JUDGMENT Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J. 1. These two matters relate to the appointment to the post of Clerk in the Muslim Vocational Higher Secondary School, Pudunagaram which fell vacant from 1-6-2002 owing to the superannuation of Sri. A. Muhammadali on the afternoon of 31-5-2002. The Manager appointed the petitioner in W. P. (C) No. 19600/2004 as against that post by order dated 1-6-2002. Smt. Anna Joseph, who is the 5th respondent in W. P. (C). No. 19600/2004 and who is the 4th respondent in W. P. (C) 14092/2004, then objected to the approval of the appointment of the petitioner in W. P. (C) No. 19600/2004 (Samaj C. Krishnan) contending that she had already staked a claim for preferential appointment in terms of Rules 51B of Chap.14(A) of K.E.R. relatable to the death of her father in harness on 8-12-1982. 2. By the orders under challenge in both these writ petitions, it is ordered that the Manager of the School shall appoint Smt. Anna Joseph on compassionate grounds revoking the appointment of Sri. Samaj C. Krishnan, already made by the Manager. W. P. (C) No. 14092/2004 is by the Manager and W. P. (C) No. 19600/2004 is by Sri. Samaj C. Krishnan. Accordingly, both these matters are taken up for consideration jointly and the documents exhibited are referred to as in W. P. (C) No. 14092/2004 and the parties will also be referred to going by their status in the said writ petition. 3. The short facts that are relevant in the context are as follows:- 4. The father of the 4th respondent, while serving as a U. P. S. A. in the School, died in harness on 8-12-1982. It appears that the 4th respondent was hardly 7 month's old at that time. She grew and after attaining majority, applied on 24-05-2000 for being considered for appointment under R.51B of Chap.14(A), in the School. A permanent vacancy of L.D.C. arose with effect from 1-6-2002 and the 5th respondent was appointed as per Ext. P1 order dated 1-6-2002 issued by the Manager. She grew and after attaining majority, applied on 24-05-2000 for being considered for appointment under R.51B of Chap.14(A), in the School. A permanent vacancy of L.D.C. arose with effect from 1-6-2002 and the 5th respondent was appointed as per Ext. P1 order dated 1-6-2002 issued by the Manager. It appears that this Court had directed the District Educational Officer to consider the request of the 4th respondent for appointment on compassionate grounds and that approval of the appointment, if any, made in the meanwhile will be subject to final orders that may be passed by the D.E.O. This direction was issued by this Court on 10-4-2002 as per Ext. R4(a) judgment. 5. Pursuant to the said judgment, the D.E.O. passed Ext. P2 order stating that the application of the 4th respondent under R.51B will be considered by the Manager in the next arising vacancy without disturbing the appointment of the 5th respondent, who is working from 1-6-2002 since the D.E.O. was of the view that R.51B is silent about its retrospective effect or otherwise. So much so, any entitlement or disentitlement of the 4th respondent was not decided by the D.E.O. with reference to the aspects relevant for consideration in that regard. 6. On an appeal stated to have been filed by the 4th respondent, the Director of Public Instruction issued Ext. P3 order stating that the said appeal dated 22-7-2002 is allowed cancelling the order of the D.E.O. and directing the Manager to appoint the 4th respondent, if she is otherwise eligible. The primary reason for issuing this order is also that no time limit is prescribed in R.51B of Chap.14(A) of K.E.R. and that the 4th respondent is qualified and had submitted an application in the prescribed form. Ext. P3 also obviously reflects that the relevant matters to be considered while deciding the entitlement of a claim under R.51B have not been considered. 7. The petitioner - Manager filed Ext. P4 revision before the Government citing different pronouncements of superior courts. The Government passed Ext. Ext. P3 also obviously reflects that the relevant matters to be considered while deciding the entitlement of a claim under R.51B have not been considered. 7. The petitioner - Manager filed Ext. P4 revision before the Government citing different pronouncements of superior courts. The Government passed Ext. P6 order affirming the decision of the D.P.I. The only added reason stated by the Government was that in the judgment dated 11-11-2002 in W.A. 1621/ 1998 and connected cases ( 2002 (3) KLT 912 ) it was held that R.51B operates only prospectively, but however the fact that a death of an employee before the introduction of R.51B does not disentitle the dependant from claiming appointment under that rule. Accordingly, the Government took the view that the date of occurrence of the vacancy is the relevant date and that if the occurrence of vacancy is on or after the coming into force of R.51B, the fact that the employee died before such commencement is immaterial. The Government held that soon after the attainment of 18 years of age on 8-5-2000 the 4th respondent submitted an application under the Dying in Harness Scheme and is therefore entitled to get appointment as Clerk under the said scheme, if otherwise eligible. 8. After hearing the learned counsel for the writ petitioner, respondent No. 4 and respondent No. 5, as also the learned Government Pleader, I am of the considered view that the question as to whether the 4th respondent is entitled to be appointed under R.51B of Chap.14(A) of K.E.R. has not been considered and decided since even in Ext. P6 Government Order after stating that the application was made immediately after the 4th respondent became a major and that the rule enables an application being made by a dependent of one who died in harness before the introduction of the Rule, the Government left the matter there, by stating that she (4th respondent) is entitled to get appointment under the Dying in Harness Scheme, if otherwise eligible. The question is whether she is eligible to be appointed and not whether she is merely entitled to apply or whether she had applied within time. 9. The question is whether she is eligible to be appointed and not whether she is merely entitled to apply or whether she had applied within time. 9. It is not in dispute that the 4th respondent is a daughter of a person who had been in employment of the School, who died in harness, and that she had applied within the period of three years of her attaining majority and therefore, her application was well within time. That she was a dependent of the deceased at the time of his death, cannot be disputed since she was hardly 7 month's old then. 10. But, going by the law laid by the Apex Court as well as of this Court down from Smt. Sushma Gosain and Others v. Union of Indian and others (JT 1989 (3) SC 57) to National Hydroelectric Power Corporation v. Nanak Chand (JT 2004 (9) SC 191), the prime requirement to make appointments on compassionate grounds is the need to provide succour to the bereaved, to enable the family to get over the sudden financial crisis. The requirement of such a yardstick to be followed has been time and again highlighted in various decisions including the Bench decision of this Court in the aforesaid W.A. 1621/1998 and connected cases ( 2002 (3) KLT 912 ) wherein their Lordships held that the proximity between the date of death and the date of application as pointed out in Deepak's case ( 2002 (3) KLT 288 ) and the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India laying down that there cannot be any doubt that the right conferred on the dependents of the deceased employee for compassionate appointment is neither absolute nor unlimited, will have to be read into the executive orders as also statutory provisions governing such appointments. Going by the ratio in Ganesan's case ( 1995 (2) KLT 700 ); Phollwati v. Union of Indian and Others (1991 Supp. (2) SCC 689). Union of India & Others v. Bhagwan Singh ( 1995 (6) SCC 476 ), Director of Education (Secondary) and another v. Pushpendra Kumar and others (JT 1998 (4) SC 155). Going by the ratio in Ganesan's case ( 1995 (2) KLT 700 ); Phollwati v. Union of Indian and Others (1991 Supp. (2) SCC 689). Union of India & Others v. Bhagwan Singh ( 1995 (6) SCC 476 ), Director of Education (Secondary) and another v. Pushpendra Kumar and others (JT 1998 (4) SC 155). State of U.P. and others v. Paras Nath ( 1998 (2) SCC 412 ) and other decisions referred to by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in National Hydroelectrical Power Corporation's case referred to supra and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in K.P. Sarada v. Pradeep Kumar T.K. & Others (2004 (2) KLT 588), the question as to whether an applicant under R.51B is entitled to be provided such a benefit would ultimately depend upon a consideration of the issue as to whether the applicant needs to be provided. The yardstick for such a decision will obviously be the income available to the family and in that view of the matter, the time lag between the death and the application of the dependent for benefit under R.51B will also be a relevant consideration. 11. The learned counsel for the 4th respondent points out that when the Government Order containing the Scheme provides that a dependant can apply within three years of attaining majority, the time lag between the date of death and date of application cannot be a relevant consideration. In support of this, the learned counsel points out paragraph 11 of the judgment in National Hydroelectrical Power Corporation's case to urge that even that judgment does not stand in the way of the claimant's case being considered sympathetically under any scheme or by any administrative decision in accordance with law. I am of the considered view that the said observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court do not thereby give its seal of approval to any administrative decision or Scheme, but only states that a decision can be taken in accordance with law. I say so because the law in this regard is laid in paragraph No. 4 of that judgment whether their Lordships categorically stated that "it is to be seen that the appointment on compassionate ground is not a source of recruitment but merely an exception to the requirement regarding appointments being made on open invitation of application on merits. I say so because the law in this regard is laid in paragraph No. 4 of that judgment whether their Lordships categorically stated that "it is to be seen that the appointment on compassionate ground is not a source of recruitment but merely an exception to the requirement regarding appointments being made on open invitation of application on merits. Basic intention is that on the death of the employee concerned his family is not deprived of the means of livelihood. The object is to enable the family to get over sudden financial crises". 12. The object of the entire scheme for compassionate appointment is therefore abundantly clear and there is no room for any doubt. A person who cannot demonstrate a need for an immediate succour cannot be appointed under R.51B, for such appointment obviously encroaches into the fundamental rights of the open market candidates which also flows directly out of Art.16 of the Constitution of India. The executive orders as also statutory provisions governing such appointments will have to be read subject to the law laid by the Apex Court as also the decisions of this Court. To put it in other words, the principles contained in the judgments will have to be read into the statutory provisions and executive orders and schemes as regards such appointments. 13. As already noticed, none of the statutory authorities has considered the aforesaid relevant matters. Having regard to the fact that the D.P.I. is an appellate authority, the statutory appellate jurisdiction is wide enough to sit in judgment over the factual matters. In this view of the matter, I set aside Exts. P2, P3 and P6 orders in W.P. (C) No. 14092/2004 (Exts. P2, P3 and P4 in W. P. (C) No. 19600/2004) and direct the D.P.I. to consider the entire issues and decide the question as to whether 4th respondent is entitled to be appointed revoking the appointment of the 5th respondent. 14. Until such a decision is taken, following the judgment of this Court in O.P. 9857/2002 (Ext. R4(a)), any approval of the appointment of the 5th respondent will be subject to final orders made by the D.P.I. as directed above. 15. 14. Until such a decision is taken, following the judgment of this Court in O.P. 9857/2002 (Ext. R4(a)), any approval of the appointment of the 5th respondent will be subject to final orders made by the D.P.I. as directed above. 15. Having regard to the nature of the matter, the D.P.I. will make earnest endeavour to dispose of the matter within the earliest possible time frame, at any rate, within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. It shall be ensured that the writ petitioner as well as respondents 4 and 5 are heard in the matter by the D.P.I. before a final decision is taken. These writ petitions are disposed of as above. No costs.