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2005 DIGILAW 1412 (MAD)

Pachaiammal & Others v. The District Collector

2005-08-23

A.KULASEKARAN, MARKANDEY KATJU

body2005
Judgment :- (Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 22.10.2002 passed in Writ Petition No.10246 of 1996.) Markandey Katju, C.J. This writ appeal has been filed against the impugned order of the learned single Judge dated 22.10.2002 passed in Writ Petition No.10246 of 1996. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record. 3. The appellants/writ petitioners challenged the notification under Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') published in the Gazette on 15.2.1996 by the respondent in respect of the land comprised in Survey No.129/1/A2 and Survey No.132/2/E1 of 185 Sooradimangalm Village, Chengai MGR District and to quash the same. 4. The sole contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants, which was also the sole contention in the writ petition was that there was no Harijan Welfare Scheme in existence and hence the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was illegal. 5. We regret our inability to accept this contention. 6. Section 4(1) of the Act states as follows: “4. Power to acquire land. -(1) Where the District Collector is satisfied that for the purpose of any Harijan Welfare Scheme, it is necessary to acquire any land, he may acquire the land by publishing in the District Gazette a notice to the effect that he has decided to acquire the land in pursuance of this section." 7. A perusal of Section 4(1) of the Act shows that the notification under that provision can be issued provided the District Collector is satisfied that it is necessary to acquire any land for the purpose of any Harijan Welfare Scheme. 8. Two things can be noted from Section 4(1) of the Act. Firstly, the satisfaction required under Section 4(1) of the Act is that of the District Collector and not of the petitioner. No doubt, if it can be pleaded and proved that there was no such satisfaction at all then the notification would be bad in law. However, in this case, there is not even an averment in any paragraph of the writ petition that there was no satisfaction of the District Collector that the aforesaid land was required for the purpose of a Harijan Welfare Scheme. However, in this case, there is not even an averment in any paragraph of the writ petition that there was no satisfaction of the District Collector that the aforesaid land was required for the purpose of a Harijan Welfare Scheme. All that has been stated in paragraph 7 of the petitioners' affidavit is that there was no Harijan Welfare Scheme warranting acquisition of the land in question. In our opinion, such a pleading is not sufficient to challenge the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. There must be a specific averment in a writ petition challenging the validity of the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act that there was no satisfaction of the District Collector that the land in question was required for the purpose of a Harijan Welfare Scheme. Such an allegation is different from the allegation that in fact there was no Harijan Welfare Scheme when the notification under Section 4(1) was issued. The Harijan Welfare Scheme can come into existence in future also even after the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is issued, and it is not necessary that such a scheme must exist prior to the said notification. This is because Section 4(1) of the Act only requires that the District Collector must be satisfied that the land in question is required for a Harijan Welfare Scheme, but there is no further requirement that the Harijan Welfare Scheme must exist prior to the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. 9. If we are to hold that the Scheme must exist on or before the issuance of the notification under Section 4(1) we will be adding words to the statute, because then Section 4(1) will read as follows:- “Where the District Collector is satisfied that for any Harijan Welfare Scheme which is in existence it is necessary to acquire any land ……..” 10. Thus, in the garb of interpretation the Court will be adding the words “which is in existence” in Section 4(1), which is not permissible. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that the Court should neither add nor delete words from a statute. 11. In State of Jharkhand Vs. Thus, in the garb of interpretation the Court will be adding the words “which is in existence” in Section 4(1), which is not permissible. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that the Court should neither add nor delete words from a statute. 11. In State of Jharkhand Vs. Govind Singh, JT 2004 (10) SC 349 the Supreme Court (vide paragraphs 10 and 11) observed:- “When the words of a Statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said (See also J.P.Bansal Vs. State of Rajasthan, JT 2003 (3) SC 169). As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As was noted by the Privy Council in Crawford Vs. Spooner, (1846) 6 Moore PC 1: ‘We cannot aid the Legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there’. The view was reiterated by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills, JT 1990 (4) SC 430 and State of Gujarat Vs. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel, JT 1998 (2) SC 253. Speaking briefly the Court cannot reframe the legislation, as noted in J.P.Bansal’s Case (Supra), for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate”. 12. The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in Padma Sundara Rao Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2002) 3 SCC 533 =2003-3-L.W.427 (vide paragraphs 12 and 14) wherein it was observed that “the Courts cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous”. 13. 12. The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in Padma Sundara Rao Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2002) 3 SCC 533 =2003-3-L.W.427 (vide paragraphs 12 and 14) wherein it was observed that “the Courts cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous”. 13. The notification in question being the notification dated 15.2.1996 states as follows: " Whereas, it appears to the Government of Tamil Nadu that the land specified in the schedule below and situated in 181 Pudupattinam village, Chengalpattu Taluk, Chengalpattu M.G.R. District is needed for the purpose of Adi-dravidar Welfare Scheme, to wit for the provision of house-sites to Adi-dravidars, notice to that effect is hereby given to all to whom it may concern in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Lands for Adi-dravidar Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 (Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1978);" 14. Thus, the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act specifically states that the land in question is needed for Adi-dravidar Welfare Scheme which is undisputably a Harijan Welfare Scheme as the Adi-dravidas are Harijans and it is needed for providing house-sites to them. 15. It is well settled in Administrative Law that when there is a recital in an order regarding the satisfaction of the authority concerned required by the Statute, then this recital places a heavy burden on the writ petitioner to prove that such a factual recital is baseless vide Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 (paragraph 60) which followed the decision of the Federal Court in Emperor v. Shibnath Banerjee, AIR 1945 FC 75 (page 92) 16. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd v. State Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1961 SC 1381 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed (vide paragraph 11): - " The difference between a case where a general order contains a recital on the face of it and one where it does not contain such a recital is that in the latter case the burden is thrown on the authority making the order to satisfy the Court by other means that the conditions precedent were fulfilled, but in the former case the Court will presume the regularity of the order including the fulfilment of the conditions precedent; and then it will be for the party challenging the legality of the order to show that the recital was not correct and that the conditions precedent were not in fact complied with by the authority: ( see the observations of Spens, C.J in Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee, 1944 FCR 1 at p.42 (AIR 1943 FC 75 at p.92) which were approved by the Privy Council in Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee 1945 FCR 195 at pp. 216-17: (AIR 1945 PC 156 at p.161). 17. In the present case, in our opinion, the petitioners have not been able to discharge that heavy burden on them. 18. Moreover there is no averment in the petition that before publishing the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act proceedings under Section 4(2) of the Act had not been taken. 19. For the reason given above, there is no merit in this writ appeal and it is dismissed.