Judgment B. Prasad, J.-The present appeal is filed in a matter of a dispute which relates to the management of a temple known as "Sitaramji Temple" It is said that two Mahants namely Mahant Gobind Das and Mahant Mohan Das were running the affairs of the temple and its management. They were doing sewa puja alternatively for years. 2. A notice under Section 17 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1959) was issued requiring the temple to be registered as Public Trust. The erstwhile rulers of Jaipur State considering the dispute directed the two Mahants to share half of the income of each year vide order dated 29.07.1942. Somewhere in 1943, the management of the temple was taken over by the Court of wards. Subsequently, when the State of Rajasthan came into being, the administration of the temple was taken over by Devasthan Department, Government of Rajasthan. Two lines of Mahants arrived at a compromise in 1950. Some orders were passed by the Revenue department also. In between, a draft deed was drawn up and an application for registration of the temple as public trust came to be filed under Section 17 of the Act of 1959. It is alleged Mahant Mohan Das died on 310.1996 and no notice of proceedings was issued to his legal representatives. 3. In the year 1999, a civil suit came to be filed by the appellant in the Court of District Judge, Jaipur City. In that civil suit, an application was filed for production/filing of the original will claimed by the defendants. It is claimed by the appellant that the will which ultimately came to be filed on the record of the civil suit is a forged one and, therefore, the producer of the will should be prosecuted for relying on a forged document. 4. The appellant plaintiff not getting the desired relief filed a criminal complaint. The same was forwarded by the learned Magistrate under Section 156(3), CrPC, to the Police Station Manak Chowk, Jaipur. The investigating officer asked the defendants to produce the Will which was not done by the defendants. Consequently, an application of police came before the Court trying the suit for handing over the documents to the investigating agency. The same was forwarded by the learned Magistrate under Section 156(3), CrPC, to the Police Station Manak Chowk, Jaipur. The investigating officer asked the defendants to produce the Will which was not done by the defendants. Consequently, an application of police came before the Court trying the suit for handing over the documents to the investigating agency. Learned trial Court dismissed the application on the ground that it was not possible to hand over the documents unless there is a compliance of Rule 181 of the General Rules (Civil ) 1986. 5. Aggrieved by the order of the learned trial Court, the appellant filed a writ petition which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present appeal has been filed. Learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition observing as follows:- "The uncle of the petitioner and respondent No. 6 treating the provision of Section 195, CrPC, applicable in the instant case filed an application before Assistant Devasthan Commissioner for making a complaint against the respondents and others with regard to the same subject matter. This application was rejected by the Assistant Devasthan Commissioner on 12.09.2001 against which the respondent No. 6 has submitted a criminal revision petition No. 57/2004 which is pending before the ADJ No. 1 Jaipur City, Jaipur. Irrespective of pendency of this revision petition and knowing fully well that in view of bar under Section 195, CrPC, the petitioner got this FIR registered concealing these material facts. Not only this the petitioner himself has submitted an application under Section 340, CrPC, before the ADJ No. 3 Jaipur City, Jaipur on the same subject matter which is also pending for decision. Thus, it is wrong to suggest that there is no alternative remedy rather the registration of FIR itself is not an appropriate and legal remedy. It is also submitted that so far examination of the documents is concerned, the trial Court is competent to get these documents examined by the FSL if the petitioner is able to satisfy it about the necessity of such examination during trial of the civil suit. It is at all not necessary to give the documents to the police to obtain FSL examination. It is at all not necessary to give the documents to the police to obtain FSL examination. Having heard the rival submissions of the respective parties and upon perusal of the order impugned and relevant provisions of law and more specifically Rule 181 of the General Rule, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, as several suits and criminal cases are pending and even a writ petition is also pending with regard to the original dispute, I am fully convinced with the submissions made on behalf of the respondents that in case the petitioner is able to satisfy the trial Court, the trial Court is quite competent to get the documents examined through FSL regarding genuineness and correctness of the documents. It is not necessary that the documents be handed over to the police for FSL verification." 6. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted before us that the appellant cannot be left remedy less. The documents which is sought by the police is forged one and that being the position, he has set the criminal law into motion. The process of criminal law cannot be scuttled and the document was required to be given to the investigating agency for investigation. He has place reliance on Section 91 of the Criminal Procedure Code whereby powers have been in the investigating agency for seeking a document relevant for investigation. Section 91 of the, CrPC, is quoted hereinbelow for ready reference:- "91. Summons to produce document or other thing. -(1) Whenever any Court or any officer in charge of a police station considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code by or before such Court or officer, such Court may issue summons, or such officer a written order, to the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, requiring him to attend and produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated in the summons or order. (2) Any person required under this section merely to produce a document or other thing shall be deemed to have complied with the requisition if he causes such document or thing to be produced instead of attending personally to produce the same." 7. (2) Any person required under this section merely to produce a document or other thing shall be deemed to have complied with the requisition if he causes such document or thing to be produced instead of attending personally to produce the same." 7. A reading of Section 91, CrPC, shows that an officer of the police is to give a written order to the person in whose possession or power a document or a thing is believed to be, requiring him to produce it. Admittedly, the document in question presently is in possession of the Court trying the civil suit. If the literal meaning is given to the language of Section 91, CrPC, then the police officer investigating a case will have to make an order for production of the document. If this aspect is considered to be imperative, then it would mean that this section authorises the police official to issue an order to a Court. In our considered opinion, such powers cannot be conceived to be vested in a police officer under Section 91, CrPC. It cannot be said that an officer of the police station has been vested with powers to issue orders to a Court. Reliance as placed by the learned Counsel for the appellant on the provision of Section 91, CrPC, appears to be misplaced. 8. It may here be noticed that summons/orders under Section 91, CrPC, is meant to be issued to a person. The Court cannot be construed to be a person. Police officer issuing orders cannot be construed to be an officer competent to issue any such orders to a Court, for production of any document. The argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant is not an argument in consonance with the language used in Section 91, CrPC, If police can be seen to be empowered to issue orders to a Court, it will lead to a situation which cannot be appreciated. The powers under Section 91, CrPC, has to be exercised in the manner prescribed only and not otherwise. That means police is empowered to issue orders for production. No orders can be issued to a Court by a police official. Summons can only be issued by Court. Thus, in this case, recourse to Section 91, CrPC, is not available. 9. The powers under Section 91, CrPC, has to be exercised in the manner prescribed only and not otherwise. That means police is empowered to issue orders for production. No orders can be issued to a Court by a police official. Summons can only be issued by Court. Thus, in this case, recourse to Section 91, CrPC, is not available. 9. The Magistrate under Section 91, CrPC, can issue a summon for production of a document, if there is proceeding pending before such Court. Admittedly, the investigation was pending with the police. Consideration by the Court that such document is necessary could not be a possibility because the Court was not ceased of the any proceedings. Only an application came to be filed by the police before the Court. On that application, it was not possible to construe that the Court could consider it necessary to issue a summon for its production. Necessity or desirability of a document can only be considered by an authority before whom an effective proceeding is pending. In the instant case, investigation was pending before the police. Seeking the Court assistance for issuance of summons thus, is a procedure where the Court has to be first made to understand that such document is necessary or desirable to be produced. Here the Court, if was to issue summons, then the summons would have been issued to the District Court for production which is not the ambit of Section 91, CrPC, because Section 91, CrPC, only requires issuance of summons to a person. Therefore, if the Court has refused to issue summons, it cannot be said that it did not exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. In that view of the matter also, the case of the appellant does not stand on a foundation which can be said to be solid and thus, the arguments of the learned Counsel have no force. 10. The controversy can still be looked into from another point of view. The Honble Supreme Court in the case of State vs. Shyam Lal, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1251 , has held that an accused of an offence cannot be asked to produce documents which is incriminatory against him. 10. The controversy can still be looked into from another point of view. The Honble Supreme Court in the case of State vs. Shyam Lal, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1251 , has held that an accused of an offence cannot be asked to produce documents which is incriminatory against him. The relevant portion of the Judgment reads as under:- "Article 20(3) has been construed by this Court in Kalu Oghads case, AIR 1961 SC 1808 , to mean that an accused person cannot be compelled to disclose documents which are incriminatory and based on his knowledge. Section 94 Criminal Procedure Code, permits the production of all documents including the above mentioned class of documents. If Section 94 is construed to include an accused person, some unfortunate consequences would follow." (Section 94 of the old Code is paramateria with new Section 91 of , CrPC). 11. According to the appellant, the defendant is an accused. The documents was in his custody before being produced in the Court. If the document had not been produced in the Court in view of the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Lal (Supra), the Court or the police official could not have summoned or ordered the accused to produce the same. Now the document is in possession of the Court under Section 91, CrPC, no order could be passed having sanction of law. 12. A reference in this regard may also be made to Section 131 of Indian Evidence Act which is quoted hereinbelow for ready reference wherein, no person in whose custody and control the document is, can be compelled to produce the document in his possession, which any other person would be entitled to refuse to produce if they were in his possession : "131. Production of documents which another person, having possession, could refuse to produce.-No one shall be compelled to produce documents in his possession, which any other person would be entitled to refuse to produce if they were in his possession, unless such last-mentioned person consents to their production." 13. As an accused, the defendants in the suit could have taken shelter in terms of law laid down in the case of Shyam Lal (Supra ). Thus, the law is against the appellant which does not entail him to ask for production of the document as has been canvassed before us. As an accused, the defendants in the suit could have taken shelter in terms of law laid down in the case of Shyam Lal (Supra ). Thus, the law is against the appellant which does not entail him to ask for production of the document as has been canvassed before us. The appellant in his memo of appeal has said as under:-"Because Rule 181 of the General Rules (Civil) 1986 is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case since it does not include investigation in a criminal case. The learned Single Judge without considering the aforesaid legal aspects rushed to the erroneous conclusion that it is not necessary for the documents to be handed over to the police for the FSL verification.". 14. A feeble attempt was made by the learned Counsel for the appellant during the arguments that the learned Single Judge has closed his way for resorting to Rule 18 of the General Rules as well. When admittedly, this rule is not attracted, his grievance that the learned Single Judge has closed this option, also has no legs to stand. In view of the aforesaid, arguments raised by the learned Counsel are of no consequence. The present appeal, therefore, has no force and deserves to be dismissed. 15. The case relied upon by the learned Counsel, "Sachida Nand Singh & Anr. vs. State of Bihar", reported in 1998 (2) SCC 493 , and Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. vs. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr., reported in 2005 AIR SCW 1929, have no application because they relate to different kind of proceedings in different set of circumstances, which is not relevant in the present controversy. 16. The appeal having no force is hereby dismissed.