Judgment R. M. S. KHANDEPARKAR, J. ( 1 ) HEARD. PERUSED the records. ( 2 ) IN all these petitions, common questions of law and facts arise and, therefore, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. ( 3 ) IN all these petitions there is challenge to the circular dated 09-04-1996 issued by the Chief Engineer (Dev. Plan) of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai in relation to the Floor Space Index (FSI) to be availed under Clause 6 of Appendix VII of the Development Control Regulations For greater Bombay, 1991, hereinafter called as "the said Regulations" and for consequential reliefs. The challenge to the said circular is two-fold: firstly, that it is beyond the powers of the concerned authority to restrict the entitlement under the said provisions of law to any percentage of the area of construction and, secondly, it cannot be made applicable to the development/construction of amenities approved or constructed in the surrendered plot earlier to the date of issuance of the said circular. ( 4 ) A circular dated 09-04-1996 came to be issued by the Chief Engineer (Dev. Plan) on the subject of grant of ADR in lieu of construction of amenity as per the provisions of the Regulation 34 read with Clause 6 of the said Appendix VII of the said Regulations. The said circular prescribed percentage of FSI which would be made available in terms of clause 6 of the Appendix VII of the said regulations for different types of amenities in the surrendered plot. It provides for 100% FSI in case of built-up area and amenities like municipal transport garage, general hospital, fire station, auditorium, electrical crematorium, municipal workshop, municipal primary school, municipal retail market, town duty office and office building, provided that such buildings are constructed and the occupancy certificate issued as per the rules and further that such buildings vest in the BMC free of cost subject to other conditions enumerated in the said circular. The circular further provides that in case of open space amenities like garden, playground, R. G. parking, open spaces and burial ground, and in case of construction of D. P. roads, widening of existing roads, etc. The circular further provides that in case of open space amenities like garden, playground, R. G. parking, open spaces and burial ground, and in case of construction of D. P. roads, widening of existing roads, etc. , the FSI which could be availed under Clause 6 of the Appendix VII of the said Regulations shall be to the extent of maximum of 15% of the area of the amenities and shall be subject to the conditions enumerated under the circular. These clauses restricting the availability of the FSI to 15% in relation to specified amenities is under challenge in the matters in hand. It appears that during the pendency of these petitions, another circular came to be issued increasing the percentage to 25% from 15% in case of said amenities. ( 5 ) IT is the contention of the petitioners that the right assured to the owner or the developer under Clause 6 of Appendix vii in relation the FSI is "equivalent to the area of construction/development done by the owner or the developer". Though Clause 6 speaks of discretion to the Commissioner in the matter of grant of FSI, it is the discretion coupled with the duty and therefore the word "may" in the said Clause 6 has to be read as "shall" and therefore such a power cannot be whittled down by administrative circulars restricting the availability of FSI to any percentage contrary to the provisions of law itself. The administrative circular which is in the form of public notice can only be in the nature of guidelines and do not enjoy the force of law nor can be enforceable as the law. The clause 6 does not empower the Commissioner to issue mandatory circulars like the one issued on 9-4-1996. There is no rationale behind restricting 15% of the total area in case of amenities like construction of road or garden and such a discrimination between the construction of the amenities in the form of road from other type of construction like buildings is violative of Article 14 of the constitution. It is also the contention on behalf of the petitioners that there is total arbitrariness on the part of the Commissioner in restricting the FSI to 15% in relation to the amenities in question. It is also the contention on behalf of the petitioners that there is total arbitrariness on the part of the Commissioner in restricting the FSI to 15% in relation to the amenities in question. Though there is no amendment carried out to the petitions, they are also seeking to challenge the subsequent circulars dated 5-4-2003 issued on the same lines but enhancing the percentage to 25% instead of 15% under the earlier circular. According to the petitioners, the word "equivalent" in Clause 6 has to be read as "equal to". Lastly, it is the contention that the legitimate expectation of the owner under Clause 6 of the said regulations is that if he satisfies the conditions therein, he would be eligible for 100% grant of further DR in the form of FSI equivalent to the area of construction and on such a legitimate expectation having completed the construction of the amenity, pursuant to the approval granted much prior to the issuance of such circular, the same cannot be restricted to 15% or 25% as the respondents are estopped from acting to the detriment of the interest of the petitioners after having carried out the construction of the amenities in terms of the approval granted much prior to the date of issuance of circular. Reliance is sought to be placed in the decisions of State (Delhi Admn.) vs. I. K. Nangia, reported in (1980)1 SCC 258 = AIR 1979 SC 1977 , State of the Uttar pradesh Vs. Jogendra Singh, reported in (1964)2 SCR 197 : AIR 1963 SC 1618 , sardar Govindrao and others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1965 sc 1222 , Gell Vs. Taja Noora, reported in 27 indian High Court Reports Bom. 307, kerala Financial Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in (1994)4 SCC 375 , State Bank of Travancore vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala, reported in (1986) Vol. 158 ITR 102, State of m. P. and another Vs. Municipal corporation, Indore, reported in 1987 (Supp) scc 748, C. L. Verma Vs. State of Madhya pradesh and another, reported in 1989 Supp (2) SCC 437, Century Spinning and manufacturing Co. Ltd. and another Vs. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and another, reported in AIR 1971 SC 1021 , union of India and others Vs. Godfrey philips India Ltd. , reported in AIR 1986 SC 806 , D. R. Nim Vs. State of Madhya pradesh and another, reported in 1989 Supp (2) SCC 437, Century Spinning and manufacturing Co. Ltd. and another Vs. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and another, reported in AIR 1971 SC 1021 , union of India and others Vs. Godfrey philips India Ltd. , reported in AIR 1986 SC 806 , D. R. Nim Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1301 and Banque Nationale de Paris Vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax, reported in 1999 ITR Vol. 237 518. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, it is the contention of the respondents that it is the discretion of the Commissioner or the appropriate authority to grant the development right in the form of FSI for the development or construction in relation to the amenity on the surrendered plot. The term "equivalent to" means equal in value and therefore the petitioners insistence for development right in the form of FSI equal to the area of the construction/development is not correct though the petitioners may be entitled for such right equal to the value of the total area of construction/development of the amenity. Such valuation of development right is done by the respondents on the basis of the prevailing rate of construction/development as specified in the affidavit in reply of Shri. Balachandran Radhakrishnan, Assistant engineer, dated 5-9-2005. It is their case that taking into consideration the prevailing rate of construction/development and the other relevant considerations, the respondents have fixed up a percentage of the area of the constructed amenities for which the developer would be entitled to DRC under Regulation 34 r/w Clause 6 of the Appendix VII of the said Regulations. The differentiation between various kinds of amenities has been done on rational basis as any contrary decision would lead to anomalous and discriminatory situation whereby a person constructing a road would seek to avail the same FSI as a person constructing a building over the equal area but has made a much higher investment in comparison to the investment by the person constructing the road over the equal area. They have also drawn attention to the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Pune municipal Corporation and another Vs. Promoters and Builders Association and another, reported in (2004)10 SCC 796 : [2004 (5) ALL MR (S. C.) 621]. They have also drawn attention to the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Pune municipal Corporation and another Vs. Promoters and Builders Association and another, reported in (2004)10 SCC 796 : [2004 (5) ALL MR (S. C.) 621]. According to the respondents, there is neither arbitrariness nor unreasonableness in fixing such different percentage for availing the FSI under Clause 6 of the said Appendix VII of the said regulations depending upon the investment by the owner or developer in relation to the amenities provided in the surrendered plot. ( 7 ) UPON hearing the learned advocates for the parties, two points which arise for consideration are as under:-" (i) Whether the Commissioner or the competent authority is empowered under clause 6 of Appendix VII of the said regulations to restrict the availability of the fsi to 15% or 25% or to. any other percentage in relation to certain amenities as against 100% FSI for the amenities like buildings, hospitals, etc. ? (ii) Whether the circular in question and the restriction of percentage regarding the availability of FSI in relation to the development or construction of amenity in surrendered plot would apply to such development which was completed or is carried out pursuant to the permission granted for the same, prior to issuance of the said circular? ( 8 ) THE Maharashtra Regional and town Planning Act, 1966 was brought into force to make provisions for planning and development and use of the land in the regions identified for that purpose and to ensure that the town planning schemes are made in proper manner and effectively executed and for that purpose to make necessary provision for acquisition of the land wherever required for public purposes in relation to the plans and matters connected with the implementation of the said Act and the schemes thereunder. ( 9 ) IN exercise of the powers conferred under Section 31 (1) read with section 22 (m) of the said Act, the Government sanctioned the said Regulations and the same came into force with effect from 25-3-1991. ( 9 ) IN exercise of the powers conferred under Section 31 (1) read with section 22 (m) of the said Act, the Government sanctioned the said Regulations and the same came into force with effect from 25-3-1991. ( 10 ) WITH the idea of reducing the financial burden upon the local authority in exercise of their obligations and duties pertaining to construction and maintenance of the road, including the matters pertaining to the road widening, it was provided under regulation 33 (1) that the Commissioner may permit additional floor space index on the area required for road widening or for construction of new roads proposed under the development plan or those proposed under the Bombay municipal Corporation Act, 1888, if the owner of such land surrenders such land for road widening or new road construction without claiming any compensation in lieu thereof and hands over the same to the Corporation free of encumbrances to the satisfaction of the commissioner. ( 11 ) WITH a view to acquire the plots of land which are reserved for the public purposes in the development plan free of cost from the owners, the said Regulations have provided for separation of development potential of such plots of land and to make the same available for utilisation thereof by awarding TDR in the form of FSI to the owner who surrenders such land to the planning authority and such right is available to the extent and as per the conditions set out in regulation 34 read with Appendix VII of the said Regulations. ( 12 ) THE Appendix VII of the said regulations which deals with the Regulations for grant of the TDRs to the owners/developers comprise of different clauses and the clauses relevant for the decision in the matter in hand read thus:-"1. The owner (or lessee) of a plot of land which is reserved for a public purpose in the development plan and for additional amenities deemed to be reservations provided in accordance with these regulations, excepting in the case of an existing or retention user or to any required compulsory or recreational open space, shall be eligible for the award of transferable Development Rights (TDRs) in the form of Floor Space Index (FSI) to the extent and on the conditions set out below. Such award will entitle the owner of the land to FSI in the form of a development Right Certificate (DRC) which he may use himself or transfer to any other person. 2. Subject to the Regulation 1 above, where a plot of land is reserved for any purpose specified in Section 22 of maharashtra Regional and Town Planning act, 1966, the owner will be eligible for development Rights (DRs) to the extent stipulated in Regulations 5 and 6 in this appendix had the land been not so reserved, after the said land is surrendered free of cost as stipulated in Regulation 5 in this appendix, and after completion of the development or construction as in regulation in this Appendix if he undertakes the same. 3. The built-up area for the purpose of FSI credit in the form of a DRC shall be equal to the gross area of the reserved plot to be surrendered and will proportionately increase or decrease according to the permissible FSI of the zone where from the tdr has originated. 4. When an owner or lessee also develops or constructs the amenity on the surrendered plot at his own cost subject to such stipulation as may be prescribed by the Commissioner or the appropriate authority, as the case may be and to their satisfaction and hands over the said developed/constructed amenity to the commissioner/appropriate authority, free of cost, he may be granted by the commissioner a further DR in the form of fsi equivalent to the area of the construction/development done by him, utilisation of which etc. will be subject to the Regulations contained in this Appendix. 5. DRs will be granted and DRCs issued only after the reserved land is surrendered to the Corporation, where it is Appropriate authority, otherwise to the State government, as the case may be, free of cost and free of encumbrances, after the owner or lessee has levelled the land to the surrendering ground level and after he has constructed a 1. 5 m. high compound wall (or at a height stipulated by the commissioner) with a gate at the cost of the owner, and to the satisfaction of the commissioner, or the State Government (where the Corporation is not the appropriate authority ). The cost of any transaction involved shall be borne by the owner or lessee. 6. 5 m. high compound wall (or at a height stipulated by the commissioner) with a gate at the cost of the owner, and to the satisfaction of the commissioner, or the State Government (where the Corporation is not the appropriate authority ). The cost of any transaction involved shall be borne by the owner or lessee. 6. With an application for development permission, where an owner seeks utilisation of DRs, he shall submit the DRC to the Commissioner who shall endorse thereon in writing , in figures and words, the quantum of the DRC proposed to be utilised, before granting development permission, and when the development is complete, the Commissioner shall endorse on the DRC in writing, in figures and words, the quantum of DRs actually utilised and the balance remaining thereafter, if any, before issue of occupation certificate. 7. The surrendered reserved land for which a DRC is to be issued shall vest in the Corporation or the State Government, if the appropriate authority is other than the corporation, and such land shall be transferred in the City Survey Records in the name of the Corporation or the State government, as the case may be, and shall vest absolutely in the Corporation or the state Government. The surrendered land, so transferred to the State Government in respect of which the Corporation is not the appropriate authority, may, on application, thereafter be allotted by the State government in favour of the concerned authority, which may be a State or Central government Department, authority or organisation on appropriate terms as may be decided by the State Government. " ( 13 ) THE Regulation 2 of the said regulations defines the various terms and expressions used in the said Regulations. The regulation 2 (7) defines the term "amenity" to mean roads, streets, open spaces, parks, recreational grounds, playgrounds, gardens, water supply, electric supply, street lighting, sewerage, drainage, public works and other utilities, services and conveniences. " ( 13 ) THE Regulation 2 of the said regulations defines the various terms and expressions used in the said Regulations. The regulation 2 (7) defines the term "amenity" to mean roads, streets, open spaces, parks, recreational grounds, playgrounds, gardens, water supply, electric supply, street lighting, sewerage, drainage, public works and other utilities, services and conveniences. ( 14 ) THE Regulation 63 of the said regulations deals with the subject of delegation of powers and provides that except where the Commissioners special permission is expressly stipulated, the powers or functions vested in him by the said Regulations may be delegated to any municipal official under his control, subject to his revision if necessary and to such conditions and limitations, if any, as he may prescribe and in each of the said regulations, the word "commissioner" shall, to the extent to which any municipal official is so empowered, be deemed to include such official. The powers exercisable by the commissioner under the various clauses of regulation 34 are delegated to the Chief engineer (Dev. Plan ). ( 15 ) THE Regulation 64 of the said regulations deals with the subject of discretionary powers and it reads thus:-" (a) In conformity with the intent and spirit of these Regulations, the commissioner may:- (i) decide on matters where it is alleged that there is an error in any order, requirement, decision, determination made by any municipal officer under delegation of powers in Regulation or interpretation in the application of these Regulations; (ii) interpret the provisions of these regulations where a street layout actually on the ground varies from the street layout shown on the development plan; (iii) modify the limit of a zone where the boundary line of the zone divides a plot with the previous approval of Government; and (iv) authorise the erection of a building or the use of premises for a public service undertaking for public utility purposes only, where he finds such an authorisation to be reasonably necessary for the public convenience and welfare, even if it is not permitted in any land use classification. "" (b) In specific cases where a clearly demonstrable hardship is caused, the commissioner may for reasons to be recorded in writing, by special permission permit any of the dimensions prescribed by these Regulations to be modified, except those relating to floor space indices unless otherwise permitted under these regulations, provided that the relaxation will not affect the health, safety, fire safety, structural safety and public safety of the inhabitants of the building and the neighbourhood. " ( 16 ) AS regards the first point for consideration, a feeble attempt was made in the course of the arguments that the commissioner will have no such power to issue circular in relation to the provisions pertaining to the implementation of the Regulations. While Section 63 empowers the Commissioner to delegate the powers, as already seen above, regulation 64 clearly empowers the commissioner in specified cases as well as in cases in general to decide the matters in relation to the interpretation for application of the said regulations. Specification of different percentage of FSI in relation to various types of amenities for the purpose of availing the additional FSI under Clause 6 of Appendix VII would be a matter in relation to interpretation of application of the said Clause of the said regulations. Certainly therefore the concerned authority would be entitled to interpret the applicability of the Clause 6 for availability of fsi equivalent to the area of construction/development in the surrendered plot to the owner/developer. Being so, the source of power to the Commissioner or the appropriate authority to issue the circular of the nature issued by such authority is clearly found under regulation 64 of the said Regulations. ( 17 ) PLAIN reading of Clause 6 quoted above would reveal that the entitlement of the fsi under the said Clause is "equivalent to the area of the construction/development done" by the owner or the developer. It also discloses that the development or construction of the amenity shall be subject to the stipulation as may be prescribed by the Commissioner or the appropriate authority and they are to be complied with to their satisfaction free of cost. The surrender of the plot has also to be free of cost. Simultaneously, it gives discretionary powers to the Commissioner or the appropriate authority to grant such FSI. The surrender of the plot has also to be free of cost. Simultaneously, it gives discretionary powers to the Commissioner or the appropriate authority to grant such FSI. ( 18 ) THE terms used in a statute are to be read and understood in the context in which they are used in the relevant provision. The term "equivalent" in the said Clause is undoubtedly related to the area and the term "area" relates to the construction or development of the amenity done in the surrendered plot. The word "area" therein does not refer to that of the area of the plot. The term "equivalence" is defined in the blacks Law Dictionary to mean "equal in value, force, measure, volume, power and effect or having equal or corresponding import, meaning or significance; alike, identical. " The equivalence in case of construction activity cannot be ascertained by merely referring to the carpet area of the land occupied by the construction but it has to take into consideration the total quantity as well as the quality of the construction. The term "quantity" would refer to the total area of construction, not only on the ground of the land but it would include even the upper floors of construction. The quality of construction would include the description as well as the type of construction i. e. whether it is road or building or shed, etc. , as well as of what material. The area of construction would obviously refer to its total area of the structure and when it relates to a building erected on a land, it would not only include the carpet area of the land occupied by such building but the total area of the super-structure and the same will have to be considered to ascertain the FSI and consequently the value of such total area of the construction would be the determining factor in that regard. It is also to be noted that the term "fsi" i. e. floor space index means and has been defined under the Clause 2 (42) of the said Regulations as the quotient of the ratio of the combined gross floor area of all floors, excepting areas specifically exempted under the said Regulations, to the total area of the plot, viz. , floor space index is equal to the total covered area of all the floors divided by the plot area. , floor space index is equal to the total covered area of all the floors divided by the plot area. Therefore the total expenditure incurred in the construction or development of amenity in the surrendered plot assumes importance while determining the entitlement of the owner or the developer for further DR in the form of FSI on that count under Clause 6 of Appendix VII. ( 19 ) AS rightly submitted on behalf of the respondents, the differentiation in the percentage is directly linked to the value of the area of the construction or the development carried out in relation to the amenities in the surrendered plot. Certainly the valuation of the construction of a road in a specified area cannot be equated with that of the value of construction in relation to a building occupying the same measure of area of land. There is bound to be a substantial difference between the value of the road built in an area of land and that of the building constructed in same measure of area of land. In case of road, the construction lies merely on the carpet area of the land. In case of building, the construction is not only on the carpet area of the land but it goes vertically above depending upon the number of its floors. In other words, while the road would occupy the ground only once, the building will occupy the ground as many times as the number of floors it will have. Being so, the area of land occupied by the construction or development of a road cannot be equivalent to the same area of land occupied by the construction of a building. Considering this important aspect of the matter, the authorities having decided to grant the FSI on the basis of the value of the area occupied by construction or development of amenity in the surrendered plot which would depend upon the prevailing rate of the cost of the construction or the development. The same cannot be found fault with. ( 20 ) AS already seen above, regulation 64 clearly empowers the commissioner to decide about the interpretation in the application of such regulation while the Clause 6 gives discretionary power to grant FSI equivalent to the area of construction or development of the amenity done by the owner or the developer in the surrendered plot. ( 20 ) AS already seen above, regulation 64 clearly empowers the commissioner to decide about the interpretation in the application of such regulation while the Clause 6 gives discretionary power to grant FSI equivalent to the area of construction or development of the amenity done by the owner or the developer in the surrendered plot. The Clause 6 nowhere specifies of 100% FSI with reference to the plot or even the construction or development of the amenity. The term "area" cannot be understood ignoring the import of the preceding expression "equivalent to" and the concept of FSI. ( 21 ) TAKING into consideration the entire provision comprised under Clause 6, therefore, it would reveal that the commissioner or the appropriate authority will have to take into consideration the construction or the development of the amenity as a whole carried out by the owner or the developer in the surrendered plot to ascertain the quantum of the FSI that could be made available to such owner or developer on that count. If the commissioner or the appropriate authority proceeds to exercise such power individually with reference to each plot separately, there could be a scope for some discrimination or arbitrariness in exercise of such power. To avoid the same, and to introduce uniformity in availing FSI on account of construction or development in the surrendered plot, the authority has issued the circular fixing different but uniform percentage for certain types of amenities. There is classification depending upon the type of the amenity and based on such classification, different percentage of FSI is earmarked for each type of amenities. Undoubtedly, the power under Clause 6 is to be exercised in the discretion of the commissioner depending upon the area of the construction and development done by the owner or the developer in the surrendered plot. To avoid arbitrariness, the Commissioner has decided to exercise such power by prescribing different percentage depending upon the value of amenities to be ascertained on the basis of the area of construction or development of such amenity. Therefore, it cannot be said that there has been any arbitrariness or failure to perform the duty by the authority or it has exceeded its power or the authority under the said Act. ( 22 ) THE decisions sought to be relied upon on behalf of the petitioners are totally out of place. Therefore, it cannot be said that there has been any arbitrariness or failure to perform the duty by the authority or it has exceeded its power or the authority under the said Act. ( 22 ) THE decisions sought to be relied upon on behalf of the petitioners are totally out of place. In I. K. Nangias case (supra), the Apex Court while considering the explanation clause to Section 17 (2) of the prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, had held that there can be no doubt that although the explanation is in terms permissive, it imposes a duty upon the company to nominate a person in relation to different establishments or branches or units and that there can be no doubt that it implies the performance of a public duty. It was also held that the explanation lays down the mode in which the requirements of a statutory provision is to be complied with and normally, the word "may" implies what is optional but in the context in which it was used in the said explanation it mean "must" as there was an element of compulsion and the power was coupled with a duty. ( 23 ) IN Jogendra Singhs case (supra), the Apex Court while dealing with rule 4 (2) of the U. P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 and the question for decision being whether the word like "may" therein conferred discretion on the governor, held that though the word "may" generally does not mean "must" or "shall" but where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, then such word denoted that the discretion should be construed to mean a command. ( 24 ) IN Sardar Govindraos case (supra), the Apex Court dealing with the word "may" in Section 5 (3) of the C. P. and Berar revocation of Land Revenue Exemption Act, 1948 held that the word "may" is often read as "shall" or "must" when there is something in the nature of the thing to be done which makes it a duty of the person on whom the power is conferred to exercise the power. ( 25 ) IN Taja Nooras case (supra) the section 6 of the Bombay Act VI of 1963 empowered the Commissioner of Police to grant licence for public conveyances and provided that he may in his discretion refuse to grant such licence for any conveyance which he may consider to be insufficiently found or otherwise unfit for the conveyance of the public. The Commissioner had approved of a certain pattern of victoria as a public conveyance in Bombay and refused to licence victorias which did not conform to that pattern. It was held that his refusal on that ground was illegal under Section 45 of the Specific Relief act and he was ordered to issue the licence asked for. ( 26 ) UNDOUBTEDLY, all the above decisions provide that when the discretion is coupled with the public duty, it is to be construed as a command of the statute. Undoubtedly, in the matters before this Court, the Commissioner has not refused to grant FSI under Clause 6 of Appendix VII. He has, however, exercised his discretion in relation to the percentage of FSI depending upon the cost of investment for the area of construction or development of amenity in the surrendered plot. It cannot be said that there is any failure in the exercise of the command under Clause 6 as far as the grant of FSI is concerned. There is no command under Clause 6. It nowhere speaks of entitlement of any fixed percentage to a party. Certainly in that case the discretion is given to and exercised by the Commissioner judiciously and without any arbitrariness. In fact exercise of that discretion is prerequisite for performance of the duty to grant FSI under clause 6 of the Appendix VII. As already held above, the criteria adopted by the commissioner clearly discloses the discretion to have been exercised judiciously and without any arbitrariness. ( 27 ) THE decision of the Apex Court in D. R. Nims case (supra) is also of no help to the petitioners to challenge the circular. In the said case, the Governments order dated 25-08-1955 reckoning the service for promoted indian Police Service Officers from 19-05-1951 was held invalid since the date was artificial and arbitrary and having nothing to do with the application of R. 3 (3), proviso 1 and 2. In the said case, the Governments order dated 25-08-1955 reckoning the service for promoted indian Police Service Officers from 19-05-1951 was held invalid since the date was artificial and arbitrary and having nothing to do with the application of R. 3 (3), proviso 1 and 2. Apparently, the ruling was in the facts and circumstances of the case and in relation to the provisions relevant for the said case. ( 28 ) THE ruling of the Apex Court in kerala Financial Corporations case (supra) was on the point whether the circular issued under the Income Tax Act could over-ride the statutory provisions in the Act. The petitioners have not been able to demonstrate as to how the circular or the fixing of percentage in relation to the FSI consequent to the development or construction of the amenities in the surrendered plot would in any manner exceed or is in contravention of any statutory provision. Being so, the decision is of no help to the petitioners. ( 29 ) THE decision of the Division bench of this Court in Banque Nationale De pariss case (supra) is also to the effect that circulars cannot over-ride or detract the provisions of the Act. Similar is the decision in the State Bank of Travancore (supra ). In municipal Corporation, Indore (supra) it was held that the statutory powers cannot be exercised in compliance with the administrative instructions of the Government but they are to be exercised under the statutory provisions itself. The orders passed by the collector on the basis of the Government instructions declaring all open land within the municipal corporations limit as Nazul lands and directing the Commissioner of the corporation not to deal or dispose of such land and consequent orders of Nazul officers were held to be bad-in-law as such orders were not passed under the powers available under any statutory provisions. In the case in hand, we have already seen that the power to issue circular is available in terms of Regulation 64 r/w Regulation Nos. 33, 34 and Clause 6 of the appendix VII of the said Regulations. ( 30 ) THE C. L. Vermss case (supra) is on the point that the administrative instructions must yield to a contrary provision in statutory rule. 33, 34 and Clause 6 of the appendix VII of the said Regulations. ( 30 ) THE C. L. Vermss case (supra) is on the point that the administrative instructions must yield to a contrary provision in statutory rule. The petitioners have not been able to point out any statutory provision which could be said to be contrary to the fixing of percentage of FSI which could be availed by the owner or the developer on account of construction or development of amenity in the surrendered plot. The Clause 6 itself nowhere prescribes any such limitation on the power of the Commissioner or appropriate authority in fixing such percentage for the reasons stated above. ( 31 ) AS already stated above, the petitioners have not been able to disclose any statutory provision which would entitle the owner or the developer of the surrendered plot to insist for 100% FSI in relation to the area of the construction or development carried out in the surrendered plot. Besides, the development by the owner or the developer in the surrendered plot is optional. If the owner or the developer decides to carry out any such development, it should be in terms of the approval granted and subject to the said regulations. It is not a matter of right for the owner or the developer to carry out such development or construction in the surrendered plot. Undoubtedly, that would not give licence to the authorities to refuse to exercise the duty under the statute, nor to exercise the discretion arbitrarily. Surely the discretion has to be exercised according to the rules of reason and justice and according to law and not arbitrarily, fancifully and capriciously. However, an administrative action or decision cannot be declared to be unreasonable unless it discloses improper abuse of power. Merely because the court thinks the decision to be unwise, it would not be a cause for setting aside the same in exercise of writ jurisdiction. ( 32 ) IN terms of Regulation 34 r/w the provisions of Appendix VII of the said regulations, it would be for the Commissioner or the appropriate authority to grant such FSI and permit the transfer thereof, utilisation whereof would be subject to the said regulations and more particularly Appendix vii thereof. ( 32 ) IN terms of Regulation 34 r/w the provisions of Appendix VII of the said regulations, it would be for the Commissioner or the appropriate authority to grant such FSI and permit the transfer thereof, utilisation whereof would be subject to the said regulations and more particularly Appendix vii thereof. The expression "equivalent to the area of development or construction of the amenity" has not been defined or explained in the said Regulations. At the same time, whenever there is any doubt about the interpretation of a Regulation and any decision is required to be taken in, that regard, the powers are given to the Commissioner under regulation 64 of the said Regulations. Being so, in exercise of those powers if the commissioner or the appropriate authority, to whom the power is delegated, prescribes FSI equivalent to the area of construction or development depending upon the value of the construction or development, it cannot be said that such an exercise is either arbitrary or unreasonable or in any manner in contravention of any of the statutory provisions. ( 33 ) THERE is no vested right for availing the further TDR in the form of FSI in relation to the construction or development of amenity in the surrendered plot, though the owner/developer carrying out construction of amenity in the surrendered plot according to the terms and conditions approved by the competent authority can be awarded with additional FSI under Clause 6 of the Appendix vii. The percentage thereof is to be decided by the Commissioner or the appropriate authority depending upon the area of the construction or the development of the amenity. Being so, merely because the approval for construction or development of amenity was granted prior to the issuance of the circular, it would not create any vested right to claim any particular percentage of FSI or even the FSI itself on account of approval of the amenity but it would depend upon the provisions of law in that regard on the date such FSI is to be granted. There is neither any retrospective implementation of the circular nor any right is created in favour of the petitioners to demand particular FSI contrary to the said circular merely because the construction or development of amenity was approved prior to the issuance of such circular. ( 34 ) THE decisions in the Century spinning and Manufacturing Co. There is neither any retrospective implementation of the circular nor any right is created in favour of the petitioners to demand particular FSI contrary to the said circular merely because the construction or development of amenity was approved prior to the issuance of such circular. ( 34 ) THE decisions in the Century spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (supra) and Godfrey Philips India Ltd. (supra) are in relation to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The rulings disclose decision to the effect that there can be no promissory estoppel against the legislature in the exercise of its legislative functions nor can the Government or public authority be debarred by promissory estoppel from enforcing a statutory prohibition and it is equally true that promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. In fact, we fail to understand how these decisions are applicable to the cases where there was neither any promise made on behalf of any of the authorities to the petitioners in relation to the availability of 100% FSI nor any representation either by the statutory authority or under any statute itself about such 100% FSI. ( 35 ) THE Apex Court in Pune municipal Corporations case (supra) has clearly held that it is settled position of law that there could be no promissory estoppel against a statute and the Rules framed under the provisions of a statute form part of the statute. ( 36 ) THE Apex Court in State of tamil Nadu Vs. M/s. Hind Stones etc. etc. , reported in AIR 1981 SC 711 , had clearly ruled that making a rule which is perfectly in order cannot be considered a misuse of the rule making power merely because it advances the interest of a State, which really means the people of the State. M/s. Hind Stones etc. etc. , reported in AIR 1981 SC 711 , had clearly ruled that making a rule which is perfectly in order cannot be considered a misuse of the rule making power merely because it advances the interest of a State, which really means the people of the State. It was held that the right to have the application disposed of in a reasonable time does not clothes an applicant with a right to have the application disposed of on the basis of the rule in force at the time of the making of the application and there is no such vested right and therefore the rule in force at the time of disposal of the application should apply. It was clearly ruled thus:-"while it is true that such applications should be dealt with within a reasonable time, it cannot on that account be said that the right to have an application disposed of in a reasonable time clothes an applicant for a lease with a right to have the application disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of the making of the application. " ( 37 ) IN Union of India and others vs. Hindustan Development Corporation and others, reported in (1993)3 SCC 499, dealing with the subject of legitimate expectancy, the Apex Court had held that:-"the expectation cannot be the same as anticipation. It is different from a wish, a desire or a hope nor can it amount to a claim or demand on the ground of a right. However earnest and sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an assertable expectation and a mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences. A pious hope even leading to a moral obligation cannot amount to a legitimate expectation. The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law or custom or an established procedure followed in regular and natural sequence. Again it is distinguishable from a genuine expectation. Such expectation should be justifiably legitimate and protectable. Every such legitimate expectation does not by itself fructify into a right and therefore it does not amount to a right in the conventional sense. Again it is distinguishable from a genuine expectation. Such expectation should be justifiably legitimate and protectable. Every such legitimate expectation does not by itself fructify into a right and therefore it does not amount to a right in the conventional sense. "it was further held that:-"a case of legitimate expectation would arise when a body by representation or by past practice aroused expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfil. The protection is limited to that extent and a judicial review can be within those limits. "similar is the ruling of the Apex Court in navjyoti Co-Group Housing Society etc. Vs. Union of India and others, reported in 1992 air SCW 3075. ( 38 ) IN all the four petitions, the amenities sought to be constructed are in the form of road and therefore would be entitled to 15% of the value of the area of the road constructed in the surrendered plot in terms of clause 6 of Appendix VII read with Regulation 34 of the said Regulations. Even though the approval for the construction of the amenity and the conditions in that regard were, in some cases, prior to the date of the impugned circular, undoubtedly, in all the four cases the availability of the FSI is to be made subsequent to the enforcement of the said circular and therefore the provisions of the said circular would be attracted in all the four cases. ( 39 ) CONSIDERING the provisions of law and in the facts and circumstances in all the petitions, both the question for consideration formulated above are to be answered in affirmative and therefore, all the petitions are liable to be dismissed. ( 40 ) HENCE, all the five petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. The rule is discharged in all the petitions with no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.