Judgment N. H. PATIL, J. ( 1 ) FEELING aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 31-12-2003 passed by the 1st Ad-hoc Additional Sessions Judge, aurangabad in Sessions Case No. 194/2003 convicting the appellant for an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one week, the appellant has preferred this appeal. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, the prosecution case is that deceased Nita was married to the son of the appellant namely Sandeep Margude on 24th April 2003. In the marriage, domestic articles were offered to the appellant. After marriage Nita started staying with her husband and mother-in-law, present appellant Kaushalyabai, at Gajanan Nagar area of Aurangabad city. On 26th April 2003 Nita had visited her parental home which is situated at satara Parisar, Beed By-Pass Road, Aurangabad. On 27th April 2003 brother of the husband of Nita, Santosh came to take Nita to her matrimonial home. Accordingly, Nita came back to her matrimonial home and started staying with her husband and mother-in-law. It is alleged that on 6th may 2003 Nita visited her mother and disclosed her that the appellant was asking for an amount of Rs. 20,000/ -. PW 1 Radhabai, the mother of the deceased told deceased that she had already paid Rs. 11000/- for purchasing clothes in the marriage to the appellant and she does not have money to pay the appellant. Nita went back again on 9th May 2003 along with her brother Sandeep to her matrimonial home. ( 3 ) IT is alleged that on 18th May 2003 Nita was set on fire by pouring kerosene on her person by the appellant. According to PW 2 Jagannath parkhe, who happens to be the maternal uncle of deceased Nita, the appellant visited his house at about 10. 30 a. m. and informed him that nita had sustained burns in her house. PW 2 proceeded to the house of nita where it was informed to him that Nita was taken to Ghati Hospital aurangabad. PW 2 went to Ghati hospital and met Nita, who was already admitted in the hospital. 30 a. m. and informed him that nita had sustained burns in her house. PW 2 proceeded to the house of nita where it was informed to him that Nita was taken to Ghati Hospital aurangabad. PW 2 went to Ghati hospital and met Nita, who was already admitted in the hospital. It is alleged that Nita disclosed to PW 2 that her mother-in-law pushed her inside the bathroom, poured kerosene on her person from a can and set her oh fire with a match stick and closed the door of the bathroom. The mother-in-law, according to him, left the place thereafter. ( 4 ) IT is alleged that PW 7 Dattu Bhoye, the investigating officer, recorded a dying declaration of the deceased (Exh. 28) at about 12. 30 p. m. and soon thereafter PW 6 Damu Kamble, the Special Executive Magistrate, recorded dying declaration of the deceased which is at Exh. 24. The investigating officer drew inquest panchanama and spot panchanama, recorded statements of witnesses, sent the seized articles to the Chemical analyser. PW 3 -Dr. Raju Surawase conducted the post mortem of the deceased. Post mortem report is at Exh. 13. The cause of death according to the medical officer is "shock due to burns". The deceased suffered 100% burn injuries. The CA report is also placed on record which is at Exh-33. The chemical Analyser found kerosene residues on the seized clothes i. e. sari, petticoat, blouse. ( 5 ) THE investigating officer filed charge sheet against the appellant. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge framed against her by the trial Court for offence punishable under sections 302 and 498-A of the indian Penal Code. ( 6 ) THE trial Court acquitted the appellant for an offence punishable under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. ( 7 ) THE prosecution examined 7 witnesses. PW1 Radhabai is the mother of deceased; PW 2 is Jagannath Parkhe, the maternal uncle of the deceased. Rest of the witnesses are PW 3 Dr. Raju Surawase who conducted post mortem, PW 4 ASI Rashid Khan who informed the police of the admission of the deceased in the hospital, PW 5 is Sk. Chiragoddin ASI who received the information sent by PW 4. Rest of the witnesses are PW 3 Dr. Raju Surawase who conducted post mortem, PW 4 ASI Rashid Khan who informed the police of the admission of the deceased in the hospital, PW 5 is Sk. Chiragoddin ASI who received the information sent by PW 4. PW 6 Damu Kamble is the Special Executive magistrate who recorded the dying declaration and PW 7 is Dattu Bhoye who is the investigating officer, who also recorded dying declaration of the deceased. ( 8 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant Shri. Vijay Sharma submitted that presuming the incident had taken place in the manner in which it was narrated by the deceased through her dying declarations, the truthfulness and correctness of the dying declarations in this case will have to be ascertained. There are discrepancies in the version of the deceased nita when she described the alleged incident in the shape of oral dying declarations to PW 1 Radhabai, her mother and PW 2 her maternal uncle, apart from two written dying declarations. The marriage of Nita was less than a month old when the alleged incident took place and according to the learned counsel it is difficult to imagine that during this short period the mother-in-law would commit a dastardly act by setting her daughter- in-law on fire for demand of some amount or articles. In view of the acquittal of the appellant for the charge framed under section 498-A of the Indian penal Code, the prosecution case that deceased was meted out with cruelty and in consequence thereof the appellant poured kerosene on her person is falsified. ( 9 ) WE have perused the evidence on record and relevant exhibits from the original record and proceedings. ( 10 ) ACCORDING to the dying declaration which was made by the deceased to the investigating officer PW 7 Dattu Kamble, which was first in time i. e. at about 12. 30 p. m. on 18th May 2003, deceased Nita stated that her husband left the house at 10. 00 Oclock on 18th May 2003 for attending to his duties and she was alone with her mother-in-law in the house. She stated that on the earlier night i. e. on 17th May 2003 her mother-in-law abused her and there was a quarrel between them. She further stated that her mother-in-law poured kerosene on her person at 10. 00 Oclock on 18th May 2003 for attending to his duties and she was alone with her mother-in-law in the house. She stated that on the earlier night i. e. on 17th May 2003 her mother-in-law abused her and there was a quarrel between them. She further stated that her mother-in-law poured kerosene on her person at 10. 15 in the morning, set her on fire and locked her inside in the bathroom. Thereafter the mother-in-law latched the door of the house and left the house. We do not notice any endorsement made by the medical officer on this dying declaration to the effect that the deceased was conscious and in a fit state of mind to make a statement. Thumb impression of the deceased is stated to have been obtained by the investigating officer on the dying declaration. We noticed half imprint of the thumb impression with some unclear ridges. We have perused the communication made by the Police Sub Inspector mukundwadi Police Station addressed to the medical officer Ghati Hospital on 18-5-2003 seeking his opinion regarding consciousness of the deceased for recording dying declaration. The said communication is at Exh. 27. We do not notice the time on the said communication. An endorsement is seen on this communication to the effect that "the patient may give her own statement". The medical officer signs below this endorsement. The said medical officer is not examined. It would be necessary to refer to the second dying declaration which, according to the prosecution, was recorded by PW 6 Damu Kamble, Special Executive Magistrate, soon after the first one was recorded by the investigating officer. The said dying declaration is at Exh. 24. In that statement deceased Nita stated that she was always harassed by her mother-in-law. She had no trouble from her husband. On 18th May 2003 at 10. 15 her mother-in-law locked her in latrine of the house, poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire with a match stick and thereafter left the house. She again reiterated that her mother-in-law set her on fire and there was no harassment by the husband. Perusal of the dying declaration shows absence of endorsement by the medical officer regarding the consciousness and fitness of the deceased to make such a statement. She again reiterated that her mother-in-law set her on fire and there was no harassment by the husband. Perusal of the dying declaration shows absence of endorsement by the medical officer regarding the consciousness and fitness of the deceased to make such a statement. Apart from these two written dying declarations PW 1 Radhabai and PW 2 Jagannath stated that they met nita in the hospital when she stated that the appellant poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire. ( 11 ) PW 1 Radhabai Bankar, mother of the deceased, stated that when enquired her daughter Nita told that the appellant set her on fire in the bathroom by pouring kerosene on her person. She further told that door of the bathroom was closed by the appellant who left the place thereafter. Nita died at 7. 00 p. m. on the same day i. e. 18th May 2003. In her cross examination PW 1 Radhabai stated that the appellant was also in service in ST Workshop at Aurangabad. The appellant herself had extended a proposal of marriage of her son with the deceased. It seems that son of the appellant was also interested to marry deceased Nita. The appellant owned a house where the incident took place. As regards the physical condition of the deceased Nita she stated that her condition was deteriorating as she was having severe pains. She was shouting loudly and asking for water which was provided to her. PW 1 was specifically suggested in the cross- examination that due to extensive burns and sever pains, Nita had lost her mental balance. The trial Court recorded the demeanour of the witness and observed that in spite of considerable time, the witness did not give answer to the said question. PW 1 further stated that when she met PW 2 jagannath in the hospital but did not enquire regarding the incident as to how it had occurred. She went on to say that she did not have any talk with Jagannath due to rush. ( 12 ) WE have perused the evidence of PW 2 Jagannath Parkhe who in his examination-in-chief stated that at about 10. 30 a. m. on 18th May 2003 the appellant came to his house and informed that Nita had sustained burns in the house. Immediately he rushed to the house of the appellant. ( 12 ) WE have perused the evidence of PW 2 Jagannath Parkhe who in his examination-in-chief stated that at about 10. 30 a. m. on 18th May 2003 the appellant came to his house and informed that Nita had sustained burns in the house. Immediately he rushed to the house of the appellant. The police had already arrived at the house and Nita was being carried to the hospital in a rickshaw. The witness followed Nita and went to the ghati hospital. He enquired with Nita about the incident to which she disclosed that her mother-in-law pushed her inside the bathroom, poured kerosene on her from a can, lighted a match stick and set her on fire. PW 2 further stated that prior to marriage appellant was related to him through parental family of his wife and 5 to 6 days before the incident, the appellant had come to his house and told him that she was getting a dowry of rs. 20000 from a family residing at Khamgaon but in the marriage of Nita, she received only Rs. 11000/ -. In his cross-examination witness stated that appellant had come to his house at 9. 45 a. m. which statement is contrary to his statement in the examination-in-chief. According to him the appellant was weeping when she informed that Nita suffered burn injuries. ( 13 ) APART from these two witnesses PW 1 and PW 2 who are closely related to the deceased Nita the prosecution has not examined any other independent witnesses like the neighbours, who must have rushed to the spot. Perusal of the spot panchanama which was drawn at 2. 00 Oclock on the same day of the incident shows that there was smell of kerosene in the kitchen room and on the floor of the kitchen room the burnt pieces of saree, brassier were found. The kitchen room was seen smeared with smoke. It was further noticed that there was kerosene smell coming out from the latrine and the match box branded as Plus-2 was also seen in the latrine. With this available evidence we will have to consider whether the appellant had any reason for committing murder of the deceased by pouring kerosene on her person and setting her on fire. It was further noticed that there was kerosene smell coming out from the latrine and the match box branded as Plus-2 was also seen in the latrine. With this available evidence we will have to consider whether the appellant had any reason for committing murder of the deceased by pouring kerosene on her person and setting her on fire. The allegation of cruelty meted out to the deceased by the appellant on account of demand or on any count has not been established in this case. There is no evidence to indicate that the appellant or her son were demanding articles or money from the parents of the deceased. Whatever was settled to be paid during marriage of the deceased Nita was shown to be the cause of strained relations between the mother-in-law and the deceased and her parents. We do not notice that the relations between the mother-in-law and the deceased could be strained to such an extent that the appellant would develop animosity and grudge against the deceased Nita who had become her daughter-in- law before couple of weeks of the incident. The allegations made by the prosecution on that count are discarded. ( 14 ) THE motive on the part of the appellant to commit murder shown by the prosecution is not established. The question would be whether the dying declaration recorded by PW Nos. 6 and 7 gives a voluntary and correct version deserving conviction of the appellant in this case. In the dying declaration recorded by the investigating officer deceased stated that her husband had left the house at 10. 00 Oclock. Whereas we find in the evidence of PW 2 Jagannath that appellant had met him to inform the incident of burns at 9. 45 a. m. The deceased further stated in the dying declaration that the mother-in-law forced her in the bathroom and poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire. Whereas we notice in the dying declaration Exh. 24 recorded by PW 6 (Exh-24) the version of Nita that her mother-in-law locked her in the toilet and thereafter set her on fire. ( 15 ) FROM the perusal of the written dying declarations and the evidence of PW Nos. Whereas we notice in the dying declaration Exh. 24 recorded by PW 6 (Exh-24) the version of Nita that her mother-in-law locked her in the toilet and thereafter set her on fire. ( 15 ) FROM the perusal of the written dying declarations and the evidence of PW Nos. 1 and 2 it is not possible to arrive at a clear conclusion regarding the place where the alleged incident took place, whether it was in toilet, in bathroom or in the kitchen of the house. The presence of the appellant in the house further becomes doubtful because the appellant, according to pw 2, met him at 9. 45 a. m. According to the dying declarations made by deceased the incident ought to have happened after her husband left the house at 10. 00 a. m. There is variance even regarding the time when the alleged incident of burning took place. ( 16 ) WE have noticed that both PW 6 the Special Executive Magistrate and PW 7 the investigating officer who claimed to have recorded the dying declarations have not put time on the said statements. We find that there was no endorsement of the doctor regarding the consciousness and fitness of the deceased on the dying declarations recorded by the witnesses. We may hasten to add that absence of endorsement made by the medical officer on the dying declaration would not in itself be an infirmity for discarding the evidentiary value of the dying declaration. We are considering these circumstances along with other facets of this case by evaluating the acceptability of these dying declarations coupled with oral narration of the deceased made to the close relatives like PW Nos. 1 and 2. ( 17 ) IT is settled position in law that conviction could be sustained based on dying declaration alone if it inspires full confidence of the court in it in which case corroboration need not be sought for placing safe reliance on the dying declaration. But in case where we notice infirmities in the prosecution story, right from its inception, and the genesis of the prosecution case itself becomes doubtful and suspicious one then it can be always safe to appreciate the evidence of dying declaration with greater care, caution and circumspection as the maker of the said stat ement is not made available for the cross-examination of the accused. ( 18 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant, Shri Sharma while supporting his content ion placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex court Dandu lakshmi Reddy v. State of A. P. The Apex Court in the facts of the said case observed that :"2. The traditional assumption that a dying person would not stoop to speak falsehood is now sought to be played down by the counsel for the appellant on the premises that it is a pedantic notion as the said assumption is fraught with the danger of insulating even a vengeful statement made by a dying person. Learned counsel submitted that at any rate the dying declaration projected by the prosecution in this case would not stand the test of credibility. "3. There can be a presumption that testimony of a competent witness given on oath is true, as the opposite party can use the weapon of cross examination, inter alia, for rebutting the presumption. But a dying declaration is not a deposition in Court. It is neither made on oath nor in the presence of an accused. Its credence cannot be tested by cross-examination. Those inherent weaknesses attached to a dying declaration would not justify any initial presumption to be drawn that the dying declaration contains only the truth. " ( 19 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant further placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the matter Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan. In para 6 of the said citation the Apex Court observed :"the principle on which the dying declarations are admitted in evidence, is based upon the legal maxim "nemo mori turus prae sumitur mentire" i. e. , a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth. It has always to be kept in mind that though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, yet it is worthwhile to note that as the maker of the statement is not subjected to crossexamination, it is essential for the Court to insist that dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court is obliged to rule out the possibility of the statement being the result of either tutoring, promoting or vindictive or product of imagination. The Court is obliged to rule out the possibility of the statement being the result of either tutoring, promoting or vindictive or product of imagination. Before relying upon a dying declaration, the Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement. Once the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration was true, voluntary and not influenced by any extraneous consideration, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration as rule requiring corroboration is not a rule of law but only a rule of prudence. " ( 20 ) LEARNED counsel lastly placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex court in the matter of State of Punjab v. Parveen Kumar. The Apex Court in para 10 has observed"while appreciating the credibility of the evidence produced before the Court, the Court must view evidence as a whole and come to a conclusion as to its genuineness and truthfulness. The mere fact that two different versions are given but one name is common in both of them cannot be a ground for convicting the named person. The court must be satisfied that the dying declaration is truthful. If there are two dying declarations giving two different versions, a serious doubt is created about the truthfulness of the dying declaration. It may be that if there was any other reliable evidence on record, this Court could have considered such corroborative evidence to test the truthfulness of the dying declarations. The two dying declarations, however, in the instant case stand by themselves and there is no other reliable evidence on record by reference to which their truthfulness can be tested. It is well settled that one piece of unreliable evidence cannot be used to corroborate another piece of unreliable evidence. " ( 21 ) IN the present case we have noticed that except two dying declarations coupled with oral declarations made to her near relations by deceased Nita there is no other independent corroborative piece of evidence to support the prosecution case. The backbone of the prosecution case rests on the dying declarations made by the deceased. Considering the material placed before the Court in the shape of the evidence we are slow in accepting that the appellant had any reason to commit murder of her daughter-in-law by pouring kerosene on her person and setting her on fire. The backbone of the prosecution case rests on the dying declarations made by the deceased. Considering the material placed before the Court in the shape of the evidence we are slow in accepting that the appellant had any reason to commit murder of her daughter-in-law by pouring kerosene on her person and setting her on fire. The conduct of the appellant is noticed by us when she visited PW 2 jagannath informing him of the incident. There is variance as regards the place where the incident of burning took place. Apart from other deficiencies noticed by us in the evidence of the prosecution. ( 22 ) LEARNED Additional Public Prosecutor Shri. Prasanna Varale supported the conviction and sentence of the appellant and stated that it was the appellant alone who was present in the house. Non explanation by the appellant regarding the nature of incident which resulted into death of Nita goes against the appellant. According to the learned A. P. P. minor discrepancies in the prosecution case more particularly regarding the time and place of the incident in question would not hamper the case of the prosecution. It is further pointed out that the dying declarations made by the deceased could not be discarded. He placed reliance on a judgment in the matter of Vajrala Paripurnachary v. State of Andhra Pradesh. The facts of the case found from para 3 are quite different than the case which is put up before us. Therefore the citation does not apply to the facts of the case in hand. ( 23 ) THE marriage of Nita was solemnised with the consent of the appellant which is prior to couple of weeks of the incident. There was no cause shown for the appellant which would have prompted her to be so cruel to deceased Nita. We could gather that the relation between the two families had just began couple of weeks before the incident in question and therefore the prosecution could not level allegations against the appellant that as the payment of some amount was not made the appellant would go to this extent of killing her own daughter-in-law in the manner in which it is described by the prosecution. From the available evidence and the attending facts and circumstances of the case and looking to the conduct of the appellant we find that it would not be possible for us to accept the theory of the prosecution that for an amount Rs. 10,000 the appellant would commit such a crime. ( 24 ) THE written dying declarations made by the deceased allegedly to pw 6 and 7 and the oral one to PW Nos. 1 and 2 could not inspire full confidence of the Court for fastening liability on the appellant for causing death of Nita. We doubt truthfulness of the dying declarations made by nita to the prosecution witnesses. In view of serious doubts raised by the appellant the infirmities pointed out by us in the evidence go to the root of the case. The version in the dying declaration is doubtful as to whether really the incident took place in the manner in which it has been described. When such a doubt is raised we are convinced that it would be unsafe to convict the appellant on the basis of evidence of the dying declarations of the deceased and therefore the benefit should go to the appellant. ( 25 ) THE learned trial Judge placed reliance on the dying declarations of Nita stating it to be consistent and involving the appellant. The statement made by the appellant under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was negatived by the trial Court. The trial Court was not in agreement with the defence that at about 9. 45 a. m. on the fateful day the appellant visited the house of Jagannath on the ground that if it was an accidental case then the appellant would have tried to extinguish the fire and thereby saved life of Nita. We have noticed in the evidence of PW 2 Jagannath himself that the appellant visited him at 9. 45 a. m. and the husband of the deceased Nita had left the house at 10. 00 a. m. It is doubtful as to whether the incident took place in the manner as narrated by the deceased Nita in her dying declarations. We have noticed in the evidence of PW 2 Jagannath himself that the appellant visited him at 9. 45 a. m. and the husband of the deceased Nita had left the house at 10. 00 a. m. It is doubtful as to whether the incident took place in the manner as narrated by the deceased Nita in her dying declarations. We have further pointed out the infirmities in the recorded dying declarations which are material for our consideration in absence of any independent corroboration to the dying declarations, which though, is not necessary if implicit reliance could be placed on the dying declarations. We are, therefore, not in agreement with the finding reached at by the trial Court as regards the statements made by deceased Nita which were treated as dying declarations. We do not find that the prosecution has led unimpeachable evidence by discharging its burden of establishing the case beyond reasonable doubt. The benefit, therefore, is given to the accused. ( 26 ) THE Criminal Appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated 31- 12-2003 passed by the 1st Ad-hoc Additional Sessions Judge Aurangabad in sessions Case No. 194 of 2003 is quashed and set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the offence for which she was charged and tried. Fine amount if paid be refunded to the appellant. The appellant be set at liberty forthwith. Appeal allowed