ORDER 1. In the present case the Hindu male died in the year 1918 leaving behind his widow and two sons. Soon after the death of the Hindu male the two sons also died leaving behind the widow and their wives i.e. daughters-in-law of the widow. The widows of the sons remarried and after that the widow adopted the plaintiff-appellant in the year 1937. The plaintiff appellant based on the adoption of 1937 filed a suit for partition in the year 1963 seeking partition of the properties from the co-parceners of his grandfathers who were in possession of the entire property. 2. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the adoption of the appellant made by the widow was not proved. It was also held that the widow did not have the right to adopt in the presence of her sons widows i.e. her daughters-in-law. 3. Aggrieved against the dismissal of the suit, the appellant tiled first appeal before the appellant court. The first appellate court held that adoption was proved but the adoption made by the widow was invalid as she did not have the capacity to adopt in the presence of widowed daughters-in-law left behind by her sons. The Plea raised by the appellant that the widows of the sons had remarried and therefore right to adopt revived in the Hindu widow was negatived following the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Gurunath v. Kamalabai, Kom Kenchanangauda Nadgaqudar1. 4. Aggrieved against the order of the courts below, the appellant filed second appeal in the High Court which has been dismissed in view of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Gurunath case1. 5. In our considered view, the point raised in the present case is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court in Gurunath easel overruling the view taken by the Nagpur High Court in Bapuji v. Gangaram2 that right to adopt a survived in the widow on the remarriage of the widow left by the son. It was held: (SCR p. 1149) "In our judgment there is not only an obvious fallacy in this reasoning but it is based on a wrong apprehension of the true reasons stated for the rule in Amarendra case3. It was held: (SCR p. 1149) "In our judgment there is not only an obvious fallacy in this reasoning but it is based on a wrong apprehension of the true reasons stated for the rule in Amarendra case3. The reason for the rule in Amarendra ease3 was where the duty of providing for the continuance b of the line for spiritual purposes which was upon the father, and was laid by him conditionally upon the mother, has been assumed by the son and by him passed on to a grandson or to the sons widow, the mothers power is gone. If that is the true reason, obviously the duty having come to an end cannot be revived on logical grounds. We are therefore clearly of opinion that the ratio of the decision in Bapuji v. Gangaram2 was erroneous. The second decision to which reference was made is a decision of the Lucknow Court reported in Prem Jagat Kuer v. Harihar Bakhsh Singh4. The learned Judges in that case followed the decision of the Nagpur High Court abovequoted, and further added (though under some misapprehension) that this decision had been approved by Their Lordships of the Privy Council. As a matter of fact, there was another decision reported in the same report on a different question that had been upheld by the Privy Council and not the decision above referred to. The authority of this later decision therefore is considerably shaken by this error and even otherwise the decision gives no independent reasons of its own apart from those contained in the Nagpur case2. 6. The view taken by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurunath case1 has been subsequently followed by this Court in Ashabai Kate v. Vithal Bhika Nade5. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that judgment of a Constitution Bench in Gurunath easel requires reconsideration but did not put forth any worthwhile submission to do so. The contention is, therefore, f rejected. The controversy raised in this appeal is no more res integra. 8. Accordingly, the civil appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.