Judgment Rajesh Balia, J.-The Writ Petition No. 1484/1998 has been filed by the three appellants-petitioner for following reliefs:- (i)by an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may be directed to give appointment to the petitioners on the post of Teacher Grade III with effect from 30th March, 1998 with all consequential benefits including salary, fixation, seniority etc. (ii) by an appropriate writ, order or direction, the cut off date fixed by the respondents for issuing appointment orders as 23.1998 be declared illegal and be struck down. (iii)any other appropriate order or direction, which this Honble Court considers just and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case, may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioners. (iv) costs of the writ petition may kindly be awarded to the petitioner. 2. The petition has arisen in the following circumstances:- The respondents had invited applications for recruitment to the post of Teacher Grade III in Dungarpur District for academic session 1997-98. The petitioners being eligible for the said recruitment, applied for the same. As a result of selection process, a select list was prepared by the respondent No. 4 , in which, the names of petitioners were placed at Sl. No. 76, 79 and 81 respectively. The respondent No. 4 had issued appointment orders in respect of selected candidates in different categories and the last appointment order was issued on 24th March, 1998 and the appointment order in the general category was issued up to SI. No. 74 amongst the selected candidates in order of merit. The appointed candidates were to join duties by 10th April 1998. The petitioners, having come to know that some of the selected candidates were working elsewhere and were not willing to accept the appointment under the Education Department, approached them and four persons who were enlisted at Sl. No. 63,66, 69 and 70 gave their intention not to join the post in pursuance of appointments offered to them. The candidate whose name was placed in order of merit at Sl. No 75, immediately next to one who was lastly offered appointment, was working at Panchayat Samiti Pipalkhunt, District Banswara and she also showed her unwillingness to accept the appointment under the Education Department at Dungarpur. The copies of the refusal letters addressed to the District Education Officer (Primary Education) No. 1, Dungarpur (Rajasthan) by the aforesaid five candidates have been placed on record. The copies of the refusal letters addressed to the District Education Officer (Primary Education) No. 1, Dungarpur (Rajasthan) by the aforesaid five candidates have been placed on record. These refusal letters were submitted by the petitioners on 28th March, 1998. The respondent No. 4, who was the appointing authority, showed his willingness to give appointment to the petitioners in order of their merit in their respective categories and sought approval from the respondent No. 3 vide his letter dated 30th March, 1998. This letter which has been annexed to the writ petition shows that on account of non-joining, 8 posts were to remain vacant against which appointment could be given to 8 persons named in the letter in order of their merit in different categories. Out of 8 vacant posts, 6 posts belonged to the General Category and 2 posts to the Reserve Category. However, the respondent No. 3 declined to accede this request of the Education Officer, appointing authority, inter alia, on the ground that the appointment order, in pursuance of relaxation in ban on fresh appointment , should have been issued only on or before 24th March, 1998 and since this proposal has been sent after 24th March, 1998, in terms of Government directions dated 24th February, 1998 no appointment order could be issued. 3. It may be noticed here that in the Advertisement inviting applications, in pursuance of which the select list was prepared, was to remain operative until 31st March, 1998 and as per that Notification, the select list would expire on 31st March, 1998. It is for that reason the cut off date fixed in the Advertisement was also challenged, inter alia, on the ground that the fixation of cut off date i.e. select list was to operate till 31st March, 1998 is irrational and the same could be operative after 31st March, 1998. 4. In reply submitted to the writ petition, the aforesaid facts have not been denied. The principal plea, which has been taken in various replies in identical cases, made in the writ petition that as per the Government Orders, after 23.1998 the appointment order cannot be issued and therefore, the respondent No. 3 has not given permission for the appointment as against vacant posts because the permission was sought after 24th March, 1998 i..e. on 30th March, 1998, and that the petitioners have no right to seek a mandamus for appointment. 5. The writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide Judgment under appeal dated 8th January, 1999. The learned Single Judge opined that the select list had admittedly expired on 31st March, 1998 and the petitioners have filed this writ petition subsequent to the expiry of the said select list, no relief can be granted to them. It is on this premise that the select list expired on 31st March, 1998, the learned Single Judge was also of the opinion that since the selected candidates were to join their duties up to 10th April, 1998, the appointing authority was clear in its mind not to offer any appointment to the persons whose names appeared below Sl. No. 74 in the select list. The learned Single Judge also opined that the respondent No. 4 had wrongly and illegally accepted the affidavits of refusal to accept offer of appointment by aforesaid candidates submitted by the petitioners. 6. It may further be noticed that the learned Single Judge has also stated that though in the writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the validity of cut-off dated, i.e. 33.1998 but at the time of hearing Mr. M.S. Singhvi, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, has given-up this prayer and he instead contended that from the orders placed by the respondents the selection list was to remain operative until 35.1998 and that in case the four selected candidates had refused to join the posts, the petitioners were entitled to get employment and respondents have illegally deprived the petitioners of their legitimate rights. 7. At the outset, we may notice that the foundation of the Judgment under appeal is that select list expired on 33.1998 because of the ban imposed by the State Government. The learned Single Judge has also opined that the cut-off date of 31st March, 1998 has not been challenged by the petitioners but the relief of extension of proceeding for issuing appointment orders up to 24th March, 1998 only granted when the select list was operative until 31st March, 1998, otherwise on the foundation that during the currency, a ban has been imposed by the Government not to offer appointment after 24th March, 1998. In support of this, it was opined that the select list has expired on 31st March, 1998 and a ban was imposed on 24th March, 1998, therefore, no appointment could be offered. In support of this, it was opined that the select list has expired on 31st March, 1998 and a ban was imposed on 24th March, 1998, therefore, no appointment could be offered. It has been assumed that the petitioners had given up the challenge to the cut-off date obviously while contending grounds that the cut-off date cannot be considered to be 31st March, 1998 in the present circumstances but it was to continue to be a operative select list. The learned Single Judge has assumed that the fixation of the cut-off date for the period of select list has not been challenged by the learned Counsel , no relief can be granted to the petitioners. 8. The principal controversy here is that once the appointing authority has decide to offer a specific number of appointment up to the candidates finding place in order of merit, in the present case up to Sl. No. 74, i.e. to say having decided to fill-in the vacancies by offering appointment but some of them did not join, can the appointing authority declined to fill-in all 74 vacancies, even by no offering appointment to the candidates finding place in the select list against the vacancies remaining unfilled merely because the appointing authority had decided not to fill-in any post. 9. We may notice here that there has been a great deal of emphasis on the cut-off date i.e. 31st March, 1998 and which is the burden of the Judgment under appeal before the learned Single Judge. On earlier occasions, when the matter came up before this Court on 10th February, 2004 and 15th January, 2004, the respondents were directed to file the Government Order dated 24th February, 1998 referred in the order dated 21st March, 1998 (Annexure -R/1) on the basis of which it was argued that while relaxing the ban on fresh appointment, the Government has directed to offer appointment only up to 24th March, 1998 and not thereafter. On 10th February, 2004, the Court made it clear that the order has not so far been produced nor any satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the Counsel appearing for the State and it was recorded that if the order is not made available to the Court on the next date, it will be assumed that the order is going against the respondents and adverse inference may be drawn against the respondents. Thereafter, the copies of the Order dated 24th February, 1998 have been placed on record. Thereafter, the copies of the Order dated 24th February, 1998 have been placed on record. The Order dated 24th February, 1998 reads as under:- ÞjktLFkku ljdkjÞ fk{kk ¼xzqi&2½ foHkkx Øekad% i-5¼15½ f k{kk&2@98 t;iqj] fnukad 24-2-1998 1-funskd ek/;fed f k{kk jktLFkku] fcdkusjA 2 funskd izkFkfed f k{kk jktLFkku] fcdkusjA 3-funskd laLd`rf k{kk foHkkx t;iqjA fo"k;%& v/;kidksa ds in ij fu; qfDr dslEcU/k esa NwVA egksn;] mijksDr fo"k;kUrxZr funsZkkuqlkj ys[k gSs fd jktLFkku ds xzkfe.k {ks= ds fk{kk foHkkx esa fkf {kdksa dh ubZ qfu;fDr;ksa ij 31 ebZ] 1998 rd fuEu krkssZ ds lkFk lkekU; NwV nh tkrh gS%&01-lkekU; NwV ds vUrxZr uohu fu;fDr;k¡ dsoy xzkeh.k {ks= ds fdlh q= ds fo|ky;ksa ds fy, gks ldsxh] kgjh {ksfo|ky; esa dksbZ uohu fu; qfDr ugha dh tk; sxhA 02-uohu fu;fDr;k¡ dsoy fuEu izdkj ls fjDr inksa ds fo:} gh dh tkosxh%& q¼d½ jkT; ljdkj ds vknskksa ds vuqlkj u;s [kksys x; s fo|ky;ksa rFkk ØeksUur fd; sx;s fo|ky; easekux.kukuqlkj Loh-r inA ¼[k½ lsok fuo`fRr ls fjDr inA ¼x½ e`R; q ls fjDr gq, inA ¼?k½ inkSUufr ds dkj.k fjDr gq, inA ¼M+½ dksVZ vknskksa dh vuqikyuk esa dh tkus okyh fu;fDr;k¡ ¼tgk¡ jkT; ljdkj us ,lh fu;qfDr;k¡ djus dk fu.kZ; ys fy;k gSA½ q03-dksbZ Hkh uohu fu;qfDr djus ls igys fu;fDr vf/kdkjh dks vius fu;a=d vf/kdkjh ls izR;sd ekeys dh vuqefr ysuh gksxh vFkkZr~ r`rh; Js.kh f k{kdksa ds fy, ftyk f k{kk vf /kdkfj;ksa dh mifunskd ls rFkk mi funskdks dks f }rh; Js.kh f k{kdksa ds fy, funskd ls vuqefr izkIr djuh gksxhA q04-bl NwV ds uohu fu;fDr }kjk lhfu;j lSds.Mjh@ek/;fed fo|ky;ksa ds r`rh; osru J`[kayk ds f k{kdksa dks dksbZ fjDr in ugha Hkjk tk; xkA sd`i;k mijksDr krksZa dk dM+kbZ ls ikyu djsa rFkk bl izfØ;k ds vUrxZr dh tkus okyh fu;fDr;ksa esa qjkT; ljdkj }kjk le;≤ ij tkjh vU; vknskka@vuqnskksa izfØ;kvksa dh iw.ksZr;k ikyuk dh tkosA ;g vknsk izeq[k kklu lfpo foRr foHkkx dh lgefr vkbZ0Mh0 la[;k 504 fnukad 20-2-1998 ds vk/k ij tkjh dh tk jgh gSA vkKk ls] g0@& ¼ts0ih0 pUnsfy;k½ mi kklu lfpo&izFkeizfrfyfi fuEukafdr dks lwpukFkZ ,oa vko;d dk; Zokgh gsrq izsf"kr gS%& Øekad% fkfojk@ek/;@laLFkk@,Q&T@12205@ fnukad 5-3-1998 1-kklu lfpo f k{kk ¼izkFkfed ,oa ek/;fed½ jkt0 ljdkj t;iqjA 2-mi kklu lfpo f k{kk ¼xqi&2½ foHkkx jktLFkku] ljdkjA 3-leLr mi funskd ¼ek/;fed@ftyk f k{kk vf /kdkjh ¼ek/;fed½ dks izsf "kr dj ys[k gS fd bl dk;kZy; ds [;d i= fnukad 27-1-1998 }kjk v/;kidksa dh fu; qfDr ij izlelafrcU/k yxk;k x;k FkkA bl izfrcU/k esa jkT; fDr nsus esa NwV iznku dh xbZ gSA vr% mDr i= esa fn; sx;s funZsljdkj ds mDr i=kuqlkj fu; qkksa dh dBksjrk ls ikyuk lqfuf pr djsaA funskd ek/;fed f k{kk jktLFkku] chdkusjA 10. A perusal of the aforesaid order goes to show that the very foundation of the respondents case and assumption by the learned Single Judge that the select list expired on 31st March, 1998 did not exist. Indeed, in the advertisement it was stated that the select list prepared in pursuance thereof shall remain in force until 31st March, 1998 only. However, during the currency of period during which the appointments were to be offered in pursuance of the said select list in question, the Government had imposed a ban on fresh recruitment on 27th January, 1998. Thus, notwithstanding the select list which was operative up to 31st March, 1998 in pursuance of the advertisement, it could not operative after 27th January, 1998. It is in the aforesaid circumstances, the Government had issued above circular dated 24th February, 1998 which was circulated by the Director, Secondary Education, Bikaner vide letter dated 5th March, 1998 and in the said circular it was stated that the Government directed that relaxation is given in making fresh recruitments in pursuance of ban on fresh recruitments by permitting fresh appointments of Teachers under Education Department in the rural area only up to 31st May, 1998. Obviously, if the operating select list was to expire on 31st March, 1998, no appointment could have been offered because of the operating ban against fresh recruitment, but as a result of this Government Order dated 22.1998, the operative period of the select list was extended up to 31st May, 1998. In these circumstances, the order of appointment could be offered until 31st May, 1998 by giving fresh appointment in terms of that Order. That being the position, in our opinion, the Judgment under appeal cannot be sustained on this ground alone. 11. In this connection, we may notice here that this Circular dated 24th February, 1998 is in consonance with an earlier decision of this Court in Dr. Rakesh Mani vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., reported in 1990 (2) WLN 414. It was a case, in which, during the currency of select list, by an Administrative Order, a ban was imposed on 31st July, 1989 to 24th January, 1990, certain persons had not joined in pursuance of appointment offered, when no ban was imposed. Rakesh Mani vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., reported in 1990 (2) WLN 414. It was a case, in which, during the currency of select list, by an Administrative Order, a ban was imposed on 31st July, 1989 to 24th January, 1990, certain persons had not joined in pursuance of appointment offered, when no ban was imposed. Rule required for preparing a reserve list to the extent of 50% of the advertised vacancies and the appointment could be made, if a requisition is sent for giving appointment against vacancies arisen, after the original list is expired, within six months, from amongst the candidates enlisted in the reserve list. The State Government has contended that the select list has already expired, no appointment could be given in pursuance of the said select list on 31st March,1990. The Court held that if the administrative ban would not have been there perhaps the appointment orders would have been issued in the event of the two candidates from the original list not joining perhaps the candidates out of the reserve list could have been recommended for appointment. For administrative reasons that the list could not be operated for full duration resulting is not operating the reserve list which has caused prejudice to the petitioner. Now, the fact remains that if the period during which the ban was in force on direct recruitment i.e. from 31st July, 1989 to 24th January, 1990 is excluded then the list can be said to be within the range of operative period and it will not be stifled under proviso to Rule 20 of the Rules of 1962 because the administrative ban was imposed on account of the administrative reasons for which the petitioner cannot be penalised and it was beyond his control. On the aforesaid principles, the directions were issued to treat the reserve list operative and that the petitioner may be appointed, if recommended, in pursuance thereof . 12. Beside the ground that the select list had expired on 31st March, 1998 and thereafter no appointment, out of the said list, could be offered, it was contended by the State Government that there is no vested right in favour of the selected candidates merely on the basis of their names finding place in the select list and they are not entitled to seek a mandamus for appointment. Reliance was placed on the decisions in R.S. Mittal vs. Union of India, reported in 1995 Supp (2) SCC 230 and Shanker Sen Das vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1991 SC 1612 . 13. It is no doubt settled law that merely because a person is on the select panel, it does not give a vested right to be appointed to the post for which he has been selected. He has a right to be considered for appointment, but at the same time, the appointing authority cannot ignore the select panel or decline to make the appointment on its whims. When a person has been selected and there is a vacancy, which can be offered to him, keeping in view his merit position, then, ordinarily there is no justification to ignore him for appointment. There has to be a justifiable reason to decline to appoint a person who is on the select panel. 14. Learned Counsel for the appellant-petitioners urged that both the cases arose in the circumstances in which after the advertisement of the vacancies, the appointing authority had decided to fill-up certain number of post and those certain number of posts have been filled-in in accordance with the order of merit from amongst the selected candidates and no mandamus was issued for giving appointment beyond what was decided to fill-in the vacancies by the appointing authority. In the present case, number of vacancies have been advertised and appointments were issued but some of the candidates did not join as a result of which certain posts remained vacant and if select list was operative, those vacancies could be filled-in by offering appointment to the candidates in order of merit against the vacancies remaining unfilled because of non-joining of the candidates though the said vacancies were decided to be filled. 15. In the circumstances as has arisen in the present case, the same has arisen before the Supreme Court in R.S. Mittal vs. Union of India, reported in 1995 Supp (2) SCC 230, Virender S. Hooda & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Anr., reported in 1999 (3) SCC 696 . A.P. Aggarwal vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr., repoted in JT 1999 (9) SC 125 and Indian Bank vs. Jayasree, reported in 1998 (2) Kerala Law Times 464. 16. Having given our thoughtful consideration, we are of the opinion that this appeal merits acceptance. 17. vs. State of Haryana & Anr., reported in 1999 (3) SCC 696 . A.P. Aggarwal vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr., repoted in JT 1999 (9) SC 125 and Indian Bank vs. Jayasree, reported in 1998 (2) Kerala Law Times 464. 16. Having given our thoughtful consideration, we are of the opinion that this appeal merits acceptance. 17. We have also noticed that a ban was imposed on fresh recruitment by order dated 27th January, 1998, as per the endorsement made by the Director, Secondary Education, Rajasthan, Bikaner while circulating the Government Order dated 24th February, 1998. By the said order dated 24th February, 1998, the Government had decided that recruitment against the vacancies in the rural areas can be filled until 31st May, 1998. Significantly, this order, belies the contention of the respondents that appointment orders on lifting ban could be issued only up to 24th March, 1998. No such limitation can be read in order dated 22.1998 which directs unequivocally to offer appointment up to 31st May, 1998. It knocks out the bottom of reason for rejecting the request of Appointing Authority dated 30.3.1998 for accepting approval to fill-in the 8 vacancies remaining unfilled because of non-joining of candidates that no order could be issued after 23.1998 as per order dated 22.1998. On non-existent order that appointments could be offered only up to 23.1998 and not thereafter, which was demonstratively baseless. It was not the case at all that Government has decided not to fill the vacancies. In fact Government has decided to fill as much vacancies as possible in rural areas by lifting ban against appointment. 18. Another feature about which there is no doubt that in pursuance of Order dated 24th March, 1998, the candidates after appointment were required to join by 10th April, 1998 and as per the letter of the District Education Officer, Dungarpur, who is the appointing authority for primary teachers, there were eight (8) vacancies which were required to be filled because of the non-joining of the candidates, who had been offered appointment but they expressed their unwillingness to join under the Education Department. It is not the case of the respondents that in spite of furnishing of affidavits, the candidates named in the select list have offered to join until 10th April, 1998 but they have not joined in fact. As a result of which 8 vacancies remained unfilled. It is not the case of the respondents that in spite of furnishing of affidavits, the candidates named in the select list have offered to join until 10th April, 1998 but they have not joined in fact. As a result of which 8 vacancies remained unfilled. Therefore, the present petitioners who were also deserving candidates and had found place in the main select list, on coming to know that certain candidates who were offered appointment were not likely to join the duties and therefore, the information was passed on the appointing authority so that he can make the request to the authorities to fill the vacancies which were vacant because of the non-joining of certain candidates before the period of ban lift expires. 19. Apparently, this is not a case in which the appointing authority has decided not to fill certain number of vacancies from among the selected candidates and keep the vacancies vacant in spite of availability of the selected candidates. Having decided to offer appointment up to the candidate placed at Sl. No. 74 in order of merit in the select list and some of them did not join, it does not mean that the appointing authority has not decided to fill those vacant posts from amongst the selected candidates. In these circumstances, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the Government had decided to keep certain posts vacant and unfilled. It was only a procedural ghost raised by the approving authority. It was required to fill those number of posts in order of merit from amongst the selected candidates and not otherwise, if some of them did not join in pursuance of appointment orders, then to fill the vacancies, the appointment ought to have been offered to the persons in order of merit who were below the serial number to which last appointment was offered as per the decision of fill up the vacancies. It is not really a case in which the Government has decided to keep certain number of posts vacant. Therefore, in our opinion, the ratio in Subhaschandra Marwahas case and Shanker Sen Dass case does govern the issue. 20. It is not really a case in which the Government has decided to keep certain number of posts vacant. Therefore, in our opinion, the ratio in Subhaschandra Marwahas case and Shanker Sen Dass case does govern the issue. 20. The principle laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in R.S. Mittals case (Supra) is nearer home, wherein, the Court made it clear that where the appointing authority has discretion to fill or not to fill a vacancy, it is not on the whims or caprice of the appointing authority while exercising the discretion but the discretion has to be exercised on reasonable grounds and which could not affect the legitimate expectations for appointment. While acknowledging the principle, the Court held that although a person on the select panel has no vested right to be appointed to the post for which he has been selected, the appointing authority cannot ignore the select panel or on its whims decline to make the appointment. It was a case in which selection of candidates for appointment to the post of Judicial Member, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, was to be made by a Selection Board. The Selection Board prepa