R. C. CHAVAN, J.:- Taking exception to his conviction for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code and the sentence of imprisonment for life inflicted upon him by the learned 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur, convict Sunil Kashinath Meshram has filed this appeal. 2. Facts, which led to the prosecution and conviction of the appellant, are as under: 3. Appellant's sister Vidya has sustained burn injuries on 13-04-1988. She had been admitted to the hospital by Ashok Domaji Meshram. but succumbed to her injuries on 14-04-1988. An accidental death was registered by the police, but was converted to a crime on 04-03-1989 on the basis of a report dated 1904-1988 given by the appellant's mother Kantabai. Ashok Domaji Meshram was taken into custody and was later released on bail. 4. On 10-07-1990 at about 1.45 p.m., when Ashok was proceeding towards Vandana Distillery, the accused, who was in the bicycle shop of his brother, rushed at Ashok with a gupti (sword cane) in his hand and stabbed Ashok in front of Vandana Distillery. The accused then went with the weapon to Police Station Panchpaoli and informed of the incident, whereupon an offence was registered. The police came to the spot, performed inquest, sent the dead body for post-mortem examination, drew up panchanama of spot, recorded statements of witnesses, seized incriminating articles, sent them to the Forensic Science Laboratory and charge-sheeted the appellant before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagpur, who committed the case to the Court of Sessions. 5. The learned 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur, to whom the case was made over, charged the appellant/accused of committing murder of Ashok Domaji Meshram. The accused pleaded not guilty and hence was put on trial. In the course of trial, the prosecution examined in all 10 witnesses. The defence of the accused is that though victim Ashok was blamed for Vidya's death, the relations between the accused and Ashok were not strained. He admitted having gone to the Police Station on seeing a dead body and stated that his clothes got stained with blood of the victim, as he helped the police in lifting the dead body. He alleged that he was falsely involved in the offence. He admitted having gone to the Police Station on seeing a dead body and stated that his clothes got stained with blood of the victim, as he helped the police in lifting the dead body. He alleged that he was falsely involved in the offence. Upon consideration of the prosecution evidence in the light of the defence raised, the learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted the appellant and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, or in default to undergo R.I. for two more months. Aggrieved thereby, accused Sunil Kashinath Meshram has preferred this appeal. 6. Shri. M. R. Daga, the learned counsel for the appellant, urged that the conviction and sentence inflicted on the appellant were bad in view of the intervening passage of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, which replaced the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. He further submitted that the evidence on record did not justify the finding of guilt recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 7. Shri. D. B. Yengal, the learned, Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, countered by submitting that since the trial of the appellant was over and he was already convicted long before the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 came into force, there was no substance in the contention raised in this behalf. He further submitted that the plea that the appellant was juvenile, was not taken and could not have been taken at the relevant time before the Trial Court, because at the relevant time, under the applicable law, the appellant was not a juvenile. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the evidence on record unmistakably pointed to the complicity of the appellant and the learned Trial Judge has rightly convicted the appellant. 8. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant was shown to be 18 years old in the charge, which was framed on 08-02-1995, and, therefore, was obviously under 18 years of age on the date of offence, that is 10-07-1990, is unexceptionable. The appellant was convicted by the judgment dated 30-09-1995. This appeal was filed on 03-11-1995. The provisions of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 came into force on 01-04-2001. The age of the accused was shown as 18 years even in the charge-sheet, which was prepared on 24-09-1990 and filed on 03-02-1991. The appellant was convicted by the judgment dated 30-09-1995. This appeal was filed on 03-11-1995. The provisions of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 came into force on 01-04-2001. The age of the accused was shown as 18 years even in the charge-sheet, which was prepared on 24-09-1990 and filed on 03-02-1991. Thus he could be taken to be aged 18 years on the date when the charge-sheet was filed. Therefore, on the date of offence, that is on 10-07-1990, he may be about 17 years of age. 9. On these facts, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the provisions of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 mandate that the case of the appellant would have to be dealt with under the provisions of the said Act, though the trial may have been concluded and the conviction may have been recorded against the appellant long before the said Act came into force. For this purpose, the learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Pratap Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand & Another, reported in 2005(1) Scale 763 : [2005 ALL MR (Cri) 2258 (S.C.)]. He also sought to rely on the decision of this Court in Rahul Govind Sharma Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another, reported in 2005 ALL MR (Cri) 1973. The facts and the issues raised in Rahul Govind Sharma's case were slightly different. The offence in that case was committed on 30-04-2002, i.e. after the Act came in force, charge was framed on 02-01-2003 and the accused was convicted by judgment dated 29-11-2004, though the petitioner was about 16 years old on the date of offence. In that context, this Court made certain observations in Rahul Govind Sharma's case directing the Trial Courts to ascertain the age of the persons before putting them on trial. 10. The facts in Pratap Singh's case decided by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court, relevant for the present purpose, could be stated as under: 11. The appellant, as one of the conspirators, was alleged to have caused on 31-12-1998 the death of deceased by poisoning. On 22-11-1999, that is almost 11 months after the incident, the appellant was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who assessed the age of the appellant to be 18 years' old. The appellant, as one of the conspirators, was alleged to have caused on 31-12-1998 the death of deceased by poisoning. On 22-11-1999, that is almost 11 months after the incident, the appellant was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who assessed the age of the appellant to be 18 years' old. Since the appellant had claimed to be a minor on the date of occurrence, that is on 31-12-1998, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate transmitted the case to the Juvenile Court. The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, upon making necessary enquiry, concluded that the appellant was below 16 years' age as on 31-12-1998 and, therefore, admitted the appellant to a bail. The matter was taken in appeal by the informant to the Court of Sessions, where the Sessions Judge, relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in Arnit Das Vs. State of Bihar, reported in (2000)5 SCC 488 : [2000 ALL MR (Cri) 1403 (S.C.)], held that the relevant date was the date of production of the offender before the Court and not the date of commission of offence. The Sessions Court remanded the matter for fresh enquiry to assess the age of the offender on the date of the production before the Magistrate. When the matter was taken to the High Court, it was disposed of following the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Arnit Das, holding that the relevant date was that of production before the Court and not the date of occurrence of crime. The matter was then taken to the Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court had in fact already taken a contrary view in Umesh Chandra Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1982(2) SCC 202 , which was not noticed by the Bench deciding the case of Arnit Das. On these conflicting views expressed in the two judgments of the Supreme Court being noticed when Pratap Singh's case came up for hearing, the following two questions were referred for decision to the Constitution Bench: “(a) Whether the date of occurrence will be the reckoning date for determining the age of the alleged offender a~ Juvenile offender or the date when he is produced in the Court/competent authority. (b) Whether the Act of 2000 will be applicable in the case a proceeding initiated under 1986 Act and pending when the Act of 2000 was enforced with effect from 01-04- 2001.” 12. (b) Whether the Act of 2000 will be applicable in the case a proceeding initiated under 1986 Act and pending when the Act of 2000 was enforced with effect from 01-04- 2001.” 12. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the proposition that the date of occurrence of offence would be the reckoning date for determining the age of the offender is conclusively settled by the Constitution Bench, overruling the view taken in the case of Arnit Das. He submitted that as appellant Sunil was obviously less than 18 years when the offence was committed, he was a juvenile in conflict with law on the relevant date. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, in view of the answer given by the Constitution Bench to the second question referred to it, the provisions of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as "the New Act") would apply even to the case of the appellant, since the proceeding in respect of Sunil's offence, namely this appeal, was still pending when the New Act came into force on 01-04-2001. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that though an appeal is fictionally deemed to be continuation of a trial, it could not be said to be a proceeding initiated under the 1986 Act in order to enable the appellant to have the benefit of the provisions of the New Act. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Section 20 of the New Act lays down that all the "proceedings" in respect of a juvenile "pending in any Court" in any area on the date on which the Act came into force would come in the sweep of the provisions of the new Act. He submitted that since the expression used is very wide, it would not be permissible to exclude the present proceedings in appeal. In any case, according to the learned counsel, the judgment of the Constitution Bench leaves no room for any doubt in this respect. The Constitution Bench had considered the provisions of Section 20 along with all other relevant provisions of the New Act and the rules made thereunder. In para 37 of the judgment rendered by Serna, J., speaking for himself and Hegde. The Constitution Bench had considered the provisions of Section 20 along with all other relevant provisions of the New Act and the rules made thereunder. In para 37 of the judgment rendered by Serna, J., speaking for himself and Hegde. Variava and Singh, JJ., the net result was summed up as under: “(b) The 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding in any court/ authority initiated under the 1986 Act and is pending when the 2000 Act came into force and the person had not completed 18 years of age as on 01-04-2001.” 14. It may be seen from the conclusions drawn by the Constitution Bench that the provisions of the New Act would apply to a pending proceeding initiated under the 1986 Act and pending when the New Act came into force, and the person had not completed 18 years of age as on 01-04-2001. Thus, if the person had completed 18 years of age as on 01-04-2001, the provisions of the New Act may not apply. This conclusion is fortified by the observations of the Constitution Bench in para 34 of the judgment as well. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that such was not the import of the observations of the Constitution Bench. He pointed out that Section 20 of the New Act reads as under: “20. Special provision in respect of pending cases - Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any Court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that Court as if this Act had not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence.” According to the learned counsel, Section 20 does not refer to proceedings under the Juvenile Justice Act, but proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any Court. Therefore, the reference to proceedings initiated under the 1986 Act in para 37 of the judgment of the Constitution Bench may have to be read in the context of the provisions of Section 20, which the Constitution Bench had specifically referred to and interpreted. 16. He submitted that since the Bench had conclusively determined that the date of reckoning of age is the date of offence and not the date of initiation of proceedings (or any other date), and since the appellant in this case was a juvenile on the date of offence, it would follow that the present appeal is a proceeding in respect of a juvenile pending in a Court when the New Act came into force. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, while the Court may continue with the proceedings as if the New Act had not been passed, should the Court find that the appellant had committed an offence, the Court may merely record a finding and instead of sentencing the juvenile, may forward the juvenile to a Board. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that this interpretation of the provisions of the New Act and the observations of the Apex Court, also flows from provisions of Section 64 of the New Act and Rule 62 of the Model Rules framed by the Central Government under the Act, both of which have been referred to in the judgment of the Constitution Bench in paras 30 and 33. The learned counsel submitted that Section 64 enjoins that a juvenile undergoing sentence of imprisonment at the commencement of the New Act would, in lieu of undergoing such sentence, be sent to a special home or be kept in a fit Institution. According to the learned counsel, therefore, had the appellant been in jail undergoing his life term on 01-04-2001, the date of commencement of the New Act, it would have been obligatory to send the appellant to a special home or a fit Institution in view of the provisions of Section 64, since he was a juvenile on the date of commission of offence. The question as to whether the appellant was a juvenile on 01-04-2001 or not would not be relevant, since the only date relevant for finding out whether the person is a juvenile or not is the date of commission of offence. 18. The question as to whether the appellant was a juvenile on 01-04-2001 or not would not be relevant, since the only date relevant for finding out whether the person is a juvenile or not is the date of commission of offence. 18. Under Rule 62 of the Model Rules framed by the Central Government, all pending cases, which have not received finality, are required to be dealt with and disposed of in terms of the provisions of the New Act and the Rules made thereunder. The Rule further clarifies that the benefits shall be made available not only to the accused, who was a juvenile or child at the time of commission of offence, but also to those who ceased to be a juvenile or child during the pendency of the enquiry or trial. The learned counsel submitted that his client was exactly such a person who was a juvenile at the time of commission of offence, but ceased to be a juvenile during the pendency of the proceedings, which have not yet attained the finality and, therefore, was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the New Act. 19. Shri. Daga, the learned counsel for the appellant, invited our attention to the decision of Supreme Court in Upendra Kumar Vs. State of Bihar, reported in (2005)3 SCC 592 . The offence in that case had occurred on 10-03-1995 and on the same date, the offender was produced before a Magistrate. Medical Board examined the offender and reported on 28-06-1995 that the offender was between 17 and 18 years of age. Offender was convicted on 03-10-1996 and sentenced to imprisonment for life on 04-10-1996. He preferred an appeal which was pending when the New Act came into force on 01-04-2001. High Court decided the appeal on 17-05-2002. After considering the provisions of Sections 15, 16 and 20 of the New Act, the Supreme Court observed in para 3 that when the High Court decided the Criminal Appeal filed by the appellant, appellant was entitled to the benefit of the New Act. The Court quashed the sentence, though the offender was atleast 24 years old when the New Act came into force. 20. The judgment in Upendra Kumar's case was noticed by the Court in para 35 of the judgment in Pratap Singh's case, just as the Court had referred to judgments in Umesh Chandra and Arnit Das. The Court quashed the sentence, though the offender was atleast 24 years old when the New Act came into force. 20. The judgment in Upendra Kumar's case was noticed by the Court in para 35 of the judgment in Pratap Singh's case, just as the Court had referred to judgments in Umesh Chandra and Arnit Das. However, the Court did not explicitly consider the implications of the observations in Upendra Kumar's case or observe that the Court was approving or overruling the observations. The learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, submitted that the findings in Upendra Kumar's case would still hold good, since it is not shown that the ratio in Upendra Kumar's case cannot stand with that in Pratap Singh's case. 21. The learned counsel submitted that the rule that emerges is thus: “once a juvenile always a juvenile” and, therefore, since his client was a juvenile on the date of commission of offence, he would be entitled to be treated as such till the proceedings, or for that matter, term of sentence, comes to an end. The learned counsel submitted that a person, who was not a juvenile in terms of the 1986 Act could be tried in any Court. Section 20 of the New Act requires such a person to be treated differently than an ordinary offender. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that (1) the relevant date for reckoning age of the offender is the date of offence; (2) on that date the appellant was a juvenile; (3) the provisions of the New Act would apply to cases of such offenders if proceedings in respect of such juvenile were pending in any Court when the New Act came in force; (4) the present appeal, being such a proceeding, was pending when the New Act came in force. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, whatever may be our findings on merit, the sentence inflicted upon the petitioner would have to be quashed. We have carefully considered these contentions in the light of observations of the Supreme Court and the relevant provisions of the New Act. 22. If the interpretation sought to be placed upon the observations of the Apex Court by the learned counsel for the appellant were to be accepted, the consequences would defeat the purpose of the Act. We have carefully considered these contentions in the light of observations of the Supreme Court and the relevant provisions of the New Act. 22. If the interpretation sought to be placed upon the observations of the Apex Court by the learned counsel for the appellant were to be accepted, the consequences would defeat the purpose of the Act. If the appellant, as a life convict was to be shifted on the commencement of the New Act on 01-04-2001 from a jail to a special home or a fit Institution, it would have resulted in placing a cat among pigeons, an adult in the company of juveniles. 23. The learned counsel also sought to rely on the observations of S. B. Sinha, J., who delivered a separate but concurring judgment in Pratap Singh's case. The learned counsel pointed out that in para 57 of the judgment, Sinha, J. has observed as under: “By reason of the aforementioned provisions a legal fiction has been created to treat a juvenile who has ceased to be a juvenile as a person as if he had continued to be a juvenile.” The conclusions of Sinha, J. have been summed up in para 116 of the judgment in Pratap Singh's case, where Sinha, J. too has observed that the New Act will have a limited application in the cases pending under the 1986 Act. In para 97 of the judgment, Sinha, J. has concurred with what Serna, J. had observed for himself and Hegde, Variava and Singh, JJ. The observations in para 97 may be reproduced as under: “97. Section 20 of the Act of 2000 would, therefore, be applicable when a person is below the age of 18 years as on 01-04-2001. For the purpose of attracting Section 20 of the Act, it must be established that: (i) on the date of coming into force the proceedings in which the petitioner was accused was pending; and (ii) on that day he was below the age of 18 years. For the purpose of the said Act, both the aforementioned conditions are required to be fulfilled....” “..... The purpose of the Act would stand defeated if a child continued to be in the company of an adult. Thus, the Act of 2000 intends to give the protection only to a juvenile within the meaning of the said Act and not an adult. The purpose of the Act would stand defeated if a child continued to be in the company of an adult. Thus, the Act of 2000 intends to give the protection only to a juvenile within the meaning of the said Act and not an adult. In other words, although it would apply to a person who is still a juvenile having not attained the age of 18 years but shall not apply to a person who has already attained the age of 18 years on the date of coming into force thereof or who had not attained the age of 18 years on the date of commission of the offence but has since ceased to be a juvenile.” 24. These observations succinctly state as to who are to be excluded from the applicability of the New Act. Therefore, after carefully considering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, we find that the decision of the Apex Court in Pratap Singh's case does not support the propositions advanced by the learned counsel. There can be no doubt that the relevant date for reckoning whether a person is a juvenile or not would be the date of commission of offence. However, the relevant date for considering status of an offender for the purpose of applicability of the New Act would be 01-04-2001. A person, who was not a juvenile in accordance with the law in force on the date of commission of offence, would be entitled to the benefit of the New Act only if (i) he was still actually and not fictionally a juvenile on the date of commencement of the New Act, and (ii) the proceedings in respect of his delinquency were pending. The decision of Constitution Bench in Pratap Singh's case must be held to have qualified the observations in Upendra Kumar's case to that extent. In this view of the matter, since the appellant was undisputedly not less than 18 years as on 1st April, 2001, it is not necessary to examine the question of his date of birth or to consider extending to him the benefit of the provisions of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, should we uphold the conviction of the appellant 25. We would now proceed to examine the evidence tendered by the prosecution to prove the appellant's complicity in murder of Ashok. We would now proceed to examine the evidence tendered by the prosecution to prove the appellant's complicity in murder of Ashok. Of the 10 witnesses examined by the prosecution, P.W.3 - Kantabai, mother of accused; and panch as P.W.5 - Darvesh and P.W.8 - Chetan do not fully support the prosecution. Their evidence does not help to connect the appellant to the crime. P.W.1 Kailash saw the appellant before and after the incident, but did not witness the actual assault. P.W.2 - Lilabai and P.W.4 - Domaji, victim's parents, had not at all seen the incident, but were examined to prove the motive. P.W.7 - Dr. Dongre had conducted the post-mortem examination and examined the weapon. The accused reported the crime before P.W.9 - ASI Pande. P.W.6 - PSI Shukla and P.W.10 - PI Tiwari had taken various steps in the investigation. 26. The evidence of P.W.7 - Dr. Dongre, who proved the notes of post-mortem examination at Exhibit-34, would leave no doubt about the manner in which the victim met with his death. The victim had an incised wound on the mandible, a stab wound on the right side of the chest, another stab wound on the left side of the chest and an incised wound on the left side of the buttock. On dissection, Dr. Dongre had found that right lung had collapsed and main aorta had been cut. The victim had died of haemorrhage and shock due to ante-mortem injuries, which were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the victim died homicidal death. The question is as to whether the prosecution proves that the appellant was the author of the injuries observed on the person of the victim by P.W.7 - Dr. Dongre. 27. P.W.2 - Lilabai and P.W.4 Domaji, victim's parents, state that Vidya, the daughter of Kashinath and sister of the accused, died about 5 to 6 years before the death of Ashok, of burn injuries. On that count, Kashinath and his sons had filed a report against Ashok. Ashok had been arrested in that case and was bailed out. Ashok used to attend the Court case on the dates given. While P.W.2 Lilabai stated that the relations between two families were cordial, P.W.4 - Domaji stated that because of death of Vidya, the relations between two families were stained. 28. Ashok had been arrested in that case and was bailed out. Ashok used to attend the Court case on the dates given. While P.W.2 Lilabai stated that the relations between two families were cordial, P.W.4 - Domaji stated that because of death of Vidya, the relations between two families were stained. 28. P.W.10 - PI Tiwari stated that on 04-03-1989, a crime was registered against victim Ashok for killing Ashok's "wife" by burning, vide FIR at Exhibit-68 (though nobody stated that Vidya was married to Ashok). The incident of Vidya's death took place on 13-041988. There is no evidence to show as to when Ashok was arrested or when he was bailed out in this offence in order to gather as to whether accused Sunil could have had any immediate reason to be provoked to eliminate Ashok. Yet, the evidence of P.W.2 - Lilabai, P.W.4 - Domaji and P.W.10 - PI Tiwari would show that accused Sunil's sister Vidya had died on 14-04-1988 and victim Ashok was a suspect in that crime. 29. Apart from the discrepancy about relations between the two families, P.Ws.2 and 4 also differ about incident dated 10-07-1990. While Lilabai stated that victim Ashok had not gone to attend the Court case on the incident day, Domaji was categorical that on 10-07-1990, Ashok was to attend the Court case. Lilabai had reached very late when the dead body was in Mayo Hospital. Domaji, however, came to know of the incident at about 2.30 p.m. He immediately took leave and went to the spot and saw that his son lying in a pool of blood. He stated that the police jeep also arrived at that spot and accused Sunil was in the jeep. Though he initially stated that the police had lifted the dead body, he changed to say that he had carried the dead body to Mayo Hospital in an autorickshaw. 30. The prosecution examined one Kailash as P.W.1, who had seen the accused before and after the incident when Kailash was getting his bicycle repaired in a shop of the brother of the accused. Thus, Kailash had no normal business to be at the spot but was there only by chance. Kailash stated that at about 12.00 noon, he saw Ashok proceeding on a bicycle from Nari Road to Kapil Nagar. Accused Sunil was by his side. Thus, Kailash had no normal business to be at the spot but was there only by chance. Kailash stated that at about 12.00 noon, he saw Ashok proceeding on a bicycle from Nari Road to Kapil Nagar. Accused Sunil was by his side. Sunil ran after Ashok with a gupti in his hand. After some time, Sunil returned to the shop with blood-stained gupti and stains of blood on his clothes. He stated that thereafter Sunil ran towards Sunil's house in Shende Nagar. He stated that though there was a traffic, there was no rush as such. In about 20 minutes, Sunil came to the spot in a police jeep. He stated that he learnt that Ashok Meshram was murdered in front of Vandana Distillery. The police lifted the dead body and went away in the jeep. Accused Sunil was also in the police jeep at the time. He admitted that the police made enquiries with him after about 15 days and that during these 15 days he did not disclose anything about the incident to anyone. He admitted that Sunil had brought the police to the spot. 31. While P.W.4 - Domaji, victim's father, stated that he carried the dead body of his son to Mayo Hospital in auto-rickshaw, P.W.1 - Kailash, an alleged eye-witness, stated that the police had lifted the dead body and carried it in the jeep along with accused Sunil. If the account of P.W.4 - Domaji is to be believed, the account of P.W.1 - Kailash would become suspicious. The presence of P.W.1 Kailash at the spot when the police came along with the accused should have normally resulted in Kailash making a disclosure about the incident to the police. In any case, it would have been normally expected of the police officers to at least note down the names of the persons, who were present, when they reached the spot in order to make enquiries in future. This too would have ensured that the statement of Kailash was recorded soon after the incident and not after 15 days if he indeed was an eye-witness to the incident. 32. The notes of post-mortem examination would show that the victim had two stab wounds and two incised wounds. The two stab wounds were cavity deep. Dr. This too would have ensured that the statement of Kailash was recorded soon after the incident and not after 15 days if he indeed was an eye-witness to the incident. 32. The notes of post-mortem examination would show that the victim had two stab wounds and two incised wounds. The two stab wounds were cavity deep. Dr. Dongre, P.W.7, in his evidence stated that particularly cut injury over aorta, the main artery carrying blood from the heart, was sufficient to cause instantaneous death. One can imagine the force with which the blood would spurt on cutting the main artery taking blood from the heart. The weapon gupti had been seized vide panchanama at Exhibit-62. This panchanama shows that the gupti had five inches' handle and sixteen inches' long blade. It was stated that the blade was stained with blood. 33. According to the prosecution story, the accused had himself produced the gupti at the Police Station immediately after the incident. The accused was with the police virtually from the moment the offence was committed. The police had obtained nail clippings of the accused and had sent them vide requisition Exhibit-51 to the Forensic Science Laboratory. The report of the Laboratory at Exgibit-36 shows that Article No.9, the clippings, did not have any stain of blood. Examination of the nail clippings of the accused, which were taken immediately after the incident, when the accused is alleged to have inflicted two incised wounds and two stab wounds, one of which cut the main artery, would have ordinarily disclosed some blood stains in his nail clippings. Absence of blood in the nail clippings is a very strong circumstance ruling out the complicity of the accused in the assault. The story of the accused in the assault. The story of the accused that he merely reported spotting of dead body to the police, accompanied police to the spot and was falsely implicated because of the old context of victim being accused of murder of the sister of the accused would become plausible. 34. In view of this, if the evidence of P.W.1 – Kailash, a chance witness, who had made a disclosure about the incident after 15 days is excluded, there is nothing which could connect the accused to the crime. The conduct of the accused, on which the learned Additional Public Prosecutor stressed, is not inconsistent with his innocence. 34. In view of this, if the evidence of P.W.1 – Kailash, a chance witness, who had made a disclosure about the incident after 15 days is excluded, there is nothing which could connect the accused to the crime. The conduct of the accused, on which the learned Additional Public Prosecutor stressed, is not inconsistent with his innocence. It is not necessary to imagine that the accused went to the police Station only out of a sense of remorse after having eliminated his foe. In any case, the circumstances brought on record do not show that the accused had any immediate cause to rush at victim Ashok and to eliminate Ashok that day, since murder of sister of accused Sunil had taken place on 13-04-1988, that is almost two years and three months before the incident. It is not that Ashok was let off by the police or the Court. The case against Ashok was pending. In view of this, we conclude that the circumstances established by the prosecution are consistent with the innocence of the accused. The account of P.W.1 – Kailash is unbelievable, first, because of delayed disclosure; secondly because of its being in conflict with the evidence of P.W.4 – Domaji about how dead body was carried, and lastly because of his being a chance witness. Absence of blood in the nail clippings of the accused makes complicity of the accused doubtful. Consequently, we find that the learned Additional Sessions Judge ought to have extended benefit of doubt to the appellant. 35. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The conviction of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and the resultant sentence of imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.500/- are quashed and set aside. The appellant is acquitted of offence punishable under Section 302, IPC. Bail bonds furnished by the appellant shall stand cancelled. Fine, if paid, shall be refunded to the appellant.