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2005 DIGILAW 1481 (RAJ)

Hemantlata alias Hemlata v. State of Rajasthan

2005-05-17

H.R.PANWAR

body2005
Honble PANWAR, J.–By this criminal revision petition under Section 397/401 Cr.P.C., the petitioner has challenged the Order dated 22.1.2005 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No.3, Udaipur (for short, ``the Trial Court hereinafter) in Criminal Case No. 178/1997, by which the Trial Court framed charges for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC against the accused-petitioner. (2). Briefly recapitulated, the facts of the case are that petitioner sought employment on compassionate ground on the death of her deceased husband late Girikant Upadhyaya, who dies while in employment. Along with the application form, petitioner submitted a marks-sheet of Higher Secondary Examination conducted by the Board of Secondary Education, Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal bearing roll No. 256422. She was given compassionate appointment on the post of Lower Division Clerk in the Office of the Senior Geologist, Banswara. A doubt crept in regarding the genuineness of the marks sheet and the verification was sought from the said Board. On verification by the Board of Secondary Education, Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal, it was revealed that in the High Secondary Examination, 1984 conducted by the said Board, Roll No. 256422 was allotted to one Prahlad Yadav but he remained absent in the examination. Thus, on verification, the marks sheet submitted by the petitioner along with the application for compassionate employment, was found to be forged. An FIR containing these facts was lodged with Police Station, Bhupalpura by complainant Shri N.S. Bohra, Director, Mines and Geology Department, Udaipur, on which the police register FIR No.249/96 for the aforesaid offences and after investigation, submitted the charge sheet against the petitioner before the Trial Court on 22.4.97. Vide order dated 9.9.1998, the Trial Court directed the SHO concerned for further investigation in the light of the directions given in that order. Ultimately, vide impugned order dated 22.1.2005, the Trial Court framed the aforesaid charges against the petitioner. Hence, this revision petition. (3). I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the Public Prosecutor for the State. Perused the impugned order and the challan papers. (4). It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that from the perusal of the challan papers, no charge is made out against the petitioner. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor submits that prima facie, there are sufficient material on record for framing the charges against the petitioner for the aforesaid offences. (5). (4). It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that from the perusal of the challan papers, no charge is made out against the petitioner. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor submits that prima facie, there are sufficient material on record for framing the charges against the petitioner for the aforesaid offences. (5). I have carefully perused the challan papers. Vide Annx.P/5, enclosing the copies of application form and the marks sheet submitted by the petitioner, a clarification was sought by the Additional Director (Admn.), Mines and Geology Department from the Board of Secondary Education, Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal. In response thereto, vide letter Annx.P/6, the aforesaid Board informed the Director to the effect that in the Higher Secondary Examination, 1984, roll No. 256422 was allotted to one Prahlad Yadav S/o Shri Laxmi Narain, whose date of birth is 1.1.1961, but Shri Prahlad Yadav did not appear in the examination and as such 000 marks were given. Again, instead of Examination Centre No. 2225, the marks sheet submitted by the petitioner shows the Examination Centre No. 2223. Therefore, as per the verification report, the marks-sheet submitted by the petitioner did not tally with the official record of the Board and the Board gave the report to the effect that the said marks sheet submitted by the petitioner is forged one. (6). Shri Jagdish Chandra, Headmaster, Government Upper Primary School, Nai Abadi, Banswara, in his police statement has stated that as per the school record, the petitioner passed VIII standard in the year 1976 and thereafter Transfer Certificate was issued to her. He has stated that the concerned record shall be submitted at the time of his evidence before the court. (7). Thus, there is prima facie evidence against the petitioner connecting her with the aforesaid offences. (8). It is settled law that at the stage of framing the charge, the court need not deeply examine the probative value of the material on record. If on the basis of material on record, the court comes to the conclusion that accused have committed the offence, the court is obliged to frame the charge. (9). (8). It is settled law that at the stage of framing the charge, the court need not deeply examine the probative value of the material on record. If on the basis of material on record, the court comes to the conclusion that accused have committed the offence, the court is obliged to frame the charge. (9). In State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 , the Honble Supreme Court, while considering the provisions of Sections 227 and 228 as also Section 401 of the Code, held as under:- ``Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weight in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt of otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (10). But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (10). In Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad vs. Dilip Nathumal Chordia & Anr., (1989) 1 SCC 715 , the Honble Supreme Court, while considering the provisions of Sections 226, 227 and 401 of the Code, held that if the Sessions Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and also makes an order in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its own course. Self- restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice staring the court in the face. The Apex Court further held that the opinion on any matter may differ depending upon the person who views it. There may be as many opinions on a particular matter as there are courts but it is no ground for the High Court to interdict the trials. It would be better for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed. (11). In State of Maharashtra vs. Som Nath Thapa & Anr., (1996) 4 SCC 659 , the Honble Supreme Court held that if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charges exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. (12). It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. (12). In Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia vs. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, 1999 Cr.L.R. (SC) 499, the Honble Apex Court held that at the stage of framing the charge, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record and if on the basis of materials on record, the Court could come to the conclusion that the accused would have committed the offence, the court is obliged to frame the charge and proceed to the trial. (13). In Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal vs. Anil Kumar Bhunja & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 52 , the Apex Court held that even on the basis of strong suspicion founded on materials before it, the Court can form a presumptive opinion regarding the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and in that even be justified in framing the charges against the accused in respect of the commission of the offence alleged to have been committed by them. (14). In State of Delhi vs. Gyan Devi & Ors., JT 2000 (Suppl.2) SC 635, the Honble Supreme Court held that at the stage of framing of charge, the Trial Court is not to examine and assess in detail the materials placed on record by prosecution nor it is for the court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged against the accused persons. The Court further held that at the stage of framing the charge, the court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that prima facie a case of commission of offence alleged has been made out against the accused. It was further held by the Honble Apex Court that the High Courts power to quash the charge should not be exercised except for strong reasons like interest of justice and avoiding abuse of process of the Court. (15). In Munna Devi vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., (2001) 9 SCC 631 ) = (RLW 2002 (1) SC 112), the Honble Apex Court held that revisional power under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. (15). In Munna Devi vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., (2001) 9 SCC 631 ) = (RLW 2002 (1) SC 112), the Honble Apex Court held that revisional power under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do. The Apex Court further held that revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. (16). In State of Maharashtra vs. Priya Sharan Maharaj & Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 393 , the Honble Supreme Court held that at the stage of framing the charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. It was further held by Their Lordships that at the stage of framing of the charge the Court has to consider the material with a view to find out if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence or that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against him and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction. (17). In Smt. Omwati vs. State, AIR 2001 SC 1507 , the Honble Supreme Court held that the High Court should not interfere at the initial stage of framing the charges merely on hypothesis, imagination and far-fetched reasons. (18). In State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, JT 2004 (10) SC 303, a Three Judge Bench of the Honble Supreme Court held that at the time of framing the charge or taking cognizance, the accused has no right to produce any material. The Apex Court further observed that the only right the accused has at that stage is of being heard and nothing beyond it. The Apex Court further observed that the only right the accused has at that stage is of being heard and nothing beyond it. The Apex Court further held as under:- ``At the stage of framing the charge roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible. It is well-settled that at the stage of framing of charge, the defence of the accused cannot be put forth. It only means hearing the submissions of the accused on the record of the case as filed by the prosecution and nothing more. The expression `hearing the submissions of the accused cannot mean opportunity to file material to be granted to the accused and thereby changing the settled law. At the stage of framing of charge, hearing the submissions of the accused has to be confined to the material produced by the police. (19). In this view of the matter, the aforesaid ground to challenge the impugned order for framing the charge, raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, are not tenable at this stage in view of the limited power of judicial review available to this Court under revisional jurisdiction. At this stage, the evidence on record cannot be evaluated meticulously and charge can be framed even on suspicion. However, in the instant case, after verification from the Board, the marks sheet submitted by the petitioner has been found to be forged and fabricated. In this view of the matter, I do not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order which may require interference in revisional jurisdiction. (20). Consequently, the revision petition is dismissed. The stay application stands disposed of.