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2005 DIGILAW 1602 (BOM)

Deepak s/o. Vasant Kale v. State of Maharashtra

2005-11-28

A.P.LAVANDE, D.S.ZOTING

body2005
A. P. LA VANDE, J.:- The appellant (hereinafter referred to as accused) challenges the Judgment and Order dated 18th March, 2002 passed by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur in Sessions Trial No.258/99 convicting the appellant-accused for the offence under section 302 of I.P.C. and sentencing him to undergo life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.500/- and in default to undergo R.I. for six months. Since the accused was undergoing life imprisonment in respect of the offence of murder committed by him earlier, the sentence has been ordered to run after the accused undergoes the sentence of imprisonment in earlier case. The accused has been convicted for causing murder of his wife Lalita. 2. In nutshell, the case of the prosecution is as under :Deceased Lalita was wife of the accused. They had one daughter-Diksha. At the time of incident which occurred in the wee hours of 6th December, 1997 the accused was residing at Nagpur along with his wife and daughter as a tenant of Sa vita Karwade (P.W. 1). The accused was released on parole on 30-10-1997. In the wee hours of 6th December, 1997 Savita heard commotion from the house of the accused and, therefore, she rushed there to ascertain the cause of commotion. She found deceased Lalita burning. She extinguished the fire and Lalita informed her that she was set ablaze by her husband-the accused. The victim was rushed to Government Medical Hospital, Nagpur. Her relatives were informed about the incident. Dying declaration of deceased Lalita was recorded on the same day at about 7.20 p.m. by P.W. 6 Padmakar Bade. In the said dying declaration the victim implicated the accused as the person who has set her ablaze. Pursuant to the report (Exh.7) lodged by Savita, F.I.R. was registered under Section 302 of I.P.C. against the accused in Butibori Police Station. Pursuant to the said F.I.R. the investigation was conducted and after completion of the investigation charge-sheet was filed against the accused. Upon committal the charge under section 302 of I.P.C. was framed against the accused. During the course of the trial the prosecution examined eight witnesses and produced certain documents like spot panchanama, post mortem report etc. which were admitted by the accused. The defence of the accused was of total denial. Upon committal the charge under section 302 of I.P.C. was framed against the accused. During the course of the trial the prosecution examined eight witnesses and produced certain documents like spot panchanama, post mortem report etc. which were admitted by the accused. The defence of the accused was of total denial. The learned Additional Sessions Judge upon appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution convicted the accused under section 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced him as above. 3. We have heard Shri. Deshpande, the learned counsel for the appellant and Shri. Dhote and Shri. T. A. Mirza, learned Assistant Public Prosecutors for the respondent. 4. Mr. Deshpande, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the learned trial Court erred in placing reliance upon the testimony of P.W. 5 Diksha since her evidence clearly discloses that she was tutored to give evidence against the accused. He further submitted that no reliance could have been placed on the oral dying declaration allegedly made by deceased Lalita to P.W. 3 Ramesh Ganvir and P.W. 4 Gautam Dangre. He further submitted that no reliance could have been placed on the written dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate since there was no medical certificate issued by Doctor certifying mental and physical fitness of the deceased before recording her statement. He further submitted that the dying declaration is lengthy and detailed one which raises suspicion that the same is neither genuine nor voluntary. The dying declaration is also suspicious since according to P.W. 6 Padmakar he took right hand thumb impression of the deceased on the dying declaration which was impossible in view of the fact that the deceased had suffered 96% of burns. According to the learned· counsel the prosecution has not adduced any evidence to prove the presence of the accused in the house at the time of the alleged commission of the offence. He further argued that non-examination of the doctor who had given certificate of fitness before recording the dying declaration by Padmakar is fatal to the prosecution case. According to the learned counsel, the C.A. report submitted by the prosecution is not in connection with the present case and as such the absence of C.A. report is fatal to the prosecution case. According to the learned counsel, the C.A. report submitted by the prosecution is not in connection with the present case and as such the absence of C.A. report is fatal to the prosecution case. Lastly, he submitted that the learned Additional Sessions Judge could not have awarded the sentence of life consecutively in view of Section 427(2) of Cr.P.C. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel relied upon the following Judgments: (i) Chhagan Dame Vs. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1994 Supreme Court 454; (ii) Manoranjan Singh Vs. State of Delhi, 1998 Cr. L.J. 2062; (iii) thacko Vs. State of Kerala, AIR 2003 Supreme Court 265 : [2003 ALL MR (Cri) 998 (S.C.)]; (iv) Smt. Laxmi Vs. Oin Prakash and others, AIR 2001 Supreme Court 2383; (v) H.C. Puttaswamy Vs. The Hon’ble Chief Justice of Karnataka, AIR 1991 Supreme Court 296. 5. Per contra, Mr. Dhote, the learned A.P.P. submitted that there is a cogent evidence led by the prosecution to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt against the accused. He submitted that Diksha was a natural eyewitness to the incident and her evidence inspires confidence. He then submitted that although the doctor who gave certificate before recording the dying declaration by Padmakar has not been examined that by itself is not fatal since the fact that such certificate was given by a doctor has been clearly established. The evidence of Ramesh Ganvir and Gautam Dangre proves the oral dying declarations made by the deceased to them and there is absolutely no reason to disbelieve these witnesses. He further submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge are borne out from the evidence on record and, therefore, no interference is called for in the appeal. Mr. Mirza, learned A.P.P. who was requested to assist the Court placed reliance on the following Judgment: Kamalnath Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2005 SCC (Cri) 1121. 6. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned A.P.P. We have perused the records. The evidence led and the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution to prove the offence against the accused can be grouped under the following heads. (i) Direct evidence of Diksha Kale; (ii) Written dying declarations; (iii) Oral dying declaration; (iv) Medical evidence; (v) Conduct of the accused; (vi) Other evidence like inquest report; spot panchanama etc. 7. The evidence led and the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution to prove the offence against the accused can be grouped under the following heads. (i) Direct evidence of Diksha Kale; (ii) Written dying declarations; (iii) Oral dying declaration; (iv) Medical evidence; (v) Conduct of the accused; (vi) Other evidence like inquest report; spot panchanama etc. 7. Since the prosecution claims that Diksha, the daughter of the accused and the deceased was an eye-witness to the incident, it would be necessary to analyze her evidence first. She deposed that her mother was set on fire by her father and the incident had occurred at Butibori in the evening. Her father was demanding money from her mother who had no money and, therefore, she refused to give money. The accused tied the legs and hands of her mother and poured kerosene on her body and set her ablaze. The witness was confronted with her police statement and omissions regarding demand of money by the accused from the deceased as well as tying the legs and hands of deceased have been brought on record. She has further admitted in the cross-examination that her maternal uncle told her that her father set her mother on fire. Since Diksha is a child witness, who was about 4 years old at the time of the incident and 8 years old at the time of her deposition, her evidence requires closer scrutiny. It is also not disputed that her statement was recorded on 1212-1997 i.e. six days after the incident. After careful analysis of the evidence of this witness we are unable to place any reliance on her testimony for several reasons. Firstly, she has admitted in her cross-examination that her maternal uncle told her that her father set her mother on fire. Secondly, according to the prosecution, the incident took place at about 5 a.m. and the witness stated that the incident occurred in the evening. Thirdly, the statement of this witness was recorded after a period of six days and there is absolutely no explanation as to why there was so much delay in recording the statement of this witness although she was available. For all these reasons, we are unable to place any reliance on her testimony. It may be that at the time of the incident she was sleeping and she had not actually seen the incident. 8. For all these reasons, we are unable to place any reliance on her testimony. It may be that at the time of the incident she was sleeping and she had not actually seen the incident. 8. The prosecution also relies upon two written dying declarations (Exh. 29 and 36) made by deceased Lalita. In order to prove the dying declaration (Exh.29) the prosecution examined P.W. 6 Padmakar Bade who at the relevant time was acting as Special Judicial Magistrate, Nagpur. He deposed that he proceeded to Govt. Medical College, Nagpur after receiving requisition from Butibori Police Station at about 8.20 p.m. on 6-12-1997. He issued requisition to the House Officer to certify whether the patient i.e. Lalita was in a fit condition to make statement or not. After examining the patient, he issued the certificate about her condition and accordingly made an endorsement on the requisition. He further deposed that before recording the statement he made endorsement that neither any relative of the patient nor the Police Officer was present near her and then he recorded the statement in question answer form. After recording the statement he read over the contents to her and then obtained her thumb impression and thereafter he signed it. The witness has identified the requisition (Exh.28) and the statement i.e. Dying declaration (Exh.29). In cross-examination he admitted that the House Officer had not endorsed that the patient was mentally and physically fit to make statement and no such endorsement was made on Exh.29. He has denied the suggestion that the deceased did not make any statement before him and that he was deposing falsely at the instance of the police. The dying declaration (Exh.29) clearly implicates the accused as the person who poured kerosene on Lalita and set her ablaze by lighting match stick. It is further stated in the said dying declaration that after setting her ablaze the accused ran away from the house and when Lalita caught fire she raised loud shouts and her landlady Savita came to her house, put a blanket on her and extinguished the fire. Thereafter, P.W. 1 Savita and another man brought her in a vehicle and admitted her in the Government Medical Hospital, Nagpur for treatment. Thereafter, P.W. 1 Savita and another man brought her in a vehicle and admitted her in the Government Medical Hospital, Nagpur for treatment. Upon close scrutiny of the dying declaration (Exh.29) and the evidence of Padmakar (P.W. 6) we have no hesitation to hold that the dying declaration recorded by Shri. Padmakar is truthful and voluntary and as such inspires confidence. Moreover, the dying declaration also stands corroborated by Medical Evidence i.e. post mortem report as well as by the evidence of Savita who has also deposed that she upon hearing cries of Lalita came to her house, put a blanket and extinguished the fire: Although Savita has not supported the prosecution fully and has been permitted to be cross-examined by the prosecution, in so far as the statement made in the dying declaration by the deceased that Savita extinguished the fire stands corroborated by the evidence of Savita. We are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Deshpande that since the doctor who examined deceased Lalita has not been examined by the prosecution the dying declaration does not inspire confidence in view of the fact that Lalita was having 96% burns. No doubt, it was expected of the prosecution to examine the doctor who had certified that the patient was fit for giving statement upon requisition being made by the Special Executive Magistrate. However, the fact remains that the Executive Magistrate clearly deposed that before recording the dying declaration the House Officer had examined the patient and certified about her condition to make the statement. In view of this position we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Deshpande that non-examination of the doctor who had made endorsement on the requisition that the patient was fit to make statement is fatal. We are also unable to accept the submission of Mr. Deshpande that the dying declaration cannot be accepted in view of the fact that the right hand thumb impression of the deceased could not have been taken on the dying declaration as she was having 96% burns. Nothing has been brought on record to establish that the deceased was not in a position to give the thumb impression on the dying declaration. The dying declaration recorded by Padmakar is also corroborated by the dying declaration (Exh.36) recorded by P.W. 7 Vasant Donade who was at the relevant time attached to Butibori Police Station. Nothing has been brought on record to establish that the deceased was not in a position to give the thumb impression on the dying declaration. The dying declaration recorded by Padmakar is also corroborated by the dying declaration (Exh.36) recorded by P.W. 7 Vasant Donade who was at the relevant time attached to Butibori Police Station. P.W.7 Vasant deposed that on 6-12-1997 he was directed to record the dying declaration of Lalita as per the report lodged by Savita. Before recording the statement of Lalita he got certificate of fitness from the doctor who after examining her certified her fit to make statement. He further deposed that Lalita told him that the accused set her ablaze by pouring kerosene on her. He further deposed that he obtained her thumb impression as she was unable to put her signature on the statement. He confirmed the contents of the Statement Exh.36 as having been recorded as per the say of Lalita. After considering the evidence of P.W. 7 Vasant and the statement (Exh.36) recorded by him, we find no reason to disbelieve the evidence of this witness as well as the dying corroborates the dying declaration (Exh.29) recorded by P.W. 6 Padmakar Bade on material aspects. Thus, we have no hesitation to hold that both the dying declarations relied upon by the prosecution are voluntary and truthful and as such inspire confidence. 9. The written dying declarations also stand corroborated by oral dying declarations made by Lalita to P.W. 3 Ramesh Ganvir and P.W. 4 Gautam Dangre. Ramesh deposed that Lalita was her sister-in-law and she along with her husband was residing at Butibori. Ajay, his brother-in-law informed him that Lalita was admitted in Ward no.39 in Govt. Medical Hospital, Nagpur and therefore, he went to the hospital with his wife Chandrakala to meet her. He talked to.Lalita and Lalita told him that her husband had set her ablaze by pouring kerosene on her person and by lighting match stick. In the cross-examination he denied that because of excessive burns Lalita could not talk coherently and that Lalita did not tell him as to how and who set her on fire. Gautam Dangre (P.W. 4) deposed that accused was his brother-in-law i.e. his sister's husband and they were married in 1992. In the cross-examination he denied that because of excessive burns Lalita could not talk coherently and that Lalita did not tell him as to how and who set her on fire. Gautam Dangre (P.W. 4) deposed that accused was his brother-in-law i.e. his sister's husband and they were married in 1992. The accused was in jail in a murder case and when he was on parole he resided at Butibori in the house of Vasant. He further deposed that Savita Karwade told him that Lalita's husband set heron fire and ran away and that Lalita was admitted in the Government Medical Hospital, Nagpur. Therefore, he visited the hospital and met Lalita there. Lalita told him that her husband set her ablaze by pouring kerosene on her person and by lighting match stick. Lalita died on 7-12-1997 and he performed funeral rites of Lalita. But, the accused neither attended the funeral nor visited Lalita in the hospital. The accused was also not present when Lalita was admitted at Govt. Medical Hospital, Nagpur. In cross-examination he admitted that Lalita was shouting loudly due to bums. The Executive Magistrate had recorded her dying declaration. Lalita did not give her dying declaration in his presence or in presence of Siddharth or anybody else. He denied the suggestion that Lalita could not talk properly because of bum injuries and that his sister never told him that her husband set her on fire. The evidence of the above two witnesses which has not been shaken in the cross-examination clearly establishes that oral dying declarations were made by Lalita to both of them. It is pertinent to note that both are close relatives of Lalita and as such their visits to the hospital after they learnt that Lalita was burnt was quite natural. It was also natural for Lalita to disclose to these witnesses as to how she had sustained bum injuries. We are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Deshpande that since both these witnesses are close relatives of deceased Lalita, the evidence of these two witnesses should not be accepted. In our opinion, the evidence of both these witnesses establishes that the oral dying declarations were made by the deceased to both of them. Thus, these two oral dying declarations also corroborate the written dying declarations. 10. The next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is that the death of Lalita was homicidal. In our opinion, the evidence of both these witnesses establishes that the oral dying declarations were made by the deceased to both of them. Thus, these two oral dying declarations also corroborate the written dying declarations. 10. The next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is that the death of Lalita was homicidal. Post mortem report (Exh.12) which was admitted by the accused discloses that the post mortem on the dead body of Lalita was carried out by Dr. Ansari at Government Medical Hospital, Nagpur and there were 96% burn injuries. According to the post mortem report, the cause of death was on account of shock due to burns. The post-mortem report also stands corroborated by inquest panchanama (Exh.14) which discloses that the cheeks, chest abdomen and legs of Lalita were burnt. Hence, the homicidal death of Lalita stands conclusively proved. 11. The prosecution examined P.W. 1 Savita Karwade in whose house the accused was residing along with deceased and Diksha at the relevant time. She deposed that on the fateful day she returned home at about 4 p.m. and at that time accused, his wife and daughters were in the house. Thereafter, early in the morning at about 4.00 a.m. she heard noise of the victim and after going to the house of the accused she saw deceased Lalita burning. She extinguished the fire. She took the victim in the vehicle of Arun to the Govt. Medical Hospital, Nagpur and got her admitted. This witness was permitted to be cross-examined by the prosecution since she did not support the prosecution on two aspects i.e. the presence of the accused at the time she saw Lalita burning and secondly the fact that the victim told her that her husband set her ablaze and thereafter ran away. Although the witness was confronted with her police statement the witness stated that it was incorrectly recorded by the police. Although this witness had not supported the prosecution on crucial aspects the evidence of the witness clearly establishes that in the wee hours of 6-12-1997 she went to the house of the accused where she saw Lalita burning and she extinguished the fire on the body of the deceased. Although this witness had not supported the prosecution on crucial aspects the evidence of the witness clearly establishes that in the wee hours of 6-12-1997 she went to the house of the accused where she saw Lalita burning and she extinguished the fire on the body of the deceased. P.W. 2 Sheela Deshmukh who was at the relevant time residing in a room belonging to Sa vita which was adjacent to the premises occupied by the deceased did not support the prosecution and claimed complete ignorance about the incident. She was cross-examined by the prosecution. In cross-examination she admitted that Savita and her husband went to the police station for lodging report. She denied that she saw Savita extinguishing fire on the body of the deceased and the accused running away from the spot. The evidence of Sheela Deshmukh (P. W. 2) does not advanced the case of the prosecution any further. 12. The next circumstances relied upon by the prosecution is the conduct of the accused. Although Savita and Sheela have not supported the prosecution in so far as the fact of the accused running away from the spot after Lalita was seen in flame by both these witnesses, is concerned, however, the evidence of P.W. 4 Gautam establishes that the accused neither came to see his wife in the hospital where she was in a very critical condition nor did he attended her funeral which was performed by Gautam. The conduct of the accused soon after the commission of the offence also lends assurance to the prosecution case. The evidence of Savita that accused was present in the house along with deceased and their daughter Diksha at about 4 p.m. on 5-12-1997 which has not been even challenged by the accused establishes that the accused was in the house on 5-12-1997 at 4 p.m.. The conduct of the accused in not visiting his wife in the hospital and not attending her funeral coupled with the fact that the accused has not offered any explanation as to where he was in the wee hours of 6-12-1997, also lends credence to the prosecution case. 13. The conduct of the accused in not visiting his wife in the hospital and not attending her funeral coupled with the fact that the accused has not offered any explanation as to where he was in the wee hours of 6-12-1997, also lends credence to the prosecution case. 13. The spot panchanama (Exh.l0) conducted on 7-12-1997 in the house where the accused was residing along with the deceased establishes that the piece of burnt petticoat which was one the person of the deceased was emanating smell of kerosene and there was on soiled green coloured plastic can kept below the cooking platform with a match box near it. Both these articles were seized under the seizure memo (Exh.ll). The spot panchanama which was not disputed by the accused clearly establishes the presence of kerosene on the petticoat of the deceased. This fact also corroborates the version given by the deceased in her written as well as oral dying declaration. We are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Deshpande that in the absence of C. A. report regarding the articles seized it can not be said that there was kerosene on the petticoat of the deceased. No doubt the prosecution has not produced the C.A. report in respect of the articles which were sent to the Chemical Analyser but has produced the C.A. report which is not connected with this case. This fact by itself in the absence of any challenge to the spot panchanama cannot help the accused. The dying declarations, written as well as oral, also stand corroborated by inquest panchanama (Exh.14) which discloses that cheeks, chest, abdomen and legs of Lalita were burnt. Thus, we have no hesitation to hold that the dying declarations made by the deceased can safely be accepted as truthful and voluntary in view of the corroboration from inquest panchanama and spot panchanama. 14. Having regard to the prosecution evidence to which we have made detailed reference, we are satisfied that the prosecution has been able to establish that it was the accused who set Lalita ablaze by pouring kerosene on her and lighting the same with match stick which cause her severe burn injuries to the extent of 96% which resulted in her death. From the very nature of the act committed by the accused and having regard to the medial evidence it is very clear that the accused intended to cause injuries to Lalita by pouring kerosene on her and lighting match stick which resulted in servere burn injuries, which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally caused murder of Lalita. Therefore, the conviction recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge for offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. cannot be faulted and requires no interference. 15. We shall now deal with the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. In Chhagan Dame Vs. The State of Gujarat (AIR 1994 SUPREME COURT 454) the Apex Court held that it was unsafe to rely upon the evidence of child witness who was under influence of tutoring. In the present case we are not placing any reliance on the evidence of child witness Diksha whose evidence does not inspire confidence. In State of Punjab Vs. Gain Kaur and another (1918 Cri.L.J. 2061) the Apex Court while upholding the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court held that the High Court was justified in not relying upon the dying declaration in view of the fact that the deceased had 100% burns and the thumb mark of the deceased appearing on the dying declaration had clear ridges and curves and as such the dying declaration could not be accepted. In the present case, although the victim was having 96% burns, nothing has been brought on record to establish that the deceased was not in a position to give her right hand thumb impression on the dying declaration. Therefore, this authority also does not help the accused. In Chacko Vs. State of Kerala (AIR 2003 SUPREME COURT 265 : 2003 ALL MR (Cri) 998 (S.C.), the Apex Court while allowing the appeal of the accused against conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code held that the dying declaration given by the deceased who was 70 years old having 80% burn injuries which was made about 8-9 hours after the incident giving material details of motive and manner of the incident created doubt about its genuineness. Moreover, there was no certificate of Doctor although the Doctor was very much available and the contents of the documents were so arranged so as to accommodate the space above thumb impression. In the present case the facts are clearly distinguishable and as such this judgment also does not advance the case of the accused. In Smt. Laxmi Vs. Om Prakash and others (AIR 2001 SUPREME COURT 2383), the Apex Court refused to rely upon dying declaration in the absence of medical evidence showing that the deceased was in a fit physical and mental condition at the time of giving statement. The facts in this case are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the present case and as such this authority also does not help the accused. 16. The next question which arises for our consideration is whether the learned Additional Sessions Judge was justified in making sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on the accused in this case to run after the earlier sentences of imprisonment imposed on him in another murder case. We find considerable merit in the submission of Mr. Deshpande, the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial Court was not legally justified to pass such an order. Sub-section (2) of Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as under: "(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence." Upon bare reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 427, it is clear that a person who is undergoing the sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. The learned counsel is justified in placing reliance upon the Judgment of the Apex Court reported in Ranjit Singh Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh and another (AIR 1991 Supreme Court 2296) in support of his submission that the sentence of life imprisonment cannot be ordered to run consecutively when the accused is sentenced to undergo life imprisonment in subsequent case. The learned counsel is justified in placing reliance upon the Judgment of the Apex Court reported in Ranjit Singh Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh and another (AIR 1991 Supreme Court 2296) in support of his submission that the sentence of life imprisonment cannot be ordered to run consecutively when the accused is sentenced to undergo life imprisonment in subsequent case. In Ranjit Singh's case (supra) the Apex Court clarified its Judgment reported in AIR 1984 Supreme Court 45 by which the death sentence imposed on the appellant was reduced to suffer R.I. for life and the sentence of imprisonment for life was ordered not to run concurrently with his earlier sentence with a further direction that in case any remission or commutation in respect of his earlier sentence is granted to him, the sentence should commence thereafter. In the said Judgment the Apex Court held that although the subsequent sentence of imprisonment for life was to run concurrently with the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life in case any remission or communication in respect of his earlier sentence was granted to him, the subsequent sentence imposed should commence thereafter. The question whether the life imprisonment is equivalent to fixed period i.e. for 14 or 20 years is no more res intergra and stands concluded by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court, the latest being Md. Munna Vs. Union of India reported in 2005 AIR Supreme Court Weekly 4524 : 2006 ALLMR (Cri) 217 (S.C.). In the said Judgment the Apex Court relied upon the Constitution Bench Judgment of the Apex Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse Vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1961 Supreme Court 600). In Godse's case, the Apex Court observed as follows: "It does not say that transportation for life shall be deemed to be for transportation for 20 years for the purpose; nor does amended section which substitutes the words "imprisonment for life" for "transportation for life" enable the drawing of any such all embracing fiction. A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural life." In Prakash Khaimar Vs. A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural life." In Prakash Khaimar Vs. State of Maharashtra (2002(2) Supreme Court Cases 35) the Apex Court while setting aside the death sentence imposed on the appellant by the trial Court which was confirmed by this Court, sentenced the appellant accused to imprisonment for life with a further direction that he shall not be released unless he had served at least 20 years of imprisonment including the period already undergone by the appellant. In the said Judgment, the Apex Court made a reference to paragraph 14 of the Judgment of the Apex Court in Dalbir Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1979)3 SCC (Cri) 848 which reads as under: "14. The sentences of death in the present appeal are liable to be reduced to life imprisonment. We may add a footnote to the ruling in Rajendra Prasad Vs. State of U.P. Taking the cue from the English legislation on abolition, we may suggest that life imprisonment which strictly means imprisonment for the whole of the man's life, but in practice amounts to incarceration for a period between 10 to 14 years may, at the option of the convicting court, be subject to the condition that the sentence of imprisonment shall last as long as life lasts where there are exceptional indications of murderous recidivism and the community cannot run the risk of the convict being at large. This takes care of judicial apprehensions that unless physically liquidated the culprit may at some remote time repeat murder." In Ram Anup Singh and others Vs. State of Bihar, (2002)6 SCC 686 ), the Apex Court set aside the death sentence awarded by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court to the appellants and sentenced them to suffer R.I. for life with a condition that they shall not be released before completing the actual terms of 20 years including the period already undergone by them. In Shri. Bhagwan Vs. In Shri. Bhagwan Vs. State of Rajasthan (2001)6 Supreme Court Cases 296) the Apex Court commuted the death sentence imposed upon the appellant and directed that the appellant shall undergo the sentence of imprisonment for life and further directed that the appellant shall not be released from the prison unless he had served out at least 20 years of imprisonment including the period already undergone by the appellant. In Jayawant Dattatraya Suryarao Vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2002 Supreme Court 143 : 2002 ALL MR (Cri) 940 (S.C.)) the Apex Court set aside the death sentence imposed on the appellant and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life with a further direction that the accused will not be entitled to any communication or pre-mature release under section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Jail Manual or any other Statutes and the Rules made for the purpose of communication and remission. The Apex Court in the case of Kamalnath Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2005 Supreme Court Cases 1121) relied upon by learned A.P.P. confirmed the conviction of the appellant for various offences including the murder and upheld the order of the trial Court by which the trial Court had ordered that any remission of sentence or amnesty in a special occasion announced by the Central or the State Government on shall not apply to the sentence of imprisonment imposed of the accused. 17. In view of the above judgments of the Apex Court it is clear that the imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the rest of the life of the convict and that the Court convicting the accused can direct that the accused who is sentenced to life imprisonment shall not be released for the remainder of his life or till he completes a fixed minimum period which obviously cannot be less than 14 years in view of Section 433-A of Criminal Procedure Code. Considering the fact that the accused committed murder of his wife when he was released on parole while undergoing the sentence of imprisonment for life for having committed murder, we are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be served if the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on him is ordered to run concurrently with the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life in terms of Section 427(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the condition that he will not be released before completing the actual terms of 20 years including the period already undergone by him. 18. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the conviction of the appellant for the offence under section 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. However, the accused shall not be released before completing actual term of 20 years including the period already undergone. The order of the trial Court in so far as it directs the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on him in the present case to run after the accused undergoes the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life is set aside. In so far as imposition of fine is concerned, the order of the trial Court is maintained. The appeal is disposed of in aforesaid terms.