Judgment ( 1 ) THE original defendant in special Civil Suit No. 201/2004 pending on the file of Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, nagpur has filed this appeal challenging the order dated 6-11-2004 passed by that court below exhibit 5 which is an application under order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil procedure for grant of temporary injunction. The present respondent claimed temporary injunction to restrain present appellants from creating any third party interest in the Suit property during pendency of Suit and by the impugned order, the Court below has granted it. ( 2 ) THE Suit property consists of land survey No. 149 admeasuring 3. 06 hectors or 7. 5582 acres and survey No. 150 admeasuring 1. 94 hectors or 4. 7918 acres, totalling to 12. 35 acres. One of the lands is non-agricultural land and present respondent is claiming an agreement for sale with present appellant No. 1 while the remaining appellants are stated to be power of attorney holders of first appellant. The case of present appellants is that there was never any agreement/concluded agreement between them and present respondent. ( 3 ) LOOKING to the nature of controversy, parties were asked to argue the matter finally at admission stage itself on 26-4-2005. Accordingly rule was made returnable forthwith and parties were heard finally on 12-9-2005. The respondent has contended that on 31-12-2003 appellant No. 1 orally agreed to sell his agricultural field admeasuring 12 acres for total consideration of Rs. 10 Lakhs. He submits that the consideration was finalised after full negotiations and after respondent published a notice inviting objections from public at large in this respect, and if it was found thereafter that present appellant No. 1 had good title, the agreement was to be reduced into writing. Accordingly, by letter dated 5-1-2004 appellant permitted respondent to give public notice inviting objections. Accordingly, respondent published a public notice in leading english and Hindi daily newspaper (Hitavada and Navbharat) respectively through his advocate on 9-1-2004. This advertisement was objected to by present appellant No. 3 on the ground that without agreement such advertisement could not have been issued. The respondent states that this dispute was mutually settled by parties and he forwarded a letter dated 10-1-2004 to the appellants in this respect. After this, there was fresh agreement between respondent and appellants and ultimately appellants Nos. The respondent states that this dispute was mutually settled by parties and he forwarded a letter dated 10-1-2004 to the appellants in this respect. After this, there was fresh agreement between respondent and appellants and ultimately appellants Nos. 2 and 3 agreed to execute agreement of sale in favour of respondent. Said agreement in writing is alleged to have been entered into on 22-1-2004 and at that time respondent paid Rs. 20,000/- (twenty thousand) in cash as earnest money and balance amount of Rs. 9,80,000/- (nine lakh eighty thousand only) was to be paid at the time of sale deed. It is further alleged that at that time appellants handed over physical and actual possession and since then he is in actual possession of Suit property. It is further mentioned that though the respondent requested the appellants to accept balance amount and to execute sale deed, the appellants avoided it and wanted to create third party interest in Suit property to the prejudice of respondent The application was opposed by present appellants who stated that the Suit itself was false. They denied the very agreement dated 22-1-2004 as fraudulent and bogus document. They denied their signatures on any such document and also denied that possession was handed over to respondent. They pointed out that field survey No. 149 is non-agricultural land and its value in market is about Rs. 1 crore 35 lakhs They further stated that before filing such Suit, Respondent did not issue any notice to them. The appellants further stated that the public notice issued on 9-1-2004 was for limited purpose and there was no agreement between parties. They also denied receipt of rs. 20,000/- as alleged by respondent. They further pointed out that they are in possession. ( 4 ) THE trial court heard the parties in this background and passed the impugned order which is challenged in present A. O. I have heard Advocate Bhangde for appellants and Advocate Voditel for respondent. The parties had exchanged their case law before 26-4-2005. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for appellant has after narrating the facts stated that court below has overlooked the apparent inconsistencies in the story pleaded by respondent and has also overlooked the communication dated 10-1-2004 given by respondent to the appellant. He argues that even on 10-1-2004 the respondent accepted that there was no agreement for sale between parties. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for appellant has after narrating the facts stated that court below has overlooked the apparent inconsistencies in the story pleaded by respondent and has also overlooked the communication dated 10-1-2004 given by respondent to the appellant. He argues that even on 10-1-2004 the respondent accepted that there was no agreement for sale between parties. He further points out that there is no specific stand about date on which appellants allegedly placed respondent in possession of Suit property and the trial court has found the respondent is not in possession thereof. He also states that no proper receipt for Rs. 20,000/- is being produced by respondent and the trial court committed error in accepting the version of respondent. He states that the handwriting expert has found that the agreement dated 22-1-2004 does not bear signature of present appellants. He also relied upon certain case law to substantiate his contention and also argued that rulings cited by respondent are not relevant. Reference to the case law shall be made at appropriate stage. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for respondent invited attention to written submissions filed on 1-4-2005 to oppose admission even at the stage of final hearing. It is his argument that the trial court as also this court are considenng the matter at interlocutory stage and, therefore, only effort should be to find out whether there is any triable issue between parties. He urges that there cannot be any mini trial at the stage of hearing of application for grant of temporary injunction He states that document on record prima facie reveals a concluded contract between parties and the lower court has found a triable issue involved in the matter. The restnction not to create third party interest upon appellants, is therefore, according to him justified and no interference is warranted in this appeal. He has relied upon several cases to support his arguments and has also attempted to show how cases cited by appellants are not on the point. Reference to these cases will be made little later in this judgment. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel Shri. Voditel for respondent/plaintiff has relied upon AIR 2001 sc 2367 "anand Prasad Agarwalla Vs. Tarkeshwar Prasad, 2001 (5) SCC 568 " observations of Honble Apex Court in paragraph 6 of this ruling are self-explanatory and said paragraph reads :-"6. Reference to these cases will be made little later in this judgment. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel Shri. Voditel for respondent/plaintiff has relied upon AIR 2001 sc 2367 "anand Prasad Agarwalla Vs. Tarkeshwar Prasad, 2001 (5) SCC 568 " observations of Honble Apex Court in paragraph 6 of this ruling are self-explanatory and said paragraph reads :-"6. It may not be appropriate for any Court to hold mini trial at the stage of grant of temporary injunction. As noticed by the division Bench that there are two documents which indicated that there was pnma facie case to be investigated. Unless the sale certificate is set aside or declared to be a nullity the same has legal validity and force. It cannot be said that no right could be derived from such certificate. Secondly, when the contesting respondents were in possession as evidenced by the record of rights, it cannot be said that such possession is by a trespasser. The claim of the contesting respondents is in their own right. The decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant are in the context of there being no dispute as to ownership of the land and the possession was admittedly with a stranger and hence temporary injunction is not permissible. Therefore, we are of the view that the division Bench has very correctly appreciated the matter and come to the conclusion in favour of the respondents. In these circumstances, we dismiss these appeals. We may notice that the time bound directions issued by the Division Bench will have to be adhered to strictly by the parties concerned and the suits should be disposed of at an early date but not later than six months from the date of the communication of this order. "thus, as against the prima facie legal sale certificate issued by an instrumentality of State government, the court found that respondent were in possession and their possession was not that of trespasser. In view of these facts on record, Honble Apex Court found that mini trial was not necessary. ( 8 ) IN Wander Limited and another Vs. Antox India Private Limited reported at 1990 (suppl) SCC 727 in paragraph 9 the Honble Apex Court has observed :-"9. In view of these facts on record, Honble Apex Court found that mini trial was not necessary. ( 8 ) IN Wander Limited and another Vs. Antox India Private Limited reported at 1990 (suppl) SCC 727 in paragraph 9 the Honble Apex Court has observed :-"9. Usually the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at the stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of interlocutory injunction, it is stated "is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the balance of convenience lies. " The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve the status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on the prima facie case. The court also, in restraining the defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scale, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he is already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise are attracted. "there cannot be any dispute about this proposition but here the dispute between parties is about its application because of the difference in facts. ( 9 ) IN AIR 1989 SC 606 "jawahar lal Wadhwa Vs. "there cannot be any dispute about this proposition but here the dispute between parties is about its application because of the difference in facts. ( 9 ) IN AIR 1989 SC 606 "jawahar lal Wadhwa Vs. Haripada Chakroberty" 1989 (1) SCC 76 on which respondent has placed reliance it is observed :"in certain circumstances once a party to a contract has repudiated a contract, it is not necessary for the other party to tender the amount payable under the contract in the manner provided in the contract in order to successfully claim the specific performance of the contract. This does not, however, mean that where one party to a contract repudiates the contract, the other party to the contract who claims specific performance of the contract is absolved from his obligation to show that he was ready and willing to perform the contract. It is settled in law that where a party to a contract commits an anticipatory breach of the contract, the other party to the contract may treat the breach as putting an end to the contract and sue for damages, but in that event he cannot ask for specific performances. The other option open to the other party, namely, the aggrieved party, is that he may choose to keep the contract alive till the time for performance and claim specific performance but, in that event, he cannot claim specific performance of the contract unless he shows his leadiness and willingness to perform the contract. "it is also observed in the said case :"the transferee was in possession of the premises and claimed protection under s. 53-A of the T. P. Act on the ground. Under the agreement of sale he was required to pay regular installments of a monthly sum to the transferor. After paying some installments, he stopped payment alleging that the transferor had repudiated the agreement. The arbitrator held that since the transferee stopped payment of monthly sum he could be said to have performed or was willing to perform his part of the contract and therefore was not entitled to retain possession under the protection afforded by S. 53-A of the T. P. Act. It was held that the award of the arbitrator could not be set aside on ground of error of law apparent on face of the award and it could not also be said that the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct. It was held that the award of the arbitrator could not be set aside on ground of error of law apparent on face of the award and it could not also be said that the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct. The agreement between parties was not in dispute. "in the facts of present case, in the I impugned order, the learned trial court has not found that the present respondent made any efforts to obtain specific performance of agreement in his favour. The perusal of impugned order also does not show any efforts made by respondent to tender the balance amount to appellants or to procure their presence for getting the sale deed executed/ registered. ( 10 ) RESPONDENT has also relied upon air 1968 SC 1028 "kollipara Sriramulu Vs. T. Aswatha Narayan". Perusal of paragraph 3 of this judgment shows that the Honble Apex court found price and area of land as also time for completion of sale was fixed between parties and mere omission to settle mode of payment therefore did not affect the contract which otherwise was complete. It is also observed that mere reference to a future formal contract in an oral agreement will not prevent a binding bargain between the parties. In 1997 (10) SCC 457 between Collector of customs Bombay Vs. Rakesh Press, New delhi, the Honble Apex Court has observed that requirement of inspection of goods purchased prior to dispatch would not dilute from firm character of binding nature of the contract. Learned Advocate for respondent has also relied upon a brief note in commentary on Indian Contract Act. However, the said brief note on 1912 (14) Indian Cases 135 allahabad DB reveals that buyer there accepted the bargain. Here, the very dispute is about existence of any contract/agreement and therefore these rulings cannot govern the present A. O. ( 11 ) IN the case of Gulabchand Vs. Kudilal reported in. AIR 1959. Madhya pradesh 151, the Honble Full Bench of said high Court considered the question of construction of a deed of contract and have held that contract must be construed as a whole and intention of parties to it must be asserted from the document of contract as a whole. It is further held that decision upon construction of one contract cannot be regarded as an authority for construction of another contract in different words and entered into under different circumstances. It is further held that decision upon construction of one contract cannot be regarded as an authority for construction of another contract in different words and entered into under different circumstances. The Honble Full Bench found that the Division Bench led emphasis on last clause of agreement to the exclusion of other clauses while reaching conclusion about the question of price and ignored the state of affairs out of which said deed of contract emanated. It is observed that contract must be construed as a whole. About the possibility of ascertaining agreement between parties as to the price by implication, the Full Bench found that such implication can be raised only from presumed intention of parties with the object of giving to the transaction such efficacy as both parties might have intended for it. Here in this Appeal against Order, the respondent/plaintiff has relied upon the alleged oral agreement dated 31-12-2003 and then the written agreement for sale dated 22-1-2004 and both these are in dispute between parties. No such dispute was involved before Honble Full bench. As such, there is no scope for consideration of any term of alleged agreement between parties by such implication here. ( 12 ) ADVOCATE Bhangde for appellants has relied upon AIR 1966 SC 543 "bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia Vs. M/s. Girdharlal Parshottamadas and Co. " particularly paragraph 4 to show that there was no concluded contract between appellants and respondent. It has been held that acceptance of offer and its intimation by vernal (sic- external) manifestation is necessary for contract - In the absence of statutory provisions, Courts in Indian are guided by english common law. If proposal and acceptance is by telephone conversation, contract is made at place when acceptance is received and part of cause of action for suit for damages for breach arise at that place. It is also observed that making of an offer at a place which has been accepted elsewhere does not form part of the cause of action in a suit for damages for breach of the contract. Ordinarily it is the acceptance of offer and intimation of that acceptance which result in a contract. By intimating an offer, when the parties are not in the presence of each other, the offerer is deemed to be making the offer continuously till the offer reaches the offeree. Ordinarily it is the acceptance of offer and intimation of that acceptance which result in a contract. By intimating an offer, when the parties are not in the presence of each other, the offerer is deemed to be making the offer continuously till the offer reaches the offeree. The offerer thereby merely intimates his intention to enter into a contract on the terms of the offer. The offerer cannot impose upon the offeree an obligation to accept, nor proclaim that silence of the offeree shall be deemed consent. A contract being the result of an offer made by one party and acceptance of that very offer by the other, acceptance of the offer and intimation of acceptance by some external manifestation which the law regards as sufficient is necessary. It is also held that in the case of a contract when the offer is made by telephone conversation and the acceptance is also by telephone, the problem as to the place where the contract takes place must be approached in the light of the relevant principles of the common law and statutory provisions contained in the Contract Act. A contract unlike a tort, is not unilateral. If there be no "meeting of minds" no contract may result. There should, therefore, be an offer by one party express or implied and acceptance of that offer by the other in the same sense in which it was made by the other. But an agreement does not result from a mere state of mind intent to accept an offer does not give rise to a contract. There must be intent to accept and some external manifestation of that intent by speech, writing or other act, and acceptance must be communicated to the offerer, unless he has waived such intimation, or the course of negotiations implies an agreement to the contrary. The facts of case at hand can be considered in the light of this ruling and it need not be gone into in more details. ( 13 ) ANOTHER ruling on which the learned counsel for appellants has placed reliance in AIR 1951 SC 184 "d. I. Mac pherson, Col Vs. M. N. Appanna". This again considers in what circumstances an oral agreement can be said to have been entered into between parties. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this ruling of Honble Apex Court are important and they read :-"4. M. N. Appanna". This again considers in what circumstances an oral agreement can be said to have been entered into between parties. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this ruling of Honble Apex Court are important and they read :-"4. The plaintiffs case is that the cable sent by defendant 1 on the 5th August, and received by Youngman on the 8th, to the effect that he would not accept less than rs. 10,000, was a counter-offer made by him through Youngman to the plaintiff, and the contract was complete as soon as he accepted it. We however find it difficult to hold on the entire facts of the case that there was any concluded contract on 14-8-1944, and we are supported in this view by the well-known case of Harvey Vs. Facy, (1893) A. C. 552 : (62 L. J. P. C. 127), in which the facts were somewhat similar to those of the present case. In that case, the appellants had telegraphed to the respondents "will you sell us B. H. P. ? telegraph lowest cash price", and the respondents had telegraphed in reply. "lowest price for B. H. P. 900" and then the appellants telegraphed "we agree to buy b. H. P. for 900 asked by you. Please send us your title deed in order that we may get early possession but received no reply. On these facts the Privy Council held that there was no contract, and Lord Norris, who delivered the judgment of the Board, observed as follows :"the third telegram from the appellants treats the answer of L. M. Facey stating his lowest price as an unconditional offer to sell to them at the price named. Their lordships cannot treat the telegram from l. M. Facey as binding him in any respect, except to the extent it does by its terms viz. , the lowest price. Everything else is left open, and the reply telegram from the appellants cannot be treated as an acceptance of an offer to sell them; it is an offer that required to be accepted by L. M. Facey. Tie contract could only be completed if L. M. Facey had accepted the appellants last telegram. It has been contended for the appellants that L. M. Faceys telegram should be read as saying yes to the first question put in the appellants telegram, but there is nothing to support, that contention. Tie contract could only be completed if L. M. Facey had accepted the appellants last telegram. It has been contended for the appellants that L. M. Faceys telegram should be read as saying yes to the first question put in the appellants telegram, but there is nothing to support, that contention. L. M. Faceys telegram gives a precise answer to a precise question, viz. , the price. The contract must appear by the telegrams, whereas the appellants are obliged to contend that an acceptance of the first question is to be implied. Their Lordships are of opinion that the mere statement of the lowest price at which the vendor would sell contains no implied contract to sell at that price to the persons making the inquiry. "5. The conclusion at which we have arrived is strengthened by certain facts which emerge from the correspondence between the parties. The real question is whether defendant I had made a counter offer in his cable on 5th August, or he was merely inviting offers. The plaintiff in his letter of 14th August addressed to youngman, stated that he confirmed his oral offer of ten thousand for the bungalow, and he did not say in so many words that he accepted the counter offer of defendant1. Similarly in the cable which Youngman sent to : defendant 1 on 28th August, he did not state that the latters offer had been accepted, but stated that he had been offered rs. 10, 000 for the bungalow and concluded with the words "may I self?" Neither party thus treated defendant 1s cable as containing a counter-offer. On the other hand, they proceeded on the footing that the plaintiff had made an offer of Rs. 10,000 which was subject to acceptance by defendant 1. Apparently, defendant 1 was in communication not only with Youngman but also White, and both of them rightly thought that no transaction could be concluded without obtaining defendant 1s express assent to it. " ( 14 ) AGAIN, in the facts and circumstances of present Appeal against Order, the above law has no application. Here, it is not disputed that on 5th January, 2004 the appellants wrote a letter to respondent that they proposed to enter in to an agreement for sale of suit property and therefore authorised one somani to advertise in newspaper to call for objection, if any. Here, it is not disputed that on 5th January, 2004 the appellants wrote a letter to respondent that they proposed to enter in to an agreement for sale of suit property and therefore authorised one somani to advertise in newspaper to call for objection, if any. Thus the consent given by appellants was for this limited purpose. The advertisement which appeared in two newspapers on 9-1-2004 was issued at the instance of respondent by his Advocate V. M. Rajkarne and it mentioned that respondent has entered into an agreement of purchase with appellants and objections were invited within seven days. The appellants wrote to said advocate and pointed out that there was only proposal and no agreement. Hence, on 10-1-2004 respondent wrote to appellants and accepted the mistake and apologised for the same. It is thus obvious that prior to 10-1-2004 there was only a proposal and there was no agreement at all between parties. According to respondent, after 10-1-2004 there is an agreement in writing dated 22-1-2004 with appellants for sale of suit property. Thus, the learned trial court as also this court is not required to consider the case of any earlier concluded oral agreement between parties. When the agreement to sell dated 22-1-2004 is looked into it is not registered and on stamp paper of Rs. 20/- only and hence not admissible. It mentions that appellants have delivered possession on 15-1-2004 as per mutual terms. This handing over of possession is not accepted by trial court. When the respondent published newspaper advertisement and invited objections within seven days, nothing could have been done before 16-1-2004. The agreement further mentions that amount of rs. 20,000/- is accepted by appellant No. 2 but when that amount has been accepted is nowhere mentioned. Whether it was on 15-1-2004 while allegedly handing over possession to respondent or whether it was on 22-1-2004 while entering into alleged agreement for sale is not clear. The agreement is witnessed by two persons namely Mohan Guhe and Kiran salodkar. The draft of sale deed produced on record by respondent also shows that vacant possession of suit property was to be handed over at the time of execution of sale. This draft sale deed is dated Nil but it mentions month and year as February, 2004. It does not make reference to any previous agreement between parties. The draft of sale deed produced on record by respondent also shows that vacant possession of suit property was to be handed over at the time of execution of sale. This draft sale deed is dated Nil but it mentions month and year as February, 2004. It does not make reference to any previous agreement between parties. It also does not account for alleged payment of earnest money of Rs. 20,000/ -. From its contents demand draft of Rs. 4,90,000/- (Rs. Four lakh ninety thousand only) seems to be ready on 5-2-2004. There were two lands to be sold and therefore other demand draft can also be presumed to be ready on same date. However, steps taken by respondent after preparation of draft of sale deed are not disclosed. As per condition No. 7 of agreement dated 22-1-2004, sale deed was to be executed on or before 10-2-2004 but no specific date was fixed for that purpose and it is stipulated that time was essense of contract. In this situation and particularly in view of the surrounding circumstances, it was obligatory for respondent/plaintiff to explain what transpired between 22-1-2004 to 5-2-2004 to prepare the draft of sale deed and the bank drafts, as mentioned above. There has to be some communication between parties for this purpose. Nothing is pointed out in this respect and straightway suit appears to have been filed on 22nd March, 2004 because of notice published by Advocate Asif M. Rizvi that his clients intended to purchase suit property from appellants. The notice was replied to any respondent by publishing that there was agreement dated 22-1-2004 between him and appellants. This reply is published in newspaper on 14-3-2004. If the respondent had no bank drafts ready with him since 5-2-2004 why he did not issue any notice of telegram calling upon appellants to execute necessary sale deed is not understood particularly when last date for execution of sale was already over and time was of essense. Further, in plaint price of Survey No. 150 is stated to be (Rs. Five lakh ten thousand) i. e. Rs. 5,10,000/- only. Thus there is inconsistency in this respect in the plaint and in the alleged agreement The appellants have come up with specific case that valuation of the property as per government ready reckoner is rs. 1,35,00,000/- i. e. (Rs. One crore thirty five lakhs only ). Five lakh ten thousand) i. e. Rs. 5,10,000/- only. Thus there is inconsistency in this respect in the plaint and in the alleged agreement The appellants have come up with specific case that valuation of the property as per government ready reckoner is rs. 1,35,00,000/- i. e. (Rs. One crore thirty five lakhs only ). There is no denial of this aspect by present respondent. ( 15 ) IT appears that due to dispute about possession between parties police also intervened. Police authorities recorded statement of Shri. Mohan Guhe one of the witnesses on the alleged agreement. Mohan guhe told police authorities that amount of rs. 20,000/- was paid on 15-1-2004 and on that day receipt thereof was obtained only on 7/12 form of revenue records. He further disclosed that price of entire land was fixed at rs 37,11,786/- only He also states that possession was handed over on 15-1-2004. He further states that certain amounts were paid even before 15-1-2004 but those payments were not in his presence. Police have also recorded statement of present respondent/plaintiff on 13-5-2004. He has mentioned that there was power of attorney with appellant no. 3 for Rs. 37,11,786/- only and its agreement was entered into on 23-1-2004 in presence of two witnesses and notary Shn. Rajendra Gupta. It will thus be seen that there is material contradiction in the story of respondent plaintiff as disclosed before police authorities and in plaint. The respondent has not denied or explained these police statements. He has also not explained why he had stated valuation of suit property to be Rs. 10 lakhs only in plaint or in agreement allegedly dated 22-1-2004 ( 16 ) THE trial court has not considered all these facts in detail though the same are available on record. The trial Court has disbelieved the contention of respondent/plaintiff about his possession but has still accepted that there is prima facie case in his favour. The court below has accepted the receipt of Rs. 20,000/- on 7-12 extract and also agreement dated 22-1-2004 for that purpose it is not understood why respondent/plaintiff did not obtain proper receipt for Rs. 20,000/- from appellants. In plaint paragraph 3, date of payment of Rs. 20,000/- to present appellant is stated to be 22-1-2004 at the time of execution of agreement which also is inconsistent. 20,000/- on 7-12 extract and also agreement dated 22-1-2004 for that purpose it is not understood why respondent/plaintiff did not obtain proper receipt for Rs. 20,000/- from appellants. In plaint paragraph 3, date of payment of Rs. 20,000/- to present appellant is stated to be 22-1-2004 at the time of execution of agreement which also is inconsistent. From the conduct of respondent discussed above, it is more than apparent that there was no such receipt or agreement between parties. The inconsistency in area of suit property agreed to be sold, its price, its possession and date of agreement militate against the story of respondent. On record there is report of handwriting expert opining that signatures on alleged agreement dated 22-1-2004 being not of appellants. All these reveal absence of pnma facie case in favour of respondent. The respondent/plaintiff has not come to court with any definite case in this respect in his favour. The court below has overlooked the effect of such inconsistent case vis-a-vis the pnma facie case When the case of respondent is not definite but inconsistent there cannot be any prima facie case in his favour Material on record is sufficient to deny existence of any such agreement, oral or otherwise It is also apparent that lespondent/plaintiff did not approach the court with clean hands, The value at which the respondent/plaintiff is trying to block the property of appellant is very meager considering the value disclosed by him and his witness to police authorities and also unrefuted government valuation thereof. In such circumstances, it is un-equitable to grant any relief of temporary injunction to such person. In Wander Limited and another Vs. Antox india Private Limited reported at 1990 (Suppl) SCC 727. the Honble Apex Court has also laid down the circumstance in which appellate court can interfere with orders of lower court in appeal against orders in matters of grant of temporary injunction. I find that the trial court has not considered entire material available on record and its effect on the case of respondent/plaintiff. If the cases of both the sides are weighed and compared as envisaged in this judgment by Apex Court. It is apparent that respondent has failed to show any legal rights and also hardship caused to present appellants will be more severe and irreparable. Such consideration of matter is necessary and it is not a mini trial. If the cases of both the sides are weighed and compared as envisaged in this judgment by Apex Court. It is apparent that respondent has failed to show any legal rights and also hardship caused to present appellants will be more severe and irreparable. Such consideration of matter is necessary and it is not a mini trial. Thus court below was in error in exercising its discretion in favour of present respondent. ( 17 ) THE impugned order dated 6-11-2004 restraining the present appellants from creating third party interest in the suit property is therefore quashed and set aside. Appeal against Order is hereby allowed in terms of prayer clause 2 thereof. Rule made absolute accordingly. No costs. ( 18 ) AT this stage, Shri. Bhandarkar, learned counsel holding for Shri. Voditel, learned counsel for the respondent requests for staying the operation and effect of present judgment for a period of six weeks. He contends that till today status quo/interim relief granted by the trial Court was operating and the respondent wants to challenge the present judgment before the Honble Apex Court. ( 19 ) SHRI. Bhangde learned counsel for the appellants opposes this request and contends that the interim order is operating to the prejudice of the appellants. ( 20 ) HOWEVER, in the interest of justice, I am inclined to grant time as prayed for and hence interim order which was operating till today shall remain in operation for a period of six weeks and shall cease to operate immediately thereafter. Appeal allowed.