench from original or appellate jurisdiction were abolished. In this regard, the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners were that the provisions of the act are arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution; provisions contained in the 1986 Act are beyond the legislative competence of the State legislature; that a right of appeal is a substantive right and one appeal on facts of law is a necessary ingredient of a system of justice; one appeal is provided in various State or Central enactments; in case even one appeal is not provided, it would result in serious consequences leading to unreasonable denial of justice. ( 32 ) PER contra, the learned counsel for the respondents urged that right of appeal is not a substantive right; merely because appeal is not provided, an enactment otherwise having legislative competence cannot be rendered invalid; right of appeal is a statutory right which may or may not be provided by a statute. In another words, it is not a constitutional right. In another words, it is not a constitutional right. ( 33 ) PARA 4 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 1987 Act reads : "4. After having sufficient experience of the working of the various courts in the State and having regard to the increase in the value of property, and in the trading and commercial activities, in all urban areas, government considers that the administration of justice in Greater bombay as well as in the mofussil should now follow a uniform pattern. There appears no reason why every litigant in Greater Bombay, whose suit or other proceeding is above a certain pecuniary limit, should be made to go to the High Court in the first instance. The High Court, as in most other States in India, should ordinarily be a Court of Appeal, and the time of its highly paid and specialised Judges should not be consumed in hearing original cases, some of which may be of a small value compared with the enormous increase in the value of property or may be of an unimportant nature. " ( 34 ) IN the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 1986 Act, inter alia, it is stated thus : "2. . . . . THE second part is really in the nature of an exception to the first, inasmuch as it provided, by way of relaxation, appeals under the above clause even in cases of second appeals, provided the Judge concerned declares or certifies that the case is fit one for appeal. The appeal provided by way of exception in the second part of the clause has now been barred by section 100-A inserted in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by Central Act 104 of 1976 and there is as such no further right of appeal against the decision of a Single Judge in second appeal with certificate of fitness. But in view of mounting arrears in the High Court, to discourage further litigation in the same Court and to give finality to the decision of the High Court, even though given by a Single Judge, it is necessary to abolish appeals in the same Court from judgments or orders of a Single Judge, whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, on the lines of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Letters Patent appeals Samapti) Adhiniyam, 1981 (M. P. Act 29 of 1981) enacted in madhya Pradesh. " ( 35 ) IN relation to entry in List I relating to constitution and organisation of the Supreme Court and High Courts, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar in the Constitutional debate stated thus : "i do not wish to interrupt the debate, but I would like to point out that we have already passed Articles 295-A, 193, 197, 201 and 207 which deal with the constitution of the High Courts. Under those articles, except for pecuniary jurisdiction, the whole of the High Courts are placed, so far as their constitution, organisation and territorial jurisdiction are concerned, in the Centre. It seems to me, therefore, that this amendment is out of order. " ( 36 ) IN considering the legislative competence of Maharashtra State in enacting the 1987 Act and the 1986 Act primarily we have to look to the relevant entries in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution : list I Union List "77. Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme court (including contempt of such Court), and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court. 78. Constitution and organisation (including vacations) of the High courts except provisions as to officers and servants of High Courts; persons entitled to practise before the High Courts. 79. Extension of the jurisdiction of a High Court to, and exclusion of the jurisdiction of a High Court from, any Union Territory. " "95. Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List; admiralty jurisdiction. "list II State List "3. Administration of justice; constitution and organisation of all Courts, except the Supreme Court and High Courts;. . (prior to 3-1-1977) 65. Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List. "list III Concurrent List "11-A. Administration of justice; constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Supreme Court and High Courts. 13. Civil procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Civil procedure at the commencement of this Constitution, limitation and arbitration. 46. Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List. " ( 37 ) AS is clear from the entries extracted above, Entry 77 in List I deals with the constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court. 46. Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List. " ( 37 ) AS is clear from the entries extracted above, Entry 77 in List I deals with the constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court. Entry 78 relates to only constitution and organisation of the High Courts and not with the jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts unlike in Entry 77 dealing with the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court in addition to constitution and organisation. Jurisdiction and powers of High Court are dealt with as a separate topic under Entry 11-A of List III, which was in Entry 3 of List II prior to the Forty-second Constitution Amendment Act. The general jurisdiction of the high Courts falls in "administration of justice" i. e. under Entry 11-A in the concurrent List. Entry 95 of the Union List, Entry 65 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List refer to special jurisdictions of the Courts relating to the matters contained in the respective lists. Entry 95 deals with the power of parliament to confer jurisdiction and powers of all the Courts except the Supreme court with respect to any of the matters in List I. Similarly, Entry 65 of List II deals with the power of the State Legislature to confer jurisdiction and powers on all the Courts except the Supreme Court with respect to the matters contained in the said list. Entry 46 in the Concurrent List refers to the power and jurisdiction of all the Courts except the Supreme Court with respect to all the matters contained in the Concurrent List. It may be noted here that one of the items in the concurrent List is the Civil Procedure Code under Entry 13. ( 38 ) IN our view, the State Legislature has power to confer general jurisdiction on all the Courts except the Supreme Court under Entry 11-A in the concurrent List falling within the meaning of "administration of justice. " Hence, the 1987 Act is within the competence of the State Legislature in the light of the discussion and reasons to follow. " Hence, the 1987 Act is within the competence of the State Legislature in the light of the discussion and reasons to follow. ( 39 ) THE State Legislature was the sole repository of power to confer jurisdiction on all the Courts except the Supreme Court and High Court under entry 3 of the State List prior to the Forty-second Amendment Act of 1976 and thereafter Parliament as well as the State Legislatures have power to confer general jurisdiction on all the Courts including the High Courts under Entry 11-A of the Concurrent List. Entry 46 of the Concurrent List deals with the special jurisdiction in respect of the matters in the Concurrent List. One of the matters in the Concurrent List is the Civil Procedure Code. The combined reading of Entry 11-A, Entry 13 and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List makes the position clear that the 1987 Act is not beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature when it deals with pecuniary jurisdiction of Civil Courts. ( 40 ) FROM careful reading of Entries 77 and 78 of the Union List it is clear that Entry 77 not only deals with the "constitution" and "organisation" but also with "jurisdiction" and "powers" in respect of the Supreme Court falling within the exclusive domain of Parliament. Entry 11-A in the Concurrent List deals with the "administration of justice" in all the Courts and the "constitution and organisation" of all Courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Thus, it is clear that Parliament is the sole repository of powers as far as the "constitution", "organisation", "jurisdiction" and "powers" of the Supreme Court is concerned. Conscious omissions of the words "jurisdiction" and "powers" in entry 78, looking to the said words included in Entry 77, it is clear that the "jurisdiction" and "powers" of the High Courts are dealt with as a separate topic under the caption "administration of justice" under Entry 11-A of the Concurrent list. The exclusion of "jurisdiction" and "powers" from Entry 78 appears to be meaningful and intended to serve a definite purpose in relation to bifurcation or division of legislative powers relating to conferment of general jurisdiction of high Courts. The exclusion of "jurisdiction" and "powers" from Entry 78 appears to be meaningful and intended to serve a definite purpose in relation to bifurcation or division of legislative powers relating to conferment of general jurisdiction of high Courts. ( 41 ) ENTRIES 77 and 78 of the Union List deal with "constitution" and "organisation" of the Supreme Court and the High Courts because after coming into force of the Constitution, the Supreme Court was required to be set up and so also the High Courts were required to be established and/or reconstituted. The expressions "constitution" and "organisation" of the High Courts in Entry 78 are referable to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Constitution. Article 2 empowers parliament to admit into the Union or establish new States, Article 3 deals with the formation of new States and alterations of areas, boundaries or names of the existing States and Article 4 provides that laws made under Articles 2 and 3 may provide for amendment of the First and Fourth Schedules and supplemental, incidental and consequential matters. The words "constitution" and "organisation" have their own meaning as against the expressions "jurisdiction" and "powers", but in the scheme of the Constitution the subject "constitution" and "organisation" of the Supreme Court and High Courts rests with the Union. ( 42 ) THE general jurisdiction of the High Courts is dealt with in Entry 11-A under the caption "administration of justice", which has a wide meaning and includes administration of civil as well as criminal justice. The expression "administration of justice" has been used without any qualification or limitation wide enough to include the "powers" and "jurisdiction" of all the Courts except the Supreme Court. The semicolon (;) after the words "administration of justice" in Entry 11 -A has significance and meaning. The other words in the same entry after "administration of justice" only speak in relation to "constitution" and "organisation" of all the Courts except the Supreme Court and High Courts. It follows that under Entry 11-A the State Legislature has no power to constitute and organise the Supreme Court and High Courts. It is an accepted principle of construction of a Constitution that everything necessary for the exercise of powers is included in the grant of power. It follows that under Entry 11-A the State Legislature has no power to constitute and organise the Supreme Court and High Courts. It is an accepted principle of construction of a Constitution that everything necessary for the exercise of powers is included in the grant of power. The State Legislature being an appropriate body to legislate in respect of "administration of justice" and to invest all Courts within the State including the High Court with general jurisdiction and powers in all matters, civil and criminal, it must follow that it can invest the High Court with such general jurisdiction and powers including the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and also to take away such jurisdiction and powers from the High Court except those, which are specifically conferred under the Constitution on the High Courts. It is not possible to say that investing the city Civil Court with unlimited jurisdiction, taking away the same from the High court, amounts to dealing with "constitution" and "organisation" of the High court. Under Entry 11-A of List III the State Legislature is empowered to constitute and organise City Civil Court and while constituting such Court the state Legislature is also empowered to confer jurisdiction and powers upon such courts inasmuch as "administration of justice" of all the Courts including the high Court is covered by Entry 11-A of List III, so long as Parliament does not enact law in that regard under Entry 11-A. Entry 46 of the Concurrent List speaks of the special jurisdiction in respect of the matters inList III. Entry 13 in List III is ". . . Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of this Constitution. . . ". From Entry 13 it follows that in respect of the matters included in the Code of civil Procedure and generally in the matter of civil procedure Parliament or the state Legislature, as provided by Article 246 (2) of the Constitution, acquire the concurrent legislative competence. The 1987 Act deals with pecuniary jurisdiction of the Courts as envisaged in the Code of Civil Procedure and as such the State Legislature was competent to legislate under Entry 13 of List III for enacting the 1987 Act. ( 43 ) THIS view gets support from the various decisions in which entries in lists I, II and III are interpreted touching the question as to the legislative competence of a State. ( 43 ) THIS view gets support from the various decisions in which entries in lists I, II and III are interpreted touching the question as to the legislative competence of a State. ( 44 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the words "constitution and organisation of the High Courts" used in Entry 78 of List I are wide enough to take within their ambit, not only the constitution and organisation, but, also the "general jurisdiction" of the High Courts. In contrast, it is contended that Entry 95 in List I pertains to the legislative power of Parliament to invest special jurisdiction in all Courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I. Correspondingly, Entry 46 of the concurrent List vests power in Parliament as well as the State Legislature to confer special jurisdiction and powers on all Courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in List III. Similarly, Entry 65 of List II enables the State Legislature to confer jurisdiction and powers on all Courts, except the supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in List II. ( 45 ) STRONG reliance is placed on certain observations of this Court in State of Bombay vs. Narottamdas Jethabhai (supra) which dealt with the interpretation of Entries 1 and 2 of List II (Provincial List) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Entry 1 of List II read : ". . . the administration of justice; constitution and organisation of all Courts, except the Federal Court. . . " Entry 2 of List II read : "jurisdiction and powers of all Courts except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List. . . " The contention urged before this Court was that the words "administration of justice and constitution and organisation of Courts"occurring in Entry 1 of the Provincial List should be read as exclusive of any matter relating to jurisdiction of Courts. Rejecting the arguments, the Court observed : "it is to be noted that the right to set up Courts and to provide for the whole machinery of administration of justice has been given exclusively to the Provincial Legislature. Rejecting the arguments, the Court observed : "it is to be noted that the right to set up Courts and to provide for the whole machinery of administration of justice has been given exclusively to the Provincial Legislature. Under section 101 of the North America act, the Parliament of Canada has a reserve of power to create additional courts for better administration of the laws of Canada but the Indian constitution Act of 1935 does not give any such power to the Central legislature. Courts are to be established by the Provincial Legislature alone. The word 'court' certainly means a place where justice is judicially administered. The appointment of Judges and officers or the mere setting apart of a place where the Judges are to meet, are not sufficient to constitute a Court. A Court cannot administer justice unless it is vested with jurisdiction to decide cases and 'the constitution of a court necessarily includes its jurisdiction' (vide Clement's Canandian constitution, 3rd Edn,, p. 527 ). "it was also observed : "entry 1 of List II (of the Government of India Act, 1935) uses the expressions 'administration of justice and constitution of all Courts' in a perfectly general manner. No particular subject is specified to which the administration of justice might relate or for which a Court might be constituted. It can, therefore, be legitimately interpreted to refer to a general jurisdiction to decide cases not limited to any particular subject. . . . . . . The distinction between general and particular jurisdiction has always been recognised in the legislative practice of this country prior to the passing of the Constitution Act of 1935 and also after that. " (Per Mukherjea, J.) ( 46 ) IT was also observed that : "the contents of general jurisdiction are always indeterminate and are not susceptible of any specific enumeration. " The words "administration of justice" and "constitution and organisation of Courts" occurring in Entry 1 of the Provincial List were construed in a restricted sense so as to exclude the scope of "jurisdiction and powers of Courts" dealt with specifically in Entry 2 (per Patanjali Sastri, J. ). " The words "administration of justice" and "constitution and organisation of Courts" occurring in Entry 1 of the Provincial List were construed in a restricted sense so as to exclude the scope of "jurisdiction and powers of Courts" dealt with specifically in Entry 2 (per Patanjali Sastri, J. ). Taking notice of the fact that on the date when the Government of India Act, 1935 was passed, there were in existence in the different Provinces a large number of Courts of law and the administration of justice throughout the Provinces was in the hands of these provincial Courts, that the Civil Courts in the Province used to try all suits and proceedings of a civil nature which were triable under the Civil Procedure Code, and the criminal Courts used to try all criminal cases triable under the Code of criminal Procedure, it was pointed out that the jurisdiction and power of the courts were not confined to cases in regard to the subjects stated in List II, nor were they debarred from dealing with cases relating to matters which had been assigned to List I. The jurisdiction of the Courts depended in civil cases on a "cause of action" giving rise to a civil liability, and in criminal cases on the provisions made in the Code of Criminal Procedure as to the venue of the trial and other relevant matters. Fazal Ali, J. observed : "it seems to me that the Government of India Act, 1935, did not contemplate any drastic change in the existing system of administration of justice, but what it contemplated was that that system should continue subject to future legislation by the proper legislature. Central or provincial, barring the jurisdiction of Courts or conferring jurisdiction or power on special Courts with regard to the matters included in the appropriate legislative lists, should there be any occasion for such special legislation. "he further observed : "in my opinion, there is nothing in the Act of 1935 to show that there was any intention on the part of its framers to affect the machinery so drastically as to confine it to the administration of a mere partial or truncated kind of justice relating only to matters specified in List II. "he further observed : "in my opinion, there is nothing in the Act of 1935 to show that there was any intention on the part of its framers to affect the machinery so drastically as to confine it to the administration of a mere partial or truncated kind of justice relating only to matters specified in List II. " ( 47 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant, however, attempts to distinguish this judgment by pointing out that when the Government of India Act, 1935 was passed, the scheme of distribution of legislative powers relating to the constitution and organisation of the High Courts was exclusively left with the provincial Legislature. The Provincial Legislature was fully empowered to make laws relating to the "constitution and organisation of all Courts, except the federal Court" (vide Entry 1 of the Provincial List ). In view of this position, the bombay Provincial Legislature was held to have legislative competence to enact the Bombay City Civil Court Act of 1948 which incidentally trenched upon the jurisdiction of the High Court, and it was essentially an exercise of power within the competence of the Provincial Legislature relatable to Entry 1 of List II of the government of India Act, 1935. ( 48 ) IT is not possible to accept that Narottamdas Jethabhai (supra) lays down that the words "constitution and organisation of Courts" necessarily mean, throughout the Constitution, a situation where the appropriate legislature which is empowered to constitute and organise a Court is necessarily invested with "general jurisdiction", as contended. ( 49 ) THE judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in amarendra Nath Roy Chowdhury vs. Bikash Chandra Ghose, AIR (44) 1957 Cal 534 on which reliance was placed before this Court, has put the matter in proper perspective. This was also a case where the petitioner before the High Court of calcutta challenged the validity of the City Civil Court Act, being West Bengal act 21 of 1953, on the ground of legislative competence. It was urged before the court that, while under the Government of India Act, 1935, the constitution and organisation of a High Court as also its powers were Provincial subjects, under the Constitution these subjects were expressly taken away from the legislative competence of the State Legislature and were made Union subjects. It was urged before the court that, while under the Government of India Act, 1935, the constitution and organisation of a High Court as also its powers were Provincial subjects, under the Constitution these subjects were expressly taken away from the legislative competence of the State Legislature and were made Union subjects. Thus, it was contended that the State Legislature had no competence tomake any law touching upon the constitution and organisation of the High Court, which necessarily included the "general jurisdiction" of the High Court. The judgment of this Court in Narottamdas Jethabhai (supra) was also cited by the petitioner. After carefully considering the observations of all the learned Judges who comprised the Bench in Narottamdas Jethabhai (supra) and after considering the speech made by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar on the floor of the Constituent Assembly, the learned Single Judge summarised the resultant legal position thus, in our opinion correctly, in para 24 : "24. In my opinion, the present position may be summarised as follows : (1) The 'constitution and organisation, jurisdiction and powers' of the supreme Court, are Union subjects. (2) While 'jurisdiction and powers' of the Supreme Court have been expressly included in Entry 77 of List I, these words have been deliberately left out in Entry 78 of the same list, in respect of the High courts. This omission is not supplied by Entry 95 because that entry only enables jurisdiction and powers to be given in respect of the matters enumerated in List I. To speak of 'jurisdiction and powers' of the High courts in respect of 'constitution and organisation' of the High Courts would be meaningless. (3) If nothing else was to be found relating to the subject, in any other part of the Constitution, then it might have been necessary to imply that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the concept of 'jurisdiction and powers' within the phrase 'constitution and organisation' of the High Courts in Entry 78. In that event, the result would be that if a High Court was constituted or organised by a parliamentary statute, it would automatically be vested with general jurisdiction to administer justice. (4) This construction, however, is not permissible because it is in conflict with Entry 3 in List II or Entry 3 read with Entry 65. In that event, the result would be that if a High Court was constituted or organised by a parliamentary statute, it would automatically be vested with general jurisdiction to administer justice. (4) This construction, however, is not permissible because it is in conflict with Entry 3 in List II or Entry 3 read with Entry 65. It is only the State legislature that can vest a High Court with general jurisdiction to administer justice. (5) While it is controversial as to whether Entry 78 in List I includes 'jurisdiction and powers' of the High Court, it is clear that under Entry 3 of List II or Entry 3 read with Entry 65, 'administration of justice' is a state subject and the 'jurisdiction and powers' of all Courts in the State including the High Court in respect of administration of justice, which must include general jurisdiction, is a State subject. (6) This construction does give rise to a curious result, namely, that parliament is given under Entry 78 a power to set up a High Court but not to vest it with jurisdiction excepting in a limited way under Entry 95. Ordinarily, and insofar as legislative practice is concerned, this state of things should not happen, but it has in fact happened under our constitution. (7) But the evil effects inherent in such an unusual provision in the constitution is mitigated by the fact that : (a) for the most part, the 'constitution and organisation' of the High Courts have already been provided for in the body of the Constitution, and (b) in the case of the formation of new States or reorganisation of existing States, there is ample power under Article 4 of the Constitution to clothe Parliament with the power to invest High Courts with the necessary 'jurisdiction and powers' of every description. (8) The State Legislature being the appropriate body to legislate in respect of 'administration of justice', and to invest all Courts within the state including the High Court, with general jurisdiction and powers in all matters civil and criminal, it must follow that it can invest a High court with general jurisdiction and powers (including territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction), and also take away such jurisdiction and powers from the High Court. (9) So far as the Calcutta City Civil Court is concerned, there can be no question that the State Legislature is competent to constitute such a Court and vest it with general jurisdiction, since that comes specifically and plainly within the scope of Entry 3 or Entry 3 read with Entry 65 in List ii. The question is as to whether it can at the same time take away any part of the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court. (10) It has been argued that the setting up of the City Civil Court, with a specified jurisdiction, and the taking away of the same jurisdiction from the High Court, was nothing more or less than doing something which affected the 'constitution and organisation' of the High Court. This again depends on the answer to the question as to whether the words 'constitution and organisation' necessarily include the concept of 'jurisdiction and powers' meaning thereby, general jurisdiction and powers relating to the administration of justice. So far as these words are used in Entry 78 of List I, the answer must clearly be in the negative. The constitution and organisation of High Courts has been made a Central subject in this limited sense because : (a) It was necessary to have uniformity in the organisation of all High courts and this could only be effected by Parliament. (b) The Constitution provides for extension of the jurisdiction of a high Court beyond the State where it has its principal seat and alsofor a common High Court in two States or two States and a Union territory. This can only be effected by Parliament. But beyond this, no necessity was felt of granting to Parliament the power to invest High Courts with general jurisdiction for the administration of justice, which was a Provincial subject before and continues to be a State subject. (11) It follows that the taking away of some of the general jurisdiction and powers of the High Court and vesting the same in the City Civil court would not necessarily mean that the State Legislature was doing anything which could be said to be an infringement of Entry 78 in List I. It was doing what it had power to do under Entry 3, or under Entry 3 read with Entry 65 of List II. " ( 50 ) OUR attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the appellant to p. 774 of the Constituent Assembly Debates and also to some other parts of the speech made by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar and Shri Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar during the debates in the Constituent Assembly, when Entry 52 of the Draft constitution was being debated upon. He drew our attention to the passage ". . . the only matter that is left to the Provincial Legislatures is to fix jurisdiction of the High Courts in a pecuniary way or with regard to the subject-matter. The rest of the High Court is placed, within the jurisdiction of the Centre. Obviously when considering entries in the Union List which are meant to give complete power to the Centre, we were bound to make good this lacuna and to bring in the high Courts which, as I said, by virtue of these articles excepting for two cases have been completely placed within the purview of Parliament. "