Judgment :- (Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issue of writ of mandamus directing the respondents 1 to 4 herein to avoid communal clash by enforcing funeral procession of Muslim community only through Mandukal street at Balasamuthiram village, Palani Taluk, Dindigul District as per agreement dated 12.4.1998 reached between Muslim and Devendrakula Vellalar communities.) Markandey Katju, C.J. This writ petition is a sequel to our decision in Mohd.Gani v. The Superintendent of Police, Dindigul, 2005(3) L.W 289 . 2. This writ petition has been filed for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents 1 to 4 to avoid communal clashes by permitting funeral processions of Muslim community only through Mandukal street at Balasamuthiram village, Palani Taluk, Dindigul District as per agreement dated 12.4.1998 reached between Muslim and Devendrakula Vellalar communities. 3. We heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 4. It is alleged in paragraph 2 of the petitioner's affidavit that in the village in question there are four thousand people belonging to Devendrakula Vellalar Community whereas there are only one thousand Muslims in the village. It is further alleged in paragraph 3 of the affidavit that in the village, the Muslims traditionally use Devar East Street otherwise called Mandukal Street to carry dead bodies to burial ground. However, it is alleged that one Mohamed Gani the fifth respondent instigated the village Muslims to use Kottai Kaliamman Koil Street where Karuppannasamy temple and Kaliamman Kovil and the petitioner's house are said to be situated. It is alleged that an objection was raised and then an agreement was reached between the Devendrakula Vellalar community people and the Muslim community people before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Palani, the third respondent herein, on 12.4.1998 according to which the Muslim community people including the said Mohamed Gani the fifth respondent agreed to use Mandukal street for funeral procession and not to use Kottai Kaliamman Kovil Street running through the petitioner's colony. 5. Mohamed Gani filed Writ Petition No.5202 of 1998 and prayed for police protection for funeral processions of Muslims according to the agreement dated 25.1.1998 and it is alleged that he did not make any member of the Devendrakula Vellalar community as a party in that writ petition. It is alleged that even according to the agreement dated 25.1.1998 Muslims have to use Mandukal street only and not Kottai Kaliamman Street. It is alleged that even according to the agreement dated 25.1.1998 Muslims have to use Mandukal street only and not Kottai Kaliamman Street. 6. Writ Petition No.5202 of 1998 was decided on 14.7.2005 by this Court and that decision is reported in 2005(3)L.W. 289 Mohamed Gani vs. The Superintendent of Police, Dindigul District, Dindigul and others. 7. It is alleged that Muslims want to carry dead bodies through Kottai Kaliamman Street instead of the agreed route of Mandukal Street and thereby there may be communal clashes. 8. This is a free, democratic and secular country as held by the Division Bench of this Court in Mohamed Gani's case (supra). India does not belong to Hindus alone. It belongs equally to Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, Sikhs, Jews, etc. and all are equal before the law. 9. No doubt, one cannot carry dead bodies through private land but we cannot see what objection can there be in carrying dead bodies through public streets. After all people of all communities have to take dead bodies to the cremation ground or burial place, and for this purpose they have to use the public streets or roads. 10. In Mohamed Gani vs. The Superintendent of Police, Dindigul District, Dindigul and others (supra) we have discussed this matter in great detail and hence we are not repeating the observations made in that judgment. As held by us in that judgment, the right to bury dead bodies in accordance with one's religious rites and customs is a part of the essential religious rites of every religious community and hence it cannot be prohibited. Such religious rites are part of Article 25 of the Constitution which provides for religious freedom not only in the matter of beliefs but also in the matter of religious rites. The relevant case law on the point has been referred to and discussed in detail in Mohd.Gani's case (supra) 11. In our opinion, even if there was an agreement between the Muslim community and the Devendrakula Vellalar community that Muslims will not use Kottai Kaliamman Kovil Street such an agreement will be in violation of the constitutional guarantee under Article 25 of the Constitution. It is well settled that there can be no waiver of fundamental rights vide Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180 12. It is well settled that there can be no waiver of fundamental rights vide Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180 12. In Olga Tellis's case (supra), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed (vide paragraph 28): - " There can be no estoppel against the Constitution. The Constitution is not only the paramount law of the land but, it is the source and sustenance of all laws. Its provisions are conceived in public interest and are intended to serve a public purpose. The doctrine of estoppel is based on the principle that consistency in word and action imparts certainty and honesty to human affairs. If a person makes a representation to another, on the faith of which the latter acts to his prejudice, the former cannot resile from the representation made by him. He must make it good. This principle can have no application to representations made regarding the assertion or enforcement of fundamental rights. For example, the concession made by a person that he does not possess and would not exercise his right to free speech and expression or the right to move freely throughout the territory of India cannot deprive him of those constitutional rights, any more than a concession that a person has o right of personal liberty can justify his detention contrary to the terms of Article 22 of the Constitution. Fudamental rights are undoubtedly conferred by the Constitution upon individuals which have to be asserted and enforced by them, if those rights are violated. But the high purpose which the Constitution seeks to achieve by conferment of fundamental rights is not only to benefit individuals but to secure the larger interests of the community. The Preamble of the Constitution says that India is a democratic Republic. It is in order to fulfil the promise of the Preamble that fundamental rights are conferred by the Constitution, some on citizens like those guaranteed by Articles 15, 16, 19, 21 and 29 and, some on citizens and non-citizens alike, like those guaranteed by Articles 14, 21, 22 and 25 of the Constitution. No individual can barter away the freedoms coferred upon him by the Constitution. No individual can barter away the freedoms coferred upon him by the Constitution. A concession made by him in a proceeding, whether under a mistake of law or otherwise that he does not possess or will not enforce any particular fundamental right, cannot create an estoppel against him in that or any subsequent proceeding. Such a concession, if enforced, would defeat the purpose of the Constitution. Were the argument of estoppel valid, an all-powerful State could easily tempt an individual to forgo his precious personal freedoms on promise of transitory, immediate benefits." 13. Similarly in Behram Khurshid v. Bombay State, AIR 1955 Sc 123 a Constituion Bench of the Supreme Court (vide paragraph 52) observed: - " In our opinion, the doctrine of waiver enunciated by some American Judges in construing the American Constitution cannot be introduced in our Constitution without a fuller discussion of the matter. No inference in deciding the case should have been raised on the basis of such a theory.................. These fundamental rights have not been put in the Constitution merely for individual benefit, though ultimately they come into operation in considering individual rights. They have been put there as a matter of public policy and the doctrine of waiver can have no application to provisions of law which have been enacted as a matter of constitutional policy." 14. Merely because there is a temple adjacent to Kottai Kaliamman Kovil Street and the house of the writ petitioner is situate there that does not mean that dead bodies cannot be carried through the aforesaid public street. After all it is a public street and not private land. 15. Of course, if at a particular time poojas (e.g. Aarti) are being conducted in the temple it is better if the Muslims avoid that time so that the feeling of the Hindus are not hurt, but they can carry their dead bodies at other times. A balance should be struck in this connection, but it is upto the local authorities to make such an arrangement. In a secular country nobody's feelings should be hurt, neither the feelings of Hindus nor of Muslims nor of Christians nor of any other community. A balance should be struck in this connection, but it is upto the local authorities to make such an arrangement. In a secular country nobody's feelings should be hurt, neither the feelings of Hindus nor of Muslims nor of Christians nor of any other community. No doubt in view of Article 25 of the Constitution the Muslims can carry dead bodies through any public street of their choice, but since Article 25(1) specifically states that this right is subject to public order, the authorities can direct that dead bodies will not be carried through the street when a particular pooja is being conducted in the temple so that the feelings of Hindus may not be hurt. In this way a balance can be struck. The District Collector and the Revenue Divisional Officer, Palani will hence ensure that proper arrangements are made in this connection so that there may not be any communal clash. With these observations the writ petition is disposed off. W.P.M.P.No.28424 of 2005 is closed.