ORDER 1. LEAVE GRANTED. 2. THE RESPONDENT WAS APPOINTED AS A DAILY-WAGER ON 23-7-1997 WITH THE APPELLANT. ACCORDING TO THE APPELLANT HIS SERVICES WERE UTILISED ONLY TILL NOVEMBER 1997. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO THE RESPONDENT HE CONTINUED TILL 11-8-1998 AFTER WHICH NO FURTHER WORK WAS GIVEN TO HIM. THE RESPONDENT RAISED AN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE UNDER THE U.P. INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. THE LABOUR COURT CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD WORKED FOR MORE THAN 240 DAYS AND BY VIRTUE OF THE VIOLATION OF THE PROVISION OF SECTION 6-N, HE WAS ENTITLED TO BE REINSTATED TOGETHER WITH FULL SALARY AND OTHER ALLOWANCES WITH EFFECT FROM 11-8-1998. THE APPELLANT PREFERRED A. WRIT PETITION, WHICH WAS DISMISSED. 3. THE LEARNED COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT HAS STATED THAT THE HIGH COURT FAILED TO NOTE THAT THE SCOPE OF ALL THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO RETRENCHMENT IN THE CENTRAL ACT, NAMELY, THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 AND THE STATE ACT, NAMELY, THE U.P. INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 WERE DIFFERENT AND THAT ACCORDING TO THE U .P. ACT, THERE WAS NO RETRENCHMENT. THE SECOND SUBMISSION IS THAT THE LABOUR COURT HAD MISDIRECTED ITSELF IN GRANTING BACK WAGES AND ALL ALLOWANCES TO A DAILY-WAGER PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN G.M., HARYANA ROADWAYS V. RUDHAN SINGH 1. THE LEARNED COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT HAS STATED THAT HIS CLIENT WOULD REALLY BE SATISFIED WITH AN ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT AS A DAILY-WAGER WITH THE APPELLANT. 4. IN OUR VIEW, THE DISTINCTION SOUGHT TO BE DRAWN BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT BETWEEN THE TWO PROVISIONS OF THE CENTRAL AND THE STATE ACTS IS NOT REALLY RELEVANT TO THE DISPUTE IN THIS MATTER. HOWEVER, THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT IS RIGHT IN CONTENDING THAT THE LABOUR COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DIRECTED PAYMENT OF BACK WAGES AS IF IT FOLLOWED AUTOMATICALLY UPON SETTING ASIDE THE SO-CALLED TERMINATION. 5. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE ORDER OF THE LABOUR COURT AND IT IS CLEAR THAT IT HAD NOT ADDRESSED ITSELF TO THE QUESTION WHETHER THE RESPONDENT WAS OTHERWISE EMPLOYED OR HAD AT ALL MADE A PLEA FOR BACK WAGES. THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN RUDHAN SINGH EASEL IS AN AUTHORITY FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT THE BACK WAGES ARE NOT TO BE PAID AS A MATTER OF COURSE. THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN RUDHAN SINGH EASEL IS AN AUTHORITY FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT THE BACK WAGES ARE NOT TO BE PAID AS A MATTER OF COURSE. VARIOUS FACTORS PERTAINING TO THE EMPLOYMENT ARE TO BE KEPT IN VIEW ALONG WITH THE ACTUAL SERVICE BY THE B EMPLOYEE AND THE NATURE OF SUCH SERVICE, NAMELY, WHETHER THE SERVICE WAS PERMANENT OR ON DAILY WAGES. IN REFUSING BACK WAGES IN RUDHAN SINGH EASEL THIS COURT HELD: (SCC P. 597, PARA 11) "11. IN THE CASE AT HAND THE RESPONDENT HAD WORKED FOR A VERY SHORT PERIOD WITH THE APPELLANT, WHICH WAS LESS THAN ONE YEAR. EVEN DURING THIS PERIOD THERE WERE BREAKS IN SERVICE AND HE HAD BEEN GIVEN SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENTS ON DAILY-WAGE BASIS IN DIFFERENT CAPACITIES. THE RESPONDENT IS NOT A TECHNICALLY TRAINED PERSON, BUT WAS WORKING ON A CLASS IV POST. ACCORDING TO THE FINDING OF THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT PLENTY OF WORK OF THE SAME NATURE, WHICH THE RESPONDENT WAS DOING, WAS AVAILABLE IN THE DISTRICT OF ROHTAK. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF ANY BACK D WAGES." 6. THE FACTS WHICH PERSUADED THIS COURT TO DENY BACK WAGES IN THAT CASE ARE EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT RESPONDENT. ACCORDINGLY, THE APPEAL IS ALLOWED. THE DIRECTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE BACK WAGES ARE SET ASIDE. HOWEVER, THE RESPONDENT WILL BE REINSTATED AS A DAILY-WAGER WITH THE APPELLANT FORTHWITH. 7. NO ORDER AS TO COSTS.