Judgment : S.N. VARIAVA, J.- This appeal is against the judgment dated 1998 passed by the Allahabad High Court. 2. Briefly stated, the facts are as follows: The respondent is a manufacturer and dealer of polyester staples fibre. It had collected, from its customers, tax in excess of what was prescribed. It is an admitted position that these amounts were deposited with the Government. The respondent had challenged the assessment and its appeal was allowed. As the tax liability was held to be lower, the officer concerned passed an order of refund but directed that the amount be deposited in the treasury in view of Section 29-A of the V.P. Trade Tax Act. 3. In the appeal, the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) granted relief to the extent of Rs 417 but confirmed the. order of the assessing authority, directing deposit of the balance amount. The respondent then filed an appeal before the Trade Tax Tribunal which directed refund of the excess amount in spite of the provisions of Section 29-A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act. The revision filed by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court by the impugned judgment. The High Court followed two earlier judgments of that Court one of which was the case of one Kheria Bros. In this case, relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Annapurna Biscuit. Mfg• Co. I the Allahabad High Court struck down Section 29-A as beingbeyond the legislative competence of the State Government. At the time the impugned judgment was passed, an appeal against the High Courts judgment in Kheria Bros. case was pending in this Court. 4. At this stage Section 29-A must be set out. Section 29-A reads as follows: "29-A. (1) Where any amount is realised from any person by any dealer purporting to do so by way of realisation of tax on the sale of any goods to such person, such dealer shall deposit the entire amount so realised into the Government Treasury, within such period as may be prescribed, notwithstanding that the dealer is not liable to pay such amount as tax or that only a part of it is due from him as tax under this Act." 5. Section 29-A set was amended on 22-8-1971 to read as follows: "29-A. (1) Where any amount is realised from any person by any dealer purporting to do so by way of realisation of tax on the sale of any goods to such person, such dealer shall deposit the entire amount so realised into the Government Treasury, within such period as may be prescribed, notwithstanding that the dealer is not liable to pay such amount as tax or that only a part of it is due from him as tax under this Act. (2) Any amount deposited by any dealer under sub-section (1) shall to the extent it is not due as tax, be held by the State Government in trust for the person from whom it was realised by the dealer, or for his legal representatives, and the deposit shall discharge such dealer of the liability in respect thereof to the extent of the deposit. (3) Where any amount is deposited by the dealer under sub-section (1), such amount or any part thereof shall, on a claim being made in that behalf in such form as may be prescribed, be refunded, in the manner prescribed, to the person from whom such dealer had actually realised such amount or part, or to his legal representatives and to no other person: Provided that no such claim shall be entertained after the expiry of three years from the date of the order of assessment or one year from the date of the final order on appeal, revision or reference, if any, in respect thereof, whichever is later. Explanation.- The expression final order on appeal, revision or reference includes an order by the Supreme Court under Article 32, Article 132, Article 133, Article 136 or Article 137, or by the High Court under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution." 6. The constitutional validity of the amended provision was challenged. The Allahabad High Court held the amended Section 29-A to be ultra vires the power of the State legislature to enact and declared the provision to be unconstitutional. This Court in Annapurna Biscuit Mfg. Co. easel upheld the decision of the Allahabad High Court and held the amended Section 29-A to be unconstitutional. The Court relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of R. Abdul Quader & Co. v. ST02 wherein it was observed as follows: (SCR pp. This Court in Annapurna Biscuit Mfg. Co. easel upheld the decision of the Allahabad High Court and held the amended Section 29-A to be unconstitutional. The Court relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of R. Abdul Quader & Co. v. ST02 wherein it was observed as follows: (SCR pp. 872-73) "The provision however is attempted to be justified on the ground that though it may not be open to a State Legislature to make provision for the recovery of an amount which is not a tax under Entry 54 of List II in a law made for that purpose, it would still be open to the legislature to provide for paying over all the amounts collected by way of tax by persons, even though they really are not exigible as tax, as part of the incidental and ancillary power to make provision for the levy and collection of such tax .... But where the legislation under the relevant entry proceeds on the basis that the amount concerned is not a tax exigible under the law made under that entry, but even so lays down that though it is not exigible under the law, it shall be paid over to Government, merely because some dealers by mistake or otherwise have collected it as tax, it is difficult to see how such provision can be ancillary or incidental to the collection of tax legitimately due under a law made under the relevant taxing entry." 7. In Annapuma Biscuit Mfg. Co. easel reliance was also placed upon the observations of this Court in the case of Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. State of Bihar3 (SCC pp.360-61, para 12) to the following effect: (SCC p. 125, para 7) "A provision which enables the dealer to pass on the liability tor payment of tax is incidental to legislation for sales tax. But we are unable to hold that a provision under which a dealer is called upon to pay to the State an amount which has been collected by him on a representation express or implied - that an equal amount is payable by him underthe Bihar Sales Tax Act, is a provision incidental to the power, to levy tax on sale or purchase of goods within the meaning of Entry 54 List II of the Seventh Schedule. Entry 54 List II of the Seventh Schedule comprehends the power to impose tax, to prescribe machinery for collecting the tax, to designate officers by whom the liability may be imposed and to prescribe the authority, obligation and indemnity of the officers. The State Legislature may under Entry 54 List II be competent to enact a law in respect of matters necessarily incidental to tax on the, sale and purchase of goods. But a provision compelling a dealer who has deliberately or erroneously recovered an amount from the purchaser on a representation that he is entitled to recover it to recoup himself for payment of tax, to pay over that amount to the State cannot, in our judgment, be regarded as necessarily incidental to Entry 54 List II. In effect the provision is one for levying an amount as tax which the State is incompetent to levy. A mere device cannot be permitted to defeat the provisions of the Constitution by clothing the claim in the form of a demand for depositing the money with the State which the dealer has collected, but which he was not entitled to collect." 8. Thereafter a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of R.S. Joshi v. Ajit Mills Ltd.4 disapproved of Abdul Quader2 and Annapurna Biscuit Mfg. Co. I cases. In this case, the question under the Bombay Sales Tax Act was whether the State legislature had legislative competence to make a provision directing a dealer to deposit the amount of tax collected by him from a customer in excess of the prescribed tax. It was held that such a provision would be within the legislative competence as a punitive measure to protect public interest in the enforcement of physical legislation. It was held that this was within the implied powers of the State legislature. 9. Following R.S. Joshi case4, a Constitution Bench of this Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 29-A (as it stood prior to its amendment) in the case of Kasturi Lal Harlal v. State of U.p5 The Constitution Bench noted that this question stood concluded by R.S. Joshi case4. It also took note of Ashoka Marketing case3 and observed that the decision in Ashoka Marketing case3 did not follow an earlier decision in Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. State of Orissa6. It also took note of Ashoka Marketing case3 and observed that the decision in Ashoka Marketing case3 did not follow an earlier decision in Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. State of Orissa6. It was held that R.S. Joshi case4 disapproved of the decision in Ashoka Marketing case3 and reaffirmed the view taken in Orient Paper Mills case6• The Constitution Bench also took note of a subsequent decision in the case of State of Orissa v. Orissa Cement Ltd.7 wherein also Ashoka Marketing case3 was held to have been dissented in R.S. Joshi case4. The Constitution Bench of this Court upheld the constitutionality of the unamended Section 29-A and held that it was within the legislative competence of the State legislature to enact. 10. The appeal in Kheria Bros. case thereafter reached hearing before a two-Judge Bench of this Court which referred the matter to a three-Judge Bench in view of the abovementioned decisions of this Court. However, subsequently a three-Judge Bench of this Court has allowed the appeal in Asst!. Commr. (Judicial) v. Kheria Bros.8 The three-Judge Bench has held that the judgment in Annapurna Biscuit Mfg. Co. casel stands overruled. We are in agreement with this view. 11. Faced with this situation, it was submitted by Mr Goel that even if the decision in Annapurna Biscuit easel is held to be erroneous, the position will be that the amended Section 29-A having been declared to be void and beyond the legislative competence, cannot revive by itself. It was submitted that the section can only revive if it is re-enacted. In support of this submission, reliance was placed upon certain observations made in the cases of Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. State of Bombay9, Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.p.lO, Deep Chand v. State of U.PIl, Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U.P12 and B. Shama Rao v. Vnion Territory of Pondicherry13. 12. We do not agree with this submission. However, in our view, it is not at all necessary to go into this submission. In this case, we are concemetl with the unamended Section 29-A. Even though the Allahabad High Coult• had held this provision to be unconstitutional, in the appeal carried to this . Court it has been declared that the section was within the legislative competence of the State legislature. In this case, we are concemetl with the unamended Section 29-A. Even though the Allahabad High Coult• had held this provision to be unconstitutional, in the appeal carried to this . Court it has been declared that the section was within the legislative competence of the State legislature. The appeal was a continuation of same proceeding and the finality could only be given by the judgment of this Court. Thus in any view of the matter it will have to be held that the unamended Section 29-A always remained on the statute-book and required no re-enactment. Thus, even if the submission of Mr Goel is accepted, the effect would be that it is only the amended Section 29-A which might require-enactment and in its absence the unamended Section 29-A would continue; to be valid and effective. In that event the amendments of 1971 would be, deemed never to have taken place. Even under the unamended Section 29-A . the amount cannot be refunded to the respondent. It could only be refunded to the party from whom it was wrongly collected. No such party has made such a claim for refund. Therefore, directing this amount to be deposited in the treasury was correct. We however clarify that we are not in agreement with the submission that the amended Section 29-A would require rc- enactment. " 13. In this view of the matter, we set aside the impugned judgment and the judgment of the Trade Tax Tribunal and restore the order of the Commissioner (Appeals ), Ghaziabad. 14. The appeal is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.