JUDGMENT : Ajoy Nath Ray, CJ., and Jagdish Bhalla, J. We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning given and the order passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Sharma in his Lordship's order dated 19.5.2005 allowing the Respondent-writ Petitioner's claim. 2. The facts as found by his Lordship are: (i) The writ Petitioner was appointed in U.P. State Food and Essential Commodities Corporation, Lucknow in a permanent post of a Salesman on 4.10.1975. (ii) on the basis of the recommendation of a Selection Committee he was promoted as Assistant Commercial Inspector on 6.9.1982 (iii) although he had worked for 13 years continuously in the promotee post a letter of permanent appointment to that permanent post which was in existence was not forthcoming ; (iv) on 6.5.1995 he was summarily terminated. 3. On these facts a writ court has no alternative but to allow the writ petition in toto. A permanent employee promoted and terminated as if he were a daily wager employed yesterday is impossible to support in law. There was no charge, no inquiry, no show cause notice-nothing at all. He was just asked to go. 4. The Respondents have delayed the filing of this appeal by 30 days but there is a condonation application on records. The Respondent did not contest any of the facts pleaded in the writ petition in the Court below by filing an affidavit in opposition although the writ petition was disposed of nearly 10 years after it was filed. 5. The learned Judge proceeded on the case of Choksi Tube Company Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1997) 11 SCC 179 and held that the statements in the petition are taken to be admitted since those are not denied. In our respectful opinion this was a correct way of going about the case. The normal rule applicable in adversary proceedings of accepting undenied statements is applicable in Government cases also ; the Court only has to use some circumspection and avoid mechanical acceptance of facts pleaded by the writ Petitioner. If the facts are illogical, absurd or even so unlikely as to excite the suspicion of the Court, the Court might call give further opportunity or compel production of records, etc. If the facts are illogical, absurd or even so unlikely as to excite the suspicion of the Court, the Court might call give further opportunity or compel production of records, etc. But in a normal case like this where nothing appears to be wrong or false or unusual the Court is best advised to proceed on the principle of admission and conclude the case without further delay. 6. The wrongful and summary order of termination having come on or about 6.5.1995, the learned Judge at the time of disposal of the case just after 10 years directed full payment of all arrears salary at the time his Lordship ordered reinstatement. 7. Ten years' salary would be a substantial sum and the reason why agree with his Lordship's order is set out below. 8. At the time of reinstatement, whether by quashing a summary order of termination or setting aside an order of termination after setting aside an order passed on due inquiry, the Court has a discretion in writ matters to order payment of full salary or no salary or even a percentage of it. 9. The matter not being a suit as between a master and a servant, the normal rules of damages applicable to those cases do not apply in their strict terms. A reinstated public servant cannot claim as of right such sums to which he would have been entitled had his service not been terminated wrongfully. But this does not mean that the principle of compensation is not paid any attention to by the writ courts even in cases of reinstatement of public servants. 10. In our respectful opinion, on the basis of Supreme Court cases which we refer to below, the normal principle of compensating a wrong person and putting him back in the same position as he would have been in, had no wrong been committed, and in so far as payment of money can do so, is borne in the mind by the writ courts and this principle is applied at the time of passing of the final order also. 11. However, the discretion in writ matters is more. 11. However, the discretion in writ matters is more. The Court can look at the circumstances of dismissal ; the Court can put a significant amount of weight on the fact that the reinstated employee had no work to do and did none during the period he was kept out of employment wrongfully ; the Court will also consider the case from the angle of the employer keeping the employee out of work forcibly even though the employee was always ready to work ; the possible alternative gainful employment obtained by the reinstated employee during the period he was kept out of employment can and should also be considered by the Court. These attending circumstances are considered at the time of making of the final order. The only difference is that in a master and servant suit, damages are awarded as of right on the principle of award and assessment of Common Law Damages, but in the case of a reinstated employee, just compensation is allowed on the basis of equitable principle, keeping all the facts and circumstances of the case in mind, and applying, above all the principles of equality, justice and fair dealing. 12. In the case of Union of India Vs. K.V. Jankiraman, etc. etc., AIR 1991 SC 2010 a Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of three Hon'ble Judges said in paragraph 7 that where the incumbent was willing to work but was denied the opportunity to work for no fault of his, he is entitled to the payment of arrears of salary. 13. This summary of the long case is to be had from no less an authority than the Supreme Court itself ; see paragraph 8 first sentence of the case of O. P. Gupta (1996) 33 ATC 324 . 14. In O. P. Gupta's case the principle of no pay no work, as an equitable principles applicable to writ cases is discussed in paragraph 7. 15. If, e.g. a seniority list is being readjusted and the Petitioner has not been out of work altogether but after the writ court's order becomes entitled to promotion, it would be within the jurisdiction of the Court to adjust equities both as regards seniority and pay. 15. If, e.g. a seniority list is being readjusted and the Petitioner has not been out of work altogether but after the writ court's order becomes entitled to promotion, it would be within the jurisdiction of the Court to adjust equities both as regards seniority and pay. It might not be unjust to allow seniority from a retrospective date but allow the extra pay only from the future date of commencement of actual discharge of service at the promoted level. 16. Again consider the situation in Jankiraman case as will appear from the right column of the judgment at page 2017 ; when an employee is completely exonerated and is not found blameworthy at all so that he cannot even be visited with the penalty even of censure, then, and in that event after the conclusion of the proceedings, which might be disciplinary or criminal or both, the employee would have a very strong case to pray before the writ court to give him full emoluments. If nothing can be shown by the employer as a counterbalancing factor, the writ court in ordinary circumstances would be almost compelled to grant all arrears pay. 17. In the case of Deshraj Gupta, a labour case, 1990 L&IC 1892 para 9, the Supreme Court found that after declaring the order of punishment illegal, the entire arrear period concerned in that case, which happened to be 16.8.1976 to 20.7.1980 became a matter of entitlement for the successful employee. The Supreme Court was also pleased to order in terrorem that the bank was directed to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the expiry of 3 months unless the amounts and arrears were paid on that date. 18. We have given these details above only to show the width of discretion, which is available to the writ court in these matters. 19. So far as our case is concerned the facts lie extremely heavily against the Appellants from what we can gather, they promoted a permanent employee in a permanent post after he had rendered 7 years of unblemished service, kept the employee working on the promotee post in a temporary capacity without issuing any appropriate order of permanency for 13 years and then one fine morning he was simply asked to walk out. If in a shocking case like this full arrears are not ordered then we do not know in what case it will ever be so ordered. 20. The special appeal is dismissed.