A. GOPAL REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition is filed under Section 482 cr. P. C. to quash the proceedings in C. C. No. 17 of 2001 pending on the file of ii Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, rajahmundry. ( 2 ) A short but an interesting questionarises for consideration in this petition is when once the petitioners failed to get the proceedings quashed can they again invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Sec. 482 cr. P. C. ( 3 ) PURSUANT to tender notification issuedby the accused for distributorship of Arun Ice cream, the 2nd respondent/complainant applied for the same to the entire town of rajahmundry and after discussion, both the parties agreed that the distributorship will be given to the complainant. It is the case of the complainant that on such agreement, he was called upon to deposit the amount and accordingly an amount of Rs. 15,000/- was paid on 16-11-1995 by way of two demand drafts each worth Rs. 7,500/- and also addressed a letter on 6-12-1995 specifically stating that unless the accused company agrees for giving sole distributorship of Arun ice Cream to the entire town of rajahmundry, they are not willing to take the distributorship. The accused accepted the same through letter dated 1-7-1996. On receipt of the said letter complainant tried to market, the product by opening three counters in Rajahmundry at the assurance given by the accused to see that minimum sale of their products and minimum profit to the complainant. When the complainant suffered loss he addressed several letters to make good the loss apart from cutting entire dues payable by the accused on verification of the accounts. The representative of the accused Mr. N. Raghunatha Rao on verification of the accounts of the company gave a letter to the said effect. Thereafter, complainant addressed a letter dated 20-11-1998 stating that he has already invested an amount of Rs. 6,75,000/- and incurred loss of Rs. 1,80,000/- and unless the accused company co-operates and make good the loss, he will not be in a position to continue the business. In order to evade legitimate amount due to the complainant, accused stopped sending stocks from December, 1998 in spite of request made by the complainant to send the stocks. 6,75,000/- and incurred loss of Rs. 1,80,000/- and unless the accused company co-operates and make good the loss, he will not be in a position to continue the business. In order to evade legitimate amount due to the complainant, accused stopped sending stocks from December, 1998 in spite of request made by the complainant to send the stocks. In view of deposits pending with the accused and huge amount spent by him for establishing three counters the accused obtained a blank cheque in March, 1997 towards costs of the decoration material supplied which was subsequently paid by the complainant for which J. Y. N. Sharma addressed a letter stating that blank cheque will be returned in lieu of cash paid, but the same was not returned. When the complainant was demanding to make good the loss, accused issued a notice dated 10-8-1999 stating that as if the complainant has issued a cheque for Rs. 1,08,477/- dated 23-7-1999 towards part satisfaction of the amount payable by the complainant to the company. Taking advantage of the having blank cheque, the accused indulged in the act of extortion and threatened the complainant to give up all the dues against the accused; otherwise complaint will be lodged against him under the N. I. Act for dishonouring of cheques. Accused having induced the complainant to spend huge amount assuming that they will reimburse the loss and having returned the deposits of the complainant, started cheating the complainant by not sending the stocks and also guilty of criminal breach of trust, cheating, fabrication of cheque, extortion filed a complaint with the Judicial Magistrate which was referred to police for investigation. Police after due investigation laid the charge sheet against the petitioners/accused for the offence under Sections 420, 406, 384 and 471 IPC. ( 4 ) ON issuance of summons petitioner scame up with a petition Crl. P. No. 1705 of 2001 under Section 482 Cr. P. C. to quash the proceedings which was dismissed on 30-10-2001 holding that on a reading of the charge sheet it cannot be said that the accused have not committed any offence and no ground to interfere. ( 4 ) ON issuance of summons petitioner scame up with a petition Crl. P. No. 1705 of 2001 under Section 482 Cr. P. C. to quash the proceedings which was dismissed on 30-10-2001 holding that on a reading of the charge sheet it cannot be said that the accused have not committed any offence and no ground to interfere. ( 5 ) ON dismissal of the earlier petition theabove petition is filed contending that the petitioner company entered into an agreement with the 2nd respondent for supply of Arun Ice Cream, but without showing the name of the company as first accused a complaint was filed against the persons showing them as Managing Director etc. and the complaint as such is not maintainable. When the complainant alleged to have deposited a sum of Rs. 25,000/- on different occasions as caution deposit with m/s. Hatsun Agro Product Limited and at no point of time he has done the business with the petitioners/accused and there is no nexus between the complainant and the accused. Prima facie, the complaint cannot be filed against the petitioners, more so, in the absence of any list of witnesses shown in the complaint to be examined on his behalf. In the absence of any oral and documentary evidence the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offence. When the cheque issued by the complainant was dishonoured for insufficient funds and account is closed, petitioners after complying the formalities filed a case in C. C. No. 9427 of 1999 on the file of XIV Metropolitan magistrate, Egmore, Chennai for the offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act and subsequent to filing of said cheque dishonoured case, 1st respondent/complainant resorted to file the above case against the petitioners apart from his filing o. S. No. 1139 of 1999 restraining the company from issuing dealership for rajahmundry town to others, which was dismissed and the appeal A. S. No. 23 of 2003 fiied against the same is pending. Therefore, initiation of criminal proceedings is nothing but abuse of process resorted to petitioners (sic. by 2nd respondent), which is liable to be quashed. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner svehemently argued that dismissal of earlier petition filed by the petitioners to quash the proceedings will not debar them from filing a second petition. Therefore, initiation of criminal proceedings is nothing but abuse of process resorted to petitioners (sic. by 2nd respondent), which is liable to be quashed. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner svehemently argued that dismissal of earlier petition filed by the petitioners to quash the proceedings will not debar them from filing a second petition. In support of his submission, strong reliance was placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Supdt. and remembrancer, W. B. v. Mohan Singh. It was further argued that proceedings initiated by the respondent/complainant is nothing but abuse of process when the petitioners/accused filed CC for dishonouring the cheques issued by the respondent/complainant. ( 7 ) IT is appropriate to consider thesubmission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the conAndhra Pradesh High Court on which strong reliance was placed. At this stage, I can touch lightly on the facts of the decision in the above case. ( 8 ) IN the above case, Saw Mill Owner,manager and another three persons were prosecuted in the Court of the Magistrate, alipore under Section 304-A r/w Section 109 ipc alleging that the lorry loaded with heavy logs of wood was driven by the 3rd respondent through a narrow lane off kalighat Road and brought to a halt in front of a saw mill. Whilst the logs of wood were being unloaded from the lorry by two coolies, they fell on a girl and resulted in her death. On FIR being lodged police registered a crime and laid charge sheet for the offence aforesaid. The saw-mill owner filed an application for quashing the proceeding on the ground that it constituted abuse of the process of the Court and in any event, its quashing would secure the ends of justice, A division Bench of Calcutta High Court refused to quash the proceedings against the saw mill owner and his application was rejected on 12-12-1968. As no progress at all was made in the criminal case until march, 1970, the saw mill owner once again moved the Court for quashing the proceedings. It was allowed by the Division bench and quashed the proceedings on the ground that no prima facie case was at all made out and the continuance of the proceedings was, therefore, an abuse of the process of the Court. It was allowed by the Division bench and quashed the proceedings on the ground that no prima facie case was at all made out and the continuance of the proceedings was, therefore, an abuse of the process of the Court. The State was of the view that once the High Court had rejected an application for quashing the proceedings earlier, High Court cannot entertain another application for the same purpose as that would amount to High Court reviewing its earlier order. The State carried the matter in appeal before the Supreme Court. In the said context the Supreme Court observed that earlier application was rejected on the ground that the evidence was yet to be led and it was not desirable to interfere with the proceeding at that stage. But, thereafter, the criminal case dragged on for a period of about one and half years without any progress at all and in the said circumstances accused were constrained to make a fresh application to the High Court under section 561-A (old) to quash the proceedings which preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court, must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. The Supreme Court further observed that the facts and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent application of respondents 1 and 2 were clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier application of the first respondent because, despite the rejection of the earlier application of the first respondent, the prosecution in the criminal case even though it was filed as far back as 1965 and the criminal case rested where it was for a period of over one and a half years. For this reason despite the earlier order the High Court entertained petition second time and quashed the proceedings, which it is entitled to do so. There is no jurisdictional infirmity in the order of High court and accordingly upheld the said order. For this reason despite the earlier order the High Court entertained petition second time and quashed the proceedings, which it is entitled to do so. There is no jurisdictional infirmity in the order of High court and accordingly upheld the said order. ( 9 ) IN R. Annapurna v. Ramaduguanantha Krishna Sastry and others, a criminal case has been chargesheeted on a complaint lodged by the complainant alleging offences under Sections 406 and 420 of the* Indian Penal Code. Some of the accused moved the High Court under section 482 Cr. P. C. prayed for quashing the criminal proceedings initiated against them, which was dismissed by the High Court on 28-1-1995 after hearing the complainant. Suppressing the said fact accused moved the High Court again for quashing the proceedings without making the complainant as party to the petitioner and without being informed the earlier order of the High Court. The Division Bench quashed the proceedings against which the complainant moved the Supreme Court. The accused made an endeavour to show that it is open to the same parties to move the High Court once again on causes, which developed subsequent to the dismissal of the earlier petition. Without expressing any opinion on the said aspect, the Supreme Court observed that the second petition for quashing was not made on the strength of anything, which developed subsequent to dismissal of earlier petition but only on the facts, which subsisted prior to that date. If that be so, the High Court had no power to upset the order dated 28-1-1995 with the help of subsequent order though in this case the High Court did so without being informed of the prior order and accordingly quashed the order of the High Court without prejudice to the right of the accused to move the trial court for discharge. ( 10 ) THE present petition is not filed on thestrength of anything, which developed subsequent to dismissal of the earlier petition i. e. 30-10-2001, and the facts on which the petitioners seek to quash the proceedings are very much available when they moved earlier. ( 11 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitionersmade a faint attempt contending that even after three years of dismissal of the earlier petition no progress is made in the case. ( 11 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitionersmade a faint attempt contending that even after three years of dismissal of the earlier petition no progress is made in the case. In view of the same, as observed by the supreme Court in case 1 supra, the proceedings are liable to be quashed. It is relevant to note that considering the long delay in disposing of the case, the Supreme court in Common Cause, A Registered society v. Union of India? laid down certain guidelines prescribing time limit regarding pendency of the cases and discharge of accused persons. The same was clarified again in Common Cause, A Registered society v. Union of India that the time limit so prescribed shall not apply to cases wherein such pendency of the criminal proceedings is wholly or partly attributable to the dilatory tactics adopted by the accused concerned or on account of any other action of the accused which results in prolonging the trial. In other words, it should be shown that the criminal proceedings have remained pending for the requisite period mentioned in the aforesaid clauses of para-2 despite full cooperation by the accused concerned to get these proceedings disposed of and the delay in the disposal of these cases is not at all attributable to the accused concerned nor is such delay caused on account of such accused getting stay of criminal proceedings from higher courts. ( 12 ) IN P. Ramachandra Rao v. State ofkarnataka the Constitutional Bench reviewed the guidelines issued in Common cause case and while reaffirming the dicta laid down by it in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, held that it is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer time limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The criminal Courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause case and Raj Deo Sharma v. State of bihar. The criminal Courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause case and Raj Deo Sharma v. State of bihar. At the most periods of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the Courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant facts as pointed out in A. R. Antulay s case (6 supra) and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused. In view of the same, upholding the quashment of proceedings on the ground of delay by the supreme Court in case 1 supra, in my considered view, impliedly overruled by the constitutional Bench, which holds the field. ( 13 ) EVEN otherwise, in the present case,the docket proceedings had disclosed since 21-12-2001 it was recorded "stay. A1 to A3 nbws. pending" and even after dismissal of earlier quash proceedings the case was adjourned for due execution of NBWs. and the same was adjourned from time to time till 24-11-2004 and the stay was continued till the disposal of the earlier petition i. e. 30-10-2001. As the said order was not communicated to the Court it was recorded by mistake till 19-5-2003. Thereafter, it was recorded N. B. Ws are pending against the petitioners. Meanwhile, petitioners moved this Court, filed this petition and obtained stay. Therefore, delay is not attributable to the complainant, since it is due to failure of the petitioners in attending the Court and avoiding execution of warrant. ( 14 ) THE object of enacting Section 138 ofnegotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is well explained by the Apex Court in Goa Plast (P) ltd. v. Chico Ursula D souza, which reads as under:". . . . . . . ( 14 ) THE object of enacting Section 138 ofnegotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is well explained by the Apex Court in Goa Plast (P) ltd. v. Chico Ursula D souza, which reads as under:". . . . . . . IN to-day s world where use of cash in day to day life is almost getting extinct and people are using negotiable instruments in commercial transactions and plastic money for their daily needs as consumers, it is all the more necessary that people s faith in such instruments should be strengthened rather than weakened. Provisions contained in Sections 138 to 142 of the act are intended to discourage people from not honouring their commitments by way of payment through cheques. It is desirable that the Court should ban in favour of an interpretation, which serves the object of the statute. The penal provisions contained in the above sections are intended to ensure that the obligations undertaken though a cheque as a mode of payment. " ( 15 ) HAVING regard to the fact and thelaudable object in enacting penal provisions under Sections 138 and 141 is to prevent the bouncing of cheques and sustaining the credibility of commercial transactions, and since the petitioners themselves contributed for the delay in disposal of the proceedings, i see no force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that if the proceedings initiated by the complainant are continued it will amount to abuse the process and the same is liable to be quashed. ( 16 ) CRIMINAL Petition is accordingly dismissed.