JUDGMENT K.C Sood, J.—Ram Dass, Plaintiff herein, has filed this suit for the recovery of rupees 15,56,438/- as damages. Plaintiff also claims interest at the rate of 18% per annum with effect from May 5, 1982. The case of the Plaintiff 2. The Plaintiff is a Forest Contractor. He applied for and was given permission to fell 169 Deodar, Kail and Rai (fir) trees from land comprised in Khasra Numbers 23, 35, 37, 43, 48, 51 and 549 from Chak Khagna by a sanction order dated July 13, 1980. These trees were exploited and converted into timber. The timber so converted was brought to the road head and stacked at Khagna Pul in Tehsil Chopal of District Shimla. 3. According to the plaintiff, he stacked 2510 scants of different sizes and species of timber at Khagna Pul. A case for offences punishable under Sections 379, 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act read with Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was registered against the plaintiff and other persons in terms of F.I.R. No. 12 of 1994. The timber stacked at Khagna Pul was taken into possession by the Enforcement Department in this case and given to the custody of Daulat Ram. The timber so seized was auctioned on the directions of the Court dated March 25, 1986. It is the case of the plaintiff that though 2510 scants were stacked at Khagna Pul but the seizure memo reflect that only 1785 scants of different sizes and species were taken into possession in the aforesaid F.I.R. as the case property. The timber was auctioned on the directions of Special Judge, Shimla on March 25, 1986. The timber so auctioned was 1556 scants. The Department of Forest which took the custody of the timber and the police authorities seized the timber are liable to account for short fall of 954 scants of different sizes and species. The value of the short-fall timber comes to rupees 5,06,100/- according to the prevalent rates in the year 1986-87 for such timber. The plaintiff and other accused were convicted for offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 167, 218 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 33,41 /42 of the Indian Forest Act. The value of the short-fall timber comes to rupees 5,06,100/- according to the prevalent rates in the year 1986-87 for such timber. The plaintiff and other accused were convicted for offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 167, 218 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 33,41 /42 of the Indian Forest Act. However, they were acquitted for offences punishable under Sections 468 and 471 of the Penal Code by the Special Judge, Shimla on December 22, 1989. The plaintiff along with other-accused, filed an appeal against their conviction and was acquitted by the judgment of this Court dated November 25, 1993. While acquitting the accused, the Court ordered, "The State will refund the confiscated amount to Shri Ram Dass within a month". This amount, it may be noticed, was directed to be confiscated by the trial Court. 4. Pursuant to these orders, rupees 3,94,238/-, the sale proceeds of confiscated timber were released to the plaintiff. 5. The plaintiff maintains that he was prosecuted unnecessarily and without there being any case against him. It is the case of the plaintiff that though the timber was auctioned for rupees 4,44,576/- but he was given rupees 3,94,238/- thus rupees 50,338/- were paid less to him and the defendants are liable to pay this amount to the Plaintiff. In all, the plaintiff claims rupees 5,56,438/- from the defendants with 18% interest per annum. Plaintiff also claims rupees 10 lakhs as damages for wrongful/ malicious prosecution. Plaintiff prays for a decree of rupees 15,56,438/ - with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from May 5, 1982. 6. The defendants in their written statements resist the suit. The allegations are controverted. The defendants plead that the case in terms of F.I.R. No. 12 of 1984 was registered against the Plaintiff with the Enforcement Department on a complaint made by Daulat Ram President of Gram Panchayat, Khagna. The complaint was enquired and it was only after inquiry that a regular case was registered against the plaintiff. The investigation showed criminal conspiracy by the plaintiff with other Government servants, accused in the case, to illicitly fell standing trees on the Government land under the garb of felling order for felling of trees from private forest. The complaint was enquired and it was only after inquiry that a regular case was registered against the plaintiff. The investigation showed criminal conspiracy by the plaintiff with other Government servants, accused in the case, to illicitly fell standing trees on the Government land under the garb of felling order for felling of trees from private forest. During the course of investigation, the land from which the trees were felled, was got demarcated by the Police Department from the Tehsildar, Chopal. It was found that though 169 trees were marked for felling by the Plaintiff but the plaintiff felled, in addition to the marked trees, 97 trees from the Government land. The Government land from which these trees were felled adjoins the private forest. The defendants refute the allegation of the plaintiff that he had stacked 2510 scants of the timber felled by him at Khagna Pul. In fact, the Investigating Agency seized 1556 scants of different sizes and species at Khagna Pul which were stacked by the Plaintiff. According to the defendants these scants included the converted timber of Deodar, Kail and Rai from the trees which were felled from the Government land. It is the further case of the defendants that the timber seized was ordered to be auctioned by the Court with the consent of the plaintiff and the timber auctioned was 1556 scants minus the samples retained by the Police/ Investigation Agency and not 2510 scants as alleged by the Plaintiff. The plea of the plaintiff, allege defendants, is after thought and without any foundation. The defendants deny that the plaintiff did not commit any offence and was falsely implicated in the case. Merely because he was acquitted by the High Court would not mean that the case was false. The sale proceeds of the auctioned timber, plead defendants, were deposited with the Forest Department in the Forest Working Division, Chopal. It is denied that the plaintiff is entitled to any amount or interest. It is admitted that the timber was auctioned for rupees 4,37,226.09 paise and Rs. 3,94,238/ -, the net amount realized after deduction of the expenses incurred in the auction of the timber was deposited with the Government Treasury on February 22, 1991 under the orders of the Special Judge. It is admitted that the timber was auctioned for rupees 4,37,226.09 paise and Rs. 3,94,238/ -, the net amount realized after deduction of the expenses incurred in the auction of the timber was deposited with the Government Treasury on February 22, 1991 under the orders of the Special Judge. The entire amount lying with the Government Treasury was released to the plaintiff in terms of the orders of this Court in an appeal filed by the Plaintiff against his conviction. 7. The following issues were settled on the pleadings of the parties: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of a sum of Rs. 15,66,438 as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover interest on the principal amount at the rate of 18% per annum from 5.5.1982? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct to claim any amount in the present suit? OPD. 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 5. Whether only 1556 scant of different species were seized by the investigating agency in case F.I.R. No. 12/84? OPD. 6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to prefer any claim which is not in conformity with the order of the trial Court dated 25.3.1986 passed in CMA No. 22-S/4 of 1985? OPD. 7. Whether the plaintiff had no right in the sale proceeds deposited in the treasury before 25.11.1993 when the property was ordered to be released to the plaintiff by the High Court? OPD. 8. Whether the defendant No. 4 had no other role except to auction the timber and to deposit the proceeds in the treasury after deduction of expenses? OPD-4. 9. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? OPD. 10. Relief. Parties have led evidence. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. My findings on the issues are: Issue No. 1. 8. The claim of the plaintiff is based on two allegations : (a) The procecution of the plaintiff was malicious. Therefore he is entitled to damages of rupees 10 lakhs; (b) He had stacked 2510 scants on the road head after having felled the trees for which permission was obtained by him but this timber was seized by the Police on the registration of the case against him. The timber so seized was directed to be auctioned by the learned Special judge but only 1556 scants were put to auction. The timber so seized was directed to be auctioned by the learned Special judge but only 1556 scants were put to auction. There was shortage of 954 scants for which defendants alone are responsible and Iiable to compensate the plaintiff for the short-fall the value of which was rupees 5,06,100. 9. So far malicious prosecution of the plaintiff, is concerned, the pleading of the plaintiff on this aspect is bereft of any particulars. What he says in para 8 of his plaint is that he was prosecuted on the basis of the report submitted by the defendants through the Himachal Pradesh Police Enforcement Department. On the conclusion of the trial, he was convicted and sentenced to undergo different terms of sentences for having allegedly committed different offences even though the plaintiff had committed no offence and was falsely implicated in the case. He laid an appeal against his conviction before this Court and was acquitted. In para 12 (a), he alleges that he was not only un-necessarily harassed, inconvenienced but also put to disrepute and suffered mental torture as also financial loss as he was forced to defend himself in the criminal proceedings and, therefore, he claims general damages in the amount of rupees 10 lakhs. He also alleges that his prosecution was groundless based on extraneous considerations. He gives no detail of any extraneous considerations. 10. Appearing as PW7, he merely contends saying : ".......Enforcement people came and made a case against me. The case was tried in the Court of Sessions Judge and I was convicted. I thereafter filed an appeal. In appeal I was acquitted. The timber taken into possession by the Forest Guard was auctioned. I was not informed about the auction". 11. He does not say or even whisper that his prosecution was groundless, without any reasonable or probable cause or he was prosecuted maliciously. He does not even say that he suffered any loss of reputation or damage. In fact, he confines his testimony to the stacking of 2510 scants which he extracted from the trees purchased by him after obtaining necessary permission and which were taken into possession by the Police and subsequently sold after misappropriating 954 scants. 12. He does not even say that he suffered any loss of reputation or damage. In fact, he confines his testimony to the stacking of 2510 scants which he extracted from the trees purchased by him after obtaining necessary permission and which were taken into possession by the Police and subsequently sold after misappropriating 954 scants. 12. Malicious prosecution envisages a criminal unsuccessful prosecution of the plaintiff without reasonable or probable cause The Tort balances two principles: (a) freedom to bring criminals to justice and (b) to prevent false accusations against innocent persons. 13. The foundation for the action lies in the abuse of the process of Court by wrongfully or maliciously setting the law in motion. It is designed to discourage the perversion of the machinery of justice for an improper purpose as observed by Privy Council in Mohammad Amin v. Jogindra Kumar Bannerjee and others, A.I.R. (34) 1947 Privy Council 108. A plaintiff in action for malicious prosecution must prove: (a) He was prosecuted by the defendant; (b) The prosecution terminated in favour of the plaintiff; (c) The prosecution was instituted against him without any reasonable or probable cause; (d) Prosecution was instituted with malicious intention; (e) He suffered damages to his reputation, person or property. 14. In the present case, as already noticed, pleading is bereft of all material particulars. The evidence of the plaintiff, on this aspect of the case, does not take his case any further. "Reasonable" and "probable" cause stems from the belief in the guilt of the accused based on reasonable grounds, assuming them to be true, which would reasonably lead any ordinary, prudent and cautious person to the conclusion that the person charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed. It is settled proposition of law that it is for the plaintiff to lead appropriate evidence to show want of reasonable and probable cause before the defendants can be asked to show such cause. The plaintiff has led no evidence on this aspect of the case save and except according to him, he was prosecuted, charged, sentenced but in appeal was acquitted. 15. The plaintiff has led no evidence on this aspect of the case save and except according to him, he was prosecuted, charged, sentenced but in appeal was acquitted. 15. The judgment of Special Judge, Shimla dated December 20, 1989 (Exhibit-DA) shows that the plaintiff along with other co-accused was prosecuted for offences punishable under Sections 379, 420, 471, 468, 167, 218,120-B of the Indian Penal Code Sections 33, 41/42 of the Indian Forest Act and 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The perusal of this judgment shows that allegations against the plaintiff and his co-accused were that he entered into conspiracy with his co-accused to fell trees from Government land in furtherance to the wrong demarcation given of the land of the plaintiff which was adjacent to the Government land, 97 trees were marked inside the Government land for felling. These 97 trees were felled from the Government land which were also marked by the co-accused Chatter Singh, a Forest Officer. Learned trial Judge, after considering the evidence on record found that the trees were marked in the Government land under the conspiracy hatched by the accused, including the plaintiff, and 97 trees were illegally felled from the Government land and were taken away by the plaintiff which were subsequently converted into timber. In appeal, admittedly, all the accused were acquitted. However, the judgment by which the plaintiff was acquitted, has not been tendered in evidence even though such judgment was filed along with the documents. The reasons for having not tendered this judgment in evidence are not fathomable. For this alone, it is not possible to say that the prosecution of the accused was without probable or reasonable cause. The plaintiff has given no evidence whatsoever to show that his prosecution was for want of any reasonable or probable cause. Merely because a plaintiff has been acquitted is not a prima facie evidence that the charge was unreasonable or false (See : Mitchell v. Jenkins, (1833) 5 B.&Ad 588). The fact that plaintiff was convicted by a competent Court though subsequently acquitted on appeal would be a prima facie evidence to show probable and reasonable cause for his prosecution by the defendants. There is nothing on record or in the evidence to conclude that the plaintiff was prosecuted for the criminal charges without substance or with malice. The fact that plaintiff was convicted by a competent Court though subsequently acquitted on appeal would be a prima facie evidence to show probable and reasonable cause for his prosecution by the defendants. There is nothing on record or in the evidence to conclude that the plaintiff was prosecuted for the criminal charges without substance or with malice. It is settled law that proceedings in criminal Court are not evidenced in civil Court. The judgment of criminal Court even though is admissible in evidence to establish the fact that the plaintiff was acquitted but it cannot be used to ascertain the grounds on which acquittal was recorded. The judgment of acquittal in a criminal case is not admissible for the purpose of proving malice and want of reasonable or probable cause which has to be established by the plaintiff by leading appropriate evidence (See: Nagendra Kumar v. Etwari Sahu and others, AIR 1958 Patna 329). 16. This apart, as already observed, the burden of proving malice is on the plaintiff and there is nothing in the evidence of the plaintiff or evidence of any other witness that the defendants, the Department of Enforcement was actuated with malice in prosecuting the accused. Malice is nothing but improper or wrongful motive, a motive other than desire to bring a person to justice. 17. In Dhanjishaw Rattanji Karani v. Bombay Municipality and others, AIR (32) 1945 Bombay 320, Bhagwati, J, as Mylord then was, after noticing several decisions held that where there is a successful appeal from a conviction, this would show termination of the proceedings in favour of the plaintiff but the conviction though reversed, would afford prima facie evidence of reasonable and probable cause for prosecution. The proposition was laid in Halsburys Laws of England (p. 12, para 13) which reads: "Where there has been a successful appeal from a conviction, this would be, for the purpose of pleading, a sufficient termination of the proceedings in the plaintiffs favour. But, it seems, the conviction, though reversed might be evidence on which the Judge might find that there was reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution’’ 18. As noticed earlier, the plaintiff has led no evidence whatsoever to show even remotely that he was prosecuted without any reasonable or probable cause. He himself does not say a word about it. 19. As noticed earlier, the plaintiff has led no evidence whatsoever to show even remotely that he was prosecuted without any reasonable or probable cause. He himself does not say a word about it. 19. This apart, in my view, if legal process is honestly used for its proper purpose, even negligence or want of sound judgment in use of it will not create any liability for malicious prosecution. A Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Girja Prasad Sharma and others v. Umashankar Pathak, AIR 1973 M.P. 79, in the context of an Investigating Officer filing a charge sheet for prosecution of a person consequent to the investigation of a case observed that it is not the duty of the Investigating Officer to scrutinize the evidence collected by him to find whether the accused is really guilty. He is charged with the duty to find it from the evidence he collected whether there is a reasonable and probable cause to bring the accused to a fair trial. In para 18, their Lordships observed : "28. Reasonable and probable cause with reference to the duty of an Investigating Officer who files a charge-sheet for prosecution of a person as a result of his investigation means whether the investigation showed existence of facts from which it could be said that there was a case proper to be laid before the Court. It is true that he has a certain measure of discretion and can reject palpably false evidence, but when the evidence of commission of offence is from apparently credible source, it is not his duty to scrutinize the same like a Court to find whether the accused is really guilty. His only duty is to find out honestly whether there is reasonable and probable cause to bring the accused to a fair trial. Reference in this connection may be made to Glinski v. Mclver, 1962-IAIR ER 696 at p. 710, where My Lord Denning observed as follows:— "In truth he (a man who brings a prosecution) be he a Police Officer or a private individual has only to be satisfied that there is a proper cause to lay before the Court, or in the words of lord Mansfield, that there is a probable cause "to bring the accused to a fair and impartial trial see Johnstone v. Sutton, (1786) 1 Term Rep 510 at p. 547. After all he cannot judge whether the witnesses are telling the truth. He cannot know what defences the accused may set up. Guilt or innocence is for the tribunal and not for him. Test it this way: Suppose he seeks legal advice before laying the charge. His Counsel can only advise him whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a prosecution. He cannot pronounce on guilt or innocence. Nevertheless the advice of Counsel if honestly sought and honestly acted on, affords a good protection: see Ravenga v. Machkintosh. (1824) 2 B & C 693 at p. 697, by Bayle, j. So also with a police officer. He is concerned to bring to trial every man who should be put on trial, but he is not concerned to convict him. He is no more concerned to convict him. He can leave that to the jury. It is for them to believe in his guilt, not for the police officer, Were it otherwise, it would mean that every acquittal would be a rebuff to the police officer. It would be a black mark against him, and a hindrance to promotion. So much so that he might be tempted to "improve" the evidence so as to secure a conviction. No, the truth is that a police officer is only concerned to see that there is a case proper to be laid before the Court". (Emphasis given) 20. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has not been able to show from the evidence that how the prosecution of the plaintiff was either malicious or without reasonable or probable cause. 21. The inescapable conclusion is that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he is entitled to damages of rupees 10 lakhs as claimed by him for malicious prosecution : (b) He had stacked 2510 scants on the road head after having felled the trees for which permission was obtained by him but this timber was seized by the Police on the registration of the case against him. The timber so seized was directed to be auctioned by the learned Special Judge but only 1556 scants were put to auction. There was shortage of 954 scants for which defendants alone are responsible and liable to compensate the plaintiff for the short-fall the value of which was rupees 5,06,100. 22. The timber so seized was directed to be auctioned by the learned Special Judge but only 1556 scants were put to auction. There was shortage of 954 scants for which defendants alone are responsible and liable to compensate the plaintiff for the short-fall the value of which was rupees 5,06,100. 22. In support of this part of his case, the plaintiff appearing as PW7 tells us that after he was granted felling permission in the year 1980, the trees were marked by the Department of Forest. He felled 169 trees of various species including Deodar, Rai and Kail. The felled trees were converted into scants through contractor. The total scants so converted were 2510. These were carried and stacked on the road head. He applied for transit permit which was not granted. In the meanwhile, this timber was taken into possession by the Enforcement Agency pursuant to the case registered against him. This timber, pursuant to the orders of the Court, was auctioned and it transpires only 1556 scants were shown to have been taken into possession whereas, he had stacked 2510 scants. Auctioned amount realized were rupees 5 lakhs but he was only given rupees 3,94,000/-. He was not compensated for the short-fall of 954 scants. 23. Dole Ram (PW5) supporting the case of the plaintiff states that he carried the timber from Nohra Thalan to Chak Khagna Pul at the instance of the plaintiff and he in all carried 2500 scants. He carried those scants in presence of Forest officials Rikhi Ram and Nathu Ram. This timber, according to him, was carried through Gorkha labour. In cross-examination he admits that he cannot give the name of the Gorkha labour which he had employed. According to him, he is not aware of the name of any one of the labours who carried the timber scants. He admits that he is a registered contractor. Nathu Ram (PW4) was posted as Block Officer at Khagna Bagar at the relevant time. According to him, a launching list was prepared by Ram Dass, another Forest Officer and verified by him which is Exhibit PW4/A and the list so prepared was in respect of 2510 scants which reached Khagna Pul. In cross-examination, this witness candidly admits that he was co-accused with the plaintiff for having felled trees from the Government land. According to him, a launching list was prepared by Ram Dass, another Forest Officer and verified by him which is Exhibit PW4/A and the list so prepared was in respect of 2510 scants which reached Khagna Pul. In cross-examination, this witness candidly admits that he was co-accused with the plaintiff for having felled trees from the Government land. He admits that this list which was prepared was not approved by the higher authority or the Revenue Department. This launching list was not sent to any higher officer though in the next breath, he says that it was sent to the Range Officer. He denies the suggestion that only 1556 scants were taken into possession by the Enforcement Department and handed over on supurdari to Bali Ram. He would tells us that 2510 scants were taken into possession by the Police. He also admits that this launching list which was prepared was not signed by any Officer of the Forest Corporation. Daulat Ram (PW6) states that he felled the trees in question, converted them into scants which were 2510 in all. He admits that he is an employee of the Forest Corporation and was so employed in June, 1983. He is unable to give a single name of the person whom he employed for felling the trees or sawing the same. It is significant to note that the plaintiff in his cross-examination candidly admits that his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded and he admitted in his statement that 1083 scants of Deodar, 457 scants of Kail and 16 Scants of Rei were seized by Inspector Roli Ram. This admission of the plaintiff clinches the entire issue. The question is not how many scants were converted or how many scants were taken on the road and/ or how many scants were stacked at the road head. The question is the number of scants which were taken into possession by the Enforcement Department pursuant to the case registered by them. 24. This apart, it is the evidence of S.D. Sharma (DW1) the then Range Officer that the procedure at the relevant time was to prepare launching list. For that purpose, individual was required to apply to the Divisional Forest Officer along with the list of converted timber and the description of the trees which were felled. 24. This apart, it is the evidence of S.D. Sharma (DW1) the then Range Officer that the procedure at the relevant time was to prepare launching list. For that purpose, individual was required to apply to the Divisional Forest Officer along with the list of converted timber and the description of the trees which were felled. The same was sent to the Range Officer who in turn would send it to the Deputy Ranger the concerned Block Incharge, then the spot would be inspected and ascertained if the felling has been in accordance with the felling permission and conversion in accordance with the list furnished along with the number of scants which were proposed to be launched. The Block Officer after inspection is to send the list to the Range Officer, then the Range Officer would sign such list and send the same to the Divisional Forest Officer who would issue the export permit. It is his evidence that at the relevant time, Nathu Ram was the Deputy Ranger and Rikhi Ram was Forest Guard. The launching list produced by the Plaintiff Exhibit PW4/A was never sent to him by the concerned Deputy Ranger nor it contain his signatures. It is his further evidence that the Enforcement Department in a case seized the timber of the plaintiff and a Seizure Memo was prepared. The timber so seized was handed over to him. This timber was seized from Ram Dass and Seizure Memo Exhibit DW1 /A was prepared original of which is on the police file. According to this seizure memo, 1556 scants were seized by the Enforcement Department. It is his evidence that this timber was seized on October 23, 1982. There is virtually no cross-examination so far the number of scants which were seized by the Enforcement Department from the plaintiff is concerned. Seizure Memo Exhibit DW1/A clearly shows that these scants were taken into possession by the Enforcement Department in the presence of this witness. Shri H.K. Sawata (PW3). Divisional Manager H.P. Forest Corporation states that in February, 1987, he received a letter from the Divisional Forest Officer, Chopal for selling the timber, seized by the Enforcement Department, and was handed over to the Department of Forest. Shri H.K. Sawata (PW3). Divisional Manager H.P. Forest Corporation states that in February, 1987, he received a letter from the Divisional Forest Officer, Chopal for selling the timber, seized by the Enforcement Department, and was handed over to the Department of Forest. This timber was taken over by the Assistant Manager of the Corporation at Sarahan under memo Exhibit PW3/A. 1187 number of Deodar scants, 294 scants of Kail and 10 number of Rai scants, in all 1491, scants were taken into possession. However, in August 1987, he was informed by the Divisional Forest Officer that there were 61 more scants lying with them and those were also taken into possession vide Memo Exhibit PW3/B. The scants so taken over by the Corporation by this Department consisted 33 scants of Deodar and 28 scants of Kail, in all 61 scants. All these cants were sent to Mantaruwala near Paonta Sahib which were auctioned and these scants were sold in fifteen auctions. Vide Memo Exhibit PW3/C 1427 scants were sold for rupees 4,49,773/-. After deducting handling charges and other Misc. charges, the exact realization was 4,22,409.54 paise. Similarly, 128 scants were sold vide Memo Exhibit PW3/D for 5080.72 paise after deducting rebate, handling charges etc. In cross-examination PW3 H.K. Sawata who was then Divisional Manager, H.P. Forest Corporation who was instrumental in selling the timber seized by the Enforcement explains that total gross amount realized from auction of 1552 scants was rupees 4,55,277/- and after deduction of handling charges and expenditure incurred on transportation and stacking, the net proceeds realized were rupees 3,94,238/ -. He explains that out of the timber received by him, six scants were kept by the Forest Department as sample and one scant was taken away by the Superintendent of Police Enforcement as sample. Some scants were broken and thus, they left with 1555 scants. The amount so realized was deposited in the Treasury on the orders of the Court. 25. In view of the evidence on record, it cannot be said that the Enforcement Department seized 2510 scants of timber which were stacked by the Plaintiff on the road head. The evidence on record clearly proves that the seizure memo was prepared and according to the seizure memo Exhibit DW1/A 1556 scants were taken into possession which have been explained by S.K. Sawata (PW3) and S.D. Sharma, then Range Officer. The evidence on record clearly proves that the seizure memo was prepared and according to the seizure memo Exhibit DW1/A 1556 scants were taken into possession which have been explained by S.K. Sawata (PW3) and S.D. Sharma, then Range Officer. Ram Lai Gazta (D4W1) deposed from the record brought by him, that 1555 scants were put to auction and the amount realized was deposited in the Government Treasury which was subsequently released to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has failed to prove that 2510 scants were seized by the Enforcement Department of the Government. In turn, the plaintiff has not been successful in proving that there was shortage of 954 scants for which the defendants are responsible and liable to compensate the plaintiff in the amount of rupees 5,06,100/- being value of the short fall in the timber. The issue is accordingly held against the plaintiff. Issues No. 3 and 4. 26. These issues are not pressed and are thus decided against the defendants. Issue No. 5. 27. In view of my findings on issue No. 1, it is held that the Enforcement Department seized 1556 scants of different species in the case registered against the plaintiff in terms of F.I.R. No. 12 of 1984. Issues No. 6, 7, 8 and 9. Not pressed, accordingly held against the defendants. Issue No. 2. 28. As the plaintiff is not entitled to any amount, therefore, there is no question of payment of any interest. The issue is accordingly decided. Relief. 29. In view of my findings above, the suit of the plaintiff fails and is dismissed with costs. Writ petition allowed. -