Judgment Arun Kumar, J.—The appellant has preferred this appeal against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court upholding his conviction and sentence. The sessions court while convicting the appellant under Section 302 I.P.C., had awarded death sentence. The case against the appellant is that he alongwith his companion Lakha Singh (who died during the course of trial proceedings) committed the murder of thirteen members of his family in the night of 17th August, 1986. The petitioner was living jointly with several other members of his family in a big house called in local language as ‘jhalla’. Thirteen persons of the family who were killed on that fateful night were father of the appellant, his two real elder brothers, wives of both the brothers, four daughters and two sons of one of the brothers who was murdered and two sons of another slain brother. The only members of the family who survived the murderous attack are one brother of the appellant namely Balwinder, his wife, who was away to her parents’ house and was, therefore, not present in the house on the date of occurrence and some children. As far as appellant’s brother Man Singh is concerned, his almost entire family was finished as he and his wife and four daughters and two sons were subjected to the murderous attack resulting in their deaths. Family of another brother Karam Singh was also finished as both the husband and wife were killed alongwith two young sons aged 9 years and 4 years at the time of the incident. Only one son of Karam Singh who is named Paramjeet Singh survived. He is P.W.2 six children of Man Singh who were killed were between the ages of 3 to 9 years. Even two of the surviving members of the family who appeared as P.W.1 and P.W.3, received injuries in the attack. 2. As per the prosecution case both the accused came with swords and started shouting and indiscriminately attacking the members of the family who were asleep at various places in the house. It is in evidence that it was a moonlit night. One Jawahar had accompanied the accused. He was a servant. No particular role was assigned to Jawahar except that he was throwing brickbats on the terrace where some of the members of the family were sleeping and was shouting at them to come down. It is in evidence that it was a moonlit night. One Jawahar had accompanied the accused. He was a servant. No particular role was assigned to Jawahar except that he was throwing brickbats on the terrace where some of the members of the family were sleeping and was shouting at them to come down. Jawahar was acquitted by the trial court and the State did not appeal against his acquittal. The other accused Lakha Singh died during trial. The trial Court convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to death. Since it was a case of death sentence, reference was made to the High Court for confirmation of sentence. The appellant also filed appeal against his conviction before the High Court. 3. The case of the prosecution is that the appellant had been married about one year prior to the date of incident. He was part of the family and was staying together with other members in the same house. The entire family was joint. The family was suspecting unnatural relationship between his newly married wife and his friend Lakha Singh, co-accused. Lakha Singh used to visit her very often and even stayed with her. The relationship between the two was felt to be unnatural. The family, therefore, was objecting to Lakha Singh’s visit and presence in the house which was not liked by the appellant as also by Lakha Singh. Therefore, they both decided to finish the entire family and in furtherance of this common intention they came with swords in their hands on the fateful night and started the murderous attack on family members. They did not spare even the father of the appellant Nazir Singh who was sleeping at a distance near the tubewell and to finish him the accused had to go there. Other family members were sleeping in the house at different places. The family members started shouting and running here and there to save themselves. But the two accused having swords in their hands attacked whosoever was within their reach. The wife of one of the brothers tried to escape from the back door into the field. However, she was chased and finished in the field itself. 4. In the High Court there was difference of opinion between the two Judges who constituted the Bench hearing the appeal. The wife of one of the brothers tried to escape from the back door into the field. However, she was chased and finished in the field itself. 4. In the High Court there was difference of opinion between the two Judges who constituted the Bench hearing the appeal. One Judge was for dismissal of the appeal and maintaining conviction and the death sentence while the other was for acquittal of the accused. The matter was referred to a third Judge who ultimately upheld the conviction and sentence vide his order dated 29th February, 1996 and the reference was answered accordingly. What weighed with the learned judge who opined for acquittal of the accused was that eye witnesses were near relations. Secondly, it was felt that the deceased family members must have raised alarm by shouting and crying and if the murder was committed as stated by the prosecution in the house of the appellant, neighbours would have come to help. Further, the learned Judge felt that it was surprising that no resistance was offered. 5. The learned amicus curiae appearing for the appellant raised same points before us while arguing the appeal. The reasoning of the learned Judge who stood for acquittal of the accused does not appeal to us and in our view, the same is totally untenable. The incident took place in the family house of the appellant. All the deceased persons were immediate family of the accused being his father, brothers, their wives and their children. The surviving eye-witnesses are one brother and two children of the brothers who were killed. Their presence in the house is natural. The entire family was sleeping in the family house at that hour of the night. The family had been taken unawares. The accused persons were wielding swords in their hands which they used to kill the family members in an indiscriminate attack on them. The medical report about nature of injuries supports attack by swords. The residential house was in an area having large farm houses. This is the tarai area as it is called in the State of Uttar Pradesh. It has very fertile land. The uprooted farmers of Punjab, were allotted lands there. They settled there and converted the entire area into a very flourishing agricultural economy. There are big farms and residential portion in each farm is located at quite a distance from each other. It has very fertile land. The uprooted farmers of Punjab, were allotted lands there. They settled there and converted the entire area into a very flourishing agricultural economy. There are big farms and residential portion in each farm is located at quite a distance from each other. Therefore, there is no question of neighbours hearing the shouts and coming for help. Most of the family members who have been killed were very young children, below ten years of age. What resistance they could offer? The brothers were sleeping at separate places and were separately attacked and killed. There was no time for the family members to group together to ward off the attack. Another argument being raised is that it was dead of night and it was difficult to identify the persons who were attacking. This argument again is totally misconceived. As already noticed, it was a moonlit night. Secondly, the accused were known persons, being members of the family. The accused remained on the scene of crime for a long time killing the victims one after the other. Therefore, there could be no doubt whatsoever about their identity to the eye-witnesses. One of the eye-witnesses is the brother of the accused while the other two are the children of deceased brothers who are more than 12 years of age. Justice Giridhar Malaviya, the Judge who gave a judgment of conviction has rightly observed in his judgment as under: “Once we examine the sequence of the murders mentioned about, it becomes quite clear that there is hardly any chance for any of the adult members to go and bring their swords to protect themselves. Even though a judicial notice of this fact can be taken that ever Sikh keeps a sword or Kripan, but it cannot be believed that they put a sword on a cot when they go to sleep, rather it is generally kept inside the house in a room. Consequently, there was hardly any time for any of the victims to go and gather their weapon. The accused persons who had chalked out the plan to commit the said crime could very well see that they could systematically eliminate all the persons in their family without any real resistance being offered in their design to commit this heinous crime. Consequently, there was hardly any time for any of the victims to go and gather their weapon. The accused persons who had chalked out the plan to commit the said crime could very well see that they could systematically eliminate all the persons in their family without any real resistance being offered in their design to commit this heinous crime. Consequently I am not prepared to accept the defence contention that only two persons could never have caused the murder of thirteen persons and injuries to two persons.” 6. The said learned Judge of the High Court relied on the evidence of the eye-witnesses i.e. P.W.1 Kumari Viro, P.W.2 Paramjit Singh and P.W.3 Balwinder Singh and upheld the prosecution case. 7. The learned Judges of the High Court have considered the evidence of the eye-witnesses in a detail before reaching their respective decisions. We do not consider it necessary to discuss the entire evidence in detail. We have carefully gone through the evidence and we are in agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges of the High Court who have upheld the conviction of the appellant. P.W.1 Kumari Viro was aged about 13/14 years. She has stated that it was a moonlit night. She was sleeping in a room alongwith her Sisters Pammi and Ravinder Kaur. Her father Man Singh and mother Sita were sleeping alongwith her sisters Kanti, Akki and brothers Richpal and Pamma on the terrace. She saw the accused appellant and Lakha Singh having naked Swords in their hands. They attacked the children who were sleeping on the cot namely Akki, Kanti, Richpal and Pammi. Accused Gurmeet attacked Man Singh and cut him into pieces by his sword. Likewise, Sita, mother of PW 1 was cut into pieces by Lakha singh. She has said that she tried to save her mother when Lakha Singh attacked due to which she received injury on her head and fingers. The story continues like this. About the motive the eye-witnesses stated: “..two or three days before this incident, while Smt. Bhajan Kaur was going to serve the meal to her husband then on the way accused Lakkha Singh, Gurmit Singh and Jawahar abused her with filthy languages. The story continues like this. About the motive the eye-witnesses stated: “..two or three days before this incident, while Smt. Bhajan Kaur was going to serve the meal to her husband then on the way accused Lakkha Singh, Gurmit Singh and Jawahar abused her with filthy languages. When Smt. Bhajan Kaur reported this matter to Nazir Singh, the head of the family and to Man Singh learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Howrah, the respondent-landlord filed a revision petition before the High Court at Calcutta under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the same was numbered as C.O.No. 472 of 2000. The learned single Judge came to the finding that as the rent for the month of March 1994 had been tendered by the appellant-tenant first on 2nd April 1994 and thereafter again on 25th April 1994, the initial tender was beyond the period prescribed under Section 4 of the aforesaid Act and since the initial tender was invalid, all the other subsequent deposits could not be held to be valid. On such reasoning, the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court set aside the order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) and held that the appellant-tenant was a defaulter in payment of rent from the month of March 1994. While holding that the appellant-tenant was a defaulter, the learned single Judge also observed that since the rents for the months of March 1994 to June 1995 had already been deposited with the Rent Controller and subsequently in the trial court, the respondent-landlord would be at liberty to withdraw the same. 6. It is the said decision of the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court which is the subject matter of the civil appeal before us. 7. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Pijush K. Roy, learned advocate, urged that by no stretch of imagination could the appellant-tenant be said to be a defaulter in payment of rent, since admittedly the rents had regularly been deposited first with the Rent Controller, Howrah and thereafter with the trial court with effect from March 1994. Mr. 7. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Pijush K. Roy, learned advocate, urged that by no stretch of imagination could the appellant-tenant be said to be a defaulter in payment of rent, since admittedly the rents had regularly been deposited first with the Rent Controller, Howrah and thereafter with the trial court with effect from March 1994. Mr. Roy submitted that the delay of 15 days in tendering the monthly rent for the month of March 1994 had been occasioned by the fact that although initially the said amount had been tendered within the time prescribed under Section 4 of the above Act, upon the refusal by the respondent-landlord to accept the same, the same had to be tendered again but a few days beyond the period prescribed under Section 4 of the above Act. Mr. Roy submitted that on account of the above, the appellant-tenant filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in tendering the rent and such application had been duly allowed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Howrah, upon payment of costs. 8. Mr. Roy then urged that, in any event, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, had been enacted as a benevolent piece of legislation and under Section 17(2A) of the said Act the court had been vested with ample power to extend the time for making all deposits under Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the said Act. Mr. Roy submitted that such an application having been made, the same had been duly allowed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) and it was not open to the respondent-landlord to claim that the appellant-tenant was, in fact, a defaulter in payment of monthly rents which under the aforesaid Act has very serious consequences. In support of his aforesaid submission, Mr. Roy firstly referred to a decision of this Court in the case of M/s. B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. vs. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick And Anr., (1987) 2 SCC 407 , which was a case dealing with delay of two months in payment of the rent. Considering the provisions of Section 17(2A) and Section 17(2A)(b) of the Act, this Court held that the said default was a default in a technical sense and not in the real sense and was hence of an inconsequential nature. Considering the provisions of Section 17(2A) and Section 17(2A)(b) of the Act, this Court held that the said default was a default in a technical sense and not in the real sense and was hence of an inconsequential nature. It was further observed that having regard to the intendment of the Act and the nature of the provisions, it can never be said that the defaults were of such a serious nature as to warrant the court refusing to exercise its discretion and to feel constrained to strike out the defence. 9. Following the decision in B.P. Khemka’s case (supra), this Court in the case of Gopal Chandra Ghosh vs. Renu Bala Majumdar (Smt.) And Anr., (1994) 2 SCC 258 , took a similar view regarding the powers of the court to extend the time for making deposits of rents. 10. Mr. Roy then referred to a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Shibu Chandra Dhar vs. Pasupati Nath Auddya, (2002) 3 SCC 617 , where in similar circumstances, this Court held that the relevant provisions would indicate that the court has power to extend the time but that such power has to be judicially exercised. Mr. Roy urged that in the aforesaid circumstances, the decision of the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court could not be sustained and was liable to set aside. 11. Opposing the prayer made on behalf of the appellant-tenant, Mr. Bijan Kumar Ghosh, learned advocate appearing for the respondent-landlord, reiterated the stand taken before the High Court that since the initial deposit of the monthly rent for the month of March 1994 had been tendered beyond the time prescribed under Section 4 of the Act, the said deposit and all subsequent deposits must be held to be invalid and, therefore, the High Court had rightly held that the appellant-tenant was a defaulter in payment of the monthly rents. 12. Mr. Ghosh urged that the application under Section 17(2) and (2A) of the above Act could not possibly cure the initial defect since the provisions thereof were referable only to Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) of Section 17 and not Section 4 of the above Act. 13. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in the aforesaid circumstances, the application filed by the appellant-tenant under the aforesaid provisions were of no relevance to the facts at issue in the instant case. 14. 13. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in the aforesaid circumstances, the application filed by the appellant-tenant under the aforesaid provisions were of no relevance to the facts at issue in the instant case. 14. Having regard to the fact that the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, is a benevolent piece of legislation, we have carefully gone through the provisions of the Act and the submissions made in connection therewith for the purpose of examining the correctness of the view taken by the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court. 15. While it is no doubt true that Section 4 of the Act provides that rents are to be paid within the time fixed by the contract, or, in the absence of a contract, by the 15th day of the month next following the month for which it is payable, once a suit is filed on any of the grounds referred to in Section 13, the tenant would be entitled to the benefits of extension of time under Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act with reference to the amounts to be deposited within Sub-section (1) and (2) thereof. For the purpose of better understanding, the provisions of Section 17(1), Section 17(2) and Section 17(2A) are extracted hereinbelow:- “Section 17. For the purpose of better understanding, the provisions of Section 17(1), Section 17(2) and Section 17(2A) are extracted hereinbelow:- “Section 17. When a tenant can get the benefit of protection against eviction.— (1) On a suit or proceeding being instituted by the landlord on any of the grounds referred to in section 13, the tenant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him, or where he appears in the suit or proceeding without the writ of summons being served on him, within one month of his appearance deposit in court or with the Controller or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of eight and one third per cent, per annum from the date when any such amount was payable up to the date of deposit, and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. (2) If in any suit or proceeding referred to in sub-section (1) there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the tenant shall within the time specified in sub-section (1), deposit in court the amount admitted by him to be due from him together with an application to the Court for determination of the rent payable. No such deposit shall be accepted unless it is accompanied by an application for determination of the rent payable. No such deposit shall be accepted unless it is accompanied by an application for determination of the rent payable. On receipt of such application, the Court shall— (a) having regard to the rate at which rent was last paid, and the period for which default may have been made, by the tenant, make, as soon as possible within a period not exceeding one year, a preliminary order, pending final decision of the dispute, specifying the amount, if any, due from the tenant and thereupon the tenant shall, within one month of the date of such preliminary order, deposit in court or pay to the landlord the amount so specified in the preliminary order; and (b) having regard to the provisions of this Act, make, as soon after the preliminary order as possible, a final order determining the rate of rent and the amount to be deposited in Court or paid to the landlord and either fixing the time within which the amount shall be deposited, or paid or, as the case may be, directing that the amount already deposited or paid be adjusted in such manner and within such time as may be specified in the order. (2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), on the application of the tenant, the Court may, by order,— (a) extend the time specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) for the deposit or payment of any amount referred to therein; (b) having regard to the circumstances of the tenant as also of the landlord and the total sum inclusive of interest required to be deposited or paid under sub-section (1) on account of default in the payment of rent, permit the tenant to deposit or pay such sum in such instalments and by such dates as the Court may fix: Provided that where payment is permitted by instalments such sum shall include all amounts calculated at the rate of rent for the period of default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which the order under this sub-section is to be made with interest on any such amount calculated at the rate specified in sub-section (1) from the date when such amount was payable up to the date of such order.” 16. From the said provision, it would be evident that it was the intention of the Legislature that on a suit for eviction being filed under the provisions of this Act, the tenant was required to deposit rent either in court or with the Rent Controller or pay to the landlord an amount equivalent to the rate of rent at which it was last paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default, including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit of rent is made together with interest at the rate indicated therein. In the instant case, there is no willful default in tendering of the rents by the tenant to the landlord and it was only on account of the initial refusal of the landlord that the tenant was compelled to tender rents for the month of March 1994 for the second time which was according to the time prescribed under Section 4 of the Act. 17. In our view, the provisions of the Act vests the court with ample authority to extend the time for making the deposit of rents in case of default and this is a fit case where the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) has on a true interpretation of the provisions of the Act and the circumstances of the case came to a finding that the appellant-tenant was not a defaulter. As expressed by this Court in B.P. Khemkas case (supra), the default, if any, was too technical to be taken note of so as to arrive at a conclusion that the tenant had committed wilful default in payment of the monthly rents. 18. Apart from the above, Section 39 of the Act provides that subject to the provisions in this Act relating to limitation, all the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to suits, appeals and proceedings under this Act. Since Section 17(2A) confers power upon the court to extend time for making deposit of all arrears for the period in default, the application made by the appellant-tenant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in the initial tendering of the rent becomes meaningful. 19. Since Section 17(2A) confers power upon the court to extend time for making deposit of all arrears for the period in default, the application made by the appellant-tenant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in the initial tendering of the rent becomes meaningful. 19. For the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to agree with the views expressed by the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court and we accordingly set aside the order passed by the learned single Judge in the revision application and restore the order of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Howrah holding that the appellant-tenant was not a defaulter in payment of the rents. The appeal is accordingly allowed but there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.