S.Sardar Zackria Hussain,J.: This habeas corpus petition is filed by the petitioner/detenu/A-2 with the prayer as stated supra. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that he was arrested and remanded to the Judicial custody by the 1st respondent for the offences under Secs.21(C), 25, 28 and 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985, as amended in 2001 on 20.1.2005, along with A-1, Schachithanandan Sarkunam alias Sabesan for the alleged possession of 3.640 kgs. of heroin before the Special District and Sessions Judge for E.C.Act and NDPS Act cases, Madurai. The petitioner has filed a bail application for statutory bail on 20.7.2005 after 182 days as per Sec.162(2), Criminal Procedure Code and Sec.36-A(4) of the NDPS Act, which was dismissed on 25.7.2005 and though he was entitled for mandatory statutory bail, since no final report was filed on 20.7.2005. It is further stated that the defective final report was filed on 12.7.2005 i.e., on 173rd day, which was returned on 19.7.2005 and the rectified final report was presented on 25.7.2005 i.e., on the 187th day. As per Sec.36-A(4) of the NDPS Act read with Sec.167(A), Criminal Procedure Code, the final report has to be filed within 180 days, failing which, the detenu has an indefeasible right to be enlarged on bail, immaterial of the charges framed. It is also contended that after the dismissal of the statutory bail application on 25.7.2005, his custody is only illegal custody and therefore, the petitioner prays that he may be set at liberty. 3. The first respondent has filed a counter affidavit, narrating the facts relating to the arrest of the petitioner. It is further stated that by virtue of Sec.36-A(4) of the NDPS Act read with Sec.167, Criminal Procedure Code, a person accused of an offence involving commercial quantity of heroin can be placed in judicial custody for a total period of 180 days pending completion of investigation by the Prosecuting Agency. In the instant case, the period of 180 days expired on 18.7.2005. In the instant case, the period of 180 days expired on 18.7.2005. Even before the expiry of the said period, after completion of investigation, a complaint was laid on 12.7.2005 in the Special Court for NDPS cases, Madurai, which was numbered as C.C.No.271 of 2005 and immediately on coming to know of the return of the complaint for certain clarifications, the petitioner gave necessary clarifications and resubmitted the complaint on the very same day i.e., on 25.7.2005 and therefore, it is incorrect to say that there was no final report on the date of filing of the bail application by the petitioner on 20.7.2005. 4. It is also further contended by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that merely because the charge sheet filed within time i.e., on 173rd day and returned for completion of certain defects and re-presented after 180th day, no inference can be drawn that the charge sheet filed is incomplete or no cognizance can be taken by the Court on the basis of such charge sheet and once the complaint or charge sheet is filed, it becomes the document of the Court and as such, it should not be returned. 5.The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has relied on the decision rendered in the case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar alias Answar alias Rahman, (2000)2 Crimes 557 , wherein the Division of the Calcutta High Court has held as under: “Mere omission to forward statement of witnesses and documents along with the police report as contemplated by Sec.173(5), Criminal Procedure Code, will not invalidate the cognizance taken by Court on the basis of the police report alone provided other requirements of law in this regard are satisfied and bail allowed to accused for offence under Sec.21 of the NDPS Act under Sec.167(2), Criminal Procedure Code, holding that charge sheet was not complete is bad in law and bail is liable to be recalled.” 6. In the other decision relied on by the Special Public Prosecutor, in the case ofA.Vinayagam and three others v. Dr.Subash Chandran and another, (2000)1 C.T.C. 225 , it was held as under: “Law does not know or provide any other mode of dealing with the complaint, much less returning the complaint. It is not possible for a Magistrate to return the complaint for the so called defects and if the defects are there in the complaint, the complainant has to suffer. It is not possible for a Magistrate to return the complaint for the so called defects and if the defects are there in the complaint, the complainant has to suffer. There is no warrant in the Criminal Procedure Code or the Criminal Rules of Practice, empowering the Magistrate to return the complaint just because he thinks that there are any defects.” It was further held, “It is the cardinal principle of law that the act of Court should not prejudice any one _”Actus curiae neminem Gravabit“. The Supreme Court has reiterated this principle in Jang Singh v. Brijlal and others, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1631: (1964)2 S.C.R. 145 . There the Supreme Court had refused to find fault with a party who had made short payment by one rupee, for which the Court was responsible. We would choose the same course by holding that once the complaints were filed within limitation, merely because the Magistrates, completely contrary to the procedure known to law, chose to return the same without fixing the date for re-presentation, it should not be held that the subsequent filing by the complaints would be held to be beyond limitation. We therefore answer the reference by holding that the date, which is to be taken into account, would be the date on which the complaints were initially presented. They being within limitation, the complaints would have to be held as validly filed and on that count, the accused cannot claim any benefit. We also hold that the act on the part of the Court of taking cognizance of the complaints has no concern with the date of filing of the complaint on a proper reading of Sec.142(b)”. 7. In respect of the offence under Secs.21(C), 25, 28 and 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985, as amended in 2001, on 20.1.2005, the petitioner was arrested for the alleged possession of 3.640 kgs., of heroin. According to the petitioner, no final report was filed before 180th day as contemplated under Sec.36-A(4) of the NDPS Act, though on the 173rd day the defective final report was filed viz., on 12.7.2005 and on return of the same, the final report was re-presented on 25.7.2005, which is the 187th day. The bail application filed on 20.7.2005, the same was not considered and dismissed on 25.7.2005. The bail application filed on 20.7.2005, the same was not considered and dismissed on 25.7.2005. In that view, it is stated by the petitioner that the judicial remand or custody after 180th day is only illegal custody or detention. Admittedly, the final report was filed on 173rd day and it appears that it was returned to carry out some defects and for filing of some documents. After compliance, the final report was re-presented on 25.7.2005, which is on the 187th day from the date of arrest of the petitioner. As rightly argued by the Special Public Prosecutor the date of presentation of the final report is to be construed as on the 173rd day, which was returned for compliance for some defects and presented within the meaning of Sec.36-A(4) of the NDPS Act as held by the Division Bench of this Court in A.Vinayagam and three others v. Dr.Subash Chandran and another, (2000)1 C.T.C. 225 . It is not disputed that such presentation of the final report is not within 180 days as contemplated under Sec.36-A(4) of the NDPS Act. As per proviso to Sec.36-A(4) of the NDPS Act, if the investigation could not be completed within 180 days and on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the period may be extended by the Special Court concerned. As per Sec.167(2), Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrates shall not authorize the detention of the accused person in custody for a total period exceeding ninety days and on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, the accused shall be released on bail, if he is prepared to and does furnish bail and under Sec.36-A(4) of the NDPS Act the period of 90 days referred to under Sec.167(2), Criminal Procedure Code, is to be construed as reference to 180 days. 8. As also rightly submitted by the Special Public Prosecutor, since the final report filed within time i.e., on the 173rd day, returned and re-presented on the 187th day, it is to be construed that the final report was filed within time, viz., within 180 days, as contemplated under Sec.36-A(4) of the NDPS Act, irrespective of the fact that the final report was returned to carry out some defects and subsequently re-presented on the 187th day. Merely because some documents have been omitted to be filed along with the final report, for which purpose it was returned and subsequently re-presented after carrying out the defects on the 187th day, it cannot be construed that the final report was not filed within time as contemplated under Sec.36-A(4) of the NDPS Act and there is no force in the argument advanced by the petitioner that the final report was filed after 180th day and as such, the petitioner is entitled for statutory bail and similarly in the contention put forth that the judicial custody of the petitioner after 180th day is illegal detention, in that the final report was filed on 173rd day. Assuming that the final report is filed on the 180th day and it was taken on file only on the next day, can it be said that the final report was not in time. On the facts of the case, it is clear that inasmuch as the final report was filed admittedly on the 173rd day, it being the crucial day, it is to be construed that the final report was filed and presented within time i.e., within 180 days after the completion of the investigation. In that view of the matter and in the light of the decisions referred to above, we are unable to accept the contentions raised for the petitioner and hold that the remand or custody or detention of the petitioner after 180 days cannot be construed as illegal remand of custody or detention, in which the final report was filed even before the 180th day i.e., on 173rd day. 9. In the result, this habeas corpus petition is dismissed.