ORDER 1. HEARD LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES. 2. CHALLENGE IN THIS APPEAL IS TO A JUDGMENT OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THE ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT HOLDING (A) THAT THE DISPUTE RAISED BY THE RESPONDENT BEFORE THE LABOUR COURT WAS MAINTAINABLE, AND (B) THAT BECAUSE OF NON-REGISTRATION OF CONTRACT ON APPRENTICESHIP, HE COULD NOT BE TREATED AS AN APPRENTICE AND THE DELAY IN APPROACHING THE LABOUR COURT DID "NOT RENDER THE CLAIM UNACCEPTABLE. 3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND NEEDS TO BE NOTED IN BRIEF: ACCORDING TO THE APPELLANT, THE RESPONDENT WAS APPOINTED AS AN APPRENTICE FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR WITH EFFECT FROM 1-7-1987 AND WAS PAID STIPEND @ RS 230. ON COMPLETION OF THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD I.E. ON 30-6-1988, HE WAS RELEASED. A WRIT PETITION WAS FILED IN THE YEAR 1993 WHEREIN THE STAND TAKEN BY THE PRESENT RESPONDENT AS WRIT PETITIONER WAS THAT HE WAS APPOINTED AS AN APPRENTICE AND HE OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE APPELLANT WHO WAS THE EMPLOYER ON EXPIRY OF THE APPRENTICESHIP PERIOD. BY ORDER DATED 17-5-1993, THE HIGH COURT DIRECTED THE EMPLOYER I.E. THE PRESENT APPELLANT TO CONSIDER THE CASE OF THE RESPONDENT-WRIT PETITIONER. IN THE YEAR 1995, A DISPUTE WAS RAISED IN TERMS OF THE U.P. INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 (IN SHORT "THE U.P. ACT"). A REFERENCE WAS MADE UNDER SECTION 4-K OF THE SAID ACT FOR ADJUDICATION BY THE LABOUR COURT, KANPUR. THE LABOUR COURT CAME TO HOLD THAT IN VIEW OF NON-REGISTRATION OF THE ALLEGED CONTRACT OF APPRENTICESHIP; THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE PRESENT "RESPONDENT BEING TREATED AS AN APPRENTICE. IT WAS FURTHER HELD THAT THE REFERENCE BEFORE THE LABOUR COURT WAS MAINTAINABLE AS HE WAS A WORKMAN AND NOT AN APPRENTICE. SO FAR AS THE STAND OF THE PRESENT APPELLANT THAT THERE WAS AN UNEXPLAINED DELAY OF NEARLY EIGHT YEARS, IT WAS HELD THAT THERE WAS, IN FACT, NO DELAY. THE LABOUR COURT, ACCORDINGLY, PASSED AN AWARD HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS TO BE REINSTATED AND WAS TO BE PAID THE ENTIRE WAGES FOR THE PERIOD DURING WHICH HE REMAINED UNEMPLOYED ALONG WITH OTHER BENEFITS AS ARE AVAILABLE IN LAW. THE DECISION OF THE LABOUR COURT WAS ASSAILED BEFORE THE HIGH COURT, WHICH HELD THAT THERE WAS IN FACT NO DELAY AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, REFERENCE WAS MADE TO TWO DECISIONS OF THIS COURT IN AJAIB SINGH V. SIRHIND COOP. MARKETING-CUM- G PROCESSING SERVICE SOCIETY LTD. THE DECISION OF THE LABOUR COURT WAS ASSAILED BEFORE THE HIGH COURT, WHICH HELD THAT THERE WAS IN FACT NO DELAY AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, REFERENCE WAS MADE TO TWO DECISIONS OF THIS COURT IN AJAIB SINGH V. SIRHIND COOP. MARKETING-CUM- G PROCESSING SERVICE SOCIETY LTD. 1 AND IN THE CASE OF SAPAN KUMAR PANDIT V. U.P. SEB2. DECISION IN ASSTT. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER V. SRI SHIVALINGA3 ON WHICH THE PRESENT APPELLANT HAD PLACED RELIANCE, WAS DISTINGUISHED. HOWEVER, THE BACK WAGES WERE REDUCED TO 50%. 4. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPEAL, LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT PLACED RELIANCE ON A THREE-JUDGE BENCH DECISION OF THIS COURT IN U.P. SEB V. SHIV MOHAN. SINGH4 WHEREIN IT WAS HELD THAT THE NON-REGISTRATION OF THE CONTRACT OF APPRENTICESHIP WAS NOT OF ANY CONSEQUENCE AND ANY APPRENTICE APPOINTED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE APPRENTICES ACT, 1961 (IN SHORT "THE APPRENTICE ACT") STILL WAS TO BE .CONSIDERED AS AN APPRENTICE AND -A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE APPRENTICE AND THE BOARD WAS OUTSIDE THE PURVIEW OF THE U.P. ACT AND THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 (IN SHORT "THE. ACT"). IT WAS ALSO SUBMITTED THAT THE QUESTION- OF DELAY IS VERY RELEVANT. AS WAS NOTED BY THIS COURT IN ASSTT. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER CASE3 THE DELAY MAY NOT BE OF MUCH CONSEQUENCE WHERE THERE IS NO DISPUTE REGARDING RELATIONSHIP OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE. THE LABOUR COURT AND THE HIGH COURT LOST SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENT HIMSELF HAD IN THE EARLIER WRIT PETITION AND IN THE PLEADINGS, ACCEPTED THAT HE WAS AN APPRENTICE. THAT BEING SO, CONCLUSIONS TO THE CONTRARY RECORDED BY THE LABOUR COURT AND THE HIGH COURT CANNOT BE MAINTAINED. IN THE INSTANT CASE, THE VERY FOUNDATION OF THE CLAIM WAS A DISPUTE IN THAT REGARD. 5. IN RESPONSE, LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT SUBMITTED THAT THERE WAS NO FINDING RECORDED THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS IN RESPECT OF A DESIGNATED TRADE. THOUGH IT WAS STATED IN THE WRIT PETITION AND IN THE PLEADINGS THAT THE PRESENT RESPONDENT WAS APPOINTED AS AN APPRENTICE, IN FACT, THERE WAS NO TRAINING IMPARTED AND THE ENGAGEMENT WAS NOT IN RESPECT OF A DESIGNATED TRADE AND THAT BEING SO, THE ESSENCE OF THE ENGAGEMENT WAS RIGHTLY TAKEN NOTE OF BY THE LABOUR COURT AND THE HIGH COURT. 6. IN OUR OPINION, THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE THREE LEARNED JUDGES IN U.P. SEB CASE4 GOVERNS THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE. 6. IN OUR OPINION, THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE THREE LEARNED JUDGES IN U.P. SEB CASE4 GOVERNS THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE. ONCE IT IS FOUND ON FACTS THAT THE ENGAGEMENT WAS AS AN APPRENTICE, OBVIOUSLY, THE PROVISIONS OF THE U.P. ACT AND THE ACT CANNOT BE APPLIED AND THE FORUM OF ADJUDICATION CANNOT BE ANY FORUM CREATED UNDER THE AFORESAID ACTS. SO FAR AS THE QUESTIONS WHETHER THE RESPONDENT BELONGED TO A DESIGNATED TRADE, THE FOUNDATION OF THE CLAIM WAS A DECISION OF THE MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT IN M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD V. BASANT KUMAR PANDEY5. THE CORRECTNESS OF THAT JUDGMENT WAS TESTED IN U.P. SEB CASE4 AND IN PARA 61 OF- THE JUDGMENT, IT WAS CLEARLY OBSERVED THAT THIS COURT DID NOT AGREE WITH THE VIEW SUBSCRIBED BY THE MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT. 7. LOOKED AT FROM ANY ANGLE, THE JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT CANNOT BE MAINTAINED AND IS SET ASIDE. 8. THE APPEAL IS ALLOWED BUT WITHOUT ANY ORDER AS TO COSTS.