JUDGMENT A. S. NAIDU, J. : As the subject matter and the point of law involved in all these cases are same, the cases were heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The orders passed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Rourkela and Controlling Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and Rules made thereunder are assailed by the Steel Authority of India Limited invoking juris¬diction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The dispute has a chequered career inasmuch as it has travelled to this Court on several previous occasions in O.J.C. No.1076 of 1999, A.H.O. No.14 of 2001, O.J.C. No.15348 of 2001, etc. The contesting opposite parties in all these cases are erstwhile employees under the Steel Authority of India (for short ‘SAIL’). Though initially they were holding non-executive posts, by efflux of time they were promoted to executive posts. They retired on superannuation prior to 24.9.1997, the date when the payment of Gratuity Act was amended. 3. The SAIL paid Rs.1,00,000/- to each of the contesting opposite parties towards their gratuity in consonance with Sec¬tion-4(3) of the Payment and Gratuity Act, 1972. Being aggrieved by such payment, the said opposite parties filed applications under Sub-Rule 1 of Rule 10 of the Payment of Gratuity Rules before the Assistant Labour Commissioner and Controlling Authori¬ty under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, inter alia claiming that they were entitled to receive higher amount i.e. Rs.3,00,617.30 ps towards gratuity and prayed for issuance of a direction to SAIL to pay the balance sum of Rs.2,00,617.30 ps being the differential amount. The SAIL appeared before the Controlling Authority and took the stand that the contesting opposite parties being executives were only entitled to a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-. Relying upon a decision of the Delhi High Court, a stand was taken by the SAIL that as the same dispute had already been answered by the said Court, the proceeding before the Con¬trolling Authority was not maintainable being hit by the princi¬ples of res judicata, and prayed to decide the question of main¬tainability as a preliminary issue. The Controlling Authority, however, without passing any order with regard to maintainability proceeded to hear the matter on merit. The petitioner-SAIL ap¬proached this Court in OJC No.1076/1999 and OJC No.5998/1999. The Controlling Authority, however, without passing any order with regard to maintainability proceeded to hear the matter on merit. The petitioner-SAIL ap¬proached this Court in OJC No.1076/1999 and OJC No.5998/1999. This Court disposed of the said writ applications and directing the Controlling Authority to decide the question of maintainabil¬ity first by a speaking order and also directed that till the question of maintainability was decided the matter would not proceed further. 4. In consonance with the direction issued by this Court, the Controlling Authority heard the matter and by a reasoned order dated 28.6.1999 held that the proceeding was to barred by principles of res judicata and the applications filed by the employees were maintainable. The said order was once again im¬pugned before this Court in OJC No.8236/1999 by SAIL. By judgment dated 21st December 2002, the writ application was dismissed with an observation that while disposing of the proceeding the Con¬trolling Authority would consider the applicability of the judg¬ment by the Delhi High Court. 5. A.H.O. No.14/2001 was thereafter filed by the SAIL assailing the judgment passed in OJC No.8236/1999. The Division Bench of this Court while not interfering with the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge directed the Competent Author¬ity to dispose of the applications filed before it in accordance with the observations made in the judgment in the A.H.O. Thereaf¬ter, the Controlling Authority proceeded with the hearing of the applications of the contesting opposite parties and dispose of the same by the impugned orders. 6. The grievance of the petitioner-SAIL in the present writ petition is that the Controlling Authority in spite of receipt of his order of transfer, proceeded in a hurry and dis¬posed of all the applications within period form 11th November 2002 to 27th January 2003. According to the petitioner Sri V. K. Sinha who was the Controlling Authority-cum-Assistant Labour Commissioner, Rourkela received his order of transfer to Saintala Ordinance Factory, Bolangir, and Sri Deba Charan Paradhan joined in his place on 11th November 2002. In spite of the said fact Sri Sinha disposed of nine gratuity cases hurriedly, and that too in a way contrary to the observations made by this Court in A.H.O. No.14/2001. It is further asserted that when the petitioner-SAIL filed application for adducing evidence with regard to non-existence of any agreement, without passing any orders thereon, the Controlling Authority closed the proceedings. It is further asserted that when the petitioner-SAIL filed application for adducing evidence with regard to non-existence of any agreement, without passing any orders thereon, the Controlling Authority closed the proceedings. It is asserted and contended that the Controlling Authority without following the principles of natural justice and equity, for the reasons best known to him, disposed of nine cases after receiving his transfer order which itself indicates that he had a bias against the petitioner. Such action also revealed a mala fide attitude of the Controlling Authority towards the petitioner-SAIL. Apart form assailing the order on the ground of bias, the veracity of the impugned order is also assailed on merits. 7. Mr. Sanganeria, learned counsel entered appearance for contesting opposite party No.4 in all the case. Mr. J. K. Mishra, learned Senior Standing Counsel (Central) accepted notice on behalf of the Central Government. 8. In course of hearing Mr. Jagannath Patnaik, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioner-SAIL forcefully sub¬mitted that the way the Controlling Authority disposed of nine cases in a hurry after receiving his transfer order clearly exhibits the bias and the mala fide intention. He challenged the order on merit, mainly on the ground that the Controlling Authori¬ty acted illegally and with material irregularity in not follow¬ing the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in A.H.O. No.14/2001. 9. Mr. Sanganeria, learned counsel appearing for the contesting opposite parties, repudiated the allegations levelled and the assertions made by Mr. Patnaik. According to Mr. Sanganeria, the Controlling Authority after hearing the cases in extenso, disposed of the same by order and any assertions made to the contrary are without any basis. According to Mr. Sanganeria, the Controlling Authority has taken into consideration all the facts and circumstances, the provisions of law, the observations made in A.H.O. by the Division Bench of this Court, the judgment of the Delhi High Court and has disposed of the applications with reasoned order. The order does not suffer form any infirmity or illegality and this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India may not interfere with the order. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties patiently, perused the materials on record meticulously and considered all the submissions diligently. The order does not suffer form any infirmity or illegality and this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India may not interfere with the order. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties patiently, perused the materials on record meticulously and considered all the submissions diligently. The first principle of natural jus¬tice consists of the rule against bias or interest and is based on three maxims (1) no man shall be a Judge in his own cause, (2) Justice should not only be done, but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done and (3) Judges, like Caesar’s wife should be above suspicion. “Bias would vilify any decision”. According to the dictionary meaning anything which tends or may be regarded as tending to cause a person to decide a case otherwise than on evidence must be held to be biased. A pre disposition to decide for or against one party, without proper regard to the true merits of the dispute is bias. The legal jurisprudence requires that justice should not only be done, but manifestly and undoubt¬edly be seen to be done. Gone are those days when a Judge, like the Caesar’s wife was above suspicion. In the present day scenar¬io judicial system and decorum mandates that a Judge should act in such a manner that it shall not throw a cloud of suspicion in the mind of any of the litigant public. 11. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case in the touchstone of the principles enumerated in the pre¬ceding paragraph an irresistible conclusion can be arrived at that in the manner the nine cases were disposed of, that too, after receiving the order of transfer, without affording opportu¬nity to adduce further evidence, creates a cloud of suspicion and I feel this is a fit case where the orders passed by the Assist¬ant Labour Commissioner (Central) and Controlling Authority, Rourkela cannot be sustained. I restrain myself form expressing any opinion on merit of the case. 12. In the result, the impugned orders are quashed and the matter is remanded to the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) and Controlling Authority, Rourkela with a direction to dispose of the applications de novo after giving opportunity of hearing to all the parties. The Writ Petitions are accordingly allowed. Parties shall bear their own cost. Petitions allowed.