( 1 ) IN this petition under articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India the petitioner, a widow, has challenged the order dated 30-9-2004 passed by respondent no. 1 Maharashtra Medical Council and has also made a prayer that the matter should be remanded back to said respondent for trial in accordance with section 20 of Maharashtra medical Practitioners Act, 1961 by giving her opportunity of hearing and of leading evidence in accordance with law within stipulated time and at Nagpur. The writ petition was earlier before Division Bench and on 26-4-2005 division Bench has passed order holding that in view of provisions of sub-rule (3) of rule 18 of chapter XVII of Bombay High Court appellate Side Rules, 1960 as the impugned order is passed by quasi-judicial authority, challenge thereto shall lie before Single Judge. Accordingly, the matter is before this court. During hearing it has become clear and agreed that Maharashtra Medical Practitioners Act, 1961 has no application here as respondent no. 2 Dr practices modern scientific medicines and hence, is governed by Maharashtra medical Council Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as Act) and Rules framed there under. Maharashtra Medical Practitioner Act, 1961 applies to "indian Medicine" i. e. it applies to Ashtang Ayurvedic or Siddha or Unani or unani Tibb systems. ( 2 ) HUSBAND of petitioner by name sudhir @ Pravin Shende met with road accident on 26-9-2001 in Amravati District and after treatment in local hospital he was admitted to Yavatmal Medical College. Due to critical condition, he was shifted to Nagpur medical College and thereafter, he was admitted to the hospital of respondent No. 2 doctor. There is dispute between parties about the date of his admission with respondent No. 2. However for present purposes that dispute is not relevant. It is stated that he expired in said hospital on 4-10-2001. The petitioner thereafter needed treatment and case papers of deceased husband for prosecuting Claim petition filed by her before Motor Accident claims Tribunal under section 166 of Motor vehicles Act, 1988. It is the grievance of petitioner that in spite of demand made by her with respondent No. 2, said documents have not been supplied and hence ultimately she complained to respondent No. 1 on 20-3-2003 and demanded those papers. These proceedings were opposed by respondent No. 2 who contended that the papers are already handed over to relatives of petitioner. It is the grievance of petitioner that in spite of demand made by her with respondent No. 2, said documents have not been supplied and hence ultimately she complained to respondent No. 1 on 20-3-2003 and demanded those papers. These proceedings were opposed by respondent No. 2 who contended that the papers are already handed over to relatives of petitioner. The petitioner states that she wanted to lead evidence before respondent No. l in this respect and for that purpose, she also submitted list of witnesses. Said list also contained names of some other prominent doctors from Nagpur city and hence petitioner requested respondent No. 1 to hold its sitting at Nagpur so as to enable her to examine these doctors. As this request was not being considered, she approached this court in writ petition 2643/2004 for that purpose and requested this court for directing respondent no. 1 to complete inquiry against respondent no. 2 within three months and to cancel the registration of respondent No. 2 and to close down his hospital. A direction to return the case papers was also sought with further direction to pay to petitioner amount of Rs. 5 lakhs. It is stated that in said writ petition, an application vide Civil Application 5477/2004 was moved for direction to respondent No. 1 to hold hearing at Nagpur and during pendency of said application before this court, respondent No. 1 closed the case for orders and on 28-9-2004, division Bench disposed of that writ petition as infructuous. It is thereafter that present writ petition has been filed challenging the orders passed by Medical Council on the ground that petitioner was not given due opportunity to lead evidence, to examine doctors and matter was closed with undue haste. ( 3 ) I have heard the Advocate kshirsagar for petitioner. Advocate kumbhakoni, learned Associate Adv. General with Adv. Deshpande for respondent No. 1 and advocate Haq for respondent No. 2. Considering the nature of controversy parties requested for final hearing at the stage of admission and accordingly Rule is made returnable forthwith, heard parties finally at admission stage itself at length. ( 4 ) ADVOCATE Kshirsagar for petitioner has not given much emphasis on challenge to the impugned order on merits. Considering the nature of controversy parties requested for final hearing at the stage of admission and accordingly Rule is made returnable forthwith, heard parties finally at admission stage itself at length. ( 4 ) ADVOCATE Kshirsagar for petitioner has not given much emphasis on challenge to the impugned order on merits. Though, during the course of arguments he attempted to point out the shift in the stand of respondent No. 2 about supply of original documents by stating that initial stand of respondent No. 2 was that he supplied the documents to Police Authorities after death, latter on respondent No. 2 contended that he supplied documents to relatives of petitioner. He further stated that grievance of petitioner against respondent No. 2 was only in relation to non supply of original documents of treatment of deceased husband as said documents were needed by her in Motor accident Claim filed for compensation on account of road accident in which her husband was injured and was required to be hospitalized and expired subsequently. He states that the stand of respondent No. 2 was that he had supplied original papers to the relatives of petitioner or to the police authorities and he produced copies of papers available with him in proceedings before respondent No. 1. He states that Xerox copies produced were not in relation to treatment of her husband and therefore petitioner wanted to examine other doctors alleged to have attended her husband in hospital of respondent No. 2. He argued that evidence of all these doctors was of vital importance and as petitioner comes from very poor family, it was not possible for her to arrange for recording of evidence of all these doctors at Mumbai where respondent No. 1 was holding the sitting for conducting inquiry. The petitioner was therefore requesting for holding sitting at Nagpur which according to him was also accepted and for that purpose he invites attention of court to certain notings of relevant information made by Administrator of respondent No. l in pencil about Nagpur. He further argues that when respondent No. 1 was aware of proceedings in High Court, deliberately and hastily case was closed for orders only to render writ petition infructuous. He invites attention to provisions of maharashtra Medical Council Rules, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as Rules) to point out that procedure as contemplated therein has not been followed. He further argues that when respondent No. 1 was aware of proceedings in High Court, deliberately and hastily case was closed for orders only to render writ petition infructuous. He invites attention to provisions of maharashtra Medical Council Rules, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as Rules) to point out that procedure as contemplated therein has not been followed. He invites attention to proceedings for date 28-8-2004 as recorded by respondent No. l to contend that even procedure as contemplated by Rule 71 of Rules has not been followed. He states that the proceedings were fixed on 31-7-2004 and thereafter were adjourned to 28-8-2004. He argues that 28-8-2004 was not the date fixed for recording of evidence and procedure followed on the day was in breach of principles of natural justice. He states that application dated 28-8-2004 submitted by petitioner for issuing summons to witnesses was not taken on record and the order sheet recorded does not reveal true and correct position. He argued that there is no provision either in the Act or in the rules which prohibits holding of sitting at nagpur. He argues that only inability to hold sitting at Nagpur and for attending hearing at mumbai on 28-8-2004 was communicated to petitioner by communication dated 3-8-2004 and she was not informed that it was going to be a last chance for leading evidence and for examining her witnesses. He further states that on that day the application of petitioner for holding the sitting at Nagpur was pending in high Court. It is further argued that procedure as prescribed by Rule 71 of the Rules has not been followed at all ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for petitioner has argued that on 6-9-2004, petitioner moved application for permission to lead evidence in support of her complaint and on 8-10-2004, petitioner moved another application for permission to file documents on record. He states that till then the order dated 30-9-2004 was not communicated to the petitioner. He further invites attention to original record of medical Council to show that original of order dated 30-9-2004 is not available on it. He argues that records are not maintained correctly. He states that till then the order dated 30-9-2004 was not communicated to the petitioner. He further invites attention to original record of medical Council to show that original of order dated 30-9-2004 is not available on it. He argues that records are not maintained correctly. He argued that petitioner was never communicated that 28-8-2004 was date fixed for recording of evidence though the petitioner had filed list of witnesses disclosing 11 names in December, 2003 itself and though respondent No. 1 was aware of efforts being made by petitioner to lead evidence by having the sitting of Medical Council at Nagpur. He states that there was no hearing on 28-8-2004 and there could not have been any hearing on that date without recording evidence. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 Advocate Kumbhakoni. learned Asso. Adv. General with Adv. Deshpande argued that during inquiry it was revealed that respondent No. 2 had supplied medical reports to the petitioner/her relatives on 4-10-2001. He further states that the medical Council has conducted the proceedings impartially and in fact guided petitioner in the matter by inviting attention to the prescribed format of filing complaint. He states that the necessary declaration form and code of Medical Ethics was also forwarded to petitioner. He pointed out that there was no charge of medical negligence against respondent No. 2 and that there is no provision which permits Medical Council to hold its sitting away from Mumbai. He has taken the court through order sheets maintained for each date by Medical Council to demonstrate as to how sufficient and full opportunity was given to petitioner and as to how it was not availed of by her. He states that no application to summons witness was tendered on 28-8-2004 and invites attention to the pleadings in this respect to point out that said date is not disclosed by petitioner and what is disclosed is only 30th without mentioning the month and the year. It is pointed out that said application is not produced before this court immediately and it has been filed only after the omission was pointed out. It is alleged that document produced subsequently is entirely different. It is stated that all charges against respondent no. 2 made by petitioner were inquired into by respondent No. l after extending the full opportunity to the petitioner/her representative. It is alleged that document produced subsequently is entirely different. It is stated that all charges against respondent no. 2 made by petitioner were inquired into by respondent No. l after extending the full opportunity to the petitioner/her representative. He states that petitioner never appeared before medical Council. Even on 28-8-2004 petitioner was not present and her affidavit evidence was not filed. Even on the day it was possible for petitioner to lead evidence of her authorised attorney and to cross-examine respondent No. 2 but her Advocate also was not present to do that though final chance was given to petitioner. It is further pointed out that petitioner has fabricated the order sheets dated 26-7-2003 to show that matter was fixed by medical Council on 20-9-2003 though in fact it was never so fixed. He also invites attention to letter dated 4-11-2003 written by counsel for petitioner to Medical Council in this respect to show that there is allegation of change of date from 20-9-2003 to 27-9-2003 in it. Petitioner was not diligent and has not explained why she did not remain present on 28-8-2004 and did not prosecute the matter. ( 7 ) HE has relied upon the judgment of Honble Apex Court reported at 1975 (2) scc 702 : AIR 75 SC 2092 (Bar Council of maharashtra Vs. M. V. Dabholkar), 1983 (4) scc 131 (Narendra Singh Vs. Chhotey singh) to contend that in disciplinary proceedings by respondent No. 1 against respondent No. 2 there is no lis involved and petitioner, who is stranger, cannot maintain a petition of present nature. Attention is also invited to ruling reported at 1970 (2) SCC 484 : AIR 71 SC 385 (Adi P. Gandhi Vs. H. M. Seervai, Advocate General) to point out who can be said to the person aggrieved. 1989 supp. (2) SCC 25 (An Advocate Vs. Bar council of India) has been pointed out to state the nature of disciplinary proceedings and it is stated that the requirement at the most is that the petitioner/complainant should be heard by placing reliance upon 2002 (1) Mh. L. J. 846 (Herat P. Parmar Vs. Maharashtra Medical council ). 1996 (1) Mh. LJ. 687 : [1996 (2) all MR 1] (Raghunath G. Raheja Vs. Maharashtra Medical Council) is pressed into service to state that the petitioner is entitled to copies of case papers subject to payment of charges. Saroj Iyer Vs. L. J. 846 (Herat P. Parmar Vs. Maharashtra Medical council ). 1996 (1) Mh. LJ. 687 : [1996 (2) all MR 1] (Raghunath G. Raheja Vs. Maharashtra Medical Council) is pressed into service to state that the petitioner is entitled to copies of case papers subject to payment of charges. Saroj Iyer Vs. Maharashtra medical Of Indian Medicine, Bombay reported at 2002 (1) Mh. L. J. 737 is cited to contend that the respondent No. 1 can control and regulate its own procedure and proceedings of inquiry. ( 8 ) ADVOCATE Haq for respondent no. 2 Medical Practitioner has stated that in entire petition petitioner has not made any grievance about rules and she has not sought any guidelines. There is no grievance that procedure followed by Medical Council is contrary to rules and, according to him, only grievance is about the venue of inquiry, demand for its shifting to Nagpur and consequential denial of opportunity to the petitioner. For this, he relies upon pages 8 and 9 writ petition. He has also stated that by notice dated 14-7-2003 Medical Council informed petitioner to produce evidence and documents with express warning that otherwise she would be proceeded Ex-parte. He also invites attention to subsequent communications dated 12-09-2003, 4-11-2003. He points out that petitioner filed a list of witnesses on 18-12-2003 as per notice of Medical Council dated 6-12-2003. He points on that petitioner has in her reply to this notice, on 18-12-2003 stated that the submissions and documents already filed on record by her should be treated as final submissions. He states that all these material documents are not filed in present petition but can be verified from record of earlier writ petition which is placed for reference with present petition. He invites attention to telegram dated 28-7-2004 forwarded by petitioner informing that writ petition for directions for holding inquiry at Nagpur is coming up for hearing and seeking time of 15 days. He states that thereafter, after the matter was closed for orders, on 6-9-2004 petitioner made application for leading evidence though she was aware that 28-8-2004 was last chance given to her. He further states on 8-10-2004, she tried to file the documents after the orders. She did not inform Medical Council that her application before High Court is coming up on 30-8-2004. He further states on 8-10-2004, she tried to file the documents after the orders. She did not inform Medical Council that her application before High Court is coming up on 30-8-2004. According to him, ample opportunity was given to petitioner and in any case she was provided reasonable opportunity. He further states that examination of doctors was not necessary looking to the nature of charges against respondent No. 2. He has also adopted the arguments of respondent number one as mentioned above. ( 9 ) IN the light of above arguments, it will be first necessary to find out whether petitioner has locus to maintain such petition. ( 10 ) IN the judgment of Honble Apex court reported at 1975 (2) SCC 702 : AIR 75 sc 2092 (Bar Council of Maharashtra Vs. M. V. Dbholkar), it has been laid down that there is no lis in proceedings before the disciplinary committee of Bar Council of India. Such committee is not deciding suit between the parties and complainant who prefers complaint against an Advocate is not like plaintiff in civil suit. In such proceedings there is no conflict between the Advocate and any other person. In paragraph 28, while interpreting the words "persons aggrieved", the honble Apex Court held that the role of Bar council is comparable to the role of Guardian in professional ethics. Test applied is whether he is a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interest. In paragraph 54, it has been stated that in developing country like ours, pattern of public oriented litigation better fulfills the rule of law if it is to run close to the rule of life. It has been held that Bar council clearly comes within this category of person aggrieved when a lawyer is involved. Attention is also invited to ruling reported at 1970 (2) SCC 484 : AIR 71 SC 385 (Adi P. Gandhi Vs. H. M. Seervai, Advocate general) to point out who can be said to be person aggrieved. It has been held that Bar council clearly comes within this category of person aggrieved when a lawyer is involved. Attention is also invited to ruling reported at 1970 (2) SCC 484 : AIR 71 SC 385 (Adi P. Gandhi Vs. H. M. Seervai, Advocate general) to point out who can be said to be person aggrieved. Paragraph 9 of this judgment is important and Honble Apex Court has held that an appeal is a creature of statute and because the person has been given a notice of some proceedings wherein he is given the right to appear and make his submissions, he should without more cannot have right of appeal from an order rejecting his contentions or submissions. In 1996 (1) Mh. L. J. 687 (Raghunath G. Raheja Vs. Maharashtra medical Council), Division Bench of this court there held that the Medical Council has to ensure that necessary directions are given to all the Hospitals and the Doctors calling upon them to furnish the copies of case papers and all the relevant documents pertaining to the patient concerned and no secrecy or any confidentiality in the matter of copies of case papers is available. It is further clarified that necessary charges for supplying such copies may be demanded from patient or his relative. In 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 25 (An Advocate Vs. Bar Council of India ). Honble Apex Court has stated basic principles which must inform the disciplinary proceedings against members of the legal profession in paragraph 4. The proceedings are held to be quasi-criminal in character because of the possibility of extreme penalty which may be inflicted affecting right of Advocate to practice as also his honour. It has been therefore held that while forming opinion the Disciplinary Committee must be guided by the doctrine of benefit of doubt and it is under obligation to record finding of guilt only upon being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. It is not permissible to reach a conclusion on the basis of preponderance of evidence or on the basis of surmise, conjecture or suspicion. In 1983 (4) SCC 131 (Narendra singh Vs. Chhotey Singh ). Honble Apex court has held that the disciplinary proceedings against a member of profession whose services are made available to society as a whole is to be viewed as between the profession and its erring member and not between the complainant and the delinquent advocate. In 1983 (4) SCC 131 (Narendra singh Vs. Chhotey Singh ). Honble Apex court has held that the disciplinary proceedings against a member of profession whose services are made available to society as a whole is to be viewed as between the profession and its erring member and not between the complainant and the delinquent advocate. Honble Apex Court has stated that this larger perspective must determine the jurisdiction of the bodies set up to carry out purposes of the Advocates Act. Division Bench of this court in 2002 (1) Mh. L. J. 846 (Heart p. Parmar Vs. Maharashtra Medical council) has held that the cause of inquiry is whether patient has suffered due to misconduct or malpractice of any medical practitioner. It has been held that therefore the complainant cannot be excluded from decision-making process particularly when the decision results in dismissal of Complaint. Judgment of hon ble Apex Court in case between Basudeo tiwary Vs. Side Kanhu University reported at 1998 (8) SCC 194 has been cited by Division bench to hold that in order to impose procedural safeguards, courts have to read requirement of natural justice in many situations when the statute is silent on this point. In said judgment Honble Apex Court has stated that the approach in this respect is that omission to impose the hearing requirement in the statute under which the impugned action is being taken does not exclude hearing and it may be implied from the nature of power, particularly when the right of a party is affected adversely. The justification for reading such a requirement is that the Court has merely supplied omission of legislature. The Division Bench found that there is no direct legislative negation or an implied exclusion of rules of natural justice in the statutory scheme under its consideration. It is to be noted that said scheme is the one under which complaint of present petitioner has been considered by respondent No. 1. The division Bench found that if Council decides to direct an inquiry to be held in accordance with Rules 66 to 73, the Rules entitle the complainant to obtain in advance, the documents filed by the registered medical practitioner before the hearing of the case commences. The division Bench found that if Council decides to direct an inquiry to be held in accordance with Rules 66 to 73, the Rules entitle the complainant to obtain in advance, the documents filed by the registered medical practitioner before the hearing of the case commences. Thereafter, Division Bench has pointed out provisions of rule 69 and rule 71 of the Rules and it has been held that when the complainant is allowed full participation at inquiry which is held by the Council, there is no reason or justification why he should not be heard at the stage of rule 65, if the Council decides to dismiss complaint on the ground that no prima facie case is made out against the medical practitioner or to exonerate the medical practitioner of charges levelled against him. After all, the effect of such a decision by the Council is, from the point of view of complainant, that his or her complaint stands dismissed. Hence, Medical Council has been directed to hear complainant either in person or through a legal practitioner before holding that no prima facie case is made out against the medical practitioner or before exonerating him. In Saroj Iyer Vs. Maharashtra Medical of Indian Medicine, Bombay reported at 2002 (1) Maharashtra Law Journal 737, division Bench has held that inquiries conducted by Medical Council are quasi- judicial proceedings. It is true that the Hon division Bench found that Medical Council is free to regulate and control the proceedings of inquiry as per Act and Rules, but in-the absence of statutory prohibition expressly or by necessary implication, regulating or controlling the proceedings it cannot impose blanket ban for public in attending such inquiry. Earlier in paragraph 9, Division Bench has held that public trial of cause is a means, though important and valuable to ensure fair administration of justice, it is a means and not an end. It is the fair administration of justice which is the end of judicial process. If conflict arises between fair administration of justice on one hand and public trial on other hand, inevitably public trial will have to be regulated or controlled in the interest of administration of justice. It is the fair administration of justice which is the end of judicial process. If conflict arises between fair administration of justice on one hand and public trial on other hand, inevitably public trial will have to be regulated or controlled in the interest of administration of justice. In paragraph 10, it is found that the principle that cause should be heard in open by judicial court will also ordinarily apply to quasi-judicial tribunals or forums as they are also required to discharge their functions analogous to judicial function. ( 11 ) THUS, all these rulings show that medical Council is under obligation to act fairly, impartially and openly so that the complainant before it can repose confidence in it. The Medical Council therefore has to show that it has really looked into the grievance of complainant before it and it has not merely made a show of having such look. Its proceedings must demonstrate that Medical council acted in a manner conducive to fair administration of justice so far as cause of complainant before it is concerned. The medical Council has to maintain standards, professional conduct, professional etiquette, professional ethics and professional morality. For that it has to view every transgression by medical practitioner seriously and has to make full efforts and inquiry to find out the truth. The complainant approaching it must not feel that the Medical Council has avoided its job to look into such transgression on part of its member for any reason whatsoever. The facts of present case need to be looked into in this background. ( 12 ) FROM the synopsis of events placed on record by respondent No. 1, it is apparent that proceedings were for the first time fixed before Medical Council on 26-7- 2003 by notice dated 14-7-2003, As per said notice petitioner was directed to bring with her documentary evidence and it was further stated that if she did not attend the hearing in person or through Advocate ex-parte decision Would be taken. On 26-7-2003 petitioner and respondent No. 2 were absent but Advocate for petitioner and representative of respondent no. 2 appeared. The Registrar of Medical council was directed to submit draft charge-sheet and inquiry came to be adjourned. On 26-7-2003 petitioner and respondent No. 2 were absent but Advocate for petitioner and representative of respondent no. 2 appeared. The Registrar of Medical council was directed to submit draft charge-sheet and inquiry came to be adjourned. Thus, it is apparent that neither presence of petitioner or witnesses nor any documentary evidence was looked into on that date and it is further apparent that matter could not have proceeded further in the absence of charges against respondent No. 2. On the 6-12-2003 chargesheet was issued levelling 5 charges against respondent No. 2. On 13-12-2003, petitioner sent communication to Medical Council treating her submissions dated 20 -9-2003 as final submissions and also gave list of 11 witnesses. On 17-7-2004 parties were informed that next date of inquiry would be 31-7-2004. Petitioner was told that she may bring with her documentary evidence in support of her claim. On 31-7-2004, petitioner pointed out that in pending writ petition 2643/2004 she had moved application seeking holding of meeting of Medical Council at Nagpur and sought adjournment. From proceedings recorded on 31-7-2004 it appears that final opportunity was given to petitioner to remain present before medical Council on next date of hearing after expressing inability to hold inquiry at Nagpur. Thus, from this proceeding it can be said that matter was for recording of evidence on 31-7-2004 though there is no express mention of this stage anywhere. Again it is not possible for lay man to gather why and for what purpose final opportunity was given to petitioner and matter was fixed on 28-8-2004. It is to be noted that even on said date application (Civil application 5477 of 2004) filed by petitioner in her earlier petition for holding sitting of medical Council at Nagpur was very much pending. Said application was listed before this court on 18-8-2004 and counsel for respondent No. l did not communicate the decision already taken on 31-7-2004 about not holding the sitting at Nagpur and sought time till 24-8-2004. The matter was adjourned to 25-8-2004 and on that day, in view of stand in reply filed by respondent No. 1, petitioner took time to file affidavit to point out that earlier medical Council has held sitting at Nagpur and at Aurangabad. The matter was adjourned to 27/8/2004 and on that day, by consent of all it came to be adjourned to 30-8-2004. The matter was adjourned to 27/8/2004 and on that day, by consent of all it came to be adjourned to 30-8-2004. On that day, counsel for respondent No. 2 pointed out that hearing is already concluded and matter is closed for order by respondent No. 1 and counsel for respondent No. 1 also supported this statement. In view of this position Civil application 5477/2004 was disposed of as infructuous by keeping the point raised in Civil application open. Respondent No. 2 thereafter moved application 5955/2004 for disposal of writ petition on the ground that prayers made in writ petition do not survive as inquiry is already completed by respondent No. l. This court on 28-9-2004 accepted said contention and disposed of writ petition as infructuous. Thus, on 28-8-2004 when respondent No. 1 closed the inquiry for orders it was aware of pendency of Civil application 5477 of 2004 before this court and it was also aware that consideration of said application is adjourned with its consent to 30-8-2004. It is in this background that neither petitioner nor her advocate were present before Medical Council on 28-8-2004. The proceedings recorded on 28-8-2004 reveal that representative of petitioner was present before Medical Council on that date. It is obvious that said representative was not present to prosecute the matter further. The proceedings reveal that medical Council observed that from time to time notice of hearing is given to both the parties and opportunity has been given to file affidavit of evidence to petitioner/complainant. It. is further mentioned that petitioner did not file affidavit or affidavit of any of her witnesses. It is further recorded that affidavit in evidence dated 20-3-2000 of respondent is on record. It is thereafter recorded that "therefore this case is at the stage of arguments". The notices issued to petitioner are already mentioned above, the efforts made by petitioner to have sitting at Nagpur to record evidence of her witnesses are also on record. Expressly, the matter is not fixed for recording of evidence at any time and suddenly it is found that matter was at the stage of arguments. Without any evidence on record either of petitioner or of her witnesses, the arguments are shown to have been heard and it is recorded that authorised representative of complainant/ petitioner argued the matter. Expressly, the matter is not fixed for recording of evidence at any time and suddenly it is found that matter was at the stage of arguments. Without any evidence on record either of petitioner or of her witnesses, the arguments are shown to have been heard and it is recorded that authorised representative of complainant/ petitioner argued the matter. It is also recorded that medical Council put certain questions to respondent No. 2 and also one question to authorised representative and arguments were closed. This was the second effective date before Medical Council, the first being 31-7-2004. It is apparent that the proceedings could have been adjourned to await decision of High court on Civil application of petitioner. It is also apparent that representative of petitioner could have been explained the consequences before calling upon him to argue the matter. It is the case of petitioner that said representative tried to obtain opportunity to lead evidence by submitting application but it was not accepted. This fact is denied by respondent No. 1. I find that respondent No. l ought to have fixed the matter stage wise or at least could have expressly communicated to petitioner or her representative the purpose for which the date was being scheduled. It can be said that the proceedings could have been more transparent and all doubts and misgivings between the parties could have been avoided. The haste suddenly shown by respondent No. 1 cannot be understood. The widow who claims documents of medical treatment of her deceased husband for use in compensation case cannot be attributed any latches of negligence when she is forwarding her representative and also Advocate to Mumbai before respondent no. l and when she is also approaching this court for ventilation of her grievance in thematter. She is dependent on her brother as her father-in-law is stated to be suffering from blindness and also poverty. She is not in position to arrange for examining her doctor witnesses at Mumbai and therefore wanted sitting to be held at Nagpur. It is to be noticed that there are no other motives ascribed to her either by respondent No. 1 or respondent No. 2. However, at the same time respondent No. 2 claims that all papers were handed over to relatives of petitioner on 4-10-2001 while handing over body and its receipt is duly acknowledged on by brother of deceased. It is to be noticed that there are no other motives ascribed to her either by respondent No. 1 or respondent No. 2. However, at the same time respondent No. 2 claims that all papers were handed over to relatives of petitioner on 4-10-2001 while handing over body and its receipt is duly acknowledged on by brother of deceased. The matter therefore needed proper inquiry and I find that Medical Council ought to have given more opportunity and could have reasonably waited at least for decision of High Court. ( 13 ) ONE of the arguments of respondent No. 2 is that there are no charges of medical negligence/deficiency in service against him and as such, it was not necessary for petitioner to examine other medical practitioners before Medical Council. From the synopsis filed by respondent No. l, it is apparent that on 31-5-2004 petitioner has filed rejoinder before respondent No. 1. Copy of said rejoinder is available in earlier writ petition and counsel for petitioner has invited attention to it. In said rejoinder petitioner has stated that signatures of her relatives were obtained while admitting her deceased husband by respondent no. 2. She has stated that those blank papers have been used to fabricate documents. She also mentioned some documents in that rejoinder. She has further mentioned that xerox copies of medical papers placed before medical Council by respondent No. 2 were not correct. She has stated that x-ray reports of Dr. Khemuka are false because said Dr. has denied those reports and also the letter heads on which those reports are prepared. She further has stated that Dr. Ponkshe has also denied his signature and report submitted by respondent no. 2 as such to Medical Council. She has made similar statements about the reports of Dr. Kisore Deshpande, Dr. Neral and Dr. Dakhole. She also contends that Dr. Ukhalkar and Dr. Chandak are ready to show how records of respondent No. 2 are incorrect. She has stated that all these doctors were contacted and reports filed as their reports by respondent No. 2 are fabricated documents because these doctors never examined her husband. The other side has objected to reading of this rejoinder on the ground that it is signed only by counsel for petitioner and it is not supported by the affidavit. She has stated that all these doctors were contacted and reports filed as their reports by respondent No. 2 are fabricated documents because these doctors never examined her husband. The other side has objected to reading of this rejoinder on the ground that it is signed only by counsel for petitioner and it is not supported by the affidavit. The fact cannot be ignored that names of some of these doctors are included by petitioner in her list of witnesses submitted on 18-12-2003. The petitioner expressed readiness and willingness to file affidavits of these doctors in this petition. However, the issue is to be sorted out by Medical Council and there is no point in getting such affidavits at this stage. Considering the seriousness of allegations made, respondent No. 1 ought to have recorded some finding on this rejoinder. In fact, if the allegations in rejoinder are true then the claim of petitioner that she did not receive documents stands substantiated. Hence, though no evidence was led on behalf of petitioner and though there were no affidavits of these doctors on record, Medical council could not have avoided its duty to apply mind to these allegations and to at least obtain a line in reply from these doctor witnesses. I find that the failure to do so or omission to do so has vitiated entire proceedings of Medical Council. ( 14 ) IT appears that according to respondent No. l the inquiry case was at the stage of Rule 71 on 28-8-2004. Grievance of petitioner is also that entire procedure as contemplated therein has not been followed by medical Council. It would be therefore worthwhile to first refer to said rule :-"7. 1. Procedure of Inquiry.- (I) Where a complainant appears personally or by a legal practitioner, the following procedure shall be followed, namely : (a) The Registrar will read to the Council the notice of inquiry addressed to the petitioner. (b) The complainant will then be invited to state his case by himself or by his legal practitioner and to produce his evidence in support of it. At the conclusion of the evidence of the complainant, his case will be closed. (c) The practitioner will then be invited to state his case by himself or by his legal practitioner and to produce his evidence in support of it. At the conclusion of the evidence of the complainant, his case will be closed. (c) The practitioner will then be invited to state his case by himself or by his legal practitioner and to produce his evidence in support of it. He may address the Council either before or at the conclusion of his evidence, but only once. (d) At the conclusion of the practitioners case, the Council shall, if the practitioner has produced evidence, hear the complainant in reply on the case generally, but will hear, no further evidence except in any special case in which the Council may think right to receive such further evidence. If the practitioner produces no evidence, the complainant will not be heard in reply except by special leave of the Council. (e) Where a witness is produced by any party before the Council will be first examined by the party producing him, and be cross-examined by the adverse party, and then re-examined by the party producing him. The Council reserves to itself the right to decline to admit in evidence any declaration where the declarant is not present or declines to submit to cross-examination. (f) The President and the assessor, if any, appointed under section 22 may put questions to the complainant and registered practitioner including any of their witnesses and members of the Council, through the president, may likewise put questions to them. (2) Where there is no complainant or no complainant appears, the following procedure shall be followed, namely ; (a) The Registrar shall read to the Council the notice of inquiry addressed to the practitioner, and will state the facts of the case and produce before the Council the evidence by. which it is supported, (b) The practitioner shall then be invited to state his case by himself or by his legal practitioner and to produce his evidence in support of it. He may address the Council either before or at the conclusion of his evidence, but only once. (c) The legal practitioner of the Council, if any, may be heard in reply if the Council so desires. " ( 15 ) IT is apparent that when representative of complainant was present and he was also witness, the Medical Council could have proceeded further in the mode and manner prescribed by Rule 71. (c) The legal practitioner of the Council, if any, may be heard in reply if the Council so desires. " ( 15 ) IT is apparent that when representative of complainant was present and he was also witness, the Medical Council could have proceeded further in the mode and manner prescribed by Rule 71. The registrar should have begun by reading the notice issued to petitioner and then petitioner could have been called to state her case and to examine herself or her witness. The representative for petitioner could have been called upon by Medical council to lead evidence. Thereafter, respondent No. 2 ought to have been called upon to lead his evidence and representative of petitioner could have been called upon to cross-examine him. Thereafter, the Medical council could have proceeded to hear arguments. All these steps are not followed by respondent No. 1 and without permitting the representative of petitioner to cross-examine respondent No. 2, it was straightway declared that the inquiry was at the stage of arguments. It is thus clear that the procedure prescribed is observed in breach. The respondent No. 1 could have conducted inquiry in more transparent manner by utilising services of assessor appointed by it by fixing the inquiry stage wise and by giving clear and unambiguous notice to petitioner about the exercise to be undertaken on any particular date instead of leaving it to conjectures and surmises. In this case petitioner has also raised doubts about the impugned order itself because of absence of original order on record. The council for respondent No. 1 has stated that important original papers are retained separately by respondent No. 1 at Mumbai and they are not forming part of original record forwarded to him. Respondents have also contended that representative of petitioner did not ask for adjournment and did not submit any application on 28-8-2004. Attention was also invited to the fact that application of petitioner seeking permission to lead evidence dated 6-9-2004 has been replied on 7-10-2004 mentioning therein that as hearing is already concluded and matter. Letter dated 6-10-2004 of Medical Council forwarding the copy of impugned order dated 30-9-2004 to the petitioner does not find mention in if. Attention was also invited to the fact that application of petitioner seeking permission to lead evidence dated 6-9-2004 has been replied on 7-10-2004 mentioning therein that as hearing is already concluded and matter. Letter dated 6-10-2004 of Medical Council forwarding the copy of impugned order dated 30-9-2004 to the petitioner does not find mention in if. It the order was really passed on 30-9-2004, it was important and relevant fact to deny permission to petitioner to lead evidence and as such ought to have been mentioned in reply dated 7-10- 2004. Absence of said fact in communication dated 7-10-2004 also raises the doubt whether order was really passed on 30-9-2004 or not. It can only be said that all these doubts could have been very well avoided by conducting the inquiry in more planned manner. However, in view of finding reached above as the matter is to be remanded back for fresh consideration of respondent No. 1, I do not find it necessary to record any finding in this respect. ( 16 ) IN view of position and facts which have emerged on record, I have no hesitation to conclude that petitioner has locus to challenge the impugned order and action of medical Council. During hearing, it has come on record that the respondent No. 1 can appoint commissioner for recording evidence outside mumbai. Such course of action could have been undertaken even in this case. It is apparent from record that petitioner has not received proper assistance for ventilation of her grievance. ( 17 ) THE impugned order dated 30-9-2004 passed by respondent No. 1 upon complain of present petitioner is hereby quashed and set aside. The said complaint is restored back for fresh decision as per Rules and procedure to the file of respondent No. 1 medical Council. If there are any technical lacunae, Medical Council shall permit petitioner to remove the same. Then Medical council shall permit petitioner to record her evidence and evidence of her other witnesses at Mumbai before it. Insofar as recording of evidence of Medical Practitioners named as witnesses by petitioner is concerned, Medical counsel shall appoint competent commissioner for recording that evidence at nagpur at the cost of petitioner. Entire exercise and inquiry shall be completed as early as possible and in any case within period of six months from the date of receipt of this order by respondent No. 1. Entire exercise and inquiry shall be completed as early as possible and in any case within period of six months from the date of receipt of this order by respondent No. 1. Rule is made absolute in above terms. No costs. Petition allowed.