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2005 DIGILAW 14 (GAU)

Tadtana v. State of Arunachal Pradesh

2005-01-07

BIPLAB KUMAR SHARMA

body2005
JUDGMENT B.K. Sharma, J. 1. Both the Writ Petitions are in respect of order passed by the Election Tribunal, Arunachal Pradesh condoning the delay in filing the Election Petitions challenging the election of the writ Petitioners as members of the concerned Zilla Parishad. Since the facts and circumstances involved in both the writ petitions are the same, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. To avoid repetition of facts, more particularly when the question of law involved in both the writ petitions is the same, the facts involved in W.P. (C) No. 8321/2004 are only narrated below. 2. By a Notification dated 26.2.2003, The State Election Commissioner, Arunachal Pradesh notified the programme for election of members to all Gram Panchayat, Anchal Samity and Zilla Parishad constituencies in all the districts of Arunachal Pradesh. The last date of filing of nomination was scheduled on and 11.3.2003. The last date of withdrawal of nomination was fixed as 14.3.2003, while the date of polling was scheduled on 2.4.2003. However, as regards the dates relating to the filing and scrutiny of nominations, same, were later on modified re-fixing the same as 10.3.2003 and 12.3.2003 respectively. 3. The proceeding in W.P.(C) No. 8321/2004 is concerned with the X Toru Zilla Parishad in the district of Papum Pare. In respect of the said constituency only two nomination papers were filed who are the Petitioner and the Respondent No. 3. During scrutiny of the nomination papers filed by the Petitioner and the Respondent No. 3, the Petitioner's nomination was found to be valid, while the nomination of the Respondent No. 3 was found to be invalid and thus rejected. Such rejection was on the ground of disqualification of the Respondent No. 3 which he earned in view of the outstanding telephone bill and motor vehicle tax. The Returning Officer rejected the nomination of the Respondent No. 3 as per provisions of Rule 57(1) of the Arunachal Pradesh Panchayati (Conduct of Election) Rules 2001, in terms of which a candidate shall be disqualified for being a member of the Gram Panchayat, Anchal Samity and Zilla Parishad, if arrears of any kind are due by him to the Gram Panchayat/Anchal Samity/Zilla Parishad and the Government. 4. 4. Consequent upon rejection of nomination of the Respondent No. 3, the Petitioner alone remained in the fray and got elected uncontested and the Returning Officer in accordance with the provisions of Rule 22(b) of the aforesaid Rules published the list of candidates who were elected uncontested which included the Petitioner. 5. The Respondent No. 3 being aggrieved by such rejection of his nomination invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 2034/2003 praying for issuance of an appropriate writ for setting aside and quashing the rejection of his nomination by the Returning Officer and the election of the Petitioner. It will be pertinent to mention here that Rule 70 of the aforesaid Rules stipulates that the Election Tribunal shall enquire into every dispute relating to election. In the normal course the Respondent No. 3 ought to have approached the Tribunal towards redressal of his grievance in respect of rejection of his nomination. However, on the date when the Respondent No. 3 invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court, the Election Tribunal was not constituted. While entertaining the writ petition by the Principal Seat of this Court vide order dated 21.3.2003, the case records were ordered to be transmitted to Itanagar Bench and upon such transfer, the writ petition was renumbered as W.P. (C) No. 146 (AP)/2003. 6. When the matter rested thus, the State Government vide Notification dated 16.4.2003 constituted the Election Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of Section 122(3) of the Arunachal Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1997. It is the case of the Petitioner that with such constitution and establishment of the Election Tribunal, the Respondent No. 3 ought to have approached the Election Tribunal immediately thereafter, which he failed to do. Be it stated here that the period of limitation prescribed for filing an Election Petition before the Tribunal as per provisions of Rule 69(1) of the aforesaid Rules is 30 days from the date of declaration of the election results. According to the Petitioner, the period of 30 days for the Respondent No. 3 in raising his grievance before the Tribunal got expired on 16.5.2003 from the date of Constitution and establishment of the Tribunal w.e.f. 16.4.2003. Meanwhile, the Petitioner who was the Respondent filed his counter affidavit in the writ petition wherein the question of maintainability of the writ petition was also raised. Meanwhile, the Petitioner who was the Respondent filed his counter affidavit in the writ petition wherein the question of maintainability of the writ petition was also raised. The writ Petitioner also filed an application seeking certain amendment to the writ petition which was allowed by order dated 16.3.2003. According to the Petitioner, the Respondent No. 3 instead of bringing amendment etc. in the writ proceeding ought to have approached the Tribunal towards redressal of his grievance. 7. In due course, the writ petition was taken up for hearing and according to the Petitioner, the Respondent No. 3 instead of pursuing the matter on its merit took a position for remitting the entire matter to the Election Tribunal and to treat the writ petition as the Election Petition filed before the Tribunal. This Court by order dated 10.2.2004, remitted the writ petition along with four (4) other writ petitions to the Election Tribunal. In the order it was observed that on receipt of the writ petition, the Election Tribunal should treat the same as Election Petition under Rule 69(1) of the aforesaid Rules and that the Election Tribunal thereafter shall try the Election Petition in-accordance with the provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules and to pass appropriate orders. According to the Petitioner, the said order dated 10.2.204 was passed experte against him. The operative part of the aforesaid order dated 10.2.2004 is quoted below: In view of the submission of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, these writ petitions are disposed of with the following directions: (1) The writ petition be remitted to the Election Tribunal constituted by Notification dated 16.4.2003(....) (2) On receipt of these writ petitions, the Election Tribunal shall treat the same as Election petitions under Rule 69(1) of he Arunachal pradesh Panchayat Raj Act (Conduct of Election Rules) 2001 which was notified on 13.8.2002. The Election Tribunal, thereafter shall try the election petition in accordance with the provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules and thereafter pass an appropriate and reasoned orders in accordance with law. (3) The Election Tribunal shall dispose of these petitions within a period of two (2) months from the date of receipt of these petitions from this Registry. (4) The Election Tribunal shall issue notice to the parties fixing the date of their appearance before the Tribunal. With the above directions these writ petitions are disposed of. (3) The Election Tribunal shall dispose of these petitions within a period of two (2) months from the date of receipt of these petitions from this Registry. (4) The Election Tribunal shall issue notice to the parties fixing the date of their appearance before the Tribunal. With the above directions these writ petitions are disposed of. Registry is directed to transmit these writ petitions to the Election Tribunal at Itanagar and to reach the Tribunal by tomorrow i.e. 11.2.2004. Sd/- Judge 8. After transmission of the case records to the Tribunal, while issuing notice to the Petitioner, the Tribunal also directed to file written statement. In the written statement filed by the Petitioner, besides other grounds controverting the claim of the Respondent No. 3 he also took the plea of the Election Petition being barred by limitation prescribed under Rule 69(1) of the aforesaid Rules as noticed above according to which an Election Petition is required to be filed within 30 days from the date of publication of the Election results, which in the instant case were declared on 14.3.2003 on which date and even one month thereafter, the Election Tribunal was not constituted. It was only on 16.4.2003 the State Government constituted the Election Tribunal and taking this date to be the starting point for limitation, it is the case of the Petitioner that the limitation for the Respondent No. 3 stood expired on 16.5.2003. 9. The Election Tribunal while adjudicating upon the question of maintainability of the Election Petition on account of delay, by its order dated 12.3.2004 condoned the delay, if any in filing the Election Petition by the Respondent No. 3. The Tribunal condoned the delay, if any, taking into account the entire background into consideration and in view of the order passed by this Court. Being aggrieved by such condonation of delay, the Petitioner made a challenge to the same by filing W.P.(C) No. 2543/2004. The writ petition was disposed of upon hearing the parties by order dated 14.9.2004 setting aside the said order dated 12.3.2004 by which the delay was condoned. The matter was remanded back to the Tribunal with a direction to frame an issue regarding limitation or to hear the question of limitation as a preliminary issue. 10. The writ petition was disposed of upon hearing the parties by order dated 14.9.2004 setting aside the said order dated 12.3.2004 by which the delay was condoned. The matter was remanded back to the Tribunal with a direction to frame an issue regarding limitation or to hear the question of limitation as a preliminary issue. 10. The Election Tribunal once again took up the matter relating to limitation and upon hearing the parties, condoned the delay in filing the Election Petition by its order dated 8.11.2004 which according to the Petitioner is in perfunctory manner contrary to the provisions of the aforesaid Act and the Rules. It is the case of the Petitioner that the Tribunal passed the impugned order dated 8.11.2004 without recording the facts and circumstances. The reasons assigned by the Tribunal for such condonation of delay by the impugned order dated 8.11.2004 are stated to be the reasons assigned in Anr. Election Petition i.e. Case No. PRET-00031/2004. The Election Petitions with which the present proceedings are concerned have been numbered as Case Nos. PRET-00035/2004 and PRET-00032/2004 concerning election of the Petitioners as members of the Papum Pare Zilla Parishad from the X Torn Zilla Parishad Constituency and from the VII Sagalee Constituency respectively. 11. It is the legality and validity of the aforesaid impugned orders dated 8.11.2004 passed by the Tribunal condoning the delay if any in preferring the Election Petitions by the private Respondents in PRET-00035/2004 and PRET-00032/2004 which have been assailed by filing the instant writ petitions. The following grounds have been urged by the Petitioners: I) The electoral rights, which includes the right to challenge the election also, is not a fundamental right and is a right created by the statute and as such it will have to be enjoyed by following the due procedure laid down for the purpose. The private Respondents having failed to file the Election Petitions within the prescribed period of limitation, the same were liable to be dismissed summarily, but instead the Tribunal condoned the delay without jurisdiction. II) The Election Tribunal by its orders dated 8.11.2004 has condoned the delay in filing the Election Petition in a perfunctory manner contrary to the provisions of the Arunachal Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act and the Arunachal Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Conduct of Election) Rules, 2001. III) The reasons assigned for condonation of delay in Anr. II) The Election Tribunal by its orders dated 8.11.2004 has condoned the delay in filing the Election Petition in a perfunctory manner contrary to the provisions of the Arunachal Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act and the Arunachal Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Conduct of Election) Rules, 2001. III) The reasons assigned for condonation of delay in Anr. Election Petition i.e. Case No. PRET-00031/2004 could not have been assigned to be the reasons for condonation of delay in respect of the Election Petitions in question i.e. Case Nos. PRET-00035/2004 and PRET-00032/2004. IV) The provisions relating to filing of Election Petition within 30 days from the date of declaration of elections results i.e. Rule 69(1) of the said Rules of 2001 being mandatory, any petition filed after the expiry of he prescribed period of limitation is liable to be dismissed more particularly when the Rule does not confer upon the Election Tribunal the power to condone the delay. V) The legislature having specifically not incorporated any provision in respect of power to condone the delay in preferring the Election Petition as could be gathered from the aforesaid Rules of 2001, the Election Tribunal erred in law in assuming the role of the legislature in providing something towards condonation of delay which has been specifically not provided by the legislature. Such assumption of power of the Election Tribunal is ultra vires to the provision of Rules of 2001. VI) Rule 69(1) of the aforesaid Rules of 2001 divest the Election Tribunal from enquiring into any dispute raised by Election Petition filed after expiry of 30 days from the date of declaration of results. The Act and the Rules being complete and self-contained code, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable towards condonation of delay, if any, in filing the Election Petition. VII) The Election Tribunal illegally assumed jurisdiction invoking inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure placing reliance on Rule 70 of the Rules. Such assumption of jurisdiction invoking exercise of the inherent powers conferred by Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is contrary to the specific provisions made in the Act and the Rules. VIII) The Election Petition being not accompanied with any application for condonation of delay explaining the circumstances leading to delay in filing the Election Petition, the Tribunal could not have condoned the delay. VIII) The Election Petition being not accompanied with any application for condonation of delay explaining the circumstances leading to delay in filing the Election Petition, the Tribunal could not have condoned the delay. IX) Although at the time of filing the writ petition, the Election Tribunal was not constituted, but when the same was constituted and became functional pursuant to the Notification dated 16.4.2003, it was incumbent on the private Respondent to approach the Tribunal instead of pursuing the writ petition before this Court even by bringing amendment. X) Even if the contention of the private Respondents that the Tribunal became functional w.e.f. 5.5.2003 is accepted then also the period of limitation prescribed expired on 5.6.2003 and the private Respondents having not approached the Tribunal within the said period, the Election Petitions are not maintainable on account of delay. 12. In both the writ petitions, no separate counter affidavit have been filed by the Respondent but they placed reliance on Misc. Case No. 3279/2004 and Misc. Case No. 3280/2004 filed in W.P.(C) No. 8321/2004 and W.P.(C) No. 8322/2004 respectively. By the said Misc. applications, the private Respondents prayed for vacating the interim order passed by this Court in both the Writ Petitions stalling the further proceedings before the Election Tribunal. 13. I have heard Mr. H. Roy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. C. Baruah, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. R.K. Dutta and Mr. L. Sera, learned Govt. Advocate. I have also heard Mr. C.K. Sarma Barua, learned Advocate General, Arunachal Pradesh assisted by Ms. M. Bora, learned Govt. Advocate, Arunachal Pradesh. 14. Mr. Roy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner in his usual eloquence made submissions highlighting the aforementioned grounds. He submitted that the reasons assigned by the Tribunal towards condonation of delay are not available in an Election Petition. He submitted that a particular period of limitation having been prescribed under the Rules holding the field, Tribunal could not have condoned the delay in the manner and method in which the same has been done more particularly when there is no provision under the Rules to condone such delay. He placed reliance on the following decisions: i) (1976) 1 SCC 897 (Hari Shankar Tripathi v. Shiv Harsh and Ors.) ii) AIR 1957 SC 444 (Harish Ch. Bajpai v. Triloki Singh) iii) (1996) 6 SCC 199 (Danda Rajeshwari v. Bodavula Hanumayamma) iv) (1978) 2 SCC 559 (Balai Ch. He placed reliance on the following decisions: i) (1976) 1 SCC 897 (Hari Shankar Tripathi v. Shiv Harsh and Ors.) ii) AIR 1957 SC 444 (Harish Ch. Bajpai v. Triloki Singh) iii) (1996) 6 SCC 199 (Danda Rajeshwari v. Bodavula Hanumayamma) iv) (1978) 2 SCC 559 (Balai Ch. Hazra v. Shewdhari Jadav) v) (1982) 1 SCC 691 (Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghoshal) vi) (1999) 8 SCC 532 (Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Lal) vii) AIR 1963 All 518 (Rameshwar Dayal v. Sub Divisional Officer) viii) AIR 1974 All 178 (Sayed Ajaz Ali Khan v. Mohammad Rafiq) 15. Countering above arguments made on behalf of the Petitioner, Mr. C. Barua, learned senior counsel in his persuasive pursuits submitted that the instant proceedings have been initiated by the Petitioners only to gain time since they are the elected candidates. He submitted that after the order of remand remitting the writ petitions to the Tribunal with the direction to treat the same as the Election Petitions and the same being an inter-party order, there is no question of attributing any delay on the part of the private Respondents in approaching the Tribunal. He submitted that in view of the admitted position that at the time of filing the writ petitions, the Election Tribunal was not constituted and the writ petitions having been filed before expiry of 30 days from the date of declaration of election results and the same very writ petitions having been remanded back to the Tribunal with direction to treat the same as the Election Petition, there is no question of any delay in preferring the Election Petitions. He submitted that there is nothing wrong in the impugned orders and that the said orders will have to judged in the spirit on which the same were passed and having regard to the facts and circumstances involved in the case. 16. Mr. C.K. Sarma Barua, learned Advocate General, Arunachal Pradesh in his usual fairness submitted that although under the provisions of the Act and the Rules, no provision has been made for condonation of delay in filing the Election Petitions, in the instant case there is no question of any delay inasmuch as the writ petitions were filed well within the prescribed period of limitation and it is the same very writ petitions which have been remitted back to the Tribunal for adjudication by treating the same as the Election Petitions. He admitted that the Election Tribunal is not vested with the power envisaged under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, but is only to follow the procedure laid down in the Code. Countering the argument made on behalf of the Petitioners that the private Respondents ought to have approached the Election Tribunal within one month of the Tribunal becoming functional, Mr. Sarma Barua submitted that the provisions relating to limitation as prescribed in Rule 69 of the Rules cannot be construed in that manner and that the said provisions will have to be understood in the context in which the first order of remand was passed by this Court. He submitted that the said order of remand having not been challenged by the Petitioners, they are precluded from raising the grievance as has been raised in these proceedings. 17. Before dealing with the controversy involved in this proceeding in the given facts and circumstances, I feel it appropriate to deal with the decisions pressed into service by Mr. Roy to bring home his point of argument that the Election proceedings initiated by the private Respondent are clearly barred by limitation reminding myself of the well settled principle that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it (See Lord Halsbury N. Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 ACC 495). 18. In the case of Hari Shankar Tripathi (Supra) the Election Petition filed on the reopening day of the High Court after the summer vacation, although the period of limitation expired during the summer vacation of the High Court, was held to be in time. The Apex Court recorded its satisfaction that, that was a case in which Section 10 of the General Clauses Act was applicable. This case has been pressed into service to bring home the point of argument that the Respondents ought to have approached the Tribunal at least within one month from the date when the Tribunal became functional. 19. The Apex Court in the case of Harish Ch. This case has been pressed into service to bring home the point of argument that the Respondents ought to have approached the Tribunal at least within one month from the date when the Tribunal became functional. 19. The Apex Court in the case of Harish Ch. Bajpai (supra) had the occasion to deal with the argument that even if the Tribunal in that case did not have the power to order the amendment in question under Section 83(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, it was competent to do so under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As in the instant case, in that case also the trial of the Election Petition was to be in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure Code. In that case the application seeking amendment was made beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing Election Petitions. The Apex Court held that the suit on the claim ought to be raised would be barred on the date of the application would be a material element in deciding whether it should be allowed or not but would not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to grant it in exceptional circumstances. It was held that the procedure of the Court under the Code of Civil Procedure in which order 6 Rule 17 is comprised, is to apply subject to the provision of the Act and the Rules, and there being no power conferred on the Tribunal to extend the period of limitation prescribed, an order of amendment permitting new ground to be raised beyond the time limited by Section 81 and Rule 119 must contravene those provisions and is, in-consequence, beyond the ambit of authority conferred by Section 90(2). 20. The Apex Court while holding that under Section 83(3), the Tribunal had power to allow particulars in respect of illegal or corrupt practices to be amended and the Tribunal had power under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure to order amendment of a petition, but that power could not be exercised so as to permit new grounds to make it in substance a new petition if a fresh petition on those grounds would be barred. This decision has been pressed into service to buttress argument that the Tribunal could not have invoked the inherent power under Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure to condone the delay in filing the Election petition when admittedly the petition was barred by limitation as per provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of 2001. 21. In the case of Danda Rajeshwari (Supra) the High Court declined to investigate into disputed question of facts and refused to go into the question relegating the parties to pursue the remedies of election dispute. In the given circumstances, the High Court directed filing of the Election Petition within three weeks from the date of the disposal of the writ petition further directing the Tribunal not to go into question of limitation and instead decide the matter on merit. The question raised before the Apex Court was whether the direction issued by the High Court to file the Election Petition within three weeks from the date of the disposal of the writ petition and to decide the same without going into question of limitation was valid in law. The Apex Court upheld the direction of the High Court in the given facts situation of the case. This case has been pressed into service to buttress the argument that unlike that case, in the instant case in the order of remand there was no direction to condone the delay rather the matter was left open to be decided as per provision of Rule 69 and 70 of the Rules and thus it was open for the Petitioner to raise the question of limitation. 22. In the case of Balai Ch. Hazra (Supra) the Apex Court following its earlier decision held that the parties cannot by their mutual consent convert a proceeding before the High Court which had no inherent jurisdiction into a proper judicial process. The failure on the part of the Appellant to object to the High Court hearing the appeal in question was held to not clothe the Bench with jurisdiction. This case has been pressed into service in respect of the first order of remand passed by this Court directing the Election Tribunal to treat the writ petition as the Election Petition under Rule 69 and to decide the same under Rule 70 of the aforesaid Rules of 2001. This case has been pressed into service in respect of the first order of remand passed by this Court directing the Election Tribunal to treat the writ petition as the Election Petition under Rule 69 and to decide the same under Rule 70 of the aforesaid Rules of 2001. According to the Petitioner such remand of the writ petition even if held to be with the consent of the parties cannot clothe the Election Tribunal with the jurisdiction, which is otherwise barred by limitation. 23. The case of Jyoti Basu (supra) has been pressed into service to buttress the argument relating to the ground No. 1 mentioned above and to emphasis that an Election Petition is not an action at common law, nor in equity. It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law nor the principles of equity apply but only those rules which the statute makes and applies. It is a special jurisdiction and a special jurisdiction has always to be exercised in accordance with the statute creating it. The Apex Court further emphasized that the concepts familiar to common law and equity must remain stranger to election law unless statutorily embodied and that in the trial of election dispute Court is put in a strait-jacket. According to the Petitioner there being no scope for condonation of delay in filing the election Petition as per provision of Rule 69(1) of the Rules, The Tribunal could not have condoned the delay on the assigned reasons which are not at all applicable in election law. 24. In the case of Lachhman Das Arora (supra) the Apex Court reiterated the proposition that it is the duty of the Court to maintain the purity of the election process but at the same time there is no gain-saying that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and that the Court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds more particularly in the matter of filing of Election Petitions under the Statute. In that case the Election Petition was filed beyond the period of limitation and the dismissal of the Election Petition by the High Court on the ground of delay was held to be justified. 25. In that case the Election Petition was filed beyond the period of limitation and the dismissal of the Election Petition by the High Court on the ground of delay was held to be justified. 25. The two decisions of the Allahabad High Court on which the learned Counsel of the Petitioner placed reliance i.e. Rameshwar Dayal (supra) and Sayed Ajaz Ali Khan (supra) are also in respect of strict application of the election law. It was held that the inherent powers are of a Court and that an Election Tribunal is not a Court. The exercise of inherent jurisdiction is the attribute of a Court of law of general jurisdiction for every Court is constituted for the purpose of doing justice according to law and must be deemed to possess as a necessary corollary and as inherent in its very constitution, all such powers as may be necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice. It was held that an authority or Tribunal of limited jurisdiction not being a Court can have no inherent power unless the statute itself confers such power on them. In absence of any such conferment of power, the authority or Tribunal can pass only such orders as the provision of the Act under which they are created, provided for. 26. All the aforesaid decisions on which the learned Counsel for the Petitioners placed reliance are on strict application of the election law and lack of inherent jurisdiction and power on the part of the Election Tribunal. Applying the twin grounds, it is the case of the Petitioner that merely because the first order of remand of this Court permitted the Tribunal to proceed with the matter, same by itself will not confer a jurisdiction on the Tribunal not vested in it as per the provision of the aforesaid Act and the Rule. By strict application of the provision of Rule 69 of the Rules, when the Election Petition was not filed within the limitation prescribed, no amount of conferment of power even on consent which made the foundation of the first order of remand would vest the Tribunal with jurisdiction which is otherwise not vested in it. As observed above, the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions will have to be understood in the background of facts situation of those cases. 27. As observed above, the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions will have to be understood in the background of facts situation of those cases. 27. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the writ petitions were filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Rule 69 of the Rules at a time when the Election Tribunal as contemplated under the Act and the Rules were not even constituted and became functional. It was only after the filing of the writ petitions, the Election Tribunal was constituted by Notification dated 16.4.2003 and it became functional w.e.f. 5.5.2003. Thus here is a case, although the statute itself provided for limitation for approaching the Tribunal but the Tribunal itself under the same statute was not even constituted. At that point of time, the private Respondents were foru mless which forced them to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court. It is true that during the pendency of the writ proceeding, the election Tribunal came into existence and became functional. The moot question for determination will be whether the Petitioners ought to have immediately withdrawn the writ petitions and approached the Tribunal within one month of Constitution of the Tribunal. 28. The circumstances in which the writ petitions were filed will have to be borne in mind to answer questions raised by the Petitioners. It is an admitted position that at the time of filing the writ petitions, the Tribunal was not constituted and the writ petitions were filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Rule 69 of the Rules. After the constitution of the Tribunal by Notification dated 16.4.2003, it became functional w.e.f. 5.5.2003. The amendments were brought to the writ petitions after the Tribunal became functional which were allowed by this Court. Eventually by judgment and order dated 10.2.2004, all the writ petitions including the petitions filed by the private Respondents were remitted to the Election Tribunal. In the said order, this Court recorded the fact that at the time of rejection of nomination papers of the Petitioners, the Election Tribunal was not constituted and the Petitioners had to approach this Court as there was no Election Tribunal constituted by the State Government. It was also recorded in the order that the Election Tribunal was constituted only on 16.4.2003 by issuing Notification. It was also recorded in the order that the Election Tribunal was constituted only on 16.4.2003 by issuing Notification. After recording the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and the agreement arrived at, it was observed in the said judgment and order that the ends of justice would be met by remitting the writ petitions to the Election Tribunal. A further observation was made that the writ petitions be treated as the Election Petitions filed before the Tribunal. It was on that basis the directions contained in paragraph 7 of the judgment as quoted above were issued. 29. A reading of the said judgment and order more particularly the observations made in paragraph 6 of the judgment that the writ petitions be treated as Election Petitions filed before the Tribunal made the position clear. There is no denial that the writ petitions were filed within the prescribed period of limitation and the same very writ petitions were directed to be treated as Election Petitions filed before the Tribunal. If that be so, there is no question of any delay in approaching the Election Tribunal. It is in this context, the directions issued in paragraph 7 of the judgment will have to be understood. The whole intention and purpose of the said judgment and order was to treat the writ petitions as the Election Petitions before the Tribunal contemplated under Rule 69 of the Rules. The Election Tribunal was directed to try the Election Petitions in-accordance with the provision of Rule 70 of the Rules and to dispose of the same within two months. On a composite reading to the said judgment and order and the directions contained therein, I am of the considered opinion that since the writ petitions themselves were directed to be treated as the Election Petitions filed before the Tribunal, and when the writ petitions were filed before this Court within the period of limitation prescribed, there is no question of raising the plea of delay in approaching the Tribunal. Otherwise the observations and directions made in the said judgment and order dated 10.2.2004 become meaningless. 30. Otherwise the observations and directions made in the said judgment and order dated 10.2.2004 become meaningless. 30. The whole emphasis made on behalf of the Petitioners is on the basis of the order dated 14.9.2004 passed in the subsequent writ petitions filed by the Petitioners in respect of the orders dated 12.3.2004 by which the Tribunal rejected the plea raised on behalf of the Petitioners that the Election Petitions were time barred. The Tribunal, while recording the objection regarding the limitation, condoned the delay, if any, taking into account the background of the case and the aforesaid judgment and order dated 10.2.2004. The petitioners made a challenge to the same by filing writ petitions which were disposed of by order dated 14.9.2004. In the said order, the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the impugned orders relating to condonation of delay were passed without hearing the writ Petitioner was recorded. It was in that context the question of limitation was kept open in the said order dated 14.9.2004. While setting aside the earlier order dated 12.3.2004 passed by the Tribunal a direction was issued to frame an issue regarding limitation or to hear the question of limitation as a preliminary issue and thereafter to pass necessary order as deem fit and proper. 31. Pursuant to the said order dated 14.9.2004, the Tribunal by the impugned order dated 8.11.2004 condoned the delay in preferring the Election Petitions. It took into account the fact that the Petitioners could not file any petitions before the Tribunal making a grievance against the rejection of their nominations since the Tribunal was not constituted at that point of time. It also noticed that the writ petitions were filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Rule 69 of the Rules and that the Tribunal became functional w.e.f. 5.5.2003. It is true that the Tribunal while dealing with the question of delay referred to the inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, at the same time it took into consideration the attending circumstances including the demand of the situation to meet the ends of justice. It is true that the Tribunal while dealing with the question of delay referred to the inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, at the same time it took into consideration the attending circumstances including the demand of the situation to meet the ends of justice. Merely because the Tribunal interfered that it might exercise the inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it cannot be said, on a reading of the impugned order dated 8.11.2004 that the Tribunal did something beyond the scope of its power and jurisdiction. 32. The entire arguments made on behalf of the Petitioners centering around the question of limitation will have to be tested in the touchstone of the peculiar facts and circumstances involved in the case. It is not a case of approaching the writ Court bypassing the Tribunal at the first instance. The writ petitions were filed challenging the legality and validity of the rejection of nominations by the Returning Officer at a time when the Tribunal itself was not constituted although contemplated under the Act and the Rules. It became functional w.e.f. 5.5.2003 after its constitution by Notification dated 16.4.2003. At that time the writ petitions were pending. Those very writ petitions were transmitted to the Tribunal by the aforesaid judgment and order dated 10.2.2004 directing the Tribunal to treat the same as Election Petitions. If that be so, the writ petitions having been filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Rule 69 of the Rules, there is no question of any delay in preferring the writ petitions. 33. The argument now being advanced like the Petitioners bringing amendment to the writ petitions even after constitution of the Tribunal and that the Petitioners ought to have approached the Tribunal within one month of its becoming functional etc. were not advanced towards disposal of the writ petitions by judgment and order dated 10.2.2004. It was rather agreed by the parties that the ends of justice would be met if the writ petitions themselves were transmitted to the Tribunal and to treat the same as the Election Petitions filed before the Tribunal. The subsequent order of this Court passed on 14.9.2004 will have to be understood in that context only. By the said order dated 14.9.2004, the earlier order dated 10.2.2004 did not get reviewed. The subsequent order of this Court passed on 14.9.2004 will have to be understood in that context only. By the said order dated 14.9.2004, the earlier order dated 10.2.2004 did not get reviewed. On perusal of the order dated 14.9.2004, it will go to show that the sequence of events leading to the filing of the writ petitions by the private Respondents and the events thereafter leading to the passing of the order dated 7.10.2004 were not discussed, rather it was recorded that the earlier order of condonation of delay was passed without hearing the writ Petitioners. It was in that context while setting aside the order of condonation of delay, the matter was remanded back to the Tribunal to decide the question of limitation afresh either by framing an issue regarding limitation or to hear the question of limitation as a preliminary issue and thereafter to pass necessary order. 34. If the arguments advanced by the Petitioners towards assailing the impugned order dated 8.11.2004 which were also available at the time of passing of the earlier orders are to be accepted, there could not have been any occasion to remand the matter back to the Tribunal as was done by order dated 14.9.2004 passed by this Court. In any case the said order dated 14.9.2004 cannot be said to obliterate or review the earlier order dated 10.2.2004. Both the orders will have to be understood in the context in which they were passed. The grounds with which the Petitioners now claim to clothe with on the factual aspect of the matter supported with the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court and the High Court certainly could have been argued in both the earlier two writ proceedings. It is Anr. thing as to whether such argument could be sustained under the given facts situation of the case or not. However, it appears that no such grounds were urged when the earlier batch of writ petitions were disposed of by judgment and order dated 10.2.2004. The matter attained finality with the passing of the order dated 10.2.2004 in terms of which the writ petitions themselves were directed to be treated as Election Petitions filed before the Tribunal. If that be so, there is no question of any delay in preferring the Election Petitions when the writ petitions were filed within the period of limitation prescribed in Rule 69 of the Rules. If that be so, there is no question of any delay in preferring the Election Petitions when the writ petitions were filed within the period of limitation prescribed in Rule 69 of the Rules. 35. In the aforesaid circumstances there was no question of raising any objection by the Petitioners in respect of alleged delay in filing the Election Petition. However, on twin grounds of not giving an opportunity of hearing to the Petitioners and not framing an issue relating to limitation, this Court interfered with the earlier order of the Tribunal by which observation was made regarding condonation of delay, if any in preferring the Election Petition. Without going into merit of the case, and the sequence of events as narrated in the earlier order dated 10.2.2004, this Court by order dated 14.9.2004 remanded back the matter to the Tribunal for a fresh decision on the question of limitation. Under the said given circumstances, the Tribunal by the impugned order dated 8.11.2004, held the Election Petitions to be not barred by limitation and rightly so in view of the sequence of event narrated above, more particularly in view of the earlier order of this Court dated 10.2.2004. A matter which attained its finality cannot be allowed to be reopened with the kind of interpretation now sought to be given by the Petitioners on the strength of the subsequent order passed by this Court on 14.9.2004. This will naturally lead to the irresistible conclusion that the decisions on which the Petitioners placed reliance to back the said interpretation will have no application to the present facts situation involved in this proceeding. 36. Even in the case of Danda Rajeshwari (supra) on which the learned Counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance, the Apex Court under similar circumstances did not interfere with the direction of the High Court in that case to file Election Petition within three weeks from the date of disposal of the writ petition. The question raised in that case, was, whether the direction issued by the High Court without going into question of limitation was valid in law. As in the instant case, in that case also the Apex Court noticed that in a matter relating to election, the remedy is a statutory remedy and limitation is one of the conditions to entertain Election Petition and that by judicial order the limitation cannot be nullified. As in the instant case, in that case also the Apex Court noticed that in a matter relating to election, the remedy is a statutory remedy and limitation is one of the conditions to entertain Election Petition and that by judicial order the limitation cannot be nullified. However, it observed that the High Court did not lack in its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It did not interfere with the direction of the High Court providing filing of Election Petition within three weeks from the date of disposal of the writ petition. In that case, the High Court issued further direction to the Tribunal not to go into the question of limitation and instead decide the matter on merits. The Apex Court also distinguished the ratio of the decision in Kirloskar Pnumatic Company Case as reported in (1996) 4 SCC 453 which was pressed into service to bring home the point of argument that the High Court could not have directed filing of Election Petition ignoring the limitation. 37. As in the said case, providing of filing of Election Petition, in the instant case also the writ petitions themselves were transmitted to the Election Tribunal with direction to treat the same as the Election Petitions. Thus the continuity from the date of filing of the writ petition which was admittedly within the prescribed limitation under Rule 69 of the Rules was maintained and as such there was no question of any delay in filing the Election Petitions. It was only in that view of the matter, the directions were issued in the order dated 10.2.2004 and such view of the matter cannot be said to be obliterated by the subsequent order of this Court passed on 14.9.2004. The said order dated 14.9.2004 cannot be read in isolation dehors the sequence of events involved in the case and the earlier order dated 10.2.2004 passed on that basis. 38. Merely because some of the observations made by the Tribunal towards passing the impugned order are capable of construing in a particular manner, the context in which the same was passed and the overall circumstances involved in this case cannot be ignored. The Petitioners cannot be made remediless on the basis of the kind of interpretation sought to be given by the Petitioner raising the question of delay in filing the Election Petitions. The Petitioners cannot be made remediless on the basis of the kind of interpretation sought to be given by the Petitioner raising the question of delay in filing the Election Petitions. I am of the considered opinion that the acceptance of the arguments advanced on behalf of the Petitioners will lead to injustice rendering the private Respondents remediless in the matter of raising the election disputes. Justice not only be done, but must appear to be done. 39. It is true that the election law is required to apply in its strict sense but the facts and circumstances involved in this case absolve the private Respondents from such strict application and the decisions on which the Petitioners placed reliance towards such application are of no consequence. As noticed above, ratio of a decision will have to be understood in the background of the facts of that case. A case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. 40. For the foregoing reasons and discussions, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order dated 8.11.2004 passed by the Election Tribunal, Arunachal Pradesh in the concerned Election Petitions. Consequently, both the writ petitions stand dismissed. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances involved in the case, there shall be no order as to cost. Petition dismissed.