JUDGMENT 1. - These six miscellaneous appeals arise out of the award, dated 7.4.1997, of the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Tonk, passed in six motor accident claim cases. Different claimants filed the claim cases arising out of one and same automobile accident took place on 29.8.1992. In the accident two vehicles are involved. The learned Tribunal held that the drivers of these two vehicles were equally negligent for the accident in question. 2. The respondent no. 3, the United India Insurance Company Limited (hereinafter shall be referred to as 'the respondent Company') is the insurer of one vehicle. The claimants did not implead the owner and the insurer of another vehicle, involved in the accident, as party to the claim petitions. 3. The learned tribunal, on the objection of the respondent Company, held it liable to make the payment of the compensation to the claimants only to the extent of 50% thereof, thus these appeals by the claimant appellants. 4. The only contention raised by the learned counsel for the claimant appellants is that the learned trial court has committed a serious illegality in limiting the liability of the respondent Company of the payment of the amount of compensation awarded in favour of the claimant appellants only to the extent of 50% thereof. In his submission it was not the case of contributory negligence but that of composite negligence i.e. the negligence was of two drivers of two vehicles and they were the tort-feasors and it is urged that they are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation and the claimant appellants are entitled to recover the amount of compensation from both the tort-feasors or against any one as their liability is joint and several. 5. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the claimant appellants placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Sampat Kunwar Bai & Another v. Gurmeet Singh & Another, 1988 ACJ 342 . 6. Shri R.K. Sharma, holding the brief on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondent no. 3, prays for deferment of hearing of the matter on the ground that Shri Bhanwar Bagri, the learned counsel for the respondent no. 3, is busy elsewhere. I find no justification in this prayer made for deferment of hearing of the matter on two counts; first, it is not given out where Mr. 3, prays for deferment of hearing of the matter on the ground that Shri Bhanwar Bagri, the learned counsel for the respondent no. 3, is busy elsewhere. I find no justification in this prayer made for deferment of hearing of the matter on two counts; first, it is not given out where Mr. Bhanwar Bagri is busy and secondly, this matter is squarely covered by the decision of this Court Sampat Kunwar Bai & Another v. Gurmeet Singh & Another (supra) and thus it is not of any use to defer the haring of the matter. 7. Having given my anxious and thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the claimant appellants I am satisfied that the respondent no. 3 is jointly and severally liable for making the payment of the amount of compensation awarded in favour of the claimant appellants. 8. In the matter of composite liability, that is where the accident occurred due to the negligence of drivers of two vehicles and therein a person dies or sustains injuries, the claimants are entitled legally to recover the amount of compensation from both the tort-feasors or against any one as their liability is joint and several. Even if the owner or the insurance company of either of the vehicle is not impleaded as party to the claim petition, it will not materially affect the merits of the claim made by the claimants. My this view is supported by the decision of this Court in the case of Sampat Kunwar Bai & Another v. Gurmeet Sigh & Another, 1988 ACJ 342 and I would like to refer here para no. 9 of that decision, which reads as under: "9. In the instant case, only two witnesses are relevant, one produced for the claimant appellant, namely, Abdul Ahmed PW-3 and Gurmeet Singh, the driver. The relevancy is also of the statement of the SHO Amar Singh DW-2 so far as he proved the site plan. It can be said on the basis of the site plan Exh.A-2 that metalled road is 9 ft. wide the width of the truck can be taken as 6 1/2ft. Thus, the metalled road was such that two trucks could not have passed on it together. Truck No. DHG 188 was coming from the side of Devli, whereas the other truck No. RSL 1645 was coming from the opposite direction. wide the width of the truck can be taken as 6 1/2ft. Thus, the metalled road was such that two trucks could not have passed on it together. Truck No. DHG 188 was coming from the side of Devli, whereas the other truck No. RSL 1645 was coming from the opposite direction. It was a place where there was a slope and when truck No. DHG 188 was ascending and when truck No. RSL 1645 was coming down from the slope, the accident took place. At a place where there is a slope, both the drivers owe a duty to see as to whether there is a truck or other vehicle coming from the opposite side or not? Brakes should also be applied and a look at Exh. A-2 will show that no signs or marks of applying breakes by any driver were there. Truck No. DHG 188 was at its left side and some portion of its left tyres were in kacha. It has come in the statement of Abdul Ahmed AW-3 that he was a constable posted at police outpost Polyanda and was returning in truck No. RSL 1645 from Tonk to police outpost Polyanda. He says that at about 7 a.m. a truck No. DHG 188 was coming from the side of Devli at a fast speed and near the police station Polyanda collided with truck No. RSL 1645. Truck No. RSL 1645 was coming with a slow speed. As a result of the accident the driver of the truck No. RSL 1645 and one boy who was sitting in the same died on the spot. He also received some injuries. He told about the accident to Tej Singh and asked him to make a report. He says that initially the truck from the opposite direction i.e., truck No. DHG 188 was on the wrong side. There can be no dispute that AW-3 was sitting in truck No. RSL 1645. It is not unusual for a police constable to stop the truck and travel in it. Gurmeet Singh DW3 was the driver of the truck No. DHG 188. He has stated that truck No. RSL 1645 was coming at a fast speed and he stopped his truck and took it on one side. It is not unusual for a police constable to stop the truck and travel in it. Gurmeet Singh DW3 was the driver of the truck No. DHG 188. He has stated that truck No. RSL 1645 was coming at a fast speed and he stopped his truck and took it on one side. A look at the reply filed on behalf of Gurmeet Singh will show that a case was not set up that truck No. DHG 188 was stopped or was stationary at the time of the accident. It has been stated in para 9 that truck No. DHG 188 was proceeding in a normal speed on its side. Therefore, it can be said that the drivers of both the trucks did not apply any brakes and the accident took place as a result of which the deceased, Veerendra Kumar and Narain in truck No. RSL 1645 lost their lives. It is not the case that Veerendra Kumar in any way contributed to any negligence. In the case of Andhra Marine Exports (P) Ltd., Quilon v. R Radhakrishan, 1984 ACJ 355 (Madras) , it was held in para 3 that: "When a person is injured without any negligence on his part, but as a result of negligence on the part of the other person or as a result of the combined negligence of two other persons, it is not a case of contributory negligence. The term 'contributory negligence' squarely and solely applied to the conduct of the claimant alone. If the claimant is guilty of an act or omission which has materially contributed to the accident and the resultant injury and damages, the matter comes within the concept of contributory negligence and courts are enjoined to apportion the loss between the parties as the facts and circumstances may justify." The court again said in para 4: "The principle of 'composite negligence' is, where more than one person are responsible in the commission of the wrong, the person wronged has a choice of proceeding against all or anyone or more than one of wrongdoers. Every wrongdoer is liable for the whole damage if it is otherwise made out, and it does not lie in the mouth of one wrongdoer to say though I am also responsible, yet, the other man was also equally responsible for the wrong and on this basis he cannot avoid the liability to the person wronged." It can, therefore, be said that in case a person is injured without any negligence on his part and he in no way contributed to the negligence, no case of contributory negligence, no question of apportionment of compensation is made out. In case an accident occurs in which a person dies and the accident is the result of the composite negligence of both the parties it is open for the legal representatives of the deceased to claim compensation from the joint tortfeasors who are liable joint or severally . This court (G.M. Lodha, J.), in the case of Mohan Lal v. Balwant Kaur, 1985 (1) ACC 322 , held that the joint tortfeasors are jointly liable in the accident cases for the negligence, can be made liable jointly and severally. A logical and legal deduction from the above is that the claimant can choose to file claim petition against any one of them and recover the damages from anyone of them. It was further held that the contention that unless the joint tortfeasors are made parties, a claim petition cannot survive, is not supported by any decision. In view of the learned Judge joint tortfeasors may be proper parties but cannot be necessary parties." 9. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, all these appeals succeed. e decision of the learned Tribunal on issue no. 3 restricting thereunder the liability of the respondent no. 3 of payment of the amount of compensation to 50% thereof is set aside and the respondent no. 3 Company is held liable to make payment of the entire amount of compensation to the claimant appellants awarded in their favour by the learned Tribunal with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition.In the facts of these cases there shall be no order as to costs.All appeal allowed. *******