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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2005 DIGILAW 15 (MP)

Lal Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh

2005-01-03

S.K.SETH

body2005
Judgment ( 1. ) THIS order shall also govern the disposal of W. P. No. 1058/2004 as common question of constitution of Gram Panchayat is involved in both the writ petitions. ( 2. ) THIS is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to assail the validity of the notification dated 12-7-2004 issued by the Collector, Shajapur. Petitioners in the present writ petition are the residents of Village Kumadi and Bejana respectively. They are aggrieved by the exclusion of Village Kumadi from the area of erstwhile Gram Panchayat, Bejana and amalgamation of Kumadi with the Gram Panchayat, Toogni. According to the petitioners, the impugned notification dated 12-7-2004 has been issued contrary to the provisions of Panchayat Raj Evam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "the Adhiniyam" for short ). It is contended that objections filed by the residents of Village Kumadi were not at all considered by the respondents. It is also contended that the distance between Kumadi and Toogni is roughly 8 Kms. And in-between Village Kumadi and Toogni there is a river known as silar and a big nala which make the approach to Gram Panchayat, Toogni difficult or inconvenient. On these allegations, present writ petition Has been filed. ( 3. ) AFTER notice, respondent have filed their reply and submitted that objections were duly considered by the Collector, Shajapur. It was also contended that issuance of notification of village under Section 3 of the Adhiniyam is a legislative function and the Courts can not sit in appeal over such decisions. ( 4. ) I have heard Shri A. K. Sethi, learned Counsel for petitioners and Shri C. L. Yadav, Addl. Advocate General for respondents at length. Perused the material available on record. ( 5. ) AFTER the 73rd amendment in the Constitution of India, Part IX dealing with the Panchayats have been inserted under Article 243 to Article 243-O of the Constitution of India. Pursuant to the Constitutional amendment, State Legislature enacted Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Evam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993. Section 3 empowers the Governor to notify a village or group of villages to be a village for the purposes of the Act. Section 10 envisages a Gram Panchayat for every village specified as a village for the purposes of the Act under Section 3. Section 3 empowers the Governor to notify a village or group of villages to be a village for the purposes of the Act. Section 10 envisages a Gram Panchayat for every village specified as a village for the purposes of the Act under Section 3. Section 125 of the Adhiniyam gives power to change the Head Quarter of Gram Panchayat, division, amalgamation or alteration of Panchayat area. Section 125 read with Section 3 makes it clear that the power can be exercised either by the Governor or by the authority authorized by him. The State Govt. has also made the rules which are known as Madhya Pradesh Panchayat (Alteration of Limits, Dis-establishment or Change of Headquarters) Rules, 1994. It is undisputed that exercising the powers, as aforesaid, the Governor has authorized Collector of the District to act as an authority authorized under Section 125 of the Adhiniyam. Accordingly, Collector, Shajapur in his capacity as an authorized officer issued the notification dated 3-7-2004 proposing exclusion of Village Kumadi from Gram Panchayat, Bejana. On the same day, by another notification, Collector, Shajapur proposed to amalgamate Village Kumadi in Gram Panchayat Toogni. In both the notifications, objections were invited by 8-7-2004. The residents of Village Kumadi submitted their objection before S. D. O. , Revenue which is available on record as Annexure P-4. In the aforesaid objections, residents highlighted their difficulties and requested that Village Kumadi be allowed to remain a part of Gram Panchayat, Bejana. Thus, the effect of the objection was that the petitioners or the residents of Village Kumadi did not want change in the area of the erstwhile Gram Panchayat, Bejana. Learned Counsel for petitioners relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Baldev Singh v. State of M. P. and Ors. , reported in AIR 1987 SC 1239 and contended that citizens of India have a right to decide what should be the nature of the society in which they live. 5-A. On the other hand, Shri Yadav, learned Addl. Advocate General appearing for respondents, justified the action of respondents and submitted that objections submitted by the residents of Village Kumadi were duly considered by the Collector, Shajapur and looking to the Geographical angle it was held that Village Kumadi is nearer to Village Toogni and rejected the objections and thereafter published the impugned notification on 12-7-2004. Advocate General appearing for respondents, justified the action of respondents and submitted that objections submitted by the residents of Village Kumadi were duly considered by the Collector, Shajapur and looking to the Geographical angle it was held that Village Kumadi is nearer to Village Toogni and rejected the objections and thereafter published the impugned notification on 12-7-2004. Shri Yadav submitted that formation of Gram Panchayat including the amalgamation of Village Kumadi in the area of Gram Panchayat, Toogni is a legislative function which is not open to interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in Sundarjas Kaniyalal Bhatija and Ors. v. Collector, Thane, reported in AIR 1990 SC 261 and also the Division Bench decision in Rajdhar Singh v. State of M. P. , reported in 1995 MPLJ 152 . He also placed reliance on an unreported Division Bench decision dated 19-11-2004 rendered in Pranay Gupta v. State of M. P. and Ors. , W. P. No. 3386/2004, wherein similar kind of notification dated 3-7-2004 and 12-7-2004 issued by the Collectors of various Districts were upheld. ( 6. ) AFTER having heard learned Counsel for the parties at length, I find that there is no merit and substance in the writ petition. Undisputedly, from the material available on record, it is clear that objections of the residents of Village Kumadi were duly considered by the Collector, Shajapur before issuance of the final notification dated 12-7-2004. Learned Counsel appearing for respondents is right in contending that to specify a village or group of villages for establishing a Gram Panchayat or change of Headquarter or alteration in the limits of Gram Panchayat area either by including or excluding any local area in the vicinity thereof, amalgamation of two or more Gram Panchayat area to split up a Gram Panchayat are all legislative functions and this Court can not sit in appeal over such functions or decisions specifically in view of the fact that objections of the villagers were duly considered and overruled by the Collector, Shajapur. The law laid down in 1995 MPLJ 152 applies on its fore to the facts of the present case. It was held as under :- "6. The law laid down in 1995 MPLJ 152 applies on its fore to the facts of the present case. It was held as under :- "6. We have considered the matter and are of the view that these are matters over which this Court can not sit over judgment as the State Government in the matter of creating Units of Local Government performs legislative functions. This question was considered by the Supreme Court of India is in Sundarjas Kaniyalal v. Collector, Thane, AIR 1990 SC 261 . In the above case, the Government of Maharashtra issued a draft notification under Section 3 (3) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 proposing to form Kalyan Corporation suggesting merger of Municipal Areas of Kalyan Ambarnath. Dombivali and Ulhasnagar. After objections were filed, the Government decided to exclude Ulhasnagar from the proposed Corporation. A writ petition was filed in the High Court of Bombay and it was alleged by certain objectors that action of the Government in affording opportunity of being heard only to the residents of Ulhasnagar and not to other objectors was in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A further plea raised was that the exclusion of Ulhasnagar was unintelligible and incomprehensible. The High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the State Government to give a fresh look to the proposal. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision given by the Bombay High Court and observed that the function of the Government in establishing a Corporation under the Act is neither executive nor administrative and agreeing with the contention of the appellants concluded that the Government performs a legislative function. In this regard, it was further observed that the Courts can not sit in judgment over such decision. It can not lay down norms for the exercise of that power. It can not substitute even its juster will for theirs. The Supreme Court took note of the earlier decisions on the subject and finally concluded in Para No. 28 as under :-"the principles and precedents thus enjoin us not to support the view taken by the High Court. We may only observe that the Government is expected to act in a way which would make it consistent with the good administration. It is they, and no one else-- who must pass judgment on this matter. We must, therefore, leave it to the Government". We may only observe that the Government is expected to act in a way which would make it consistent with the good administration. It is they, and no one else-- who must pass judgment on this matter. We must, therefore, leave it to the Government". " ( 7. ) THE view expressed by the Division Bench is in conformity with the latest decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Tehal Singh, reported in (2002) 2 SCC 7 . In the considered opinion of this Court, reliance placed by Shri Sethi on the decision reported in AIR 1987 SC 1239 (supra) is of no avail because in that case the Court was dealing with the constitution of notified area as provided under Section 256 of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act by including portions of 4 villages. In the aforesaid case, no opportunity of hearing was given to the residents of the villages sought to be included in the notified area. It is in this background of the factual context prevailing in that case, it was held that it was an administrative action involving civil consequences and without affording opportunity of being heard this could not have been done. In the present case, the facts are altogether different. Objections were duly invited and considered before issuing the final notification dated 12-7-2004, therefore, the decision given in AIR 1987 SC 1239 (supra) would not apply. It is also pertinent to point out that the Supreme Court in the case of Sundarjas Kaniyalal Bhatija (supra) duly considered its earlier decision given in Baldev Singhs case (supra) and thereafter, it was held that establishment of Corporation is a legislative function. 7-A. The reliance placed by Shri Yadav on an unreported decision given in W. P. No. 3386/2004 is misconceived in as much as in that case, the Division Bench was considering the effect of publication of notification in the Gazette after the due date for inviting the objections, i. e. , 8-7-2004. The question of amalgamation or alteration of limits or change of Headquarters was not involved in that case. ( 8. ) THE aforesaid discussion would equally apply to W. P. No. 1058/2004 which has been filed by the Gram Panchayat, Lakhwa, Tehsil Sitamau, District Mandsaur through its Sarpanch challenging the change of Headquarter of Gram Panchayat, Lakhwa to Dhankhedi. ( 9. ( 8. ) THE aforesaid discussion would equally apply to W. P. No. 1058/2004 which has been filed by the Gram Panchayat, Lakhwa, Tehsil Sitamau, District Mandsaur through its Sarpanch challenging the change of Headquarter of Gram Panchayat, Lakhwa to Dhankhedi. ( 9. ) IN view of the foregoing discussion, I find no merit and substance in both the writ petitions. Same are accordingly dismissed. However, no order as to costs.