JUDGMENT :- Being aggrieved by the order passed by Special Judge, Buldhana in Special (Atrocities) Case No.33/1994, convicting the Appellant/Accused for the offence punishable under Section 3(i)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 sentencing the appellant/Accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.l,000/- the appellant has approached this Court by way of the present appeal. 2. With the able assistance of Shri. K. P. Sadawarte, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/accused and Shri. Jichkar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing for the respondent-State, I have gone through the evidence and the impugned judgment. 3. The prosecution story, as it emerges on re-appreciation of the evidence, is that on 2nd June, 1994 when the prosecutrix Smt. Sheela Ganesh Jadhav, was having her meals at home, the appellant-accused Gajanan, driver of Ramesh Laddha, came there and stated that, she was called immediately by Dr. Agrawal in his office, where the prosecutrix was employed. After some hesitation, she went with the accused in the vehicle, which was driven by the accused. However, on noticing that the vehicle was going on the wrong direction, she asked the accused that, why he is going in wrong direction. The accused replied that he had some work, however, the prosecutrix found that the accused had no work. She immediately asked the accused to stop the vehicle and tell her what exactly the work was. On this, the appellant/ accused said that she should allow him and the persons who were sitting on the rear side of the vehicle to commit intercourse with her and that he will give her Rs.500/-. Since the prosecutrix warned them not to do any immoral act, there was a scuffle between the prosecutrix and the accused, and at that particular time the persons sitting in the rear portion of the vehicle, pacified the accused and brought the vehicle in the city and the prosecutrix and her daughter were allowed to alight near the flour mill of one Kazi. The complainant and her daughter went to home and thereafter lodged report with the Polici Station, Chikhli on 3-6-1994, which came to be registered as Crime No.85/1994 under section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant accused was arrested on 24-6-1994, and after completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the trial Court. 4. The complainant and her daughter went to home and thereafter lodged report with the Polici Station, Chikhli on 3-6-1994, which came to be registered as Crime No.85/1994 under section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant accused was arrested on 24-6-1994, and after completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the trial Court. 4. According to the prosecution, this is what happened and the appellant/accused is prosecuted for the offence punishable under section 3(i)(xi) of the Act. From the entire evidence on record, it is obvious that throughout the incident, as has been narrated by the prosecutrix, there was no physical assault nor any crime took place. There was no use of force established. Even if, the entire case of the prosecution is accepted, what has been proved is, that the accused required the prosecutrix to accompany him, which she voluntarily did. However, when the prosecutrix declined to act as per the desire of the appellant/accused, she was allowed to go to her home. This being the factual position, there was no proof of assault, and therefore, according to the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant/accused, the conviction under section 3(i)(xi) of the Act, was not possible. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant, invited my attention to the Section 3 of the Act, which reads thus: "3(i)(xi) -Whoever. not being a member of the Scheduled Castes or a Scheduled Tribes with intent to dishonour or outrage her modesty shall be punished. as provided there." The contentions raised on behalf of the appellant, is that, this being the requirement of the Section, the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the same beyond doubt, and that there was assault or use of force to a woman belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. What has been proved by the prosecution is that the prosecutrix/complainant a woman was belonging to the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe, was requested to allow sexual intercourse/illicit relationship, and on her declining, she was allowed to go home. However, there is no evidence on record to show that there was any assault or use of force to the prosecutrix (P.W.l). 6. It is the further contention of the appellant, that the assault and use of force on woman must be with an intention to dishonour or outrage her modesty. However, there is no evidence on record to show that there was any assault or use of force to the prosecutrix (P.W.l). 6. It is the further contention of the appellant, that the assault and use of force on woman must be with an intention to dishonour or outrage her modesty. In view of this, firstly there has to be assault or use of force, and consequently it must be with an intention to dishonour or outrage the modesty of the woman. The prosecution has failed to prove the use of force and intention on the part of the appellant/ accused to dishonour or outrage modesty. It is no doubt true, that, a woman on outraging of her modesty, may be dishonoured. What is necessary under section 3(i)(xi) of the Act, is the assault or use of force, which are totally absent in the present case. Hence according to the learned counsel for the appellant/accused the findings recorded by the Court below are unsustainable, and therefore, the judgment is liable to be quashed and set aside and the appellant be acquitted. 7. The enactment of 1989 has replaced the 1955 Act called as "the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955". This enactment is made for protection of the people belonging to backward class, who have been stopped to proceed for centuries together, attempted to stop this on the society whether or since prior to independence, in respect of social evil on large magnitude and vast impact. Though the atrocities to the members to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes decreased, they were never eliminated. Consequently, when the Constitution of India was framed the policies of un-touchability, prevention of practice of untouchability, ground of special rights to avail equality to the members of Scheduled Castes and Tribes were framed. They were framed, since they were found right. Article 14 confers right to equality before law, Article 15 bans practice of untouchability. It prohibits discrimination of any kind between Citizen of India, on the ground of religion, sex or caste The adverse policy or enactment of Article 17 was liable to be noticed. It reads thus: "Policy of untouchability is into policy and practice in frustration. He who enters any disability arising out of untouchability shall be punished accordingly". It prohibits discrimination of any kind between Citizen of India, on the ground of religion, sex or caste The adverse policy or enactment of Article 17 was liable to be noticed. It reads thus: "Policy of untouchability is into policy and practice in frustration. He who enters any disability arising out of untouchability shall be punished accordingly". It was therefore a constitutional mandate given by Article 17, which is fundamental right of every citizen that the Parliament of India, was required to enact legislature on Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955. It was thus enacted to give factual, real protection to the people of Scheduled Castes and Tribes, from practice of untouchability which continue even inspite of constitutional ban. The Act of 1955 did provide similar protection to the Civil Rights. Inspite of that the atrocities continued. Having seen the continuance of atrocity for about 35 years, inspite of the legislation of 1955, the Parliament legislated the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, and made the provisions more strict and punishment more severe to see that the prevention which is fully stopped. It will therefore, be clear from this legislative history that the provisions of the Act of 1989 are stringent, deterrent and contain severe penalties. Ignorance of interpretation penal law with penal code is required to be considered strictly and the proof thereof also must be very strict and complete, and it is liable to be seen with the provisions of Section 3(i)(xi) of the Act. 8. According to the prosecution all that conspired includes verbal threats. Verbal threats has no use of force or assault. Therefore, when the Section speaks of assault or use of force, it will have to be interpreted mere factual assault or factual use of force so seen. However, in the present case, there is no evidence on record to show that there was assault or there was use of force. What the prosecutrix has stated that she had stopped the vehicle from running by catching hold the steering while the accused was on steering wheel, and it is only when the accused agreed to drop her, she left the steering wheel and then the accused turned the vehicle back and stopped the same and allowed her to step down from the vehicle. Throughout the incident, there is no one to say that there was any assault or factual use of force. Taking into consideration the legal position that penalty stated must be construed and will have to be construed under section 3(i)(xi) of the Act, the learned Judge of trial court has erred in convicting the accused only because of verbal threats to honour the victim. Even the evidence adduced on record is not adequate for such conviction. 9. In the result, the appeal succeeds. The impugned order as well as the sentence imposed, is quashed and set aside. The accused is acquitted. He is already on bail. His bail bond stands cancelled. Appeal allowed.