Honble KESHOTE, J.–Special appeal, under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, is directed by the petitioner appellant Shiyanand against the order, dated 2.5.1994, of the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2042/1994. (2). The petitioner appellant was dismissed from the service vide order, dated 31.3.1993, of the Superintendent of Police, Jhunjhunu, on being found proved against him three charges communicated to him vide memo, dated 2.9.1992, Annexure-1. (3). Against this order, the petitioner appellant filed a departmental appeal which was dismissed by the appellate authority. These orders are challenged by the petitioner appellant in the aforesaid writ petition and that was dismissed under the impugned order, thus this special appeal. (4). The learned counsel for the petitioner appellant contended that the Superintendent of Police, Jhunjhunu was not competent to order for dismissal of the petitioner appellant from the services. In his submission the Inspector General of Police was the competent authority to punish the petitioner appellant by the major penalty. (5). It is next contended that the copy of the enquiry report was not furnished to the petitioner appellant and thus the order of the respondent to dismiss him from the services is illegal. (6). Further it is submitted that the appellate authority has not passed a speaking order; it has not considered the points raised in the memo of appeal. Carrying this contention further the learned counsel for the petitioner appellant urged that the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition of the petitioner appellant considering it to be a case of compulsory retirement. (7). Lastly it is contended that the penalty of dismissal of the petitioner appellant from the service is highly excessive and disproportionate to the misconduct alleged to have been committed by the petitioner appellant. (8). Shri J.K. Agarwal, the learned Additional Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, supported the order of the learned Single Judge. (9). We have given our anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival contention made by the learned counsel for the parties. (10). Re first contention, the reply to the charge-sheet submitted by the petitioner appellant is not produced on the record of the writ petition or the appeal. (9). We have given our anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival contention made by the learned counsel for the parties. (10). Re first contention, the reply to the charge-sheet submitted by the petitioner appellant is not produced on the record of the writ petition or the appeal. That was the first stage where the petitioner appellant has to raise the point that the Superintendent of Police, Jhunjhunu, is not competent to initiate departmental enquiry and punish him for major penalty. During the course of the departmental enquiry, the petitioner appellant appears not to have raised this objection. Not only this against the order of the Superintendent of Police, Jhunjhunu, the petitioner appellant filed the departmental appeal; the memo of the appeal is on the record; we have carefully gone through it and find that this point was also not raised by the petitioner appellant therein. Further before the learned Single Judge also this point has not been raised in the writ petition nor it was pressed during the course of arguments. (11). The learned counsel for the petitioner appellant placed reliance on the decision of the learned Single Judge of this court in Rameshwar Lal vs. The State of Rajasthan & Others (WLR 1992 (S) Raj. 521), but having gone through it we are of the opinion that it is hardly of any help to the petitioner appellant. (12). Making reference to Rule 15 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short, `the Rules, 1958), the learned Single Judge in that decision held that it is permissible under the Rule delegation of powers to any Officer with the prior approval of the Government. The Head of the Department or the officer specially empowered by the Head of the Department with the approval of the Government, can take the disciplinary action against an employee. In Rameshwar Lals case (supra), the learned Single Judge has given decision on the point of proper delegation of powers by the head of department with the approval of the State Government. In the case in hand the petitioner appellant has not raised this point and, as such, there was no occasion for consideration thereof nor the respondents could have taken their stand in this respect. In the case in hand the petitioner appellant has not raised this point and, as such, there was no occasion for consideration thereof nor the respondents could have taken their stand in this respect. The petitioner appellant has neither raised this point in the departmental enquiry before the disciplinary authority, nor before the appellate authority, nor in the writ petition and nor in the memo of special appeal and thus he cannot be permitted to raise this point during the course of argument. (13). Re second contention, the law is almost settled that only on the ground of non-supply of the enquiry report to the delinquent employee the departmental proceedings and the order passed therein imposing penalty cannot be vitiated, unless this point is specifically raised and the delinquent employee proves and establishes to the satisfaction of the court that non-supply of the enquiry report has caused prejudice to his defence. Before the appellate authority the petitioner appellant, in this respect, has raised following objections, ^^Jheku iqfyl v/kh{kd egksn; us lsod dks yxk;s x;s vkjksiksa dk vuqfpr :i ls mRrjnk;h ekuk rFkk lsod dks nf.Mr djus ls iwoZ tkap vf/kdkjh dh fjiksVZ dh udy ns dj lsod dk Li"Vhdj.k ugha fy;k rFkk tkap vf/kdkjh fjiksVZ ls lger gksrs gq, lsod dks nf.Mr fd;k x;k ftlls vlUrq"V gksrs gq, Jheku dh lsok esa U;k; dh vkkkk ls fuEukafdr rF;ksa esa of.kZr fu;ekoyh ds fu;e 23 ds vUrxZr vihy isk dh tkrh gSA 1- Hkkjrh; lafo/kku ds 42 osa lakks/ku 1976 ds vuqlkj izLrkfor n.M ds lEcU/k esa uksfVl dk fn;k tkuk vko;d ugha vkSj u tkap vf/kdkjh dh fjiksVZ dh udy dk fn;k tkuk vko;d Fkk fdUrq Hkkjrh; mPpre U;k;ky; esa lgt U;k; ds fl)kUrksa dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, tkap vf/kdkjh dh fjiksVZ dk vkjksih dks n.M iznku djus ls iwoZ fn;k tkuk vko;d ekuk blds vfrfjDr dkj.k crkvksa uksfVl dk Hkh fn;k tkuk vko;d cryk;k blds vk/kkj ij lafo/kku ds lakks/ku ds ckn Hkh Hkkjrh; fofo/k mPp U;k;ky; rFkk mPpre U;k;ky; ds }kjk ;g vko;d ekuk fd vkjksih dks tkap vf/kdkjh dh fjiksVZ dh udy nsuk rFkk ;g dkj.k iwNuk fd D;ksa u tkap vf/kdkjh ds er ls lger gksrs gq, vkjksiksa dks fl) eku fy;k tk;s fdUrq iqfyl v/kh{kd egksn; us mijksDr lEcU/k esa izdkfkr fuEukafdr fu.kZ; ds izfrdwy lsod dks tkap vf/kdkjh dh fjiksVZ ,oa Li"Vhdj.k dk volj iznku fd;s dBksj n.M ls nf.Mr fd;kA ¼1½ egkfoysoj ih uk; fo:) dukZVd jkT; 1982 yscj b.MLVªh;y dsl ua- 296 iSjk ua- 19 o 28 ¼2½ xksihuj flag fo:) fcgkj jkT; 1982 yscj b.MLVªh;y dsk 1095 ¼Mh-ch-½ ¼3½ izseukFk kekZ fo:) Hkkjr la?k 1988¼6½ ,-Vh-lh- 962 ¼iw.kZihB½ ¼4½ ,-vkbZ-vkj- 1988 lqfize dksVZ 1000 ¼5½ ,-vkbZ-vkj- 1960 lqfize dksVZ 1001 ¼6½ jktLFkku gkbZdksVZ us Hkh vusd izdj.kksa esa blh izdkj ds fu.kZ; fn;s gSaA 2- of.kZr fu;ekoyh ds fu;e 16 ¼9] 10 o 12½ ds vuqlkj Hkh tkap vf/kdkjh dh fjiksVZ dh udy ns dj vkjksih dks Li"Vhdj.k izLrqr djus dk volj fn;k tkuk vfuok;Z ekuk x;kA** (14). Having gone through the objection raised before the appellate authority, it was only for the sake of objection. The petitioner appellant, in the memo of appeal, has nowhere stated that what prejudice has been caused to him on account of non- supply of the enquiry report. Having gone through the objection raised before the appellate authority, it was only for the sake of objection. The petitioner appellant, in the memo of appeal, has nowhere stated that what prejudice has been caused to him on account of non- supply of the enquiry report. Unless it is specifically pleaded and proved to the satisfaction of the court, merely on this technical plea raised in the case, the enquiry cannot be ordered to be vitiated nor the order of penalty can be quashed and set aside. The petitioner appellant has not found it a point of merit and substance, which is borne out from the fact that before the learned Single Judge no such ground was taken, the reference may have to the para Nos. 15 (a) to 15 (e) of the writ petition. This is another ground on which the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner appellant deserves no acceptance. (15). The matter does not end here. In the memo of appeal this point has also not been raised. During the course of argument the learned counsel for the petitioner appellant has failed to point out what prejudice is caused to the petitioner appellant due to non supply of the copy of the enquiry report. (16). Re the third contention, the appellate authority, under the impugned order, has affirmed the order of the disciplinary authority. Where the order of the disciplinary authority is affirmed, it is not necessary for the appellate authority to give out the detailed reasons. It is not the case where the grounds taken by the petitioner appellant in the memo of appeal have not been referred by the appellate authority. A detailed decision is required by the appellate authority only on reversal of the finding and setting aside the order of the disciplinary authority and that is not the case here. (17). That apart, merely on the ground that it is not the speaking order, normally the writ petition is not to be accepted. Reason is very obvious the court has considered the matter on merits. When the learned Single Judge has not found any merit in the case of the petitioner appellant, what benefit could have been fallen in the share of the petitioner appellant by remanding the matter to the appellate authority to pass a speaking order. Reason is very obvious the court has considered the matter on merits. When the learned Single Judge has not found any merit in the case of the petitioner appellant, what benefit could have been fallen in the share of the petitioner appellant by remanding the matter to the appellate authority to pass a speaking order. The substance and not the form, is most important, relevant and essential in the proceedings initiated by the delinquent employee under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Where we go by the substance of the matter we do not find any error in the order of the learned Single Judge impugned in this appeal. (18). In the impugned order, the learned Single Judge though mentioned as if the penalty of compulsory retirement was given to the petitioner appellant but it is apparently a typographical error and thereby no prejudice is caused to the petitioner appellant nor the order of the learned Single Judge vitiates. (19). As regards to the last contention raised, it is suffice to say that the petitioner appellant was the member of the disciplinary services i.e., police services where much more high standards of discipline is expected from every employee and the natural consequence of the misconduct of the nature committed by the petitioner appellant is his removal from the services. The justification given by the petitioner appellant for his long absence due to death of his son and illness of his wife, but it is hardly of any substance and relevance. On the death of a family member of an employee, we can appreciate, his absence duty for a short period is acceptable but that is not the case here. The petitioner appellant has not applied for leaves on account of the death of his son. It appears that his son has died during period of his wilful absence from the duty. (20). As regards to the explanation furnished for his absence on account of illness of his wife, it is suffice to say that though the medical certificates have been produced but it is not conclusive evidence of the illness of the wife and more so to justify his long absence from duty. In case his wife was seriously ill, he could have applied for the leaves on this ground but he did not do so. In case his wife was seriously ill, he could have applied for the leaves on this ground but he did not do so. The disciplinary authority is correct in its approach not to accept the medical certificate in the absence of prescription and the medical bills of purchase of medicines. It is also not the case of the petitioner appellant that his wife was admitted to the hospital. In case the wife of the petitioner appellant was so serious, he was to purchase the medicines or that she would have been hospitalized. No such evidence has been produced by the petitioner appellant in this respect. That apart even his wife was ill, we fail to see any justification in his long absence. The utmost important thing, both for the employee and his family, is that the employee performs his duties. Only a person, who has handsome source of livelihood in addition to his salary, can afford to remain absent from the duty without sanction of leave. It appears to be a concocted and manufactured defence of the petitioner appellant and rightly it has not been accepted by the disciplinary authority. Looking to the misconduct committed by the petitioner appellant and also his service record brought on the record by the respondents in their objections filed in the appeal, we are satisfied that it is not a case of disproportionate punishment given to the petitioner appellant by the disciplinary authority. (21). In the matter of punishment of the government servants in the disciplinary proceedings, it is no more res integra that the court has very very limited and circumscribed power of judicial review. Only where the penalty imposed upon the delinquent employee is shocking to the conscience of the court there may be a justification of its interference but not as of rule and that is not the case here. (22). As a result of the aforesaid discussion the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.