Steel Authority Of India Ltd. v. State Of Jharkhand Through Deputy Commissioner
2005-02-22
HARI SHANKAR PRASAD, M.Y.EQBAL
body2005
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT M.Y. Eqbal, J. 1. Since the points involved in all the Letters Patent Appeals are common, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. These Letters Patent Appeals, at the instance of the appellant-Steel Authority of India Limited, are directed against the judgment and order dated 15.12.2001 whereby and whereunder, the learned Judge has allowed all the Miscellaneous Appeals being MA No. 116 to 134 of 2000 (R) filed by the State of Bihar, now Jharkhand, and remanded the matter to the Executing Court for fresh decision. 3. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. The erstwhile State of Bihar issued notifications in the years 1956 and 1964 for acquisition of land at villages Sangjori, Marafari, Pipar Tanr and other villages for construction of Iron and Steel Plant at Bokaro. After issuing subsequent notification under Sections 6 and 9 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as "The Act"), awards were prepared. The awardees filed applications for reference under Section 18 of the said Act which were registered as several reference cases in the Court of the Land Acquisition Judge, Bokaro at Chas. The compensation amount awarded by the Collector was enhanced in each reference cases. Several execution cases were levied for the recovery of the award amount by the awardees against the judgment debtor-State of Bihar. The decree holder-awardees filed application in the Executing Court for attachment of properties of the judgment debtor and the order of attachment was passed. The State of Bihar thereafter filed objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure stating, inter-alia, that the compensation amount was liable to be paid by the Managing Director, Bokaro Steel Plant, as the lands were acquired for the purpose of the Plant which has stepped into the shoes of the Hindustan Steel Limited. In some of the execution cases, decree holders also filed applications under Order XXI Rule 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure for attaching the property of the Bokaro Steel Plant treating them as Garnishee of the State of Bihar. Pursuant to that, the Bokaro Steel Plant filed objection and denied their liability to pay the compensation amount as, according to them, the lands, were acquired under Chapter 11 of the Act for public purpose and at public expenses.
Pursuant to that, the Bokaro Steel Plant filed objection and denied their liability to pay the compensation amount as, according to them, the lands, were acquired under Chapter 11 of the Act for public purpose and at public expenses. It is worth to mention here that against the decree and award passed by the Land Acquisition Judge in one of the reference case i.e. Reference Case No. 360 of 1976, the State of Bihar preferred FA No. 46 of 1991 (R) in this Court which is still pending. In the said appeal, the Managing Director, Bokaro Steel Plant was added as a party. 4. As noticed above, pursuant to the objection filed by the State of Bihar under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, about 19 Miscellaneous Cases were registered by the Executing Court. In those miscellaneous cases, both the State of Bihar and the Bokaro Steel Plant examined witnesses and also brought on record various documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. The question of maintainability of Garnishee proceeding was also raised for consideration by the Executing Court. The Land Acquisition Judge being the Executing Court by a common order dated 14.6.2000 dismissed all 19 Miscellaneous Cases holding that the judgment debtor-State of Bihar has no right to file such an application as there was no order passed under Order XXI, Rule 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure attaching debt and prohibiting the other side in accordance with the provisions of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 46 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Executing Court further held that the award and decree is not binding on the Steel Authority of India Limited being the successor of the Bokaro Steel Limited. By the said order, the Executing Court also dismissed eleven applications filed by the awardees-decree holders holding that they failed to prove that the Managing Director, Bokaro Steel Plant was the Garnishee of the State and was liable to satisfy the decree. 5. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent-State of Bihar herein, now State of Jharkhand, filed 19 Miscellaneous Appeals before this Court being Miscellaneous Appeal Nos. 116to 134 of 2000 (R).
5. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent-State of Bihar herein, now State of Jharkhand, filed 19 Miscellaneous Appeals before this Court being Miscellaneous Appeal Nos. 116to 134 of 2000 (R). All these appeals have been allowed by the learned Single Judge in terms of the impugned judgment and the matter has been remanded back to the Executing Court for fresh hearing, hence these appeals by the Steel Authority of India Limited. 6. Learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that at the stage of execution both the judgment debtor as well as the decree holder made request under Order I XXI, Rule 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure and on notice, the Bokaro Steel Plant denied its liability to satisfy the award passed under the Act. Learned Single Judge therefore held that it was the duty of the Executing Court under Rule 4(C) of the Act to decide the question raised by the parties and to determine the liability. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the State at length. 8. In course of argument, learned counsel appearing for the State Submitted that against the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge one of the decree holders of MA No. 119 of 2000 (R) moved before the Supreme Court in SLP No. 1396 of 2003. In that case the respondent-State was directed to deposit decreetal amount and it was held that the liability inter se between the State of Jharkhand and the Bokaro Steel Plant shall be decided by an appropriate forum. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of the order passed by the Supreme Court, execution of the case has become infructuous. I am unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel. In my opinion, in terms of direction of the Supreme Court the liability inter se has to be decided by the Executing Court. 10. Taking into consideration the order of the Supreme Court in SLP No. 1396 of 2003, the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge remitting the matter to the Executing Court for determination of liability by passing fresh reasoned order is fully justified. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in these appeals, which are, accordingly, dismissed.