Judgment ( 1 ) THIS "appeal against order" is filed against the order dated 19-4-2005 passed by forth Ad hoc Additional district Judge, Chandrapur, in Special Civil suit 1/2003 instituted by appellant whereby the trial court has refused to grant temporary injunction to restrain present respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (original defendants No. 1 and 2) from receiving amount of Rs. 42,23,800/- only (i. e. Forty-Two Lakhs Twenty-Three Thousand eight Hundred) from respondent No. 3/defendant No. 3 Central Bank of India, chandrapur and to restrain said respondent no. 3 from making any payment to respondents no. 1 and 2 til disposal of suit towords disputed letter of Credit issued by respondent No 3. ( 2 ) I have heard Advocate V R. Thakur for appellant, Advocate Lalji James, for respondents No. l, 2, 5 and 6, Advocate samel for Respondents No. 3 and 4, and advocate Anil Kumar for respondent No. 7. Before proceeding to mention the facts in detail, it will be appropriate to narrate the points briefly urged by Advocate Thakur to challenge the impugned order as that will facilitate appreciation of facts also. ( 3 ) ADVOCATE Thakur has raised following points :-a. the appellant never received the goods for which the letter of credit was to be issued. b. there is no letter of credit issued by respondent No. 3 Central Bank of India. c. the document acted upon as letter of credit is not a legal and valid document issued as per contract. d. the letter of credit was to be/is "not negotiable. e. the respondent No. 7 i. e. State Bank of hyderabad did not even cursorily verify the accompanying documents as per requirement of letter of credit and acted with gross negligence in negotiating/discounting it. f. documents authorising respondent no. 3 Central Bank to retire documents were procured under coercion from appellant. g. E-mails immediately forwarded byappellant, giving rise to these questions can be stated thus. The appellant, as sole proprietor, is doing import export business under the style "noble exports" Chandrapur. He received order to supply 400 metric tons of fresh garlic from alakh Import Export Enterprises, respondent no. 6 herein, from Johannesburg, South Africa. The garlic was to be shipped from Navasheva port, Mumbai. The contract is dated 8-4-2002. The appellant, as sole proprietor, is doing import export business under the style "noble exports" Chandrapur. He received order to supply 400 metric tons of fresh garlic from alakh Import Export Enterprises, respondent no. 6 herein, from Johannesburg, South Africa. The garlic was to be shipped from Navasheva port, Mumbai. The contract is dated 8-4-2002. In view thereof appellant entered into further contract with present respondent No. 1 Gopal international of New Delhi on 10-6-2002 and under it respondent No. l irrevocably committed to sell and supply 200 metric tons of tresh garlic to appellant within 60 days. The price agreed was Rs. 21,119/- only per metric ton FOB Mumbai. According to appellant, the price included pre-paid freight up to the destination i. e. Navasheva Port, Mumbai. This garlic was to be packed in corrugated boxes as mentioned in the contract. The contract also prescribed details of bankers and United Bank of India, Overseas Branch, Asatali Road, New delhi was agreed to be the bank of respondent no. 1 while Central Bank of India, Kamptee road, Nagpur was agreed to be the bank of appellant. The payment was to be made by appellant by opening irrevocable letter of credit in favour of respondent No. 1 by a local Bank by 100% value payable on 180 days by sight. The 8 documents required to accompany the letter of credit for payment were expressly stipulated. Accordingly, appellant applied to respondent No. 3 Central Bank at Chandrapur for issuance of letter of credit The respondent no 3 requested Central Bank f India, Janpath. New Delhi to open letter of credit as per instructions contained in its request letter. The copy of this request letter was received by appellant without Annexure-I accompanying it. The said Annexure has been later on produced in Civil Suit. Respondent No 3 also issued a document dated 5-7-2002 supposed to be the letter of credit in favour of respondent no 1 and said document is not in usual format normally used by bank. Earlier, respondent no. 3 sanctioned a packing limit to the appellant vide sanction letter dated 15-5-2002 according to which the goods were required to be pledged with the bank. The appellant did not have knowledge of the source from where respondent No. 1 was to procure garlic. Earlier, respondent no. 3 sanctioned a packing limit to the appellant vide sanction letter dated 15-5-2002 according to which the goods were required to be pledged with the bank. The appellant did not have knowledge of the source from where respondent No. 1 was to procure garlic. The annexure-I as mentioned above sent with request letter dated 5-7-2002 had a note which mentioned "document dated prior to opening of inland L/c is acceptable". The appellant contends that this note has been misused by respondent No. 1 to forge delivery challans to create impression that appellant has received the garlic. The said delivery challans were vague in material particulars. Using them, respondent No. 1 negotiated letter of credit with respondent No. 7 State Bank of Hyderabad and appellant was required to retire documents given in sealed cover by respondent No. 3 central Bank of India. Under pressure and force from respondent No. 3 proprietor of appellant put his signature by applying rubber stamp of Noble Exporters thereon. The other documents like transport receipts were not accompanying the forged invoices and delivery challans. Appellant states that alleged delivery of 200 metric tons of fresh garlic was given to him as per respondent No. 1 between 29-6-2002 and 3-7-2002 which is much pnor to the date of letter of credit. Respondent No. 7 State Bank of Hyderabad discounted the letter of credit and made payment to respondent No. l. Thereafter respondent No. 7 demanded reimbursement from respondent No. 3 Central bank of India Appellant contends that he issued letters and e-mails to respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on 12-7-2002,15-7-2002,19-7-2002,20-7-2002, 29-7-2002, 18-8-2002 and 24-8-2002 making grievance that he did not receive the garlic. However there was no reply from said respondents Appellant further contends that respondent No. 3 Central Bank also obtained under pressure two letters from him on 29-10-2002. He has stated that on 20-12-2002 he sent telegram to respondent No. 1 and thereafter he also lodged police complaint on 30-12-2002 thereafter he filed Special Civil Suit 1/2003 alongwith application for temporary injunction. It was opposed by respondents. In support of his contentions, appellant filed affidavit of Bhojraj Kamble dated 29-11-2003 and affidavit of Dhananjay Potdukhe, computer engineer dated 16-7-2003 and also is affidavit of Vithal Asodkar. It was opposed by respondents. In support of his contentions, appellant filed affidavit of Bhojraj Kamble dated 29-11-2003 and affidavit of Dhananjay Potdukhe, computer engineer dated 16-7-2003 and also is affidavit of Vithal Asodkar. The learned trial court by its order dated 1-2-2003 directed respondent No. 3 to maintain status quo until further orders and ultimately by order dated 19-4-2005, it rejected the application for temporary injunction. It is this order which is challenged in present appeal. " ( 4 ) ADVOCATE Thakur has assailed the observations and findings of learned lower court by contending that the said court has erroneously observed that there is no specific plea about formal receipt of garlic by appellant. He has taken this court through the relevant pleadings in an attempt to demonstrate that the appellant/plaintiff has clearly stated that he never received garlic. He further stated that emphasis in law is on proof of receipt of garlic by appellant in terms of contract of letter ot guarantee and therefore the plaint allegations appear to be so. However according to him the allegations are clear and not qualified. He has further invited attention of court to the two letters obtained from appellant by respondent no. 3 Bank at Chandrapur and has argued that these letters were required to be submitted because of pressure put upon him by respondent No. 3 and also in view of the fiduciary relations which he had with said respondent He argues that the envelop containing the documents to be retired was sealed and immediately after getting knowledge of contents thereof, appellant forwarded e-mail of non-receipt/non-delivery of garlic by him on next day i. e. 12-7-2002. He further states that the dispute about date of e-mail is unnecessarily raised and has confused the trial court. According to him affidavit of computer engineer Dhananjay Potdukhe filed by appellant before trial Court clinched the issue and it was shown that date on e-mail message is entered by server of the department and no tampering in this respect is possible. He contends that the copies of e-mails produced by respondent No. 1 to show that he got it on 16-12-2002 are bogus and tampered documents He further invited attention to the conduct of appellant to show that he never received garlic. He also invites attention to the fact that police complaint has been filed on 30-12-2002. He contends that the copies of e-mails produced by respondent No. 1 to show that he got it on 16-12-2002 are bogus and tampered documents He further invited attention to the conduct of appellant to show that he never received garlic. He also invites attention to the fact that police complaint has been filed on 30-12-2002. He further states that respondent No. 1 has forged delivery challans also and on the date on which the said delivery challans are shown to have been signed at New delhi by appellant or his agent, both of them were in fact at Chandrapur. He invites attention to material available on record to support this stand. He further invites attention to the fact that there is no admitted letter of credit on record and respondent No 3 had only requested its counterpart of New Delhi to issue appropriate letter of credit. He invites attention to the document received by him to show that said letter of credit was to be subjected to certain terms and conditions and those terms and conditions are nowhere included in it He states that the letter of ciedit was to be honoured if it was accompanied by 8 documents and that too by only specified Bank. He argues that thus it was not negotiable and in spite of this the respondent No. 7 State Bank discounted it though it was not accompanied by 8 documents as was required by contract between parties He therefore argues that said respondent No. 7 and also respondent No. 1 have both acted fraudulently to the prejudice of appellant only to cause him loss. He further argues that even respondent No. 3 Central Bank has not discharged its obligation about verification of documents lodged with letter of credit by respondent No. 7 with It. ( 5 ) HE has relied upon the judgment of Honble Apex Court reported at 1988 (1) scc 174 between U. P. Coperative federation Vs. Singh Consultants and engineers, as also the other judgment of honble Apex Court reported at AIR 1981 SC 1426 between United Commercial Bank Vs. Bank of India. He has also relied upon these cases to contend that in appropriate cases where special equities are involved or where there are exceptional circumstances i. e. of fraud or irreparable injustice, the courts can grant injunction. Bank of India. He has also relied upon these cases to contend that in appropriate cases where special equities are involved or where there are exceptional circumstances i. e. of fraud or irreparable injustice, the courts can grant injunction. He argued that the documents are required to be meticulously scrutinised by bank before honouring/discounting the letter of credit. If this degree of care Is not taken by bank, it is its negligence and it cannot recover the amount under such letter of credit from appellant. He points out that as documents as directed by appellant and incorporated in directions in writing were not tendered by respondent No. 1 to respondent No. 7, iespondent No. 7 could not have made payment to respondent No. 1. He further states that when this mischief/mistake is within the notice of respondent No. 3, respondent No. 3 must also refuse to make payment to respondent No. 7. He further states that in fact there is no letter of credit filed before lower court and what is filed is only request letter. He therefore argues that learned lower court was in error in refusing to grant temporary injunction to the appellant. He further points out that the credit was subject to Uniform Customs and Practice for documentary Credit but that was also not correctly specified in letter of credit. He further states that letter of credit was to be presented within 10 days of date of delivery Challan/invoice and in this case, it is produced after 10 days and he further states that respondent No 3 was entitled to warehouse receipt of export bills to show its charge on such stored garlic, bills of lading and other shipping documents. However, these documents also have not been produced. He has further argued that the respondent No. 1 has not produced any document to show that 200 metric tonnes of garlic was purchased by it or to show that it was handed over to appellant on the respective dates of delivery challans. It is his contention that looking to the quantity of garlic, respondent No. 1 could have produced before court material to show purchase of 200 metric tonnes of garlic by it and also its delivery. It is his contention that looking to the quantity of garlic, respondent No. 1 could have produced before court material to show purchase of 200 metric tonnes of garlic by it and also its delivery. He further argues that such huge quantity could not have been received by appellant at New delhi and had he really received it, there would have been material available with respondent no. 1 to show it. He further contends that when price fixed was for FOB delivery at Navasheva port, there is absolutely no reason and justification for appellant to go to New Delhi and to accept delivery at that place. It is his case that respondent No. 1 has defrauded and cheated him, and respondent No. 7 Bank has assisted respondent No. 1 in the matter. ( 6 ) INVITING attention to paragraphs 25 and 26 of impugned order, counsel for appellant argues that the trial court has not correctly appreciated the position emerging on record in the light of allegations of fraud by appellant. He argues that copies of e-mail produced by respondent No. 1 are fabricated and the dates upon e-mail can never be changed. Affidavit ot expert filed by appellant/plaintiff could not have been ignored by trial court. He also invites attention to the fact that the document produced as letter of credit (Annexure-IV with appeal memo) does not contain any Annexure and is incomplete. He urges that contusion is being created between request letter and letter of credit, and original letter of credit is not at all on record. He invites attention to communication dated 5-7-2002 sent by respondent No 3 Central Bank, chandrapur to beneficiary respondent No. 1 gopal International, particularly clause No. 2 thereof, to show that seller was under obligation to submit full set of clean "shipped on board" bill of lading to order. He relies upon the judgment of Honble Apex Court in case between Elierman and Bucknall steamship Co. Ltd. Vs. Sha Misrimal bherajee reported at AIR 1966 SC 1892 , in order to demonstrate how said document is understood in law and by parties. He invites attention to reply of respondent No. 1 and points out as to how said respondent has tried to plead that it was "unrestricted local" letter of credit. He points out that the seller is treating request letter as letter of credit. He invites attention to reply of respondent No. 1 and points out as to how said respondent has tried to plead that it was "unrestricted local" letter of credit. He points out that the seller is treating request letter as letter of credit. He also invites attention to defence that State Bank of hyderabad verified the documents before discounting. He contends that no bills of lading were submitted by seller to said Bank. He also invites attention to reply filed before lower court by respondent No. 7 State Bank of hyderabad which is on same lines. He argues that respondent No. 7 Bank has committed lapses in performance of its duties and no advantage can be taken either by it or by respondent No. 3 Central Bank of alleged clearance/noc procured from appellant. He further points out that the condition of presenting letter of credit with documents within 10 days is conveniently ignored by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as also respondent no. 7. He argues that because of particular nature of letter or credit, the bankers of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were specifically mentioned and, hence, respondent No. 7 could not have interfered in the matter. He argues that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 might have approached specified Banker and due to absence of required documents, said banker might have refused to oblige them and hence the respondents worked out arrangement with respondent No. 7. It is his argument that conduct of respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 7 is not above board. ( 7 ) ADVOCATE Thakur, in order to substantiate the case of fraud has pointed out as to how Bank accepting letter of credit for discounting has to scrupulously examine the documents furnished by seller to it He states that trial court has believed appellant/plaintiff only on account of three letters. He states that the appellant/plaintiff is Ayurvedic Medical practitioner and not a businessman or trader. He invites attention to first e-mail forwarded by appellant on 12-7-2002 and argues that the respondent Nos 1 and 2 communicated that they have already despatched the garlic and appellant accepted this representation and acted upon it. He relies upon the judgment of honble Apex Court reported at 2004 (11) SCC 364 between Commissioner of Customs, kandla Vs. Essar Oil Ltd. and Ors. to point out how fraud is judicially understood. He relies upon the judgment of honble Apex Court reported at 2004 (11) SCC 364 between Commissioner of Customs, kandla Vs. Essar Oil Ltd. and Ors. to point out how fraud is judicially understood. To emphasise the obligation of banks to verify the documents submitted by seller, he places reliance upon the judgment reported at 1983 co. Cases (53) 550 of Delhi High Court in case between Interads Advertising (P) Ltd. Vs. Palmex Enterprises. ( 8 ) ADVOCATE James for respondent nos. 1,2,5 and 6 states that the argument about authentic letter of credit or its copy is in fact misleading. He contends that in previous writ petition 4980/2004 filed by appellant before this court, appellant accepted very same document as letter of credit and now hes going back on it. He further states that the said document filed with this appeal as Annexure-I is having 7 pp but only 6 pp are produced in this court He relies upon judgment of Honble apex Court reported at AIR 1994 SC 853 to urge that appellant is not entitled to any relief for misleading and playing fraud upon this court. He further argues that in view ot letter of credit, for deciding the issue involved, contract dated 10-6-2002 between parties is not relevant and it is the document of letter of credit which squarely regulates the payment thereafter He states that as per Annexure to said letter of credit only five documents were required to claim payment under it. He has further relied upon Article 4 of Uniform customs and Practice for Documentary credits, (1993 revision mentioned as UCP hereafter) to state that in such operation, parties deal with documents and not with goods. He further states that documents other than those specified in letter of credit cannot be asked by respondent No. 7 bank for negotiation/discounting. He further states that out of total five documents furnished by respondent No. 1 along with letter ot credit. 2 are signed by appellant himself while 1 document is signed by his agent and 1 document is signed and accepted by appellant himself. He further states that while retiring these documents, appellant gave in writing a letter on his letterhead in his own handwriting about his satisfaction and he did this only because he had received garlic. 2 are signed by appellant himself while 1 document is signed by his agent and 1 document is signed and accepted by appellant himself. He further states that while retiring these documents, appellant gave in writing a letter on his letterhead in his own handwriting about his satisfaction and he did this only because he had received garlic. He further invites attention to Article 37 ot UCP 500 to show that commercial invoices need not be signed by parties. Simultaneously he also invites attention to article 38 thereof to point out that only when credit calls, other documents are required He further points out that no where the appellant alleged that rubber stamp of his establishment on his signature were forged. In view of Article 37 and Article 38, it was not necessary for respondent No. l to forge the documents in this respect. He further states that story of handing over sealed envelope by respondent No. 3 to appellant is again imaginary as respondent No 3 Bank would not handover the documents without verification and appellant, who is in business, would not authonse its retirement without scrutiny He further states that story of appellant in this respect is not consistent. He has not disclosed which documents he received from respondent no. 3 and he invites attention to paragraph 5 of temporary injunction application, Exhibit 4 in trial court and to paragraph 7 of this appeal where reference made is "the other documents" He states that respondent No 7 paid the amount only after verification from respondent No. 3 Bank and after the documents were received by present appellant. He states that complaint in this respect has been made after several months i. e. on 16-12-2002 through e-mail. He contends that appellant/plaintiff antedated his e-mails and while doing so appellant failed to change the date of system while sending first e-mail He invites attention of Court to paragraph 6 of reply affidavit filed in this court and also to paragraph 16 of the impugned order of trial court. He contends that to suppress this tampering with date, the top portion of first e-mail has been torn away by appellant. According to him, respondent no. 1 got letter of credit only through Janpath branch of Central Bank of India at New Delhi. He states that appellant is unnecessarily creating confusion about it. He contends that to suppress this tampering with date, the top portion of first e-mail has been torn away by appellant. According to him, respondent no. 1 got letter of credit only through Janpath branch of Central Bank of India at New Delhi. He states that appellant is unnecessarily creating confusion about it. It is contended that there is no prima facie case or balance of convenience in favour of appellant whose case is based upon total falsehood. ( 9 ) HE also invites attention to article 2 to demonstrate meaning of credit and contends that the moment terms and conditions are complied with and stipulated documents are produced, respondent No. 3 Bank is placed under obligation to clear payment In view of article 5 of UCP the credit documents are required to be precise and documents against which payment, acceptance or negotiation is to be made must be clearly mentioned. He invites attention to article 6 to show that credit in present case is irrevocable and article 9 to show obligation of respondent No. 3 (issuing bank) and respondent No. 7 (confirming bank) to honour it. He also invites attention to subclause (iv) of clause (a) of this article to contend that bank is under obligation to pay without recourse to draw such credit. The letter of credit in this case is negotiable in view of stipulation of "without recourse" in it. He further states that documents were to be presented for negotiation within 10 days from the date of delivery Challan/invoices. Letter of credit issued by respondent No. 3 was irrevocable, without recourse and unrestncted. Special instructions of this letter of credit are as per its Annexure 1 and said Annexure is not produced either by appellant or by respondent no. 3. Article 10 provides types of credit and as per sub-clause (b) (i) thereof the credit has to stipulate expressly that it is available with issuing bank and otherwise, credit must nominate the bank which is authorised to pay, or in treely negotiable credit, any bank is nominated Bank. In view ot this condition, according to learned counsel, respondent No. 1 was justified in presenting letter of credit with respondent No. 7 Bank. In view ot this condition, according to learned counsel, respondent No. 1 was justified in presenting letter of credit with respondent No. 7 Bank. He further invites attention to Annexure 1 with letter of credit to show that total only five documents mentioned therein as documents for negotiation are sufficient in view of article 4 and as per note appearing at the end of this Annexure documents of date prior to opening of letter of credit were also valid if presented within time limit set out in the credit In support of this reliance is placed on article 22 Respondent no. 1 submitted required 5 documents within time to respondent No. 7 with letter of credit and there is no fraud or cheating in the process. Present appellant has not made any grudge about this note at the end of Annexure 1. Standard for examination of these documents is also prescribed in article 13 and if the documents on their face comply with terms and conditions of credit, the bank has to honour the credit. The documents not stipulated in the credit need not be examined by bank and no liability can be fastened in that respect on bank. It is his argument that bills of lading are not contemplated in list of five documents mentioned in Annexure 1 with letter of credit and as such the same were not required to be submitted and also respondent No. 3 or 7 could not have refused to honour the credit because those documents were not submitted by respondent No. 1 or, if submitted were found to be defective by banks. The documents were cleared by appellant himself on 11 -7-2002 and thereafter only payment was released in favour of respondent No. 1. ( 10 ) HE further points out that plaint as also application for grant of temporary injunction was silent in several material respects and therefore application under Order vi, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure was moved by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to seek further particulars. He further states that letter authorising retirement of documents and giving green signal for payment dated 11-7-2002 written by present appellant to respondent No. 3 was not produced by appellant. Also all 7 pages of purchase contract were not produced by appellant. 1 and 2 to seek further particulars. He further states that letter authorising retirement of documents and giving green signal for payment dated 11-7-2002 written by present appellant to respondent No. 3 was not produced by appellant. Also all 7 pages of purchase contract were not produced by appellant. He has argued that though all pages are stated to be signed by both the parties but last Page is only appearing to be signed by respondent No. 1 and appellant and remaining pages are not signed by appellant. It is his contention that the appellant ought to have explained this situation. ( 11 ) HE relies upon the judgment of learned Single Judge of this court reported at 2005 (3) Mh. L J. 387 : 2005 (3) ALL MR 33 between Deshmukh and Comp. Vs. Avinash vishnu Khandekar, to point out as to how the appellate court has to approach and evaluate the order of trial court in appeal in such circumstances. He states that the appellate court cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion by trial court as the appeal is treated as an appeal on principle and it is not open to this court to reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different than that of trial court, only because other view of the matter is possible. He relies upon the judgment of Honble Apex Court reported at AIR 1994 SC 853 between S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath to contend that courts summarily throw out the person like appellant who withholds vital information or documents or whose claim is based upon falsehood. He also invites attention of court to the ruling of Honble Apex Court reported at AIR 1970 SC 891 between M/s. Tarapore and Comp. Vs. M/s. V/o. Tractor export Moscow to contend that interference with mechanism of irrevocable letter of credit is bound to have serious implications on trade and as such the courts should not interfere with it. He contends that such letter of credit is a bargain between banker and the vendor and the banker is under obligation to pay irrespective of any dispute between parties about the goods. He has also placed reliance upon judgment of Honble Apex Court 1988 (1) scc 174 between U. P. Coperative federation Vs. Singh Consultants and engineers (supra) on which Advocate Thakur has also relied. He has also placed reliance upon judgment of Honble Apex Court 1988 (1) scc 174 between U. P. Coperative federation Vs. Singh Consultants and engineers (supra) on which Advocate Thakur has also relied. He has drawn extensively from this judgment to substantiate his point that courts should not grant injunction at instance of beneficiary of irrevocable letter of credit and commitments of bank must be honoured to avoid damage to the trade, internal and international. He argues that only in exceptional cases where fraud or irreparable injustice is apparent, the courts interfere. He also invites attention to concurring judgment delivered separately therein to show that the question of examination of prima facie case or balance of convenience does not arise if the court cannot interfere with the unconditional commitment made by the bank in the guarantee/letter of credit. He further states that dispute between buyer and seller is to be settled by themselves and court can interfere only if there is fraud in transaction. He also invites attention to judgment of Honble Apex Court in case between Federal Bank Ltd. Vs. V. M. Engineering Ltd. reported at AIR 2000 SC 3166 wherein the Honble Apex Court has again reiterated the same principles and has held that fraud must be clearly proved and circumstances must exist in which realistic inference of such fraud can be reached. He further states that as respondent No. 7 bank was holder in due course, its claim against respondent No. 3 Bank cannot be defeated even if basic transaction between appellant and respondent No. 3 is found to be vitiated by fraud. ( 12 ) ADVOCATE Samel for Central bank of India, respondent No. 3 and respondent no. 4 has stated that appellant executed various documents in its favour and on same day respondent No. 3 issued letter of credit. He also adopted the arguments advanced on behalf of respondent No. 1 along with case law cited on the point to avoid repetition. It is further contended that the controversy about letters dated 29-10-2002 has been raised by appellant for the first time after respondent No. 3 filed its reply before trial court on 27-1-2003. It is stated that the total 48 documents were filed before trial court including these two letters and 20 delivery Challans. It is further contended that the controversy about letters dated 29-10-2002 has been raised by appellant for the first time after respondent No. 3 filed its reply before trial court on 27-1-2003. It is stated that the total 48 documents were filed before trial court including these two letters and 20 delivery Challans. It is contended that fraud is played on this court by suppressing these delivery challans which are signed by appellant and which also bear the endorsement in his own handwriting that he received goods as per contract. It is argued that police report dated 30-12-2002 lodged by appellant against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is silent about any coercion or pressure by respondent No. 3 Bank in obtaining abovementioned 2 letters. He further pointed out that the payment has been cleared only after the documents were cleared by appellant on 11-7-2002. He also invites attention to relevant observations contained in the impugned order and also to the pleadings of present appellant before lower court to demonstrate as to how appellant did not approach the court with any definite case/plea in the matter and story about alleged fraud is also evasive. He states that none of the e-mails were admittedly sent to respondent No. 3 or 4. ( 13 ) ADVOCATE A. Kumar for respondent No. 7 - State Bank of Hyderabad has mostly adopted the same arguments and has stated that it discounted the documents on 12-7-2002 after the same were cleared by respondent No. 3 and appellant. Respondent no. 7 is not concerned with private dispute between appellant and respondent Nos. l and 2 and he argues that there is no correspondence with it by appellant complaining about the goods up to 30-12-2002. He further argues that e-mails produced on record by appellant are governed by provisions of section 65-A and 65-B of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and none of the e-mails produced are in consonance with said provisions. He has invited attention to provisions of section 14 of Specific Relief Act to contend that contract of letter of credit between appellant and respondent No. 3 cannot be specifically enforced and to provisions of section 41 thereof to show that in such circumstances and injunction is to be refused. He has invited attention to provisions of section 14 of Specific Relief Act to contend that contract of letter of credit between appellant and respondent No. 3 cannot be specifically enforced and to provisions of section 41 thereof to show that in such circumstances and injunction is to be refused. He also invites attention to provisions of Order 39, Rule 1 of C. P. C. to contend that in such situation temporary injunction cannot be granted to appellant. He relies upon Federal bank Ltd. Vs. V. M. Engineering Ltd. reported at AIR 2000 SC 3166 , to contend that respondent No. 7 is in position of a holder in due course an no injunction can be granted in the matter to its prejudice. He has also relied upon the judgment of Apex Court reported at air 1996 SC 445 between National Thermal power Corporation Vs. Messers Flowmore pvt. Ltd. , to show that the bank in such circumstances is not concerned with inter se dispute between beneficiary and the person at whose instance it issued the bank guarantee. He further relies upon judgment of Honble apex Court reported in AIR 1994 SC 626 in case between Svenska Handlesbanken Vs. Indian Charge Chrome, to point out that bank must pay if the documents are in order and bank was not allowed to determine whether seller had actually supplied the goods or whether the goods conformed to the requirements of the contract. The obligation of bank to pay cannot be interdicted by court in the absence of fraud or special equities in the form of preventing irretrievable injustice between parties. He has also relied upon judgment of Bombay High court reported at 11 (1998) BC 505 : 1998 (2) all MR 170 between Akai Impex Ltd. Vs. General Steel Export and Ors. , to submit that the banks must be left free to honour bank guarantee/letter of credit without any interference by courts. He states that respondent No. 7 is unnecessarily being put to loss because of internal dispute between appellant and respondent No. 3. He argues that the appellant has raised the plea of fraud belatedly and half-heartedly. He further states that injunction sought for in the application was to restrain respondent No. 3 Central Bank from making payment to respondent Nos. 1 and 2. He states that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have already received the payment and respondent no. He argues that the appellant has raised the plea of fraud belatedly and half-heartedly. He further states that injunction sought for in the application was to restrain respondent No. 3 Central Bank from making payment to respondent Nos. 1 and 2. He states that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have already received the payment and respondent no. 3 is duty bound to discharge a call on its credit. ( 14 ) IN brief reply, Advocate Thakur for appellant contended that his argument about absence of letter of credit issued by respondent No. 3, gross negligence in not verifying the documents submitted by respondent No. 1 of respondent Nos,3 and 7, the fact that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 approached a stranger bank like respondent no. 7 instead of approaching the bank named by appellant and respondent No. 3 and specified by respondent No. 1 itself and the letter of credit was not unrestricted are not answered by respondent No. 3. He further states that the document of commercial practice at international level produced on record is entirely different than the one which is named in letter containing request for opening letter of credit. He further pointed out that the time to submit bills for payment within 10 days was not extended and reference to communication dated 15-5-2002 to show that time was extended up to 21 days is totally misconceived because the communication dated 15-5-2002 does not deal with transaction between appellant and respondent No. 1. He therefore urged that appeal should be allowed and the civil Suit pending before court below should be expedited. ( 15 ) BEFORE applying the mind to the facts on record, it would be appropriate to consider some of the important judgments on the point. In 1988 (1) SCC 174 between U. P. Coperative Federation Vs. Singh consultants and Engineers, the Honble apex Court has clarified that in the matter of fraud, the bank issuing letter of credit can refuse to honour it. The Honble Division bench of Apex Court has written two separate but concurring judgments. The appellant as also respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have placed reliance on this case. The Honble Apex Court has stated that the bank acts as a principal and not as agent for its customer, and it engages its own credit. The Honble Division bench of Apex Court has written two separate but concurring judgments. The appellant as also respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have placed reliance on this case. The Honble Apex Court has stated that the bank acts as a principal and not as agent for its customer, and it engages its own credit. In paragraph 48, while quoting from speech of Lord Diplock, it is observed that the whole commercial purpose for which system of confirmed irrevocable documentary credits has been developed in international trade is to give to the seller an assured right to be paid before he parts with control of goods and that does not permit of any dispute with the buyer as to the performance of the contract of sale being used as the ground for nonpayment or reduction or deferment of payment the established exception to this rule is where seller for the purpose of drawing on credit, fraudulently presents to the confirming bank documents that contain, expressly or by implication, material representations of fact that to his knowledge are untrue. In paragraph 34 it is observed that commitments of banks must be honoured free from interference by the courts. Otherwise trust in commerce. internal and international would be irreparably damaged. It is only in exceptional cases that is to say in case of fraud or in case of irretrievable injustice, the court should interfere. It is further observed in paragraph 53 that since the bank pledges its own credit involving its reputation, it has no defence except in the case of fraud. It is the fraud of beneficiary, not the fraud of somebody else. If the bank detects with a minimal investigation the fraudulent action of seller, the payment could be refused. The bank cannot be competed to honour the credit in such cases. But it may be very difficult for the bank to take a decision on the alleged fraudulent action. In such cases, it would be proper for the bank to ask the buyer to approach the court for an injunction. In paragraph 54 it has been stated that only exceptional case in which injunction may be gr?nted is where it is proved that bank knows that any demand for payment already made or which may thereafter be made will clearly be fraudulent. In paragraph 54 it has been stated that only exceptional case in which injunction may be gr?nted is where it is proved that bank knows that any demand for payment already made or which may thereafter be made will clearly be fraudulent. In this paragraph it is also observed that there should be serious dispute 10 be tried and there should be a good prima facie act of fraud. But the evidence must be clear, both as to the fact of fraud and as to the banks knowledge. It would certainly not normally be sufficient that this rests on uncorroborated statement of the customer, for irreparable damage can be done to a banks credit in the relatively brief time which must elaps between the granting of such an injunction and an application by bank to have it discharged. In paragraph 23 it is observed that the banks duty to seller was only vitiated if there was fraud on part of seller, and the bank remained under the duty to pay the amount of the credit to the seller even if the documents presented, although conforming on their face with the terms of the credit, never the less contained in a statement of material fact that was not accurate. Opening of confirmed letter of credit constitute a bargain between the banker and the seller of goods which imposed on banker an absolute obligation to pay. In paragraph 43, it is observed that it would be futile to contend that the court was justified in granting the injunction since it has found a prima facie case. The question of examining prima facie case or balance of convenience does not arise if the court cannot interfere with the unconditional commitment made by the bank in the guarantee in question. In paragraph 45 it is observed that the seller receives the payment from issuing bank when he presents a demand as per terms of document. The bank must pay if the documents are in order and the terms of credit are satisfied. The bank, however, was not allowed to determine whether the seller had actually shipped the goods or whether the goods conformed to the requirement of the contract. Any dispute between the buyer and the seller must be settled between themselves. The courts, however, carved out an exception to this rule of absolute independence. The bank, however, was not allowed to determine whether the seller had actually shipped the goods or whether the goods conformed to the requirement of the contract. Any dispute between the buyer and the seller must be settled between themselves. The courts, however, carved out an exception to this rule of absolute independence. The courts held that if there has been "fraud in the transaction" the bank could dishonour beneficiarys demand for payment. The courts have generally permitted dishonour only on the fraud of beneficiary, not the fraud of somebody else. ( 16 ) IN judgment of Honble Apex court reported at AIR 1981 SC 1426 between united Commercial Bank Vs. Bank of India, the Honble Apex Court has specified the circumstances in which the court of law would be in position to grant injunction at the instance of beneficiary of irrevocable letter of credit restraining the issuing bank from recalling the amount paid. The observations in paragraphs 27, 28, 31, 32, 32-A, 37 and 38 are important and stipulate the law on point as under :-"27. The main point in controversy is; whether the Court should in a transaction between a banker and a banker grant an injunction, at the instance of the beneficiary of an irrevocable letter of credit restraining the issuing bank from recalling the amount paid under reserve from the negotiating bank acting on behalf of the beneficiary against a document of guarantee/indemnity at the instance of the beneficiary? Another question also arises as to whether the Court should not in a matter like this, depart from its normal practice, and refuse to interfere with an interlocutory order under Article 136 of the Constitution. ""28. The nature of the contractual obligation flowing from a bankers letter of irrevocable credit and more particularly, the rights of the seller as the accredited party or beneficiary of the credit, against the issuing and drawee bank was dealt with by this Court in Tarapore and. Co. , Madras Vs. Tractors Export Moscow, 1969 (2) SCR 920 : ( AIR 1970 SC 891 ). It was held that the opening of a confirmed letter of credit constitutes a bargain between the banker and the seller of the goods which imposes on the banker an absolute obligation to pay. Co. , Madras Vs. Tractors Export Moscow, 1969 (2) SCR 920 : ( AIR 1970 SC 891 ). It was held that the opening of a confirmed letter of credit constitutes a bargain between the banker and the seller of the goods which imposes on the banker an absolute obligation to pay. It was, however pointed out relying on a passage in "chalmers Bills of Exchange" that it can hardly be over-emphasised that banker is not bound or entitled to honour the bills of exchange drawn by the seller unless they, and such accompanying documents as may be required thereunder, are in exact compliance with terms of the credit. Such documents must be scrutinised with meticulous care. If the seller has complied with the terms of the letter of credit, however, there is an absolute obligation upon the banker to pay irrespective of any disputes there may be between the buyer and the seller as to whether the goods are up to contract or not. The Court relied upon the two decisions in hamzeh Malas and Sons Vs. British Imex industries Ltd. , (1958)2 QB 127 and urguhart Lindsay and Co. Ltd. Vs. Eastern bank Ltd. , (1922)1 KB 318 and observed at p. 930 of the Report, that the refusal of the bank to honour the bills of exchange drawn by the seller on presentation of the proper documents constituted a repudiation of the contract as a whole, and the sellers were entitled to damages arising from such a breach. ""31. In Gutteridge and Megrahs Law of bankers Commercial Credits, Sixth Edn. p. 21; the nature of the obligation created by a bankers commercial credit is succinctly stated. A seller of goods relying on such an instrument believes that he has the direct obligation of the issuing bank running in his favour, enforceable by him against that bank, that it will pay his drafts if drawn in compliance with the terms of the letter of credit. Banks are not concerned with the sales contract or the goods: if it were otherwise credit business would be impossible. ""32. Bankers commercial credits are almost without exception everywhere made subject to the code entitled the Uniform customs and Practices for Documentary credits, by which the Genera! Provisions and Definitiongand the Articles following are to "apply to all documentary credit and binding upon all parties thereto unless expressly agreed". ""32. Bankers commercial credits are almost without exception everywhere made subject to the code entitled the Uniform customs and Practices for Documentary credits, by which the Genera! Provisions and Definitiongand the Articles following are to "apply to all documentary credit and binding upon all parties thereto unless expressly agreed". A Banker issuing or confirming an irrevocable credit usually undertakes to honour drafts negotiated or to reimburse in respect of drafts paid, by the paying or negotiating intermediate banker and the credit is thus in the hands of the beneficiary binding against the banker. The credit contract is independent of the sales contract on which it is based, unless the sales contract is in some measure incorporated. Unless documents tendered under a credit are in accordance with those for which the credit calls and which are embodied in the terms of the paying or negotiating bank, the beneficiary cannot claim against the paying bank and it is the paying banks duty to refuse payment. ""32-A. General provision (c) of the uniform Customs states that : (c) Credits, by their nature are separate transactions from the sales or other contracts on which they may be based and banks are in no way concerned with or bound by such contracts. and Article 8 emphasises this in providing that : (a) In documentary credit operations all parties concerned deal in documents and not in goods. ""37. The relevant authorities uniformly lay down in dealing with commercial letters of credit that the documents tendered by the seller must comply with the terms of the letter of credit and that the banker owes a duty to the buyer to ensure that the buyers instructions relative to the documents against which the letter of credit is to be honoured are complied with. The rights of a banker are described in Halsburys Laws of England, 4th Edn. . Vol. 3, para 141 at p. 106: unless documents tendered under a credit are in accordance with those for which the credit calls and which are embodied in the promise of the paving or negotiating banker, the beneficiary cannot claim against the paying banker, and it is the paying bankers duty to refuse payment. The documents must be those called for, and not documents which are almost the same or which will do just as well. The banker is not called upon to know or interpret trade customs and terms. The documents must be those called for, and not documents which are almost the same or which will do just as well. The banker is not called upon to know or interpret trade customs and terms. It has been held that where a mandate is ambiguous and a paying banker acts in a reasonable way in pursuance of it, he may be protected. But this general rule cannot be stretched so far as to protect a banker who pays againt documents describing goods in terms which are similar to. but not exactly the same as those stipulated in the credit. The description of the goods in the relative bill of landing must be the same as the description in the letter of credit, that is, the goods themselves must in each case be described in identical terms, even though the goods differently described in the two documents are, in fact the same. It is the description of the goods that is all important The reason for this requirement is stated in Davis Law Relusting to commercial Letters ol C redit. 2nd Edn. p. 76 : it is not only the buyer who faces the risk of dishonesty sharp practice on the part ot the seller For in many instances the banker looks to the. goods for reimbursement of the whole or part of the amount he pays under the letter of credit. It is equally to his interests to ensure that such documents are called for by the letter of credit as will result in goods of the contract description being ultimately delivered. The buyer is not compelled to enter into the sales contract nor is the banker compelled to issue the letter of credit. If either of these contracts is entered into then it is for the buyer and the banker respectively to safeguard themselves by the terms of the contract. Otherwise they must be prepared to bear any ensuing loss. But the liability thus imposed on the issuing banker carries with it a corresponding right that the seller shall, on his part, comply with the terms of the letter of credit and the sellers obligations have been construed as strictly as those of the banker. We have already referred to the statement of law in Halsburys Laws of england which found a place in Pagets law of Banking, 8th Edn. We have already referred to the statement of law in Halsburys Laws of england which found a place in Pagets law of Banking, 8th Edn. at p. 648, and we may at the risk of repetition reproduce the same to the effect : unless documents tendered under a credit are in accordance with those for which the credit calls and which are embedied in the promise of the intermediary or issuing banker, the beneficiary cannot claim against him and it is the bankers duty to refuse payment. The documents must be those called for and pot documents which arc almost the same or which seem to do just as well. "38. In the light of these principles, the rule is well established that a bank issuing or comfirming a letter of credit is not concerned with the underlying contract between the buyer and seller. Duties of a bank under a letter of credit are created by the document itself, but in any case it has the power and is subject to the limitations which are given or imposed by it, in the absence of the appropriate provisions in the letter of credit. " ( 17 ) IN Elierman and Bucknall steamship Co. Ltd. Vs. Sha Misrimal bherajee reported at AIR 1966 SC 1892 , has been relied upon by Advocate Thakur to explain implication of not furnishing bill of lading and also the meaning of term fraud/deceit in this background. Paragraphs 4, 10, 14, 15 and 16 of the judgment which consider this issue are :-"4. The appeals were heard by a Division bench of the Madras High Court. The learned Judges of the High Court came to the conclusion that the ship owners with the knowledge that the bills of lading would be negotiated gave, at the request of the seller, clean bills of lading while as a matter of fact only unclean bills of lading should have been given. They further held that the purchaser was damnified, as on the basis of the misrepresentation found in the bills of lading the Bank paid the amount against the shipping documents which it would not have done if it had known that the bills of lading were unclean. In the result, they gave a decree for the entire suit claim against the ship owners. In the result, they gave a decree for the entire suit claim against the ship owners. They allowed c. C. C. A. No. 61 of 1957 against the ship owners but dismissed it against the Bank. C. C. C. A. No. 54 of 1957, the appeal filed by the Bank, was allowed The ship owners have preferred the present appeal against the decree given by the High Court against them. ""10. A bill of lading serves three purposes, viz. . (i) it is receipt for the goods shipped containing the terms on which they have been received: (ii) it is evidence of the contract for carnage of goods: and (iii) it is a document of title for the goods specified therein The contract of the ship owners in the bill of lading is that they will deliver the goods at their destination "in the like good order condition" in which they were when shipped. In terms of the contract the ship owners delivered the goods to the buyer in the drums. The consignee incurred damages not because of any defect in the drums but because the seller sent goods different form those he had agreed to sell to him. Therefore, the ship owners were not to liable for any. damages to the purchaser on the basis of breach of any of the terms of the contract. No further elaboration on this point is called for, as finally this point was not seriously pressed by the learned counsel for the respondent. 14. "deceit is a false statement of a fact made by a person knowingly or recklessly with the intent that it shall be acted upon by another who does act upon it and thereby, suffers damage": see "a Text-book of the Law of Tort" by Winfield, 5th Edn. , at p. 379. In order to make the ship owners liable for deceit, the first ingredient to be satisfied is that they knowingly issued a clean bill of lading, when it should not have been given with intent that on that basis payment would be made to the holder of the bill under the letters of credit. , at p. 379. In order to make the ship owners liable for deceit, the first ingredient to be satisfied is that they knowingly issued a clean bill of lading, when it should not have been given with intent that on that basis payment would be made to the holder of the bill under the letters of credit. In order to come to a correct conclusion whether the ingredients of the definition of "deceit" have been satisfied in the present case, it is necessary to know the exact scope of the following three terms: "letters of credit", "bill of lading", and "clean bill of lading". The said three expressions are evolved in the law of merchant to facilitate international trade. The origin and importance of letters of credit in the international commerce has been stated by denning, L. J. , in Pavia and Co. , S. P. A. Vs. Thurmann Neilsen, (1952)2 QB 84 at p 88 as follows :"the sale of goods across the world is now usually arranged by means of confirmed credits The buyer requests his bankers to open a credit in tavour oi the seller and in pursuance of that request the banker, or his foreign agent, issues a confirmed credit in favour of the seller. This credit is a promise by the banker to pay money to the seller in return for the shipping documents. Then the seller, when he presents the documents. gets paid the contract price The conditions of the credit must be strictly fulfilled, otherwise, the seller would not be entitled to draw on it ""15. But when issuing banker has no branch in the relevant country where the beneficiary operates, the services of an intermediary banker may be requisitioned the intermediary banker may be asked to advise the beneficiary of the credit or may be asked to add his confirmatory undertaking to it In the latter event the beneficiary has the promise of both the bankers. ""16 As letters of credit are issued or opened on conditions on which the request is made, the banker can only negotiate the shipping documents if the conditions are strictly complied with If tor instance, the mandate of the buyer is that the banker shall pay on a clean bill of lading, the banker can only honour a clean bill and not an unclean one when a purchaser specifically directs the banker to pay against a clean bill of lading, the condition for payment is an obvious one But, when a credit for bills of lading without any qualification, in normal circumstances it means clean bills of lading, see British Imex Industries Ltd Vs midland Bank Ltd. , (1958)1 QB 542 at p. 551. " ( 18 ) TO emphasise the obligation of banks to verify the documents submitted by seller, he places reliance upon the judgment reported at 1983 Co. Cases (53) 550 of Delhi high Court in case between Interads advertising (P) Ltd. Vs. Palmex enterprises In this case, Delhi High Court reached finding that the cable issued by person asking for opening a letter of credit mentioned no of documents as express conditions of credit and those were the essential terms of letter of credit Those terms were not complied with by the issuing bank or the en-cashing bank The documents required also included full set of clean on board ladings and also certificate of quality issued by any independent surveyor. When the plaintiff and the negotiating Bank got copies and the documents respectively, plaintiff wrote to buyer pointing out that the documents were contrary to express conditions of letter of credit. There was no certificate about the quality of goods and bill of lighting was also improper. The bank in turn submitted that it a made payment in the letter of credit and suit of plaintiff became infructuous. It also took stand the documents were in complete conformation with terms and conditions of letter of credit. Delhi High Court has observed that for grant of temporary injunction person seeking such injunction must satisfy, 1 that there is serious question to be tried in the suit and on facts before the court there is probability of its being entitled to relief claimed 2 court's interference is necessary to protect him from irreparable injury, and 3 balance of convenience is in his favour. It was found that agreement entered into between parties is subject to Uniform Customs and practice for Documentary Credits. Article 3 of brochure provided that an irrevocable credit constitutes a definite undertaking of the issuing bank provided that the terms and conditions of the credit are complied with. Article 7 states that banks must examine all documents with reasonable care to ascertain that they appear on their face value to be in accordance with terms and conditions of credit. Delhi High court found that bill of lading before it was per se contradictory and did not conform with the conditions of letter of credit It therefore held that en-cashing Bank did not comply with the terms thereof It is further observed that it was the responsibility of the Bank issuing the letter of credit or the en-cashing Bank to examine the documents with reasonable care to ascertain that they appear to be in accordance with the terms and conditions of credit. It held that, prima facie, bank was not entitled to make payment against said documents and it therefore confirmed ex-parte temporary injunction granted earlier ( 19 ) IN 2004 (11) SCC 364 between commissioner of Customs, Kandla Vs. Essar Oil Ltd. and Ors. , (the Apex Court) points out how fraud is judicially understood. Paragraphs 29, 30, 31 and 32 of this ruling are important. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. A benefit or advantage to the deceiver, will almost always cause loss or detriment to the deceived. For the purposes of present case, it is not necessary to go into more details of fraud at this stage. ( 20 ) JUDGMENT of learned single Judge of this court reported at 2005 (3) Mh. L. J. 387 : 2005 (3) ALL MR 33 between Deshmukh and Comp. Vs. Avinash Vishnu Khandekar considers circumstances in which copyright can be said to have been assigned or licensed. It also lays down the principles for granting or refusing temporary injunction and principles for interference by appellate court in such orders of trial court either granting or refusing temporary injunction. The Hon'ble Judge has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex court in case between Wander Ltd. and Anr. It also lays down the principles for granting or refusing temporary injunction and principles for interference by appellate court in such orders of trial court either granting or refusing temporary injunction. The Hon'ble Judge has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex court in case between Wander Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. reported at 1990 (Supp.) SCC 727. The observations in paragraph 78 of the judgment of Hon'ble single Judge read :-"78. While considering the appeal against order, another question which needs to be addressed is : What is the jurisdiction of the appellate court while considering the appeal against order or injunction. In dealing with the matter raised before it at appellate stage, the appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it may have come to contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner, the fact that appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. If it appears to the appellate court that in exercising its discretion the trial court has act unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts, then it would be open to the appellate court to interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion. In this behalf it would be profitable to refer to the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Wander Ltd. and another Vs. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. reported at 1990 (Supp) SCC 727 as follows :"the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principle of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion in the said to be and appeal on principle. The appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. The appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion". " ( 21 ) IN AIR 1994 SC 853 between S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath, the hon'ble Apex Court has observed that there is legal duty cast upon plaintiff to come to court with true case and prove it by true evidence. The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be stretched to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. It is also observed that property grabbers, tax evaders, bank loan dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court process a convenient way to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. A person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court and he can be summarily thrown out at any stage of litigation. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, disagreeing with the view taken by high Court, Hon'ble Apex Court observed that non-production and even non-mentioning of release deed at the trial tantamounted to playing fraud on court. A person withholding vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side is held to be guilty of playing fraud on the court. ( 22 ) HON'ble Apex Court at AIR 1970 sc 891 between M/s, Tarapore and Comp. Vs. M/s. V/o. Tractor Export Moscow, in paragraph 7 and paragraphs 10 and 11 (relevant paras) has observed as under :-"7. The main grievance of the Indian Firm is that if the Russian Firm is allowed to take away the money secured to it by the letter of credit, it cannot effectively enforce its claim arising from the breach of the contract it complains of. It was urged on its behalf that the Russian Firm has no assets in this country and therefore any decree that it may be able to obtain cannot be executed. It was urged on its behalf that the Russian Firm has no assets in this country and therefore any decree that it may be able to obtain cannot be executed. Therefore, it was contended that the Trial court was justified in issuing the impugned orders. The allegation that Russian Firm has no assets in this country was not made in the pleadings. That apart in the circumstances of this case that allegation has no relevance. An irrevocable letter of credit has a definite implication. It is a mechanism of great importance in international trade. Any interference with that mechanism is bound to have serious repercussions on the international trade of this country. Except under very exceptional circumstances, the Courts should not interfere with that mechanism""10. A case somewhat to interfere with that established practice, (not reproduced ). There is this to be remembered, too. A vendor of goods selling against a confirmed letter of credit is selling under the assurance that nothing will prevent him from receiving the price. That is of no mean advantage when goods manufactured in one country are being sold in another. It is, furthermore, to be observed that vendors are often reselling goods bought from third parties. When they are doing that, and when they are being paid by a confirmed letter of credit, their practice is - and I think it was followed by the defendants in this case - to finance the payments necessary to be made to their suppliers against the letter of credit. That system of financing these operations, as I see it, would break down completely if a dispute as between the render and the purchaser was to have the effect of "freezing" if I may use that expression the sum in respect of which the letter of credit was opened. ""11. After informing Seattle Bank of their intention, they paid Sica the full amountof the credit. Plaintiffs thereupon brought an action in the District Court of New York for the recovery of the moneys paid to Sica. The action was dismissed by the trial Court and that decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. That decision establishes the well known principle that the letter of credit is independent of and unqualified by the contract ot sale or underlying transaction. The autonomy of an irrevocable letter of credit is entitled to protection. The action was dismissed by the trial Court and that decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. That decision establishes the well known principle that the letter of credit is independent of and unqualified by the contract ot sale or underlying transaction. The autonomy of an irrevocable letter of credit is entitled to protection. As a rule courts refrain from interfering with that autonomy. " ( 23 ) HON'ble Apex Court in case between Federal Bank Ltd. Vs. V. M. Engineering Ltd. reported at AIR 2000 SC 3166 , explains the situations in which the courts can interfere in such credit matters and important observations are as under :-"33 The following points arise for consideration in this appeal : (1) In the context of the need for Banks to take reasonable care to scrutinise the documents produced before it for honouring the L/c, what is the relevance of the UCP Code issued by the International chamber of Commerce, which was here expressly incorporated in the L/c? (2) If it is the case of the plaintiff-buyer that there is 'fraud' on the part of the sellers in relation to the documents and if it is not its case that the Negotiating Bank was guilty of fraud or had knowledge of fraud by the seller, could the Negotiating Bank not seek reimbursement from the Issuing Bank, as a holder in due course of the Bill of exchange, against the L/c? (3) Whether, once the Issuing Bank had certified the documents which were presented to the Negotiating Bank by the sellers, the said Bank could turn round and refuse reimbursement on the ground that on further scrutiny made by it - long after the Negotiating Bank parted with monies was not correct or was mistaken?"points 1"35. This Court had occasion in United commercial Bank Vs. Bank of India, (1981)2 SCC 766 (at 780) ( AIR 1981 SC 1426 at p 1435) to refer to the Uniform customs and Practices for Documentary credits (UCP for short) by which the 'general provisions and Definitions and the articles following are to apply to all documentary credit and binding upon all parties thereto unless otherwise expressly agreed'. The UCP states that it shall be deemed incoi porated into each documentary credit if there are words in the credit indicating that such credit was issued subject to Uniform Customs and Practices of Documentary Credits56. The UCP states that it shall be deemed incoi porated into each documentary credit if there are words in the credit indicating that such credit was issued subject to Uniform Customs and Practices of Documentary Credits56. In several judgments of this Court, it has been held that Courts ought not to grant injunction to restrain encashment of Bank guarantees of Letters of Credit Two exceptions have been mentioned - (i) fraud and (ii) irretrievable damage. If the plaintiff is prima facie able to establish that the case comes within these two exceptions, temporary injunction under Order 39, Rule 1, C P. C can be issued. It has also been held that the contract ot the Bank guarantee or the Letter of Credit is independent of the main contract between the seller and the buyer. This is also clear from Art. 3 of the ucp (1983 Revision) In case of an irrevocable Bank guarantee or Letter of credit the buyer cannot obtain injunction against the Banker on the ground that there was a breach of the contract by the seller. The Bank is to honour the demand for encashment if the seller prima facie complies with the terms of the Bank guarantee or Letter of Credit, namely, if the seller produces the documents enumerated in the Bank Guarantee or Letter of Credit. If the Bank is satisfied on the tace ot the documents that they are in conformity with the list of documents mentioned in the Bank Guarantee or Letter of Credit and there is no discrepancy, it is bound to honour the demand of the seller for encashment While doing so it must take reasonable care. It is not permissible for the Bank to refuse payment on the ground that the buyer is claiming that there is no breach of contract. Nor can the Bank try to decide this question of breach at that stage and refuse payment to the seller. Its obligation under the document having nothing to do with any dispute as to breach of contract between the seller and the buyer. As to its knowledge of fraud or forgery, we shall presently deal with it. Knowledge ot fraud. "57. Decided cases hold that in order to obtain an injunction against the Issuing bank, it is necessary to prove that the Bank had knowledge ot the fraud. ""58. Kerr, J said in R. D Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd. Vs. As to its knowledge of fraud or forgery, we shall presently deal with it. Knowledge ot fraud. "57. Decided cases hold that in order to obtain an injunction against the Issuing bank, it is necessary to prove that the Bank had knowledge ot the fraud. ""58. Kerr, J said in R. D Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd. Vs. National westminister Bank Ltd , 1978 QB 146 (at155) that irrevocable Letters of Credit are 'the life blood of international commerce'. He said : "except possibly in clear cases of fraud of which the banks have notice, the courts will leave the merchants to settle their disputes under the contracts by litigation or arbitration Otherwise, trust in international commerce could be irreparably damaged". Denning M. R. stated in Edward and Owen Engineering ltd. Vs. Barclays Bank International Ltd. , 1978 QB 159, that 'the only exception is where there is a clear fraud of which the bank had notice'. Browne, L. J. said in the same case : "but it is certainly not enough to allege fraud, it must he established" and in such circumstances, I should say, "very clearly established". In Bolivinter Oil S. A. Vs. Chase Manhattan Bank, (1984)1 All ER 351 at p. 352, it was said 'where it is proved that the Bank knows that any demand for payment already made or which may thereafter be made, will clearly be fraudulent'. But the evidence must be clear, both as to the fact of fraud and as to the bank's knowledge. It would certainly not be sufficient that this rests upon the uncorroborated statement of the customer, for irreparable damage can be done to a bank's credit in the relatively brief time "before the injunction is vacated". Thus, not only must 'fraud' be clearly proved but so far as the Bank is concerned, it must be proved that it had knowledge of the fraud. In United Trading Corpn. S. A. Vs. Allied arab Bank Ltd. . (1985)2 Llovds Rep 554. it was stated that there must be proof of knowledge of fraud on the part of the Bank at any time before payment. It was also observed that it "would be sufficient if the corroborated evidence of the plaintiff usually in the form of contemporary documents and the Unexplained failure of a beneficiary to respond to the attack, lead to the conclusion that the only realistic inference to draw was 'fraud'. It was also observed that it "would be sufficient if the corroborated evidence of the plaintiff usually in the form of contemporary documents and the Unexplained failure of a beneficiary to respond to the attack, lead to the conclusion that the only realistic inference to draw was 'fraud'. " In guarantee Trust Co. of New York Vs. Hannay, (1918)2 KB 623 (KB), the Banker accepted the documents without any knowledge of fraud or falsify and it was held that the defendants could not counterclaim from the Bank. However, it would be the Banker's duty to refuse the documents which on their face bear signs of having been altered (See Re : Saloman and Nandszus, (1899)91 LT 325. That was a c. i. f. contract. This Court in ITC Ltd. Vs. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998)2 SCC 70 (at 79) : (1998 AIR SCW 237 : AIR 1998 SC 634 ) also held that knowledge of the Bank as to the fraud or forgery had to be prima facie established. ""59. The foundation of English Law in this area is the American case of Sztejn Vs. J. Heney Schroder Banking Corpn. , (1941)31 nys 2d 631. (Extensive details of this case are available in 'documentary Credits' by raymond Jack, 1991 pp. 191-192 ). This case has been cited in more than one judgment of this Court and the English courts but we shall give more facts of that case and the principle of 'holder in due course' laid down therein which arises in the case before us, as per the appellant's pleadings. In that case, the applicant for a credit (i. e. the buyer) claimed injunction against the Issuing Bank Schroder Banking corporation to prevent it paying on the documents which had been presented. The credit had been advised to the seller in India by the issuing Bank's correspondent in india, the chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. The correspondent had not confirmed the credit. The applicant alleged that what had been shipped was rubbish rather than the bristles contracted to be supplied. The Chartered Bank (the collecting Bank) which received the documents from the seller for 'collection', applied for dismissing the buyer's claim. (This was a proceeding similar to Order 7, rule 11, CPC) for an injunction on the ground that there was no cause of action. The Chartered Bank (the collecting Bank) which received the documents from the seller for 'collection', applied for dismissing the buyer's claim. (This was a proceeding similar to Order 7, rule 11, CPC) for an injunction on the ground that there was no cause of action. The buyes in their application for injunction, informed the Issuing Bank about the fraud of the sellers. For the purpose of hearing that application of the Collecting bank, the Court assumed the facts stated in the application of the buyer as to fraud to be true. (Otherwise, this was a difficult burden of proof normally ). Shientag, J. held that :"where the seller's fraud has been called to the bank's attention before the drafts and documents have been presented for payment, the principle of the independence of the bank's obligation under the Letter of credit should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller. It is true that even though the documents are forged or fraudulent, if the issuing bank has already paid the draft before receiving notice of the seller's fraud, it will be protected if it exercised reasonable diligence before making such payment. "the facts, as stated above, were that the sellers had drawn the draft under the letter of credit to the roder of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and delivered the draft and the fraudulent documents to the said Chartered Bank's branch at caunpore for 'collection' on account of the sellers. The Chartered Bank could not compel that issuing Bank, Schroder banking Corporation, to pay by seeking a dismissal of the buyer's application by way of demurrer. The plaintiff was entitled to injunction for it had brought the allegation to the knowledge of the issuing Bank, before the payment was made. Shientag, J. further observed :"as one Court has stated : Obviously, when the issuer of a letter of Credit knows that a document, although correct in form, is, in point of fact, false or illegal, he cannot be called upon to recognise such a document as complying with the terms of a letter of credit. Shientag, J. further observed :"as one Court has stated : Obviously, when the issuer of a letter of Credit knows that a document, although correct in form, is, in point of fact, false or illegal, he cannot be called upon to recognise such a document as complying with the terms of a letter of credit. "no hardship will be caused by permitting the bank to refuse payment where fraud is claimed, where the merchandise is not merely inferior in quality but consists of worthless rubbish, where the draft and the accompany document are in the hands of one who stands in the same position as the fraudulent seller, where the bank has been given notice of fraud before being presented with the drafts and documents for payment, and where the bank itself does not wish to pay pending an adjudication of the rights and obligations of the other parties. The Court also noticed that, on facts, the collecting Bank, Chattered Bank was not a holder in due course but was a mere agent for collection for the account of the seller who was charged by the buyer with fraud. Therefore the Chartered Bank's motion to dismiss the complaint (similar to Order 7, rule 11, CPC) must be denied. Shientag, j. referred to the principle of 'holder in due course' and said as follows :"if it had appeared from the face of the complaint that the Bank presenting the draft for payment (i. e. Chartered Bank) was a holder in due course, its claim against the bank issuing the letter of credit would not be defeated even though the primary transaction was tainted by fraud". This passage lays down the law as to when a person becomes a holder in due course in the case of a fraud by the sellers. This last paragraph from judgment of Shientag, J. is directly applicable to the facts of the Case. ""60. This passage lays down the law as to when a person becomes a holder in due course in the case of a fraud by the sellers. This last paragraph from judgment of Shientag, J. is directly applicable to the facts of the Case. ""60. Applying the said principle, we may state that if the appellant Federal Bank was merely a collecting Bank or agent which had approached the Bank of maharashtra (the Issuing Bank) and if the issuing Bank was sought to be restrained by the buyer before payment was made by the Issuing Bank to the Collecting Bank, the Collecting Bank could not have compelled the Issuing Bank to release the money, for collection if the buyer informed the Issuing Bank in his plaint that the documents to be presented to it by the collecting Bank were forged or fraudulent. But where, on the other hand, the negotiating Bank, i e. the Federal Bank (appellant), has paid on the basis of a cleaiance given by the Issuing Bank as to genuineness of documents, and seeks reimbursement, then the Negotiating Bank is in the position of a holder in due course and can claim that the suit of the buyer must fail if it sought to restrain the Issuing Bank from reimbursing the Negotiating Bank. These principles prima facie flow from shientag. J. 's. judgment which has been followed both in England and by this Court, in several cases. "66. Summarising, we hold that when the plaintiff buyer has no case that the appellant-Negotiating Bank had any. knowledge of fraud, and when it took precaution in getting clearance for the document from the Issuing Bank on 20-2-98 and such clearance was given on 22-3-98 by the latter, it was not open to the issuing Bank to contend that on fresh scrutiny in May, 1998, it found that the documents were not in conformity with the letters of Credit or that the buyer had so informed them. Prima facie, the appellant was in the position of a holder in due course. Points 2 and 3 are decided in favour of the appellant. ""67. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal and vacate the temporary injunction granted in favour of the plaintiff against the bank of Maharashtra in so far as the said injunction precluded the Bank of maharashtra from reimbursing the appellant-Federal Bank. Points 2 and 3 are decided in favour of the appellant. ""67. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal and vacate the temporary injunction granted in favour of the plaintiff against the bank of Maharashtra in so far as the said injunction precluded the Bank of maharashtra from reimbursing the appellant-Federal Bank. It is clarified that the said injunction will not come in the way of the Bank of Maharashtra from complying with its obligation to reimburse the Federal bank. The Appeal is allowed. No costs. " ( 24 ) THESE decisions establish the principle that the letter of credit is independent of and unqualified by the contract of sale or underlying transaction. The autonomy of an irrevocable letter of credit is entitled to protection. As a rule Courts refrain from interfering with that autonomy. It is thus more than clear that in case of clear fraud alone that the law courts can interfere in the matter of letter of credit and even in relation to fraud the case sought to be made out has to be convincing There must be proof of knowledge of fraud on the part of the Bank at any time before payment and such knowledge is required to be pleaded and proved. The Bank is to honour the demand for encashment if the seller prima facie complies with the terms of the bank Guarantee or Letter of Credit, namely, if the seller produces the documents enumerated in the Bank Guarantee or Letter of Credit. If the Bank is satisfied on the face of the documents that they are in conformity with the list of documents mentioned in the Bank guarantee or Letter of Credit and there is no discrepancy, it is bound to honour the demand of the seller for encashment. Unless documents tendered under a credit are in accordance with those for which the credit calls and which are embodied in the terms ot the paying or negotiating bank, the beneficiary cannot claim against the paying bank and it is the paying bank's duty to refuse payment. Similarly, it follows that if fraud comes to knowledge of purchaser availing letter of credit facility; he must immediately act and bring it to notice of bank who is to honour said letter of credit. No delay or negligence in this respect can be tolerated. Similarly, it follows that if fraud comes to knowledge of purchaser availing letter of credit facility; he must immediately act and bring it to notice of bank who is to honour said letter of credit. No delay or negligence in this respect can be tolerated. He must also approach the Court of law without wasting any time unnecessarily he must show that he took all necessary steps and precaution promptly and diligently to avoid any loss to himself or to the Issuing Bank. In absence thereof, the question of examining prima facie case or balance ot convenience does not arise as the court cannot interfere with the unconditional commitment made by the bank in the letter of credit in question. , ( 25 ) IN the facts of present case on 11-7-2002 the appellant himself was consulted by respondent No. 3 Central Bank and he permitted respondent No. 3 to retire the documents submitted by respondent No. 1 for negotiations to respondent No. 7. It is after this green signal given by appellant that the respondent No. 3 has permitted respondent no. 7 to negotiate and respondent No. 7 has thereafter paid the amount after discounting the letter of credit. In this background, particularly when present appeal is directed against the interlocutory order, it is not necessary for this court to go into more details and depth at this stage. The contention of appellant that he received sealed envelope or he did not verify documents therein cannot be accepted at this stage. It is to be noted that this letter of appellant is produced by respondent No. 3 Bank in defence before the learned trial court. The appellant has not disclosed it either in his plaint or in his application for grant of temporary injunction. It was therefore necessary for appellant to explain reasons for this vital omission at least in his appeal memo but that also has not been done. In paragraph 5 of his plaint, appellant has stated thus :"the defendant No. 3 aware of terms and conditions of the sale-purchase contract No. : GARLIC/g. I. /noble/1006/02, dated 10-6-2002 since on the basis of this document, the defendant no. 3 had issued letter of credit and cannot and should not ask for payment of the alleged amount of Rs. 42,23,800/- only till end of 180 days from 11-7-02. In spite of this defendant no. 3 had issued letter of credit and cannot and should not ask for payment of the alleged amount of Rs. 42,23,800/- only till end of 180 days from 11-7-02. In spite of this defendant no. 3 is day to day mounting pressure on the plaintiff calling upon plaintiff to make payment of aforesaid amount of Rs. 42,23,800/-". Thus, though appellant/plaintiff mentions date "11-7-02" in his plaint, he has not disclosed its significance or relevance anywhere. The omission is important because the learned trial court in impugned order has heavily commented upon this. In paragraph 15 of its order the trial court has recorded that appellant issued letter to present respondent No. 3 on 11-7-2002 under the subject "acceptance of documents" and in that letter, he specifically stated that he received documents negotiated by respondent No. 1 against 180 days L. C. issued for Rs. 42,23,800/- to purchase garlic against his export contract dated 8-4-2002. He has further stated therein that he thoroughly checked the documents and was pleased to inform that there was no discrepancy in retiring documents. Not only this but he further requested manager of respondent No. 3 to retire documents and issue him original documents to enable him to proceed for export formalities. He also requested respondent No. 3 to issue letter to respondent No. 7 State Bank of hyderabad that he would pay amount of rs. 42,23,800/- on 180th day from the letter of credit i. e. from 5-7-2002. The learned trial court has further observed that had appellant not received goods, he would have protested and would not have asked respondent No. 3 central Bank to retire the documents and to issue letter to respondent No. 7. The appellant has also lodged a police complaint against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on 30-12-2002 and it also reveals that appellant in it communicated to police authorities that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have prepared bogus seals/stamps on his concern and thereafter fabricated invoices and also obtained signature of some person on it and forwarded those invoices to him through bank. It is to be noticed that the civil suit is filed on next day i. e. on 31-12-2002. In this police complaint, appellant has alleged that he did not receive goods/garlic and made inquiries on several occasions with respondent Nos. l and 2 who told him to wait. It is further stated that respondent Nos. It is to be noticed that the civil suit is filed on next day i. e. on 31-12-2002. In this police complaint, appellant has alleged that he did not receive goods/garlic and made inquiries on several occasions with respondent Nos. l and 2 who told him to wait. It is further stated that respondent Nos. l and 2 has directly recovered the amount from New Delhi and hence respondent No. 3 Bank is pressurising him to deposit the amount of letter of credit. Thus, appellant had knowledge of alleged fraud of preparation of false and bogus invoices and still he permitted respondent No. 3 Bank to retire the documents. It is apparent that he got all these documents on 11-7-2002. In this police complaint he has not made reference to the authorisation/permission to retire documents given by him to respondent No. 3 bank or to subsequent two letters dated 29- 10-2002. Explanation as given in plaint by appellant that he believed on version of respondent No. 2 about dispatch of garlic also cannot be accepted in this background. He has also not complained against respondent No. 3 bank or respondent No. 7 Bank in the matter thus application of mind by trial court in relation to alleged fraud, in the fact circumstances of present case cannot be labelled either as perverse or as erroneous. On the contrary, when this conduct is seen, I find that at this stage it is not possible to arrive at any other conclusion in relation thereto. ( 26 ) FROM above, it is apparent that appellant did not approach the trial court with clean hands and did not make clean breast of matter before it. At this stage, it can be presumed that he deliberately suppressed the letter written by him on 11-7-2002 and produced the e-mails and police complaint to induce belief that he has not received goods. However, letter dated 11-7-2002 clearly shows that on 11-7-2002 he did not complain that he has not received goods and on the contrary permitted respondent No. 3 Bank to retire documents and to clear payment. If he had any grievance about any term or condition of letter of credit or about non-receipt of goods, he ought to have made it immediately on 11-7-2002. If he had any grievance about any term or condition of letter of credit or about non-receipt of goods, he ought to have made it immediately on 11-7-2002. He could have pointed out that documents accompanying letter of credit were not in conformity with the requirement thereof and could have made a grievance well within time that there was no bill of lading. The argument that the documents in envelope were not looked into by him cannot be entertained in this background. Moreover, the argument about negligence/omission on part of respondent No. 7 Bank or respondent No. 3 bank in verifying the documents placed for negotiation with them also pales into insignificance in view of the fact that it is the appellant who himself has permitted these banks to retire the documents. The contention of appellant that the bill of lading was not accompanying these documents or that the bills were presented after period of 10 days for negotiation also therefore lose their substance. The appellant was aware on 11-7-2002 that payment towards goods was to be made the moment he cleared the documents and still he cleared the documents and therefore the payment Thus having permitted respondent no 7 Bank to make payment to respondent no. 1, he cannot be permitted to turn around and make an attempt to stop respondent No. 3 bank from making over the payment in terms of letter of credit to respondent No. 7 Bank. In short, effort of appellant is to avoid recovery from him. From the case law stated above, it is apparent that both these banks are/were really not concerned with alleged dispute between appellant and respondent No. 1 after the documents were permitted to be retired by appellant There is one more angle to the matter in this respect. Having permitted the documents to be retired on 11-7-2002, the appellant contends that he forwarded e-mail to respondent No. 1 on the 12-7-2002 pointing out that he had not received the goods. Still from 12-7-2002 till filing of suit on 31-12-2002 he did not make any attempt to see that the respondent No. 7 Bank did not effect payment to respondent No. 1 and did not complain to respondent No 3 Bank that he did not receive the goods. Still from 12-7-2002 till filing of suit on 31-12-2002 he did not make any attempt to see that the respondent No. 7 Bank did not effect payment to respondent No. 1 and did not complain to respondent No 3 Bank that he did not receive the goods. By virtue of suit filed by him before trial court, he is making attempt to see that the payment of amount of letter of credit is not released to respondent Nos. 1 and 2. He has also sought injunction to prohibit respondent nos. l and 2 as also respondent No. 7 from receiving that amount from respondent No. 3 bank. In view of this relief, it was most important that the appellant should have made grievance of alleged cheating and fraud immediately to respondent No. 3 Bank and also to respondent No. 7 Bank. Instead of entering into alleged correspondence through e-mails with respondent Nos 1 and 2, it was more urgent requirement of situation that he lodged his grievance with at least respondent No. 3 bank. No such immediate attempt was made to stop payment and it was allowed to be effected and suit was filed after more than five months in the matter. All this speaks volumes about lack of bonafides on part of present appellant at this stage. There is absolutely no explanation and justification for such conduct on his part. ( 27 ) NOT only this, the appellant has written two letters to respondent No. 3 Bank thereafter in the month of October, 2002. Both these letters are dated 29-10-2002. By first letter the appellant has communicated that when he was preparing to ship 200 metric tons of garlic to importer at South Africa, he got a message/fax from said importer, by which date of shipment was amended till 15-12-2002 and letter of credit expiry was 31-12-2002. It is mentioned that therefore the garlic was sold in local market on credit through brokers and money would be deposited with respondent no. 3 as soon as appellant got it from buyers. Again, if appellant did not receive the garlic why he issued such letter to respondent No. 3 bank is not understood. By second letter again written on same date, he assured Bank to pay amount of letter of credit made over to respondent No. 1 by 5-1-2003. 3 as soon as appellant got it from buyers. Again, if appellant did not receive the garlic why he issued such letter to respondent No. 3 bank is not understood. By second letter again written on same date, he assured Bank to pay amount of letter of credit made over to respondent No. 1 by 5-1-2003. At the end of this second letter, there is a note written on next day by appellant in his handwriting promising to pay Rs. 9 lakhs on 31-10-2002 and balance amount within one month. Again, if during this period the appellant was making grievance with respondent No. 1 that appellant has not received the garlic at all; he could have informed the same immediately to respondent no. 3 Bank and could not have accepted the obligation to pay for amount of letter of credit. Advocate Thakur for appellant contended that appellant is earning his livelihood by practicing as Doctor and that he is not a trader and that he was under influence of respondent No. 3 bank and said Bank got this letter written from him under pressure/coercion. It was further stated that respondent No. 3 Bank discovered its negligence in the matter of verification of documents and therefore, to cover it up, coerced appellant into writing these letters. The argument does not hold any water. It was not necessary for respondent No. 3 Bank to obtain any such letter from appellant because of letter dated 11-7-2002 given by appellant to it. Moreover, the letter of credit was already issued on 5-7-2002 and the documents required to be submitted for its negotiation were already mentioned in it. In view of this, it cannot be said that there was any negligence on part of either respondent No. 3 or respondent No. 7. It appears that appellant himself wanted to gain time and therefore, has written these letters to the respondent No. 3 Bank. A person like appellant who is educated and is in profession and has obtained letter of credit cannot be presumed to come under influence or coercion of anybody. No such presumption can be drawn at least in the above background and at prima facie stage. It cannot be forgotten that it is the case of appellant that he had been sending e-mails from 12-7-2002 till 16-12-2002 to respondent No. l complaining about non-receipt of garlic. No such presumption can be drawn at least in the above background and at prima facie stage. It cannot be forgotten that it is the case of appellant that he had been sending e-mails from 12-7-2002 till 16-12-2002 to respondent No. l complaining about non-receipt of garlic. If this e-mails and grievance therein is presumed to be correct, the conduct of appellant in writing these two letters to respondent No. 3 Bank on 29-10-2002 is totally inconsistent and incomprehensible. ( 28 ) IT cannot be forgotten that this court is considering the controversy only prima facie and suit is yet not tried on merits. In the circumstances, in the face of letter dated 11-7-2002, it is not necessary for this court to consider the case of appellant that delivery challans are forged and did not bear the signature of appellant or his representative. His contention that he did not receive the goods/garlic at New Delhi therefore also need not be gone into. At this stage, this court is concerned only with question of grant of temporary injunction restraining respondent No. 3 Bank from honouring a call on its credit in view of letter of credit i ssued by it. Neither respondent no. 3 Bank for respondent No. 7 Bank are concerned with alleged non-receipt ot garlic by appellant. Prima facie, it established that the documents of letter of credit have been validly retired and its negotiation/discounting is not by playing any fraud upon appellant by either respondent No. 3 Bank or respondent no. 7 Bank. It is matter of record that after appellant instructed respondent No. 3 Bank to retire documents, the same has been done and respondent No. 7 Bank has effected payment to respondent No. 1. Moreover, the prayers in his civil suit made by appellant are very limited and he has not sought any relief of recovery against respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The suit as filed now survives only for consideration of question whether appellant can seek relief of injunction prohibiting respondent No. 3 Bank from making payment to respondent No. 7 bank. Having not taken essential steps in this respect within time, prima facie, I find that the appellant may not be entitled to such relief. There is dispute between parties as to which uniform Customs and Practice for documentary Credit is applicable. Having not taken essential steps in this respect within time, prima facie, I find that the appellant may not be entitled to such relief. There is dispute between parties as to which uniform Customs and Practice for documentary Credit is applicable. In the communication/letter of credit No. 22/1 respondent No. 3 has mentioned that credit is subject to Uniform Customs and Practice for documentary Credit (1974) (revision) international Chamber of Commerce publication No. 290. As against this in letter of credit addressed to respondent No. l it is stated that is subject to Uniform Customs and practice for Documentary Credit (1983 revision) International Chamber of Commerce publication No. 400. The learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has pointed out uniform Customs and Practice for documentary Credit (1993 revision) international Chamber of Commerce publication No. 500. At this stage of suit, it is not necessary for this court to record any finding in this respect. Whether the respondent nos. l and 2 submitted necessary documents with letter of credit or not and what is its effect on discounting/honouring the letter of credit is a question which can be gone into by trial court after parties lead their evidence. However, in the face of letter dated 11-7-2002 and 2 letters dated 29-10-2002 this controversy does not have any bearing on question of finding out of prima facie case or even fraud at this stage. It cannot be said that respondent no. 3 Bank or respondent No. 7 Bank were not diligent in accepting the documents along with letter of credit and in discounting it. For the same reasons, the contention of appellant that documents have been discounted after expiry of period of 10 days from the date of delivery (as alleged by respondent Nos. l and 2) also need not be considered at this stage. The appellant has also contended that document produced as letter of credit is only a request letter and real documents of credit is not produced on record at all. It is further contended that a particular banker namely "united Bank of India, New Delhi" is a specified Bank of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the letter of credit was therefore not unrestricted and it could not have been discounted by respondent No. 7. Again, on 11 -. 7-2002 appellant has permitted respondent no. It is further contended that a particular banker namely "united Bank of India, New Delhi" is a specified Bank of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the letter of credit was therefore not unrestricted and it could not have been discounted by respondent No. 7. Again, on 11 -. 7-2002 appellant has permitted respondent no. 3 Bank to discount it by retiring documents in favour of respondent No. 7 State Bank of hyderabad. In view of these facts, said challenge also is not sufficient to dilute the prima facie view of the matter as reached by learned trial court and as accepted by this court. ( 29 ) LEARNED Counsel for appellant has also invited attention to the stipulation about documents to be submitted while claiming payment and the letter of credit as enumerated in contract dated 10-6-2002 between appellant and respondent Nos. 1 and2. He states that letter of credit is agreed to be payable against total 8 documents and according to him packing list in duplicate is one of the important documents. It is argued that the said documents would have disclosed that the garlic is actually loaded in truck for its delivery at Mumbai to this appellant as the delivery as FOB Mumbai. It is further pointed out by him that in Annexure-I with the alleged letter of credit only five documents are mentioned while packing list has been omitted. It is also argued that said Annexure contains a surprising note that document dated prior to opening of inland letter of credit would be acceptable. It is to be noticed that in view of 3 letters mentioned above i. e. 11-7-2002 and 29-10-2002, at this stage it would be inappropriate to dwell in detail on this challenge. However there is a consequential argument that respondent No. 7 Bank or respondent No. 3 bank have failed in their duty to verify these documents. Hence I am considering the issue only prima facie and on the basis of documents. It is to be noted that the documents for negotiation mentioned in Annexure-I contain delivery Challan in duplicate. These delivery challans are admittedly furnished by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 along with letter of credit to respondent No. 7 Bank. These delivery challans are stated to be signed by appellant and his representative. The appellant has permitted the bank's to retire these documents. These delivery challans are admittedly furnished by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 along with letter of credit to respondent No. 7 Bank. These delivery challans are stated to be signed by appellant and his representative. The appellant has permitted the bank's to retire these documents. The dispute about place of delivery is also not relevant therefore. Thus mere absence of packing list or bill of lading does not have any material bearing on prima facie consideration of case. It is to be noted that the note about acceptance of documents prior to opening of letter of credit appearing at the bottom of Annexure-I is also mentioned in the contract between appellant and respondent nos. 1 and 1. It is appearing at serial No. 6 in the list of documents mentioned below head "payment". It is to be noted that the purchase order is stated to be dated 4-6-2002 and the letter of credit is dated 5-7-2002. The parties therefore have taken care of deliveries made between 10-6-2002 to 5-7-2002. If there were no deliveries before 5-7-2002, the appellant could have instructed Bank to delete said condition. It is to be noted that application seeking letter of credit is moved on 5-7-2002 and respondent No. 3 Bank has also issued it immediately on same day. ( 30 ) ONE of the major defenses of appellant has been about the e-mails. The trial court has considered said issue at appropriate length in its order. The arguments of parties in this respect are already mentioned above. The question to-day is not of restraining respondent Nos. l and 2 from invoking letter of credit or it is not of prohibiting respondent no. 7 Bank or respondent No. 3 Bank from making payment to respondent Nos. 1 and 2. After clearance of documents by appellant on 11-7-2002, respondent No. 7 has made the payment to respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and interim prayer in this respect as made before trial court has become infructuous. In fact, it was infructuous on the date on which it was made. The disputed e-mails are not addressed either to the respondent No. 3 or respondent No. 7. As such, these e-mails cannot be used to their prejudice particularly when they have acted as per express instructions dated 11-7-2002 of appellant. In fact, it was infructuous on the date on which it was made. The disputed e-mails are not addressed either to the respondent No. 3 or respondent No. 7. As such, these e-mails cannot be used to their prejudice particularly when they have acted as per express instructions dated 11-7-2002 of appellant. It is therefore not necessary to make reference to provisions of Section 65-A, 65-B or 88-A of Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It is also not necessary to record the finding about the correctnessor otherwise of the affidavit filed on behalf of appellant by his expert Shri. Potdukhe. I find that this issue can be conveniently left for adjudication after parties adduce their respective evidence. ( 31 ) THE question involved is whether there was any fraud played upon appellant at all. The question also is who is the victim of said fraud. It will also have to be found out who were the parties to said fraud. If it is proved that appellant received his garlic, it is apparent that there will not be any need of going into all these questions. Hence, on the basis of documents before it the trial court has rightly concluded against appellant at prima facie stage. There is no error or perversity in said finding. I do not find that any case is made out by appellant to enable this court to take different view in the matter. The Appeal against order, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. ( 32 ) AT this stage, Advocate Thakur, makes a request that the order of status quo which is operating since the filing of the proceedings before the trial Court should be continued till 16-11-2005 to enable the appellant to approach appropriate forum in the matter. The request is opposed by Advocate kumar, who represents respondent No. 1 - bank. However, in the interest of justice, I am inclined to grant time till 16-11-2005 to the appellant to take appropriate steps in the matter. The order of status quo which was operating during the pendency of this appeal shall therefore, continue to operate till then, and shall cease to operate automatically thereafter. Appeal dismissed.