JAYANT PATEL, J. ( 1 ) THE short facts of the case are the petitioners are claiming the tenancy rights over the land in question admeasuring 4 acres 13 gunthas bearing S. Mo. 369 at village Khanva taluka Jambusar and the land admeasuring 1 acre 20 gunthas bearing S. No. 371 at village Khanva,tal. Jambusar. Since common questions arise both these petitions are considered by this common judgment. ( 2 ) IT appears that the father of the petitioner was the tenant of lands in question and as per the say of the petitioner after the death of the father of the petitioner the petitioner continued with the possession over the land in question. As per the respondent landlord the tenancy rights were surrendered on 26. 5. 1950 and the same was before Aval Karkun who was the then competent authority and as per the order, dated 3. 7. 1950 such surrender was recorded as voluntary and the tenancy rights were terminated. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner has continued to be in possession of the land in question whereas it is the case of the respondent landlord that after surrendering tenancy the village Form 7 and 12 shows the cultivation by the respondent landlord. ( 3 ) IT appears that the petitioners preferred Civil Suit No. 868/81 in the court of Civil Judge (JD) at Jambusar for protecting the possession and in the said suit it was contended by the petitioners herein interalia that there is tenancy right over the land in question. The claim of the petitioner was denied by the landlord and therefore the civil court had to decide the question in respect of the rights of the petitioners herein as tenants. It appears that the reference is made to the competent authority under Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act), i. e. Mamalatdar and ALT who ultimately registered the case as Tenancy Case No. 4/82 and on 24. 6. 1982 the Mamalatdar and ALT passed order whereby it has been observed that the plaintiff has proved the possession and it has been further found that the proper procedure for surrendering of tenancy rights is not followed and therefore it is declared that the tenancy of the petitioners is not terminated and the petitioners continue as the tenants of the land in question. It appears that the appeal was preferred against the order of the Mamalatdar before the Dy. Collector being Tenancy Appeal No. 9/82 and the said appeal came to be allowed as per order, dated 10. 5. 1983. The matter was further carried in revision before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and as per the judgment, dated 9. 11. 1983 in Revision No. 953/83 the matter was remanded to the Dy. Collector for fresh hearing of the appeal. It appears that thereafter the Dy. Collector passed the order on 13/20. 1. 1984 whereby he held that the claim of petitioner as tenant is raised after 30 years and no proper evidence is produced and that the tenancy was voluntarily surrendered and the petitioner is not the tenant of the land in question. It appears that the matter was, once again, carried before the Revenue Tribunal by preferring revision by the petitioner being Revision No. 294/84 and 295/84. The tribunal confirmed the order of the Dy. Collector and did not find case for interference and the revisions were dismissed. It appears that the matters were carried before this court by preferring Special Civil Application Nos 6197 and 6198/84 by the petitioners and as per order dated 22. 1. 1985 passed by this court, the orders passed by the Dy. Collector as well as by the Gujarat Revenue tribunal were quashed and the matters were remanded to the tribunal for fresh decision in accordance with law considering the oral and documentary evidence. It may be recorded that the aforesaid order, dated 22. 1. 1985 came to be passed by this court upon the consent of both the parties. It appears that thereafter the Asst. Collector considered the matter and passed the order on 30. 4. 1985 whereby it has been held that the possession is of the petitioner and proper procedure for surrendering the tenancy is not followed and the surrendering of tenancy is illegal and it is observed that the petitioner is the tenant of the land and ultimately the order passed by the Mamalatdar is confirmed. It appears that the matters were carried before the revenue tribunal in revision by the landlord by preferring revision application Nos 468 and 483/85. It appears that the matters were carried before the revenue tribunal in revision by the landlord by preferring revision application Nos 468 and 483/85. The tribunal has found that surrendering of the tenancy is in the year 1950 and therefore the provisions of amendment made in the year 1956 would not be applicable and the only procedure which was required to be followed was as per the Rule 2a of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") and no elaborate formalities were required to be followed while surrendering the tenancy rights. The tribunal further found that the surrendering of the tenancy was legal and proper and the Mamalatdar in the subsequent proceedings should not have reviewed the earlier decision and the tribunal also recorded that as the position of law is clear. The tribunal observed that other evidence, oral as well as documentary, presented by the two parties before the Mamalatdar was not required to be considered and ultimately the tribunal has allowed the revision and declared that the petitioner was not a tenant in respect of the disputed land. It is, under these circumstances, the petitioners have preferred these petitions before this court. ( 4 ) HEARD Mr. Sunil Mehta for Mr. S. K. Bukhari for the petitioner in both the petitions and Mr. J. M. Patel appearing for the respondent-landlord in both the petitions. ( 5 ) ON the question of surrendering of tenancy in the year 1950 by the father of the petitioner is concerned, the reasons recorded by the tribunal at para 7 appear to be proper in as much as the tribunal was right in holding that in the yea 1950 the provisions of amended Section 15 which has been inserted in Statute book in the year 1956 was not there. The tribunal has recorded that the procedure as required under Rule 2a of Rules, 1949 was required to be followed. The decision of the tribunal shows that there is no further discussion on the aspect regarding the procedure to be followed and actually followed by the authority while accepting the surrendering of tenancy. As the litigation is of 1982 instead of remanding the matter to the tribunal, I also have heard the learned advocates for both the sides on the question of procedure to be followed and actually followed by the authority as per Rules of 1949. As the litigation is of 1982 instead of remanding the matter to the tribunal, I also have heard the learned advocates for both the sides on the question of procedure to be followed and actually followed by the authority as per Rules of 1949. ( 6 ) RULE 2a of Rules, 1949 as submitted by the learned counsel appearing for respondent reads as under:"2-A. Manner of verifying surrender of tenancy: The Mamalatdar when verifying a surrender of a tenancy by a tenant in favour of the landlord under clause (b) of subsection (30 of section 5 shall satisfy himself, after such enquiry as he thinks fit, that the tenant understands the nature and consequences of the surrender and also that it is voluntary, and shall endorse his finding in that behalf upon the document of surrender. "the order passed by the authority while accepting the procedure for surrendering the tenancy rights reads as under:"jilu Mastu and Mastu Ajab have been registered as protected tenants of S. No. 371 and 369 of Kahava respectively. Mastu was expired and so S. No. 369 is cultivated by Jilu Mastu being his son and heir. Jilu Mastu admits to have willingly surrendered tenancy rights of both these S. Nos in favour of the occupants. I Order that the tenancy right of Jilu Mastu and Mastu Ajab are being terminated and their names should be removed from R. R as protected tenants of S. Nos 371 and 364 at Kahanva respectively. "therefore, the surrender of tenancy rights of both persons in favour of occupants is recorded and it is ordered that the tenancy rights of Jilu Mastu and Mastu Ajab are terminated. The reliance placed by the Mamalatdar while passing the order dated 24. 6. 1982 upon the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Ramchandra Keshav Adke (dead) by LRs vs Govind Joti Chavare and Ors reported in AIR 1975 SC 915 was erroneous because in the said case the surrendering of tenancy was in the year 1953. It appears that the procedure as required under Rule 2a of Rules of 1949 was followed and therefore the tribunal has not committed any error apparent on the face of record to that extent which may call for interference by this court in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It appears that the procedure as required under Rule 2a of Rules of 1949 was followed and therefore the tribunal has not committed any error apparent on the face of record to that extent which may call for interference by this court in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 7 ) HOWEVER, it appears that the tribunal in its impugned order has recorded that in view of the provisions of law it is not necessary to go into the other aspects of evidence, oral as well as documentary, presented by both parties before the Mamalatdar. It appears that as such when the petitioner is claiming the right as tenant over the land in question, as contended in the civil suit, incidentally while considering the question of tenancy on the date of the suit, it may be required to be considered the rights of the petitioner as in possession of the land in question even if the tenancy is validly surrendered in the year 1950. I would have considered the matter on the said aspects, however, the learned counsel appearing for respondent-landlord Mr. Patel submitted that there was no claim by the petitioner herein before the Mamalatdar that his tenancy is on account of fresh tenancy after 1950 or there is any right with the petitioner under section 32 (O) due to continuation of possession after surrendering of the tenancy and therefore he submitted that this court may not consider the said aspects as it was not contended by the petitioner even before the Mamalatdar. Mr. Mehta, Ld. advocate for the petitioner submitted that the tribunal ought to have gone into the aspects of possession because the petitioner has established the possession of the land in question including the house constructed by the petitioner over the land in question and therefore he submitted that as per the petitioner, as a matter of fact, the surrendering of tenancy was not acted upon and the petitioner has continued to be in possession of the land in question. It appears from the order of the Mamalatdar that the claim of the petitioner was as tenant in the possession of the land in question. One of the defences of the respondent landlord in the suit appears to be that the tenancy is terminated. It appears from the order of the Mamalatdar that the claim of the petitioner was as tenant in the possession of the land in question. One of the defences of the respondent landlord in the suit appears to be that the tenancy is terminated. Therefore, the reference is made by the civil court on the point as to whether the petitioner is tenant of the land in question or not. Even if it is considered that the tenancy was terminated in the year 1950 and when there was valid surrender of tenancy then also the factum of establishing the possession over the land in question by the petitioner before the Mamalatdar and the said finding confirmed by the Dy. Collector and not upset by the tribunal can not be ignored for the purpose of rights of the petitioner, if any, on the basis that after surrendering of tenancy in the year 1950, the petitioner has continued to be in possession of the land in question and consequently the rights pertaining thereto including the right to purchase the land as per section 32 (O) of the Act. It appears that it is an admitted position that the petitioner at any point of time uptil now has not made any application for such purpose before the competent authority under section 32 (O) of the Act. Therefore, I find it proper to leave the matter at that stage without observing further on the said aspects. Suffice it to say that it will be for the competent authority and/or to the civil court to decide the matter in accordance with law as and when such question arises for its consideration at an appropriate time. ( 8 ) IN view of the above, subject to aforesaid observations, both the petitions are dismissed. Rule in each petition is discharged. Considering the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. .