JUDGMENT Hon’ble Bhanwar Singh. J.—All these petitions having common facts and law are taken together for decision. 2. All the petitioners have filed these petitions for a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the opposite-parties of the Forest Department and U.P. Forest Corporation (hereinafter to be known as ‘Corporation’) to reinstate the petitioners in service with all consequential benefits and allow them, in the meantime, to continue in service. 3. A prayer for another writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the notices/Retrenchment Orders and the Circular dated 7th February, 1995, contained in Annexures 21 to 31 (Writ Petition No. 880 (SS) of 1995) and similar other orders and notices has been made. 4. In brief, the facts giving rise to these petitions, may be stated as below:- The petitioners were initially engaged in the Corporation in the year 1982 and 1983. Whereas some of the petitioners were called as Scaler, a few were known as Field Assistants. However, subsequently, even the Field Assistants were placed as Scalers with effect from different dates as recited in the petitions. According to the Circular dated 30th August, 1979 issued by the Chairman and Managing Director of the Corporation, the names for recruitment of the Labourers on Daily Labour basis (hereinafter to be known as DL basis’) were to be solicited from the Employment Exchange and the selection had to be made on the basis of a written test. Then, a select list in the order of merit was to be prepared. Although such list should have been termed to be as merit list, but it was wrongly called as seniority list. The Circular also stipulated that the employees would be engaged in order of preference according to the seniority list. Besides that, a clear ban was inflicted on the direct recruitment of the pay bill Scaler, (i.e. regular appointment) and it was provided that on completion of two years’ satisfactory service, D.L. Scalers will be placed on pay bill. The similar procedure of the circular was later adopted in the Regulation 16 of the U.P. Forest Service Regulations as notified vide G.O. No. 606/14.4.87-810/83, dated 25th February, 1987 with effect from 1st February, 1985 (hereinafter referred to be as ‘Regulations’) for the purposes of engagement of Group employees including Scalers. All the petitioners passed the requisite test conducted by the Corporation for being placed on pay bill. All the petitioners passed the requisite test conducted by the Corporation for being placed on pay bill. However, when they were not placed on pay bill despite their long length of service, they were obliged to file writ petitions. Some of the petitioners then were appointed as Scalers in pursuance of the interim orders issued by the Court. Though it was clearly mentioned in the appointment and posting orders of the petitioners that the same would be subject to further orders of this Court that might be passed in the writ petitions filed by the petitioners, yet surprisingly the authorities of the Forest Department without seeking modification of the interim orders issued orders of reversion degrading them from pay bill to D.L. basis and this exercise was done in the camouflage of cancellation of earlier appointment and posting orders perhaps under the pretext of changing norms. The reversion orders as well as the modification norms were challenged by some of the petitioners in several writ petitions, viz., Writ Petitions No. 537, 538, 852, 899 and 1897 - all of 1993 (SS). The High Court intervened and directed the opposite-parties to retain the petitioners in service and pay them the same salary regularly which they were getting before the orders of reversion were issued. In compliance to the Court’s Orders, the petitioners were paid their salary in the old pay-scale of Rs. 320-460/- (unrevised). Although the petitioners were entitled to draw the intermediary difference of the salary payable against the pay bill and on the D.L. basis, yet their demand was not carried out. In the meantime, a bunch of writ petitions was decided by this Court and the authorities were asked to bring the petitioners on pay bill from D.L. basis. In spite of this judgment and the fact that the petitioners had already cleared the requisite test for being appointed on pay bill, the concerned authorities kept mum. Their representations too did not fetch them any result. 5. While the petitioners were waiting for being regularized, they got a blow when they were served with letters issued by the authorities concerned alongwith cheques consisting of a lump-sum amount in the name of balance salary and ex-gratia payment. The lump-sum amounts varied from one petitioner to another but all of them resented to the calculated move of the authorities to make payment on the basis of daily wages. The lump-sum amounts varied from one petitioner to another but all of them resented to the calculated move of the authorities to make payment on the basis of daily wages. The details of such payments were also not furnished in spite of specific demands. Even their joining reports submitted well in time were not accepted. A tentative seniority list was published on 14th November, 1994. Several juniors to the petitioners sought to be reverted from pay bill to D.L. basis under the pretext of the aforesaid judgment dated 12th July, 1994 preferred Special Appeals and the Appellate Court was pleased to direct the respondents not to give effect to their reversion. In this way, if the juniors to the petitioners were allowed to continue in service on pay bill, the petitioners will also be entitled to continue on the pay bills as they have been serving the Corporation for the last 12 years and all of them have already passed the requisite test. However, the petitioners were served with retrenchment notices/orders. The names of some of the petitioners were included in the list of surplus employees. As a matter of fact, the Managing Director of the Corporation issued a Circular on 7th February, 1995 whereupon the retrenchment orders were issued. The petitioners were aggrieved of such orders, even though juniors to them were retained in service. In November, 1992, i.e. much before the retrenchment orders, the names of the petitioners were shown in the list of 145 Scalers prepared by the Regional Manager for the Eastern Region. In these circumstances, the retrenchment orders of the petitioners were violative of the provisions of Section 25-P of the Industrial Disputes Act referred to in the Managing Director’s Guidelines as contained in Circular dated 6th November, 1992 which is analogous to the principle of ‘last come first go’. Even the Circular dated 7th February, 1995 (Annexure 31) issued with reference to an earlier Circular dated 6th November, 1992 (Annexure 32) clearly mentioned a cut off date, viz. 31st December, 1985 regarding appointment of Scalers of daily labourers and 31st December, 1986 for the appointment of Chowkidars. The High Court had already rejected the Corporation’s defence plea regarding paucity of work vide its Judgment dated 12th July, 1994. The action of Managing Director about the norms being changed with a view to reduce the staff was also not appreciated by the Court. The High Court had already rejected the Corporation’s defence plea regarding paucity of work vide its Judgment dated 12th July, 1994. The action of Managing Director about the norms being changed with a view to reduce the staff was also not appreciated by the Court. As a matter of fact, it was wrong to say that the Circular dated 7th February, 1995 had been issued in compliance to this Court’s Judgment dated 12th July, 1994. 6. According to the bi-partite negotiations held on 8th February, 1995 in between the management of the Corporation and the U.P. Van Nigam Karmachari Sangathan, it was agreed that the quantum of work of the Corporation would be expanded and the instructions would be issued by the authorities for filling of the already sanctioned posts of the Scalers to be appointed from amongst the daily labourers. The work of the Corporation has been expanding every year with the addition of new arena of projects of Tendu Patta and Nainital Tarai Farm Project. The net profit of the Corporation in the concerned financial year was shown as 200.145 million rupees. According to the provisions of Sections 14(d) and 15(2)(a) of the U.P. Forest Corporation Act, 1974, the functions of the Corporation includes to manage, maintain and develop such forests as are transferred or entrusted to it by the State Government and also to set-up workshops or factories for processing forest raw materials. All these functions are well covered under the terms ‘plantation’ and factory’ as defined in Plantations Labour Act, 1951 as well as Factories Act, 1948 respectively. Thus the petitioners before their retrenchment were entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. As the impugned orders have been issued in utter disregard to Regulation 22 of the Regulations and also in violation of provisions of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, all the petitioners are entitled to continue in service with all benefits. The petitioners would not have got the efficacious remedy by approaching the Government for reference of their dispute through Labour Court nor the Government had agreed to do so. It is in these circumstances that the petitioners were left with no efficacious remedy except to file these writ petitions invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court and thereby seeking quashing of their retrenchment orders. 7. It is in these circumstances that the petitioners were left with no efficacious remedy except to file these writ petitions invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court and thereby seeking quashing of their retrenchment orders. 7. The opposite-parties filed counter-affidavit of Shri Udai Bhan Tewari, the Divisional Logging Manager, U.P. Forest Corporation, Gorakhpur Division. Shri Tiwari asserted that the present bunch of petitions is not maintainable in view of their having approached the Labour Court. It was asserted further that the High Court had clubbed all the petitions of D.L. employees of U.P. Forest Corporation filed earlier and decided them on 12th July, 1994. Various questions were raised by different categories of employees in those writ petitions. However, the main dispute was as to whether the appointment of D.L. Scalers appointed on the post of pay bill Scalers in their respective division by D.L.M./D.S.M. prior to 25th February, 1987 would be rendered as invalid. The Service Regulations which came into force on 1st April, 1985 were approved by the Government on 25th July, 1987. Prior to that, the seniority of D.L. Sealers was maintained at the divisional level and they were brought on pay bill on the basis of the divisional level seniority depending upon the vacancies. The service regulation provided that the seniority of D.L. Scalers shall be maintained at regional level instead of divisional level and it was on the basis of this provision that the High Court vide its Judgment of 12th July, 1994 clarified that the seniority of D.L. Scalers should be maintained and acted upon the regional basis. It was also held that the seniority of stump markers engaged as Scalers should be computed from the date they have been engaged as Scalers on D.L. basis after the prescribed test and the seniority of Field Assistants should be treated at par with the Scalers appointed on D.L. basis and the period of service rendered by them as Field Assistants would not be ignored while computing their seniority with D.L. Sealers if they have passed the requisite test as prescribed for the D.L. Scalers. 8. I have heard learned Counsel for both the parties and perused the voluminous record. 9. The preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Corporation is that all these petitions are not maintainable as the alternative remedy under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act is available to the petitioners. 8. I have heard learned Counsel for both the parties and perused the voluminous record. 9. The preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Corporation is that all these petitions are not maintainable as the alternative remedy under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act is available to the petitioners. In support of his contention, learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation referred to a Full Bench decision of this Court pronounced in Writ Petition No. 16186 of 1989, Chandrama Singh v. Managing Director, U.P. Co-operative Union, Lucknow and others, (1991) 2 UPLBEC 898. It was held in this decision that an aggrieved person cannot invoke remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if he has an alternative remedy under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act or under Industrial Disputes Act unless, of course, he establishes that a remedy of reference is not adequate and efficacious. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners took shelter of the exception clause and contended that in spite of the present long drawn litigation being third in round, the authorities of the Corporation have not acted either in accordance with the Regulations or in pursuance of the necessary directions issued by this Court in the petitions filed earlier by Van Karmachari Sangh and Unions. The provisions of the Service Regulations applicable in case of the petitioners and the directions contained in the decisions of this Court would be discussed at the relevant places of this Judgment hereinafter. However, keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of this case, it can reasonably be observed that the Corporation has vis-a-vis the petitioners acted in an arbitrary manner. The petitioners have been working for more than 10-12 years before their Retrenchment Orders were issued without caring for the Court’s decision dated 12th July, 1994, referred to earlier. The Corporation also had thrown to winds the bi-partite agreement arrived at on 8th February, 1995 between the workmen Sangathan and the corporation authorities. Also the authorities did not bother to carry out the Mandamus of this Court issued vide its Judgment dated 12th July, 1994, whereby they were directed to evolve a scheme for absorption of all the Scalers, Field Assistants and Chowkidars, etc. The prescribed time for framing of such a scheme was extended twice but with no result. In case of paucity of work, the Court had issued certain guidelines before terminating the services of the daily wagers. The prescribed time for framing of such a scheme was extended twice but with no result. In case of paucity of work, the Court had issued certain guidelines before terminating the services of the daily wagers. First of all possibility of the daily wagers being engaged in other regions had to be explored and if at all no work was available anywhere in the Corporation, retrenchment had to take place on the basis of the principle of ‘last come first go’. Even in the seniority list, admittedly wrong dates of engagement of many Scalers were mentioned and rectification despite protest was not carried out on the pretext of the present litigation being pending. What is further significant to note is that various juniors to the petitioners, whose names have been disclosed in the petition were allowed to be retained in service on the pretext of there being stay or status quo orders of this Court but the authorities of the Corporation felt shy to honour the stay orders which were granted by this Court to some of the petitioners. Stay orders of this Court carry equal importance, therefore, there should have been no discrimination whether stay orders were granted by this Court in some Special Appeals or in Writ Petitions. Obviously thus, there remains a fact that the authorities of the Corporation not only acted in an arbitrary manner but also went to the extent of making discrimination not only in retaining the daily basis Scalers but also permitting some to be on the job while rejecting the claim of others - even though all were similarly circumstanced. Admittedly, some of the petitioners approached the Labour Court for an appropriate relief but all such claims are pending although more than nine years have elapsed. Therefore, the alternative remedy is neither efficacious nor as can be observed at this juncture, it is adequate. All such proceedings are trapped in the technicalities of the matter. Moreover, mandatory provisions of the Central Industrial Act have been violated by the Corporation, as a result of which this Court must interfere with the arbitrary acts of the Corporation and provide adequate relief to the petitioners. All such proceedings are trapped in the technicalities of the matter. Moreover, mandatory provisions of the Central Industrial Act have been violated by the Corporation, as a result of which this Court must interfere with the arbitrary acts of the Corporation and provide adequate relief to the petitioners. Moreover in the Special Appeal preferred by Bhopal Singh Rawat in relation to the Judgment dated 12th July, 1994, this Court had candidly observed that the petitioners might avail remedy in any forum or prefer a writ petition before this Court. It was in the light of such observation that the Sanghatan asked some of its members, who had filed claim petitions before the Labour Court not to pursue the matter nor file fresh claim petitions. In this situation, the preliminary plea of the Corporation is rejected. [The decision of the Apex Court in ‘Radha Raman Samanta v. Bank of India and others, [ (2004) 1 SCC 605 ]’ is relied upon.] 11. Mr. L.P. Shukla, learned Counsel for the Corporation also pressed into service the plea of ‘delay and laches’ on the part of the petitioners and contended that some of the petitions have been filed after five years of the retrenchment orders, therefore, all these petitions deserve to be dismissed as no plausible reason for delay in filing such petitions has been offered. A reference had also been made to an order passed in Writ Petition No. 7191 (SS) of 2003, Praveen Kumar Singh v. U.P. Forest Corporation and others, which was dismissed. A copy of the dismissal order passed in that writ petition is enclosed with the written submissions of the Forest Corporation. A perusal of this order reveals that the said Writ Petition filed by Shri Praveen Kumar Singh was dismissed on the ground of unreasonable delay in filing it at the stage of admission. The four Writ Petitions No. 868 (SS) of 2000, 5608 (SS) of 2001, 5609 (SS) of 2001 and 4374 (SS) of 2002 were no doubt filed after long lapse of time, but since the Forest Corporation was asked to file counter-affidavit, it will now be atrocious to dismiss these petitions. Moreover, these petitions have been clubbed with the petitions pending from before. Moreover, these petitions have been clubbed with the petitions pending from before. Either an objection should have been raised at the admission stage or kept pending subject to certain conditions or orders but neither of the two courses was adopted; therefore, it would now be causing hardship to those petitioners if their petitions are thrown out four-five years after they were admitted. Accordingly, it is held that in view of the justice, equity and good conscience all these petitions having already been clubbed together with the bunch of other writ petitions pending for long ten years shall be dealt with jointly and issues arising therefrom determined together. It is no gainsaying that the points/issues in dispute are common in all the writ petitions including those alleged to have been filed long after the termination orders having been issued. In the result, the contention of ‘delay and laches’ in respect of the aforesaid four writ petitions is turned down. The Apex Court in its decision in Dilbagh Rai Jerry v. Union of India and others, [ AIR 1974 SC 130 ] held that it is not right for a welfare State like ours to be janus-faced and while formulating the humanist project of legal aid to the poor, contest the claims of poor employees under it pleading limitation and the like. 12. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Forest Corporation Service Regulations (for short Regulations’) notified vide Government Order dated February 25, 1987 came into force with effect from 1st April, 1985. As per provisions of Regulation 16, employees would be engaged on Daily Labour basis on consolidated monthly salary after conducting the written, oral, physical and medical examination. Even prior to this, the practice in vogue was that Daily Labours were engaged after holding a written test and the selected employees were placed in a select list in the order of seniority. They were to be regularized after completion of two years satisfactory service. Some of the labourers, who were engaged prior to the Regulations came into force, filed writ petitions praying for various reliefs including confirmation etc. In those writ petitions being led by Writ Petition No. 4209 (SS) of 1988, this Court issued a Writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the Forest Corporation and the other authorities to prepare absorption/regularization scheme and regularize the D.L. Staff against the then existing 755 posts. In those writ petitions being led by Writ Petition No. 4209 (SS) of 1988, this Court issued a Writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the Forest Corporation and the other authorities to prepare absorption/regularization scheme and regularize the D.L. Staff against the then existing 755 posts. The direction postulated for regularization in a phased manner. The S.L.P. preferred by the Corporation against the Judgment in that Bunch was dismissed. Till date, no such Scheme has been finalized, although learned Counsel for the Corporation submitted that a Scheme framed in pursuance of the Court’s Order was sent to the Government for approval. No plausible reason has been disclosed as to why the Government has not yet taken a final decision on such Scheme. Instead of complying with the Mandamus, the Corporation preferred a Review Petition, which was heard alongwith the bunch of Writ Petitions filed in the meantime by such staff working on D.L. basis who had been restrained from coming to work on the ground of their being seasonal labourers. The orders issued by the Corporation authorities terminating the services of such labourers were challenged on various grounds including the one that such termination orders were violative of the Regulations. In its Judgment of July 12, 1994, this Court deprecated the action of the authorities of the Corporation of issuing enmass retrenchment orders. The alteration in the norms envisaged in the Regulations was also held to be illegal. It was observed in the above referred judgment that action was taken by the authorities without seeking permission of the Court. The authorities did not even care to inform the Court about the bulk retrenchment orders. The Court, therefore, decided the Writ Petitions in terms of the interim orders and as such, the D.L. staffers were allowed to continue to work and be paid salary. A perusal of this Judgment would reveal that the stand of the Corporation in violating the specific Mandamus issued by this Court in earlier bunch of cases was deprecated, although with an observation that an employer had to make retrenchment in strict adherence to the statutory provisions. The authorities without caring for interpreting the Judgment in letter and spirit took shelter of the alternative clause and again retrenched the daily labours in the year 1995. The authorities without caring for interpreting the Judgment in letter and spirit took shelter of the alternative clause and again retrenched the daily labours in the year 1995. The Judgment of July 12, 1994 clearly stipulated that before making retrenchment, the authorities of the Corporation would make every effort to accommodate its employees and if not possible in the eastern region, then in any other region. Except verbal submission that such efforts were made, there is nothing on record to justify that sincere endeavour was taken recourse to by the Corporation to accommodate the D.L. staffers in other regions. This was a mandatory direction but the authorities of the Corporation perhaps took it lightly and did not bother to explore the possibility of its D.L. staffers going to be retrenched, being accommodated in other regions. It was an atrocious decision of the Corporation without undergoing such an exercise to have retrenched the D.L. staff, some of them being engaged even prior to the year 1985. As can be observed, it was a deliberate and mischievous omission on the part of the authorities of the Corporation whereby this Court’s direction was circumvented. The direction may be reproduced as below : “In case of reduction of work or shortfall in the work, the authorities of the Forest Corporation would make an endeavour to adjust them in alternative works available in the particular region, in which they are working or in any other region where work is available before giving them seasonal leave or terminating their services.” 13. The apathetic attitude of the authorities which compelled some of the petitioners to enter into third round of litigation deserves to be censured. In such circumstances, the Court is left again with no alternative except to set aside the retrenchment orders passed by the Corporation without caring for the Court’s earlier Mandamus. 14. In the tentative seniority list published on 14th November, 1994 in the newspapers, wrong dates of initial engagement of numerous daily labours were recited as a result of which their placement in the seniority list was wrongly depicted and resultantly wrong retrenchment orders were issued. The specific allegation regarding mentioning of wrong dates of initial engagement was not controverted; rather, the authorities were beating the bush by simply putting an excuse that if errors were rectified, a large number of labourers will get the benefit. The specific allegation regarding mentioning of wrong dates of initial engagement was not controverted; rather, the authorities were beating the bush by simply putting an excuse that if errors were rectified, a large number of labourers will get the benefit. In this way, the fate of the petitioners was put in lurch because of the arbitrariness and the alleged dilemma on the part of the authorities of the Corporation who mischievously sailed in whimsical manner. 15. In one of the Special Appeal preferred against the above referred Judgment, it was specifically observed that the reference of any provisions of the Industrial Law in that Judgment does not exclude the benefits arising out of other provisions of Industrial Law. In this context, it is significant to note that Section 25-N is included in Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘I.D. Act’ for the sake of brevity) which includes the special provisions relating to retrenchment etc. in relation to plantation, work and factory. 16. According to the provisions of Clauses 1 and 2, the workmen concerned will have to be given three months notice, in writing, before making any retrenchment, indicating the reasons for retrenchment or the wages in lieu of such notice, after the permission has been obtained and given by the appropriate Government. Clause 3 of Section 25(1) of the I.D. Act further provides that where the application for permission for retrenchment is preferred, the appropriate Government or the specific authority will grant or refuse to grant such permission after making such enquiry, as it thinks fit. Then a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer and the workmen concerned as also the persons interested in such retrenchment has to be given with a view to ascertain the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons disclosed by the employer. Clause 4 further provides that if a period of sixty days expires from moving of such an application for permission, it will be deemed to have been granted. Clause 5 postulates that such a permission or refusal for permission shall be binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of its order. Clause 4 further provides that if a period of sixty days expires from moving of such an application for permission, it will be deemed to have been granted. Clause 5 postulates that such a permission or refusal for permission shall be binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of its order. Clause 7 of Section 25-N is very important and it postulates that where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made or where the permission for retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice for retrenchment was given to the workmen and the workmen shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice has been given to him. 17. The contention of the learned Counsel for the opposite parties that Section 25-N is not attracted in the case of the Forest Corporation can be negatived in view of the Judgment of Uttaranchal High Court passed in a bunch of Writ Petitions No. 1376 (MS) of 2001, 1015 (MS) of 2001 and 3008 (MS) of 2001. A copy of the said Judgment has been brought on record by the learned counsel for the petitioners. According to this verdict, Section 25-N contained in Chapter V-B of the I.D. Act is attracted in case of Forest Corporation which is engaged in the manufacturing process of cutting trees, selling their logs, wood and timber. The following observation of the Court is very relevant from our point of view : “The validity, legality or illegality of a retrenchment order referred for adjudication does not depend on the factor that under which provision the reference is made. Retrenchment is in accordance with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act which is pari materia with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act or is in accordance with Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act which (sic.) is attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Retrenchment is in accordance with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act which is pari materia with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act or is in accordance with Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act which (sic.) is attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. As it has been held in this judgment that in the facts and circumstances of the case, Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act was attracted, therefore, the validity of the retrenchment order is to be adjudged solely by determining the question as to whether the provisions of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act were complied with or not.” 18. The Uttaranchal High Court held that retrenchment of the D.L. staffers being issued without compliance of the provisions of Section 25-N of the I.D. Act will have no legal effect and the employer-employee relationship between the parties will not get snapped. 19. It is admitted to the opposite-parties that they have not moved any application seeking permission for retrenchment indicating any reasons and thus all the petitioners of the petitions in hand are entitled to the benefits arising out of such illegal retrenchment. In other words, all retrenchment orders being violative of the provisions of 25-N of the I.D. Act are illegal and they deserve to be set aside. 20. Article 254 of the Constitution of India is a guiding principle of law in the event of there being inconsistency between laws laid by the Parliament and the laws made by the Legislature of States. Although the provision of Section 6-N is an alternative provision to Section 25-N of the I.D. Act, yet there seems to be no inconsistency between the two provisions of enactments. Both the Acts were enacted in terms of Entry 22 of List III of the Constitution. Since Section 25-N of the Central Act will have an overriding effect over the provisions of Section 6-N, the Forest Corporation cannot, therefore, be permitted to skip over the shelter of umbrella laid therein and seemingly postulated for benefit of the labourers. The observations of the Apex Court in paras 21 and 41 of the decision in ‘Engineering Kamgar Union v. Electro Steels Castings Ltd., [ (2004) 6 SCC 36 ] are relied upon, which may be quoted as below : “21. The Central Act and the State Act indisputably cover the same field. The observations of the Apex Court in paras 21 and 41 of the decision in ‘Engineering Kamgar Union v. Electro Steels Castings Ltd., [ (2004) 6 SCC 36 ] are relied upon, which may be quoted as below : “21. The Central Act and the State Act indisputably cover the same field. The jurisdiction of the State Legislature to enact a law by a parliamentary legislation is not impermissible. Subject to the provisions contained in Article 254 of the Constitution of India, both will operate in their respective fields. The constitutional scheme in this behalf is absolutely clear and unambiguous. In this case, this Court is not concerned with the conflicting legislations operating in the same field by reason of enactments made by Parliament and the State in exercise of their respective legislative powers contained in List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India but admittedly the field being the same, a question would arise as regards the effect of one Act over the other in the event it is found that there exists a conflict. For the said purpose, it is not necessary that the conflict would be direct only in a case wherein the provisions of one Act would have to be disobeyed if the provisions of the other are followed. The conflict may exist even where both the laws lead to different legal results.” “41. In any event, such a question could have arisen for consideration if the Central Act and the State Act had been enacted in terms of different entries of List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. In this case, admittedly, both the Central Act and the State Act had been enacted in terms of Entry 22 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. In case of any conflict therefor the constitutional scheme contained in Article 254 will have to be applied. Even if Section 25-S of the State Act is read to have an overriding effect, undoubtedly the provisions of the supreme law shall prevail over a statute. A non obstante clause contained in a statute cannot override the provisions of the Constitution of India.” 21. Even if Section 25-S of the State Act is read to have an overriding effect, undoubtedly the provisions of the supreme law shall prevail over a statute. A non obstante clause contained in a statute cannot override the provisions of the Constitution of India.” 21. Endorsing the above legal view, if we advert to the factual scenaris, it is shoking to note that the petitioners were retrenched despite that in bi-partite negotiations held on 8.2.1995, the Management had admitted that the quantum of work in the Corporation had expanded and the instructions would be issued to all the Regional Managers to fill-up the sanctioned posts from the D.L. staff. It may be recalled that the said bi-partite meeting was attended by the Managing Director, the General Manager and the General Manager (Production) of the Corporation as well as the office-bearers of the U.P. Van Nigam Karmachari Sanghatan. The Minutes were recorded to bear the instructions to accommodate all the D.L. staffers of eastern and southern region and it was also resolved that wherever it will be feasible, the surplus staff will be absorbed. It is borne out from record that the U.P. Van Nigam Karmachari Sanghatan had resorted to strike and some of its members were on hunger strike unto death. It is different as to whether such a stringent action of the staff was or was not justified, but the fact remains that the D.L. staffers being victims of atrocities of the authorities of the Corporation had taken recourse to the strike and some of them to hunger strike to express their resentment. It was in this background that the bi-partite negotiations between the Karmachari Sanghatan and the Management were held on 15th February, 1995 - possibly with a view to persuade the strikers to resume work but on one hand such resolutions were being taken while on the other hand exercise for labourers being retrenched was going on. Such an intriguing exercise has to be deplored. 22. The opposite parties have not been able to support their contention that on account of considerable shortage of field work, retrenchment of the D.L. Scalers was necessitated to be taken recourse to. 23. Such an intriguing exercise has to be deplored. 22. The opposite parties have not been able to support their contention that on account of considerable shortage of field work, retrenchment of the D.L. Scalers was necessitated to be taken recourse to. 23. This Court in its Judgment of July 12, 1994 directed for regularization of the ‘D’ category employees in a phased manner within a period of one year from the date of Judgment as directed earlier in the Judgment passed in Writ Petition No. 4209 (SS) of 1988 and others. The Court had shown a lenient attitude for there being no compliance of the earlier Judgment in Writ Petition No. 4209 (SS) of 1988 and others with the contemplation that the D.L. Staffers and D.L. Scalers would be absorbed permanently. This Mandamus was blatantly violated by the authorities of the Corporation. It appeared that initially they had bonafide intention with them to carryout the Court’s direction and it was in the backdrop of the said Judgment containing Writ of Mandamus that the authorities agreed to absorb all the D.L. Staffers and D.L. Scalers and an agreement to this effect was reduced to writing on 8th February, 1995. All those D.L. Scalers who were engaged prior to December, 1988 were to be regularized under that agreement. Not only this, but an assurance was also given that nobody would be victimized. All these petitioners were engaged prior to December, 1988. In this way, it is apparent that the Corporation not only committed the act of betrayal by first assuring the labourers of their regularization and then issuing retrenchment orders but they had also committed breach of this Court’s Judgment dated 12th July, 1994. 24. The contention of there being shortfall in the work was an artificial ground so as to justify the retrenchment of the daily labourers and D.L. Scalers. Within a couple of years thereafter, the Government sanctioned 212 posts of category D employees and 76 posts of D.L. Scalers. Even in the Judgment dated 12th July, 1994, the plea of paucity of work was not accepted. The Corporation has, all through these years, been running in profits. No documentary evidence has been filed to support the contention that the strength of D.L. Scalers was reduced so as to bring the Corporation back from losses. Even in the Judgment dated 12th July, 1994, the plea of paucity of work was not accepted. The Corporation has, all through these years, been running in profits. No documentary evidence has been filed to support the contention that the strength of D.L. Scalers was reduced so as to bring the Corporation back from losses. Therefore, the theory of there being shortfall in work following ban on cutting of trees is far from truth. 25. In the matter of retrenchment, the authorities of the Corporation have not followed the principle of ‘last come first go’ but they applied the rule of reservation in various categories and retrenched the candidates by passing discriminatory orders. The opposite parties clearly admitted in their supplementary counter affidavit that they did not follow the rule of ‘last come first go’ taking into their consideration the rules of reservation of various categories. They did not dispute the contention of Shri Ram Surat Verma, the petitioner that Awadhesh Kumar Singh, Uma Singh and Harihar Prasad, Vishwambhar Singh, Jai Prakash Narain Yadav, Vishwa Vijay Yadav and Dhruv Narain Singh were juniors to him. He filed a representation, a copy whereof is Annexure RA1 in his writ petition and lodged a strong protest against the juniors being retained in service. Some of the juniors were even promoted to the position of Scaler on pay bill. Their names were disclosed by him as Mata Pratap Pathak, Ganga Ram Yadav, Gulam Nabi Khan, Malik Ram Yadav, Tribhuvan Prasad Yadav and Ram Singh. Obviously, the retention of juniors and retrenchment order of the petitioners was contrary to the provisions of Section 6-B and 6-Q of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 26. In Writ Petitions No. 3055 (SS) of 1995, 4441 (SS) of 1995 and 2706 (SS) of 1995, the interim orders were granted to the petitioners with a direction to the opposite parties to either continue them in service or provide them work subject to availability but the opposite parties did not allow them to work although juniors to them were permitted to do their job. When the authorities were confronted during the pendency of these petitions, they tried to sidetrack their obligation by pleading that the juniors to the petitioners were allowed to work on the strength of Court’s Orders. It was a fallacious inconsistency that some of the orders were complied while others ignored. When the authorities were confronted during the pendency of these petitions, they tried to sidetrack their obligation by pleading that the juniors to the petitioners were allowed to work on the strength of Court’s Orders. It was a fallacious inconsistency that some of the orders were complied while others ignored. As a matter of fact, all the orders of the Courts deserve to be honoured by all concerned without there being any discrimination as to whether such interim orders have been issued in appeal or on the original side of jurisdiction. It was in this background that this Court had, vide Order dated 14th May, 2001, issued directions to the effect that in case any subsequent appointee was allowed to continue in service, the senior petitioners would also be permitted to carry on the job. The opposite parties admitted that although juniors to the petitioners were working either on the basis of interim orders or on the ground of their belonging to the reserved categories, yet in the instant bunch of cases they had disregarded the interim orders on the pretext of there being no work. This Court is unable to accept this hypocritic manner of doing things. As a matter of fact, all the orders passed by this Court either in original jurisdiction or in Special Appeal or passed by the higher Court deserve to be obeyed in the letter and spirit and the authorities might not be set at liberty to comply or obey in one case and disobey in the other. Moreover, retention of the reserved category daily wagers, despite being juniors, was not in pursuance to the Judgment dated 12th July, 1994. No doubt, there can be reservation in recruitment but not in retrenchment/the principle of ‘last come first go’ as envisaged in Section 6-B and 6-Q of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would be followed. 27. The petitioners of the instant bunch of cases may not be termed to be as economic dead weight. The Judgment in M/s. Parry and Co. Ltd. v. P.C. Pal, Judge of the Second Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta and others, [ AIR 1970 SC 1334 , has relied upon by Mr. 27. The petitioners of the instant bunch of cases may not be termed to be as economic dead weight. The Judgment in M/s. Parry and Co. Ltd. v. P.C. Pal, Judge of the Second Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta and others, [ AIR 1970 SC 1334 , has relied upon by Mr. L.P. Shukla, learned Counsel for the Forest Corporation may not be of any help in the instant cases for the simple reason that the retrenchment carried out here was neither bona fide nor fair; rather, it was an unfair labour practice, which despite a bi-partite treatment to absorb all the petitioners amounted to resultant victimization of the employees. Indeed, this Judgment would have been of immense assistance to the Forest Corporation had the retrenchment orders of the petitioners been bona fide. As said earlier, the retrenchment orders suffer from all round mischief. Such orders were not only violative of the Writ of Mandamus issued vide Judgment of July 12, 1994 but there were also acts of victimization. The petitioners, who have put in decades of service and who had fought their legal battle twice in the High Court, were again thrown out of job without caring for the length of service they had rendered and that too without following the provisions of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. 28. In these circumstances, all the retrenchment orders being vitiated on account of deviation from the relevant laws are termed to be as illegal and they deserve to be quashed. 29. Accordingly, all the writ petitions of the instant bunch of cases are allowed and the Termination Orders of the Petitioners of all the petitions are quashed. A Writ of Certiorari is issued to this effect. Further, a Writ of Mandamus is issued commanding the opposite-parties to reinstate and allow all the petitioners to continue in service and regularize them in a phased manner in view of the directions given earlier in this Court’s Judgment dated 12th July, 1994. However, since a long lapse of time has intervened in between, they would not be entitled to the back wages but the Forest Corporation and the Government shall make their best endeavour to absorb them on permanent basis as early as possible. All the petitioners shall be entitled to get costs of the entire litigation from the Forest Corporation. Petition Allowed. ———