JUDGMENT S.S. NIJJAR, J. (ORAL) 1. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length and perused the paper-book. 2. The petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to call the petitioner for interview, for the post of Professor, fixed for 23.12.2005 under the Career Advancement Scheme. 3. The petitioner was eligible to be considered for promotion on 5.11.1999. The Board of Governors of respondents had taken a decision on 19.4.2003 and passed the following resolution:- “The Board approved the implementation of Career Advancement Scheme (CAS) as per Agenda Item and as per AICTE/GOI letters referred therein. The Board very strongly stressed that while implementing the scheme, the main criteria must be `performance of the individual in the Institute’ not the mere fact that he/she fulfils the eligibility as per CAS. As a special case, Hon’ble Chairman, Board of Governors very kindly agreed to chair the Selection Committee involving the promotion of Assistant Professor to Professor under CAS.” 4. On the basis of the aforesaid decision, applications were invited from the eligible candidates. The petitioner submitted the necessary application. However, the respondents did not consider the claim of the petitioner. Ultimately, the petitioner retired on 30.11.2005. Now the respondents have fixed the date of interview on 23.12.2005. The claim of the petitioner would not be considered as the petitioner had already retired. 5. Mr. Gulati, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the decision of the respondents not to fix the interview during the period when the petitioner was in service, was deliberate. The respondents did not deliberately hold the interview with an intention to deprive the petitioner of the post of Professor. Furthermore, right of the petitioner to be considered for promotion crystalized on 19.4.2003 when the resolution was passed by Board of Governors of respondent no.1. The petitioner has been deprived of his legal right to be considered for promotion on the post of Professor, without any fault of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was entitled to a direction to the respondents to interview the petitioner for being considered for promotion on the post of Professor for which the petitioner became entitled in the year 1999. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was entitled to a direction to the respondents to interview the petitioner for being considered for promotion on the post of Professor for which the petitioner became entitled in the year 1999. In support of his submission, learned counsel relies on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Chaman Lal Lakhanpal v. Union Public Service Commission and others, 1999(1) SLR 670. 6. We have anxiously considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. We are, however, unable to grant any relief to the petitioner as, in our opinion, no legal right of the petitioner has been infringed. Merely because the petitioner became eligible to be considered for promotion on the cut-off date i.e. 5.11.1999 would not entitle the petitioner to seek the issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to call him for the interview. In fact, the resolution dated 19.4.2003 itself makes it clear that mere eligibility would not give the concerned candidate any right to be promoted. The Resolution categorically states that the Board very strongly stressed that while implementing the scheme, the main criteria must be ‘performance of the individual in the Institute’ not the mere fact that he/she fulfils the eligibility as per CAS. In such circumstances, it would not be possible to hold that any legal right of the petitioner has been infringed. The judgment passed in the case of Chaman Lal Lakhanpal (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in our opinion, does not lay down any proposition of law, as advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In fact, a perusal of the of the aforesaid judgment would show that the same has been rendered on the basis of the rules governing inclusion of Haryana Civil Services Officers in the select list of IAS. In the present case, no rule which may be para materia to the rules which were under consideration of the Division Bench in the case of Chaman Lal Lakhanpal (supra), have been brought to our notice. The aforesaid judgment was clearly given in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the aforesaid case. In the present case, no rule which may be para materia to the rules which were under consideration of the Division Bench in the case of Chaman Lal Lakhanpal (supra), have been brought to our notice. The aforesaid judgment was clearly given in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the aforesaid case. Mr.Gulati has also submitted that the petitioner is prepared to forego all financial benefits in case a direction is issued to the respondents to interview the petitioner for the post of Professor, as the petitioner is only interested in vindicating his honour. He has also emphasied that the designation on the post of Professor is not dependent on the availability of the vacancy, but is merely personal to the candidate. In our opinion, no such direction can be issued to the respondents in the absence of any statutory rules having been violated. The allegations of mala fide cannot be examined for lack of material particulars. The petitioner has also not cared to implead any particular individual or authority. In the absence of necessary pleadings and parties, the delay in holding the interview cannot be held to be either arbitrary or unreasonable. It was within the discretion of the respondents-Institute to take a decision as to when the interview was to be held. 7. In view of the above, we find no merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed. - 2006 (1) LAW HERALD 0285 (P&H) (DB) PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT (DIVISION BENCH) CORAM M.M. KUMAR, BALDEV SINGH, JJ. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO. 19908 OF 2005 20.12.2005 Jagdish Chand and others Petitioner Vs. State of Punjab and others Respondents For the Petitioner : Mr. K.S. Dadwal, Advocate. IMPORTANT POINT Precedents-When the stay order is passed by the Supreme Court, then the view taken by High Court in another judgment is under a cloud and no relief can be granted. Service Law - Work Charge Service - Counting of - For the purpose of setting up and enhancement of pay on the basis of Full Bench judgment in the case of Kesar Chand - Department dismissing the representation of the petitioner on the ground that the judgment of this Court taking similar view have been stayed by the Supreme Court - Effect of ? - The view of this Court is under a cloud on account of stay order passed by the Supreme Court - No relief could be granted - Petition dismissed. (Para 3) Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 141 - Precedents - When the stay order is passed by the Supreme Court, then the view taken by High Court in another judgment is under a cloud and no relief can be granted. (Para 3) Cases Referred : - 1. Kesar Chand Vs. State of Punjab, 1988 (5) SLR 27. (Para 1) (REF) JUDGMENT M.M. KUMAR, J. 1. This petition is being treated only on behalf of petitioner no.1 as Court fee in respect of 35 others has not been paid. 2. A short question raised in this petition is whether the petitioner is entitled to add up his work charge period of service to the regular service rendered by him for the purposes of proficiency step up and enhancement of his pay on the basis of Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Kesar Chand v. State of Punjab, 1988 (5) Service Law Reporter 27 and Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in CWP No. 219 of 2003, decided on 13.11.2003 (Annexure P3)? 3. The petitioner is stated to have made representations on the basis of aforesaid pronouncements of this Court, which have been dismissed by the respondent department on the ground that the judgments of this Court taking similar view, have been stayed by the Supreme Court. The aforementioned view of the department is evident from the perusal of paras 6,7,8,9,10 and 11 of the impugned order and the same reads as under:- “6. Whereas the State of Punjab Department of Public Health and others had filed Civil Appeal No.1174 of 2003 (Arising out of SP (C ) No. 13546 of 2001) titled as Mehash Mittar and others and the same was allowed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on 10.2.2003. Copy of order dated 10.2.2003 is attached. 7. Whereas the decision of Hon’ble High Court in C.W.P. No. 13876 of 2001 is on the similar grounds of SLP 14265 of 2003 against CWP No. 16534 of 2001 State of Punjab vs Bhajan Singh and others filed for praying the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has stayed the operation of judgment dated 6.2.2003 of Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in this case. The case is still pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. During the pendency of said SLP the claim of the petitioners can not be considered for the benefits of proficiency step up(s) after completion of 8 years or 18 years service. Copy of order dated 18.8.2003 is attached. 8. Whereas the decision dated 10.2.2003 of Hon’ble High Court in Civil Writ Petition NO. 7565 of 2001 on the similar grounds SLP (C ) No.20782 of 2003 against CWP No.7565/2001 State of Punjab V. Resham Singh and others filed for praying the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has stayed the operation of judgment dated 10.2.2003 of Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in this case. The case is still pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. During the pendency of said SLP the claim of petitioners cannot be considered for the benefits of proficiency step up (s) after completion of 8 years or 18 years service. Copy of order dated 20.8.2004 is attached. 9. Whereas the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case State of Punjab v. Gurdeep Kumar Uppal and others 2001(3) SLR 256 has held that the period of adhoc service rendered by an employees cannot be included in calculating the period of service for giving higher scale of pay and only the regular service is to be counted. 10. Whereas the interpretation of law has been changed with the order dated 20.2.2001 of the Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.6525 of State of Punjab and other v. Harjinder Kaur and others which lays down that for purpose of cadre seniority and Higher Pay under Proficiency step up scheme, only regular service and not adhoc service is to be counted. 11. Whereas already explained in para 10 above the interpretation of law has changed with the order of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India order dated 20.2.2001 in Civil Appeal No. 6528 of 1998 State of Punjab v. Harjinder Kaur and others that for the purpose of cadre seniority and higher pay under proficiency step up scheme, only regular service and not adhoc service is to be counted. In view of this order, the work charged service cannot be counted for the purpose of reckoning 8/18 years service for the grant of Proficiency step up(s). In view of this order, the work charged service cannot be counted for the purpose of reckoning 8/18 years service for the grant of Proficiency step up(s). Hon’ble Court in the aforementioned judgment on behalf of respondent no.5 and 6 i.e. Executive Engineer, Shah Nehar Extn. (Civil) Division Hoshiarpur and Executive Engineer, Investigation Division, I.B., Hoshiarpur on the basis of record put up before us. The claim of the petitioners has been considered and is hereby rejected, being devoid of any merit.” 3. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perusing the impugned order (Annexure P-10) dated 12.8.2005 passed by the respondent department, we are of the view that there is no legal infirmity in the view taken by it. This Court has taken the view that the adhoc/ work charge service rendered by an employee is entitled to be added to the regular service for the purposes of granting benefit of proficiency step up enhancing the pay of the petitioners. However, the aforementioned view is under a cloud on account of stay order passed by the Supreme Court. Therefore, we are of the view that no relief can be granted to the petitioner in this petition at this stage and the petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. For the reasons aforementioned, this petition fails and the same is dismissed.