Judgment :- (PRAYER : Civil Revision Petition against the order of the learned V Additional City City Judge made in C.M.A. No.73 of 2002 dated 12.9.2001 confirming the order of the learned V Assistant City Civil Judge made in I.A. No.4625 of 1987 in O.S. No.7876 of 1986 dated 24.1.2001.) By consent, the main revision itself is taken up for disposal. 2. The suit was filed for ejectment by the respondent against the petitioners. In the plaint, it was stated that one Leese and Company, which was a sole proprietorship concern of one Rajarathnam, was the tenant of the respondent. The respondent was employed abroad for over seven years and in his absence, there were some legal proceedings between the respondent's co-owners and Leese and Company in which it was held that Leese and Company was the tenant of the land forming the superstructure. Subsequently, the respondent became the full owner of the property. He issued a notice dated 20.8.1985 to Leese and Company since he was not aware at that time that Rajarathnam, the sole proprietor of the company, had died. A reply was sent by the petitioners on 23.9.1985 alleging that they are the tenants. To ascertain the position, the respondent again sent a notice on 26.6.1986 calling upon the petitioners to explain how the right of the first defendant's business had devolved on them. By way of abundant caution, the notice was sent as per the provisions of Section 11 of the City Tenants' Protection Act (Act in short). The petitioners gave an evasive reply and thereafter, the respondent issued a quit notice dated 26.6.1985 and filed the suit. 3. The petitioners resisted the suit on various grounds. According to the petitioners, after the death of Rajarathnam, his brother Dorairajan was allotted the superstructure in a partition between him and the heirs of Rajarathnam. After Dorairajan died, his widow Andalammal became entitled to the superstructure. The said Andalammal, by her Will dated 14.12.1982, bequeathed the same to the petitioners. Petitioners claimed that the Act applied to them. I.A. No.4625 of 1987 was filed under Section 9 of the Act. 4. Andalammal died on 12.3.1983. The Will of Andalammal was proved in T.O.S. No.14 of 1983. 5. The learned trial Judge, by his order dated 24.1.2001, dismissed I.A. No.4625 of 1987. Against that, the petitioners filed C.M.A. No.73 of 2001, which was also dismissed. I.A. No.4625 of 1987 was filed under Section 9 of the Act. 4. Andalammal died on 12.3.1983. The Will of Andalammal was proved in T.O.S. No.14 of 1983. 5. The learned trial Judge, by his order dated 24.1.2001, dismissed I.A. No.4625 of 1987. Against that, the petitioners filed C.M.A. No.73 of 2001, which was also dismissed. Thereupon, the petitioners filed C.R.P. No.2125 of 1998, raising two questions as follows : (a) whether petitioners 2 and 3 can claim the benefits of Section 9 of the Act as legatees under the Will of Andalammal ? and (b) whether the respondent had recognised defendants 2 and 3 ? On the first question, K. Sampath, J. held that petitioners 2 and 3 cannot claim the benefits of Section 9 of the Act as legatees under the Will of Andalammal and remanded the matter to the trial court for deciding the other. The trial court heard the matter afresh and dismissed the application. The appeal was also dismissed and hence this revision. 6. The only question, therefore, that remains is whether they have been recognised and can claim to be the tenants and whether the landlord had recognised them as tenants. 7. The learned senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioners would submit that the respondent, having admitted in his cross-examination that he had agreed to Leese and Company as his tenant, cannot retract from his statement by stating that he did not receive any rents from then in recognition of the tenancy. According to the learned senior counsel, subsequent to the death of Andalammal, the petitioners herein had paid rents and the same was also received by the respondent and the respondent had recognised the petitioners as his tenants. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the statement made in the cross-examination must be read in the entire context of the case. The respondent had never denied that the original tenant was Leese and Company, the proprietory concern. But, the case of the respondent is that after the death of Radhakrishnan and after the business had been formed into a partnership, there had been no tenancy agreement, either implied or express between the respondent and the partners of Leese and Company. The notice issued to Leese and Company and the reference to Leese and Company was only in its original character as that of the sole proprietory concern. The notice issued to Leese and Company and the reference to Leese and Company was only in its original character as that of the sole proprietory concern. But, the arrangement amongst the family members and the formation of the business as a partnership was not to the knowledge of the respondent and the respondent had never recognised petitioners 2 and 3, who are now the partners, as tenants. 9. It is the specific case of the petitioners that they are the tenants, that is to say, Pakkiri Devi and Radhakrishnan, petitioners 2 and 3. But now, an attempt is made on behalf of the petitioners that Leese and Company was without dispute the tenant at the inception and it is only Leese and Company that had put up the superstructure and even now, it is the same Leese and Company which is the tenant, as acknowledged by the landlord in the notice dated 23.9.1985. It is contended that the proprietory concern is now converted to a partnership and that cannot in any way take away the right vested in Leese and Company as a tenant under the Act. This contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that Leese and Company is a proprietory concern, and though the tenancy is in the name of the concern, and the tenant is only the proprietor. The right of the proprietor of Leese and Company would not automatically get transferred to petitioners 2 and 3. It must be proved that petitioners 2 and 3 were recognised as tenants. It is their case that they were recognised, as seen from paragraph 2 of the reply notice dated 23.9.1985, which is extracted hereunder: "It should be placed on record so that facts cannot be distorted by your client that the tenants are (1) Pakkiri Devi and (2) R. Radhakrishnan, but Leese & Co. of which they are partners, has been mistakenly mentioned as the tenants. The tenancy is in respect of land only. The superstructure has been constructed by my client's predecessors in or about 1950." So according to them, Leese and Company was mistakenly mentioned as tenants and it is only they who are the tenants. Now, they cannot change that stand. Once they claim that petitioners 2 and 3, viz. The tenancy is in respect of land only. The superstructure has been constructed by my client's predecessors in or about 1950." So according to them, Leese and Company was mistakenly mentioned as tenants and it is only they who are the tenants. Now, they cannot change that stand. Once they claim that petitioners 2 and 3, viz. Pakkiri Devi and Radhakrishnan, are entitled to the protection of the Act, there should be either an implied or an express recognition by the landlord of their tenancy. 10. The notice dated 20.8.1985 is addressed to Leese and Company and not to respondents 2 and 3. Andalammal died on 12.3.1983. The Amendment Act came into force in the year 1980, extending the provisions of the Act to all tenancies that came into force before the date of the Act. The petitioners, could have inherited the tenancy only in the year 1983 and cannot, therefore, get the protection of the Act. In 1975 (II) M.L.J. 204 [Abdul Mallik vs. Fr. Joseph Sandanam], it was held, "Though an assignee is now given protection under the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, it is not all assignees that will get the protection, but only those assignees of lands and buildings who get the assignment prior to 12th September, 1955 and continued in possession thereafter; they alone will be entitled to the benefit of the protection under the amended definition of the term 'tenancy'." The same ratio applies to the case on hand. 11. 2003 (3) C.T.C. 488 [S.R. Radhakrishnan vs. Neelamegam] was somewhat similar to this case. One 'R' had taken on lease a property on 2.2.1970 and he put up the roof and made certain improvements. Subsequently, he took along with him, in his business, his two younger brothers. The plaintiff purchased the property from the respondent/ landlord in the year 1979 and issued a quit notice. 'R' sent a reply stating that it is now his brothers who were in possession of the property and he had nothing to do with them. Thereupon, the plaintiff sent another notice and filed a suit for ejectment, impleading all the three brothers. In the meantime, the original tenant 'R' had executed a lease deed in favour of his younger brothers relinquishing his entire interest in the business carried on in the premises. The brothers of 'R' filed an application under Section 9 of the Act. Thereupon, the plaintiff sent another notice and filed a suit for ejectment, impleading all the three brothers. In the meantime, the original tenant 'R' had executed a lease deed in favour of his younger brothers relinquishing his entire interest in the business carried on in the premises. The brothers of 'R' filed an application under Section 9 of the Act. The application was dismissed. The matter went to Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, inter alia, examined the question of the alleged assignment of tenancy rights. The brothers of 'R' also claimed to be tenants holding over. The Supreme Court held that since they never became tenants, the question of their holding over does not arise. The Supreme Court held that unless the persons seeking protection under Section 9 of the Act satisfy the conditions required, they cannot be granted the right which is a right granted by the statute against the right of the landlord. 12. In the present case, there is absolutely nothing to show that the respondent had assented to the presence of petitioners 2 and 3 as tenants. K. Sampath, J., in his order passed in C.R.P. No.2125 of 1998, has made it clear that unless petitioners 2 and 3 are able to make out that there was an agreement of tenancy between them and the respondent and that the respondent had recognised them as tenants and had received rents from them, they will not be entitled to the benefits of Section 9 of the Act. Further, the court below, after the remand, on facts, found that there was no continuity in the character of Leese and Company as a tenant. Ex.P.8, which was marked, showed three persons as partners, one Andalammal, one Devi and one Unnamalai. Andalammal died, as stated above, on 12.3.1983 and the firm was dissolved on 15.4.1985. The court below also found that the petitioners have not made out a case as to how they claim to have any right, title or interest in the property thereafter. The documents marked by them also show that one Devi was the proprietrix, as seen from the proceedings of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer dated 22.12.1993. In other documents, the said Devi is shown as partner. 13. It is not necessary for us to go into the question as to who is in charge of Leese and Company. The documents marked by them also show that one Devi was the proprietrix, as seen from the proceedings of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer dated 22.12.1993. In other documents, the said Devi is shown as partner. 13. It is not necessary for us to go into the question as to who is in charge of Leese and Company. All we have to find out is whether petitioners 2 and 3 have proved that the respondent has recognised them as tenants. The court below also found that the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 did not show that they have been paying rents to the respondent and that he has been receiving the same in recognition of their tenancy rights. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that the court below failed to take note of the receipt of the cheque by the respondent which was enclosed in the reply by the petitioner's counsel dated 1.7.1986 in which it is stated that a cheque for Rs.1,080/- is attached to the letter. The court below rightly held that there is no proof that this cheque was received and encashed by the landlord and even otherwise, in 2003 (3) C.T.C. 488 cited supra, the claim of the tenants that they had paid rent was rejected by the Supreme Court in the following words : "There is no rent receipt in their favour. The landlord is not a party to the release deed. He is not bound by any recitals contained in the release deed. Further, it is settled law that one does not become tenant by mere payment of rent even if that be so." 14. In (1996) 6 S.C.C. 399 [P.A. Thomas vs. M. Mohammed Tajuddin], the facts were almost similar. The tenancy was in favour of an individual, though it was in the name of the business which was a proprietory concern. Subsequently, it became a partnership, and the original tenant pleaded that he was the managing partners, but failed to prove it. So, it was held that the possession of the partners was only as sub-tenants, there being no direct nexus between them and the landlord. It was held that the tenants were not entitled to the protection of the Act. 15. So, it was held that the possession of the partners was only as sub-tenants, there being no direct nexus between them and the landlord. It was held that the tenants were not entitled to the protection of the Act. 15. In (2005) 5 S.C.C. 543 [Shanti Prasad Devi vs. Shankar Mahto], it was held that mere acceptance of rent will not signify assent to tenancy, nor could the tenant claim that he was 'holding over'. So, even if the rent had been paid and received, it will not help the petitioners. They must prove that there was either express or implied recognition of them as tenants. In this case, they have failed to do this. 16. The court below has rightly considered the factual as well as the legal aspects in this regard and has dismissed the application under Section 9 of the Act and there is no reason to interfere with the same. Accordingly, the civil revision petition is dismissed with costs of Rs.5,000/-. Consequently, C.M.P. No.10131 of 2005 is closed.