Judgment :- (Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code against the order and decretal order dated 27.1.2003 passed in E.A.No.10 of 2003 in E.P.No.126 of 1996 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Madurantakam in Chengalpattu Principal Sub Court O.S.No.42 of 1987.) The revision petitioner is the first defendant/first judgment-debtor. This Revision Petition is directed against the dismissal of the petition E.A.No.10 of 2003 in E.P.No.126 of 1996 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Madurantakam in Chengalpattu Principal Sub Court O.S.No.42 of 1987, as per order dated 27.1.2003. 2. The revision petitioner/first defendant/first judgment-debtor filed the petition E.A.No.10 of 2003 under Order 34, Rule 5 read with Order 34, Rule 15 and Section 151 C.P.C. to set aside the sale held on 17.3.1997 and to terminate E.P.No.126 of 1996, recording full satisfaction of the decree in O.S.No.42 of 1987. 3. One Subbaraya Reddiar filed the suit O.S.No.42 of 1987 on the file of the Principal Sub Court, Chengalpattu, against the revision petitioner/Radhabai Ammal/first defendant and another to recover a sum of Rs.23,892.50 together with interest on Rs.15,500/-, at 12% from the date of plaint till date of realisation and for a charge in respect of the suit properties situated at Vedavakkam Village, Madurantakam Taluk, Chengalpattu District. As per the plaint, it is stated that the suit properties were sold to the revision petitioner/1st defendant, Radhabai Ammal for a sum of Rs.16,825/- under a registered sale deed dated 25.4.1978. Towards the sale consideration, the revision petitioner/1st defendant agreed to discharge the debts payable by the plaintiff/Subbaraya Reddiar, namely, Rs.10,000/- to Land Development Bank, Madurantakam; Rs.1,600/- to Pasumbur Co-operative Society and Rs.2,000/- to Sivalingam of Vedanthangal under a mortgage deed dated 1.6.1974. The revision petitioner/1st defendant has retained a sum of Rs.1,900/- as surplus amount towards discharge of the mortgage debt to Sivalingam. If Sivalingam's claim is settled for Rs.2,000/-, the revision petitioner/1st defendant agreed to return the said sum of Rs.1,900/- to the plaintiff Subbaraya Reddiar. But, the revision petitioner/1st defendant did not discharge the debts as per the terms and conditions of the sale deed and also did not return the sum of Rs.1,900/- retained by her. If Sivalingam's claim is settled for Rs.2,000/-, the revision petitioner/1st defendant agreed to return the said sum of Rs.1,900/- to the plaintiff Subbaraya Reddiar. But, the revision petitioner/1st defendant did not discharge the debts as per the terms and conditions of the sale deed and also did not return the sum of Rs.1,900/- retained by her. Since the 1st defendant did not discharge the debts, the plaintiff Subbaraya Reddiar paid a sum of Rs.1,800/- on 22.12.1986 towards part payment of the debts payable to the Land Development Bank, Madurantakam, and fully discharged the loan amount due to Pasumbur Society. The said Sivalingam filed a suit in O.S.No.705 of 1982 on the file of the District Munsif, Madurantakam against the plaintiff and the 1st defendant, in which a final decree was also passed. The plaintiff caused lawyer notice dated 6.2.1986, which was not replied by the first defendant. Since the 1st defendant/Radhabai Ammal created mortgage in favour of the second defendant, the second defendant was also added as a party for effective adjudication. Therefore, the plaintiff has filed the present suit claiming that he is entitled to the suit claim from the defendants, towards the said sale consideration and for sale of the suit properties, for which the 1st defendant has agreed to discharge the debts, with interest at 12% from the date of plaint till realization and for a charge over the suit properties. 4. After filing of the suit, the plaintiff/Subbaraya Reddiar died and the 2nd plaintiff, namely, the respondent herein, V. Krishnamoorthy, was impleaded to continue the suit as per the Will dated 3.3.1989, executed by the deceased plaintiff in favour of the 2nd plaintiff. 5. The suit was resisted by the 1st defendant in the written statement. The suit was decreed ex parte, on 14.3.1990, creating a charge over the suit properties. Thereafter, the decree-holder, namely, the respondent herein filed E.P.No.55 of 1990 on 4.7.1990 before the Principal Sub Court, Chengalpattu, for sale. On transfer, the above E.P. was renumbered as E.P.No.126 of 1996 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Madurantakam and the suit properties were brought for sale and purchased by the respondent herein on 17.3.1997 as the permitted decree-holder. 6. On transfer, the above E.P. was renumbered as E.P.No.126 of 1996 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Madurantakam and the suit properties were brought for sale and purchased by the respondent herein on 17.3.1997 as the permitted decree-holder. 6. The revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor filed E.A.No.10 of 2003 on 3.1.2003 to set aside the sale held on 17.3.1997 stating that the debts, which she undertook to repay for and on behalf of the vendor/Subbaraya Reddiar towards the sale consideration in respect of the suit properties were discharged by her, for which a separate suit will be filed by her, seeking such relief. She has also stated that the sale warrant amount is Rs.38,603/- to which a sum of Rs.5,394/- being 6% interest till the filing of the E.A.No.10 of 2003, is added and the total amount comes to 43,997/-. With that Rs.43,997/-, a sum of Rs.1,089/- being poundage and Rs.1,765/- being commission at 5% on the sale amount of Rs.39,300/- are added. The total amount comes to Rs.46,691/- and the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor has agreed to deposit the said sum of Rs.46,691/- into Court. 7. The said Execution Application was resisted in the counter by the respondent/decree-holder, mainly on the ground that the provision as sought by the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor to deposit the amount decreed in the suit into Court, after the Court auction sale held on 17.3.1997 is incorrect. Further, Order 34, Rules 5 and 15 C.P.C. is not applicable, and the same is applicable only in the cases of mortgage. It is also stated that as per Section 65 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the suit properties shall be deemed to have vested in the Court auction purchaser, namely, the decree-holder/respondent herein, from the time when the suit properties were sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute. It is also stated that as per the provision made under Article 127 of the Limitation Act, the petition to set aside the Court auction sale is not filed within 30 days from the date of sale, and so the petition to set aside the Court auction sale cannot be entertained under Order 21, Rule 89, C.P.C. The further facts, which led to the filing of the suit, which culminated into passing of the decree, have also been stated therein. Since, for want of bidders, the suit properties could not be sold in Court auction, despite 4 applications were filed to reduce the upset price, the decree-holder filed a petition E.A.No.14 of 1994 on 5.1.1995 praying permission to the decree-holder for bid and set off. After due enquiry, the executing Court permitted the respondent/decree-holder to purchase the suit properties in Court auction sale held on 17.3.1997. The judgment-debtor has not filed the petition within 30 days to set aside the Court auction sale, and so Order 34, Rules 5 and 15 C.P.C. is not applicable. It is also stated therein that once the Court auction sale is held and no application is filed to set aside the sale by the revision petitioner/judgment-debtor within 30 days from the date of sale, it cannot be questioned by the judgment-debtor now. The confirmation of sale is only a formal procedure and the matter is between the Court auction purchaser and the Court, in which the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor have no say. The 2nd plaintiff/respondent being the beneficiary under the Will executed by the deceased plaintiff Subbaraya Reddiar, has stepped into the shoes of the said Subbaraya Reddiar, and he is entitled to the fruits of the decree. 8. The executing Court after considering the various submissions made on both sides, did not accept the case of the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor and refused to set aside the Court auction sale held on 17.3.1997 and dismissed the Execution Application No.10 of 2003 on 27.1.2003. The said order is under challenge in this revision petition by the first judgment-debtor. 9. Heard Mr.S.Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor and Mr. K.V. Subramanian, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/decree-holder. 10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor put-forth several submissions. Firstly, it is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that the Court auction sale held on 17.3.1997 in favour of the respondent/2nd plaintiff has not been confirmed and inasmuch as the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor is ready and willing to deposit the decree amount to the credit of the suit into Court, the Court auction sale held in favour of the respondent/2nd plaintiff has to be set aside. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the executing Court after accepting the decree amount and recording the full satisfaction, should have set aside the sale held on 17.3.1997. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the executing Court after accepting the decree amount and recording the full satisfaction, should have set aside the sale held on 17.3.1997. It is also submitted that the Execution Application No.10 of 2003, subject matter of this revision petition, filed before the confirmation of sale, is in time, in that, the Code of Civil Procedure is a Special Act and the Limitation Act is a General Act and so the Special Act will apply. Further, referring to Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act, it is contended that the provisions of Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act stated therein, are all subsequent to the facts of the case and therefore, the Court auction sale held in favour of the respondent/decree-holder, has to be set aside. 11. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner has relied on the following decisions:- (1) Jagannatha Rao - vs. - Surya Rao reported in A.I.R. 1936 Privy Council 204, in which it is held as follows:- "The transaction in respect of the transfer of the portion of the mortgaged property, although it could not operate as a mortgage, constituted a sale and that under Section 55(4)(b) of T.P. Act the mortgagee decree-holder was entitled to a charge upon the property transferred in the hands of the mortgagor judgment-debtor for the amount of the purchase money and for interest thereon. The charge could be enforced by sale of the property under Section 100, T.P. Act, and under Order 34, Rule 15, Civil P.C., as in the case of a simple mortgage." (2) Jaganathan - vs. - Amrutham & others reported in 1980 T.L.N.J. 402 in which this Court has held as follows:- "A bare reading of Section 56 of the Transfer of Property Act leaves no room for doubt that it applies only to mortgages. However, by legal fiction enacted by Section 100 of the Act, which deals with charges, all the provisions which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to charges. Section 100 of 'the Act' speaks about creation of charges by act of parties or by operation of law. However, by legal fiction enacted by Section 100 of the Act, which deals with charges, all the provisions which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to charges. Section 100 of 'the Act' speaks about creation of charges by act of parties or by operation of law. There is no gainsaying that the charge created by the decree in question cannot be stated to be one created by act of parties." It is further held therein as follows:- "If there is a statutory charge and the decree merely declares or enforces such a charge, it can be stated that the charge is one created by operation of law." (3) Nilan, U. - vs. - Kannayyan (Dead) 1999(III) CTC (Supreme Court) 544 in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph 17 thus:- "17. The provisions extracted above clearly indicate that an application under Order 34 Rule 5 C.P.C. can be filed or moved by the mortgagor for the deposit of mortgage money at any time before the confirmation of sale." It is further held in paragraph 19 as follows: - "19. Order 34, Rule 5 provides the last chance to the mortgagor to save his property from being passed on to the auction purchaser and avoid the disturbance of his title ensuring, at the same time, that, mortgage money is paid to the person in whose favour the property had been mortgaged by depositing the entire amount in the Court, including the amount, where the property has been sold, contemplated by Sub-rule (2) of this Rule. The whole step has to be taken before the confirmation of sale." (4) Kharaiti Lal - vs. - Raminder Karu (SC) 2000(II)CTC 248, in which, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, following the earlier decision in U.Nilan – v. - Kannayyan (Dead) through Lrs., 1999(8) SCC 511 : 1999(III)CTC 544, held in paragraph 8 as follows:- "8. The entire case law was reviewed by this Court in a recent decision in U.Nilan v. Kannayyan (Dead) through Lrs., 1999(8) SCC 511 in which also the Court had formulated the following question:- "What is the meaning of the phrase "before the confirmation of sale" may now be considered in the light of other relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure." The above question is identical to the question framed by the Division Bench of the High Court in this case. This Court, on a consideration of a number of decisions, including the decision of this Court in Hukamchand's case, A.I.R. 1968 SC 86 laid down that if an appeal was pending against an order refusing to set aside the sale, the confirmation of sale as also the issuance of sale certificate would be in a nebulous state and, consequently, it would be open to the judgment-debtor to invoke the provisions of Order 34, Rule 5 C.P.C. and make the necessary deposits to save his property from being transferred to a third person or, may be, to the decree-holder, in execution of the decree passed in the mortgage suit. It may be mentioned that in U.Nilan's case, 1999(8) SCC 511 , reliance was also placed upon the decision of this Court in Meganlal & Anr. v. Jaiswal Industries, Neemach & Ors., AIR 1989 SC 2113 , in which it was held that the sale does not become absolute or irrevocable merely on passing an order confirming the sale under Order 21 Rule 92, but it would attain finality on the disposal of the appeal, if any, filed against an order refusing to set aside the sale." 12. Learned counsel for the respondent/2nd plaintiff/decree-holder, by referring to the counter-affidavit filed in C.M.P.No.4774 of 2003 for vacating the stay(Vacate Stay Petition V.C.M.P.No.16945 of 2003), more particularly, para Nos.4 to 6, submitted that the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor, who has transferred the rights in favour of a third party, has already filed suits and number of petitions to delay and defeat the lawful right of the respondent/decree-holder and the execution of the decree. Learned counsel further submitted that even after filing E.P.No.55 of 1990 before the Principal Sub Court, Chengalpattu, for realising the decree amount, the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor filed petition to set aside the ex parte decree, and after enquiry, the same was dismissed by the trial Court, and therefore, the decree has become final. So, the sale papers were filed on 7.12.1990 and the sale was posted to 19.12.1991. On receiving the sale notice, the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor appeared and after several adjournments, the upset price was fixed. On 12.2.1996, the E.P.No.55 of 1990 on the file of the Principal Sub Court, Chengalpattu, was transferred to the District Munsif Court, Madurantakam and renumbered as E.P.No.126 of 1996. On receiving the sale notice, the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor appeared and after several adjournments, the upset price was fixed. On 12.2.1996, the E.P.No.55 of 1990 on the file of the Principal Sub Court, Chengalpattu, was transferred to the District Munsif Court, Madurantakam and renumbered as E.P.No.126 of 1996. Again, notice was sent to the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor and after several adjournments at the request of the first judgment-debtor, finally upset price was fixed on 21.3.1996. Since there was no bidders, the respondent/decree-holder was permitted to bid in the Court auction sale and the sale was completed on 17.3.1997. The claim petition filed by one Balasubramanian, subsequent purchaser, from the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor was dismissed. The said subsequent purchaser filed a suit O.S.No.61 of 1999 for declaration and permanent injunction before the District Munsif Court, Madurantakam to delay the further proceedings and an injunction petition I.A.No.319 of 1999 was also filed, which was dismissed. Against that dismissal, C.M.A.No.6 of 1999 was preferred in Sub-Court, Madurantakam and the same was allowed granting interim injunction in favour of the subsequent purchaser Balasubramanian. Thereafter, C.R.P.439 of 2000 was filed by the respondent/decree-holder. The subsequent purchaser has also filed C.R.P.No.2099 of 2000 against the appointment of advocate-commissioner appointed in E.A.No.430 of 1998 in E.P.No.126 of 1996 in O.S.No.42 of 1997. Both the C.R.Ps. were tried together and as per the order dated 3.8.2001, C.R.P.No.439 of 2000 filed by the respondent/decree-holder was allowed with costs of Rs.2,000/- and C.R.P.No.2099 of 2000 filed by the subsequent purchaser was dismissed, as no order was necessary. E.A.No.10 of 2003 filed under Order 34, Rule 5 C.P.C. by the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor is not maintainable and is barred by time. The properties originally belonged to the predecessor-in-interest were sold to the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor only to discharge the debts. Since the debts were not discharged by the revision petitioner and the properties were brought to sale, in order to protect the family properties, the debts were discharged by the said Subbaraya Reddiar and he filed the suit O.S.No.42 of 1987 and obtained money decree against the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor. Even during the pendency of the suit, the first judgment-debtor sold the properties to third party, and with a view to delay the proceedings further, the application E.A.No.10 of 2003, subject matter of this revision petition, has been filed. Even during the pendency of the suit, the first judgment-debtor sold the properties to third party, and with a view to delay the proceedings further, the application E.A.No.10 of 2003, subject matter of this revision petition, has been filed. Learned counsel further submitted that Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to the facts of this case. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor has not deposited the entire decree amount or the E.P. amount. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent/decree-holder has relied on the following decisions:- (1) Seethalakshmi Ammal - vs. - Srinivasa, A.I.R. 1958 Madras 23 in which this Court (Ramaswami, J. as he then was) following the decision of this Court in Thangavelu - v. - Thirumalswami, A.I.R. 1956 Madras 67, has held thus:- "Even in cases of charges created by decrees a distinction has to be borne in mind with regard to the mode of enforceability. If the decree is executable, a charge created by it can be enforced in execution. No particular form of words is necessary to create an enforceable charge and all that is required is that there must be clear indication of the property being made security for the payment of money." (2) Latchan - v. - Sanyasamma, A.I.R. 1963 SC 1556, in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has held in paragraph 6 as follows:- "A charge is different from a mortgage. A mortgage is a transfer of an interest in property while a charge is merely a right to receive payment out of some specified property. The former is described a jus in rem and the latter as only a jus ad rem. In the case of a simple mortgage, there is a personal liability express or implied but in the case of charge there is no such personal liability and the decree, if it seeks to charge the judgment-debtor personally, has to do so in addition to the charge. This being the distinction it appears to us that the appellant's contention that the consequences of a mortgagee acquiring a share of the mortgagor in a portion of the mortgaged property obtain in the case of a charge is ill-founded. This being the distinction it appears to us that the appellant's contention that the consequences of a mortgagee acquiring a share of the mortgagor in a portion of the mortgaged property obtain in the case of a charge is ill-founded. The charge can be enforced against all the properties or severally." (3) Following the decision reported in Seethalakshmi Ammal - v. - Srinivasa, A.I.R. 1958 Madras 23, the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the decision in Naganna Naidu - v. - J.K.Rangarao, A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 622, held as follows:- "Section 100 is restricted in its operation to two categories of charges, namely, those created by act of parties and those created by operation of law. Charges created by decrees of courts are not included. Such charges are not charges created by operation of law and cannot be extended to charges created by the decrees of courts." (4) S.Sivaprakasam - v. - B.V.Muniraj – (1997)9 SCC 636 , in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus:- "It is not possible to accept the contention that under Order 21, Rule 92 CPC as soon as objections have been raised and rejected, the court is required to confirm the sale and in this case the act of confirmation being the ministerial act, that does not defeat the right of the auction-purchaser nor confer any right on the subsequent purchaser under a simple money decree. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to the facts. The procedure under Order 34 is entirely distinct and different from the procedure prescribed under Order 21. Order 21 deals with execution of decrees and orders and objections therein other than those relating to the property covered in mortgage decree. Order 34 is a special procedure prescribed relating to mortgages. Therefore, the procedure prescribed under Order 21, Rule 92 has no application as regards the passing of final decree under Order 34, Rule 5 CPC. Therefore, the action taken by the executing court is not vitiated by any error of law, warranting interference." 14. Order 34 is a special procedure prescribed relating to mortgages. Therefore, the procedure prescribed under Order 21, Rule 92 has no application as regards the passing of final decree under Order 34, Rule 5 CPC. Therefore, the action taken by the executing court is not vitiated by any error of law, warranting interference." 14. The facts are not in dispute that the respondent herein in pursuance of the charge decree dated 14.3.1990 in O.S.No.42 of 1987 against the judgment-debtor, the revision petitioner herein, which suit was filed on 7.4.1987, brought the properties, viz., 4.05 acres situated at Vedavakkam village, Madurantakam Taluk, Chengalpattu District, in Court auction sale and as per the permission of the Executing Court to bid in the Court auction sale, the properties have been purchased by the respondent/decree-holder on 17.3.1997. 15. The suit O.S.No.42 of 1987 was filed after causing lawyer notice dated 6.2.1987 which was not replied by the first judgment-debtor. It appears that during pendency of the suit O.S.No.42 of 1987, filed on 7.4.1987, the first judgment-debtor sold the suit properties to one Balasubramanian by way of two sale deeds dated 13.7.1987 and 17.7.1987, which were hit by lis pendens. It also appears, the subsequent purchaser Balasubramanian filed a suit O.S.No.61 of 1999 for declaration and permanent injunction and also injunction petition I.A.No.319 of 1999 to restrain the decree-holder from proceeding with E.P.No.126 of 1996 in O.S.No.42 of 1987. The trial Court dismissed the I.A.No.319 of 1999. However, the said Balasubramanian was successful in the Sub Court, Madurantakam, which allowed the appeal C.M.A.No.6 of 1999 granting interim injunction in favour of the subsequent purchaser Balasubramanian. The Court auction purchaser, viz., the respondent herein filed C.R.P.No.439 of 2000 challenging the correctness of the order in the appeal C.M.A.No.6 of 1999 and this Court trying the said C.R.P. along with C.R.P.No.2099 of 2000 filed by the subsequent purchaser Balasubramanian, against the order of appointment of advocate-commissioner, allowed the C.R.P.No.439 of 2000 and dismissed the C.R.P.No.2099 of 2000 as per common order dated 3.8.2001. 16. 16. The first judgment-debtor Radhabai Ammal having failed in all other attempts to set aside the ex parte decree in O.S.No.42 of 1987, it appears, the subsequent purchaser Balasubramanian filed claim petition under Order 21 Rule 58 C.P.C. which was dismissed after contest and since the said claim petition was filed, the Court auction sale in favour of the respondent herein could not be confirmed as barred under Order 21 rule 58 C.P.C. 17. Therefore, as a lost resort, the first judgment-debtor has filed E.A.No.10 of 2003 on 3.1.2003 to set aside the Court auction sale held on 17.3.1997, in that, the Court auction sale in favour of the respondent has not been confirmed, under Order 34 Rule 5 read with Order 34 Rule 15 and Section 151 C.P.C., which was dismissed after contest and challenging the said order, this revision petition has been filed. 18. It is true that the Court action sale in which the respondent was successful bidder as the permitted decree-holder, has not been confirmed, in view of the dilatory tactics adopted by the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor and by one Balasubramanian who claimed as subsequent purchaser of the properties from the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor by two sale deeds dated 13.7.1987 and 17.7.1987 after filing of the suit O.S.No.42 of 1987 on 7.4.1987, which were clearly hit by lis pendens. The respondent only obtained charge decree in O.S.No.42 of 1987 against the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor and another and as such, to set aside Court auction sale on deposit, Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. alone is applicable. 19. As per the Madras High Court Amendment of Rule 89 of Order 21 C.P.C. "the judgment-debtor or any person deriving title from the judgment-debtor or any person holding an interest in the property" can seek to set aside the Court auction sale on his depositing in Court for payment to the purchaser, a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase-money and for payment to the decree-holder, the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, less any amount which may, since the date of such proclamation of sale, have been received by the decree-holder. 20. 20. Article 127 of the Limitation Act prescribes 30 days from the date of sale, as the period of limitation to set aside the sale in execution of a decree, including any such application by a judgment-debtor. Therefore, since E.A.No.10 of 2003 subject matter of this revision petition is filed on 3.1.2003 to set aside the Court auction sale held on 17.3.1997, in which the respondent was successful bidder as the permitted decree-holder, the said petition is clearly barred under Article 127 of the Limitation Act. 21. As rightly argued for the respondent, under Section 65 C.P.C. the respondent being successful bidder and permitted decree-holder in the Court auction sale on 17.3.1997, the properties so purchased shall be deemed to have vested in him from the time when the properties were sold on 17.3.1997. The learned counsel for the respondent also pointed out that in view of the dilatory tactics adopted by the first judgment-debtor Radhabai Ammal, and also the claim petition under Order 21 Rule 58 C.P.C. by one Balasubramanian claiming that he is the subsequent purchaser as per the sale deeds dated 13.7.1987 and 17.7.1987, which sales were hit by lis pendens, as the sale deeds were executed during the pendency of the suit O.S.No.142 of 1987, the Court auction sale could not be confirmed in favour of the respondent. 22. As per Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act, the seller is entitled to a charge upon the property in the hands of the buyer, where the ownership of which has been passed to the buyer before payment of the whole of the purchase-money. 23. Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act reads thus:- "Where immovable property of one person is by act of parties or operation of law made security for the payment of money to another, and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the latter person is said to have a charge on the property and all the provisions hereinbefore contained which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to such charge." By referring Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, the argument advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the revision petitioner that only Order 34 rule 5 read with Order 34 rule 15 C.P.C. is applicable, is without any force. Order 34 Rule 5 C.P.C. reads thus:- "5. Order 34 Rule 5 C.P.C. reads thus:- "5. Final decree in suit for sale - (1) Where, on or before the day fixed or at any time before the confirmation of a sale made in pursuance of a final decree passed under sub-rule (3) of this rule, the defendant makes payment into Court of all amounts due from him under sub-rule (1) of Rule 4, the Court shall, on application made by the defendant in this behalf, pass a final decree or, if such decree has been passed, an order - (a) Ordering the plaintiff to deliver up the documents referred to in the preliminary decree, and, if necessary,- (b) Ordering him to transfer the mortgaged property as directed in the said decree," Order 34 Rule 15(1) C.P.C. reads thus:- "15. Mortgages by the deposit of title-deeds and charges – (1) All the provisions contained in this Order which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds within the meaning of Section 58, and to a charge within the meaning of Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882(4 of 1882)." The respondent has only obtained a charge decree in O.S.No.42 of 1987 against the judgment-debtor. By virtue of Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, the judgment-debtor cannot claim that the charge decree obtained in O.S.No.42 of 1987 by the respondent herein is a mortgage decree and as such, the judgment-debtor is entitled to claim benefits under Order 34 Rule 5 read with Order 34 Rule 15 C.P.C., in that, the suit O.S.No.42 of 1987 was not filed as a suit on mortgage and no preliminary decree and final decree were passed in that suit. Therefore, the contention put-forth for the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor that under Order 34 Rule 5 read with Order 34 Rule 15 C.P.C., the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor can seek to set aside the Court action sale in favour of the respondent, in that, the sale has not been confirmed in his favour, in view of the dilatory tactics adopted by the revision petitioner/first judgment-debtor as set out above, is not acceptable. 24. 24. The Executing Court considering all these aspects properly and also the facts that the petition E.A.No.10 of 2003, which is filed only on 3.1.2003 and beyond 30 days from the date of sale, to set aside the Court action sale held on 17.3.1997 in favour of the respondent, is clearly barred by time and accordingly dismissed the said E.A.No.10 of 2003. Such order being not erroneous does not call for any interference and has to be confirmed. 25. In the result, this Civil Revision Petition fails and is dismissed with costs of Rs.5,000/-. The order-dated 27.1.2003 made in E.A.No.10 of 2003 in E.P.No.126 of 1996 in O.S.No.42 of 1987 by the learned District Munsif, Madurantakam, is confirmed. Consequently, the petition C.M.P.No.4774 of 2003 is also dismissed and the petition V.C.M.P.No.16945 of 2003 is allowed and the interim stay of confirmation of sale granted in C.M.P.No.4774 of 2003 is vacated.