1. The dispute in this writ petition relates to taking over possession of properties and/or management and affairs of the Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences at Soura; Kashmir Nursing Home at Gupkar Road and Dr. Ali Jan Shopping Complex at Kothibagh in Srinagar by the government. The petition challenging the government order dated 22nd July, 2003 was referred to the Division Bench having regard to the “subject and nature of the petition, the public interest involved and the reliefs prayed for”. The Division Bench, however, gave a split verdict. While V. K. Jhanji, J. dismissed the writ petition, Syed Bashir-ud-Din, J. quashed the impugned order and allowed the writ petition. The petition in the circumstances was ordered to be listed before the third Judge in terms of rule 36 of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court Rules, and that is how the case came up before me for hearing. 2. The facts of the case have been set out in detail in the judgment of V. K. Jhanji, J. Briefly stated, the background of the case is that the Housing Department of Government of Jammu and Kashmir acquired about a thousand kanals of land at Zoonimar, Srinagar for construction of a housing colony. A plan to build a 500-bed hospital at Soura, Srinagar was also under consideration of the government. Zoonimar and Soura are adjoining localities. On 21st November, 1972, it is said, some people, said to be friends and admirers of late Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, on the occasion of his 68th birth day decided to set up a public charitable trust for establishing a medical institute at Srinagar. On 19th May, 1973 the trust, by name ‘Sher-i-Kashmir National Medical Institute Trust’, was registered. On 4th September, 1973, vide Government Order no.627-HD/G of 1973, sanction was accorded to the transfer of the government dispensary at Soura along with the dispensary building, its kitchen block, chowkidar’s shed with land and appurtenances to the trust. On 14th October, 1973, vide Government Order no.872-HD of 1973, sanction was accorded for lease of 292 kanals and 8 marlas of land to the trust for a period of 40 years on consolidated rent of Rs.100/- per annum subject to execution of a lease deed. On 23rd May, 1974, vide Government Order no.332/HD/G of 1974, sanction was accorded to the transfer of Drug Research Laboratory, Moulana Azad Road, Kothibagh to the trust on rent. On 23rd May, 1974, vide Government Order no.332/HD/G of 1974, sanction was accorded to the transfer of Drug Research Laboratory, Moulana Azad Road, Kothibagh to the trust on rent. In the order it was stated that the terms of transfer would be decided separately. In February, 1975 late Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah took over as Chief Minister of the State. On 22nd May, 1975 the Secretary of the trust requested the government to amend Government Order no.872-HD of 1973 dated 14th October, 1973 and convert lease of 292 kanals and 8 marlas land at Zoonimar into absolute grant in favour of the trust. On 27th August, 1976, vide Government Order no.214-ME of 1976, the Kashmir Nursing Home at Gupkar Road was also transferred to the trust along with land, building and other assets. Meanwhile, the request for absolute transfer of 292 kanals and 8 marlas of land was processed at different levels. Finally, pursuant to Cabinet Decision dated 12th April, 1978, Government Order no. Rev(NDK)90 of 1978 dated 19th April, 1978 was issued regarding transfer of ownership rights as donation under clause (c) of Section 140 of the J&K Transfer of Property Act, 1977 Svt. whereby not only the said 292 kanals and 8 marlas of land at Zoonimar but the government dispensary at Soura, Drug Research Laboratory at Kothibagh and Kashmir Nursing Home at Gupkar Road, along with their land and appurtenances were also transferred to the trust. Though no formal deed of transfer was executed, the trust got the properties mutated in its name in the revenue records. In the meantime, the government in the Medical Education Department had issued order no.18-ME of 1977 dated 18th January, 1977 renaming the proposed hospital at Soura as Institute of Medical Sciences, Soura, Srinagar. On 17th December, 1980 an agreement was entered into between the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and the trust in terms of which the trust provided land measuring 292 kanals and 8 marlas to Sher-i-Kashmir Hospital and Poly-Clinic along with land at Soura for construction and establishment of the medical institute. The agreement stipulated that the properties made available to government would continue to be property of the trust without any change in the proprietary rights. The Institute of Medical Sciences at Soura finally became functional in 1983. The agreement stipulated that the properties made available to government would continue to be property of the trust without any change in the proprietary rights. The Institute of Medical Sciences at Soura finally became functional in 1983. Meanwhile the Drug Research Laboratory at Moulana Azad Road, Kothibagh was dismantled by the trust and converted into a shopping complex known as Dr. Ali Jan Plaza and shops and accommodation therein were leased out to private individuals. The Kashmir Nursing Home at Gupkar Road, Srinagar was also renovated / reconstructed and converted into a 40-bed nursing home at government expense. On 22nd July, 2003 by the impugned order nursing home at Gupkar Road and other properties mentioned above were taken over allegedly to preempt the move to hand over possession of the nursing home to a private party. 3. On 25th August, 2003 the writ petition was filed. On 1st September, 2003 it was taken up and on the same day referred to Division Bench. The Division Bench took up the hearing and after passing some interlocutory orders finally disposed of the writ petition in the manner stated above. No interim relief was granted to the petitioner at any stage with the result that the impugned order took effect and has been holding the field. Before referring to the reliefs sought in the writ petition, it would be appropriate to quote the impugned order as follows: “Sub: Taking over of Kashmir Nursing Home, Gupkar Road, Srinagar and allied matters. Ref: Cabinet Decision No.119/Cir dated 22.7.2003. Government Order No.820-HME of 2003 Dated 22.7.2003. Before referring to the reliefs sought in the writ petition, it would be appropriate to quote the impugned order as follows: “Sub: Taking over of Kashmir Nursing Home, Gupkar Road, Srinagar and allied matters. Ref: Cabinet Decision No.119/Cir dated 22.7.2003. Government Order No.820-HME of 2003 Dated 22.7.2003. Whereas vide Government Order No.214-HME of 1976 dated 27.8.1976, Kashmir Nursing Home, Gupkar Road was transferred along with its land, building and all the assets to the “Sher-i-Kashmir National Medical Institute Trust” (hereinafter referred to as the Trust) with the condition that the same shall exclusively be used for maintaining a Nursing Home; and Whereas the Trust had to provide adequate representation to the Government on its Management Committee; and Whereas no such representation has been provided to the Government on the Management Committee which is breach of the transfer of the Nursing Home; Whereas, vide Government order No. Rev (NDK) 90 of 1978 dated 19.4.1978, land measuring 292 Kanals 8 marlas situated at Zoonimar, Srinagar, Government Dispensary at Soura, Drug Research Lab along with land measuring 7 Kanals and 12 marlas and Kashmir Nursing Home measuring 23 Kanals 5 marlas, particulars whereof are given in Annexure ‘A’ to this order, were transferred to the Trust in ownership as a donation from the Jammu & Kashmir Government; and Whereas, no formal deed of transfer was executed between the parties in respect of the aforementioned property; and Whereas in the year 1995-96, the management of the Trust approached to the Government for taking over the Kashmir Nursing Home as the Trust was not able to maintain the Nursing Home because of the paucity of the funds; and Whereas, in a meeting held under the chairmanship of the then Chief Minister on June 4, 1997, it was decided to take over the aforesaid Nursing Home by the Government and to run it on the analogy of Col. Chopra Nursing Home of Government Medical College, Jammu; and Whereas, vide Government Order No.695-HME of 1997 dated 6.8.1997, the Government sanctioned an amount of Rs.50.00 Lakhs as Grant-in-Aid in favour of the Trust for completion of the new building coming up in the premises of Kashmir Nursing Home; and Whereas, the matter remained pending and, resultantly, the Kashmir Nursing Home remained closed; and Whereas the matter regarding transfer of land effected vide aforesaid Government order was discussed in a meeting by Commr./Secretary, Health & Medical Education, with the then Law Secretary and it was opined that- ‘the transfer of landed property with structures thereon though done twice had been done only through simple Government order which ab initio is violative of the State laws. The property was required to have been transferred under the Transfer of Property Act and further conditions defined too, stating whether this is a lease, perpetual or a 99 year lease etc. Therefore, the simplest way to take back the property so transferred to the said Trust is by simply rescinding the Government orders issued in this behalf’. Whereas, Shri R. K. Raina, Director, Madr-e-Meharban Institute of Health Services, Jammu, through a communication dated 18.5.2003 addressed to Commissioner/Secretary Health & ME Department, sought the permission of the Government for opening a branch of Madr-e-Meharban Institute of Health Sciences, Jammu, at Srinagar; and Whereas the said Dr. Whereas, Shri R. K. Raina, Director, Madr-e-Meharban Institute of Health Services, Jammu, through a communication dated 18.5.2003 addressed to Commissioner/Secretary Health & ME Department, sought the permission of the Government for opening a branch of Madr-e-Meharban Institute of Health Sciences, Jammu, at Srinagar; and Whereas the said Dr. R. K. Raina stated in the aforesaid communication that the Trust had agreed, in principle, to lease out the premises of the Kashmir Nursing Home at Gupkar Road to the aforesaid Institute for utilizing the Nursing Home both for patient care as well as for training of para-medical personnel; and Whereas, from the aforesaid communication it is revealed that the Trust has decided to transfer the said Kashmir Nursing Home to a third party in violation of the Government order No.214-HME of 1976 dated 27.8.1976 and without bringing it in the notice of the Government; and Whereas, the purported transfer of the Nursing Home by the Trust to a third party will create interest in his favour at the cost of the State Government and public at large; and Whereas, the Trust had entered into an agreement with the third party to transfer the said Nursing Home to that party for which the inauguration was fixed for 23rd July, 2003, the invitation cadres having been already distributed; and Whereas, purported transfer of land as detailed in Annexure ‘A’ vide Government order No. Rev (NDK) 90 of 1978 dated 19.4.1978 in favour of the Trust is also without any legal authority and in disregard to the provisions of the law; and Whereas, the Government has received numerous complaints about the running and management of the Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences, Soura; and Whereas the employees of the SKIMS have held demonstrations demanding that the control of the Trust on SKIMS be removed; and Whereas, the SKIMS was made exclusively with the State land and Government funds and the full financial burden of its upkeep, plan and non-plan expenses are borne by the Government; and Whereas, property situated at Kothibagh (commonly known as Dr. Ali Jan Shopping Complex) purported to have been transferred to the Trust vide Government order No. Rev (NDK) 90 of 1978 dated 19.4.1978 has been transferred by the Trust to third parties who have constructed shops and offices thereon and are using the same for commercial purposes in violation of the purpose for which the said property had been so transferred; and Whereas the transfer of the land by the Trust in favour of the third parties, being in violation of the Government order and the purpose for which it was transferred, requires to be probed into thoroughly; and Whereas, it is in interest of public at large, patient care and for managing the affairs of the Institutes and properties more professionally and efficiently that the Government rescinds the aforesaid Government orders and takes over the possession of the Institutes and the properties; Whereas the Trust has committed various breaches despite the notices and warnings to that effect given to it by the Government; Now, therefore, in the interest of public at large, patient care and to manage the affairs of the aforesaid institutions and the properties efficiently and professionally, sanction is hereby accorded to the: 1) revocation of Government Order No.214-ME of 1976 dated 27.08.1976 and Government order No. Rev (NDK) 90 of 1978 dated 19.04.1978 and taking over the possession of the property and land etc. referred to in the said Government orders; 2) taking over the possession and management of Kashmir Nursing Home, Gupkar Road, Srinagar; 3) taking over the full management of the affairs of Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences, Soura, and any other institution / institutions affiliated with it; 4) taking over the legal possession of the property situated at Kothibagh, Srinagar, (Dr. Ali Jan Shopping Complex) over which the State Government asserts the lawful title and claims as real owner thereof vis-à-vis those who have raised construction thereon and are in physical possession thereof; and; 5) referring of the matter to the Vigilance Organisation for investigating the transfer of the land mentioned hereinabove by the trustees / management of Sher-i-Kashmir National Medical Institute Trust to the parties who have constructed houses and shops thereon and are using it for commercial purpose in breach of the purpose for which it was handed over to the trustees. By order of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.” 4. By order of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.” 4. The reliefs sought in the writ petition may at this stage be mentioned as under: “It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be graciously pleased to: (a) Issue an appropriate writ, direction or order quashing and setting aside Cabinet Decision No.119/Cir. Dated July 22, 2003; (b) Issue an appropriate writ, direction or order quashing and setting aside Government Order No.820-HME of 2003 dated July 22, 2003; (c) Issue an appropriate writ, direction or order commanding he respondents No.1 to 11 not to interfere with the working of the Trust and with the Trust properties, including the property transferred to the Trust vide Government Order No. Rev (NDK) 90 of 1978 dated April 19, 1978 and all other property owned by the Trust; (d) Issue an appropriate writ, direction or order commanding the respondents No.1 to 11 to return/restore the possession and management of the Kashmir Nursing Home, including the Trust Office, located at Gupkar Road, Srinagar, to the Trust; (e) Issue an appropriate writ, direction or order to the respondents No.1 to 11 to run the Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences (SKIMS) and any other institution/institutions affiliated with it in accordance with the terms of the agreement dated 17th December, 1980, through the Governing Body constituted under Clause (5) and other relevant Clauses of said Agreement; (f) Pass such further or other orders that this Hon’ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 5. The case of the petitioner-trust is that it was created by 40 settlors who raised donations from different quarters for its establishment. The object, inter alia, was to establish Sher-i-Kashmir National Medical Institute to help, aid, assist, sponsor, organize, establish and/or maintain hospitals, dispensaries, clinics, health centers, maternity homes etc. Being satisfied with the aims and objects of the trust, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir initially vide order no.214-ME of 1976 dated 27th August, 1976 transferred Kashmir Nursing Home comprising of 22 kanals of land and structures thereon along with its assets at Gupkar Road to the trust. In view of Government Order no. Rev (NDK)90 of 1978 dated 19th April, 1978 transferring different properties, including Kashmir Nursing Home, as donation, the aforesaid transfer under Government order no.214-ME of 1976 dated 27th August, 1976 in respect of Kashmir Nursing Home lost its relevance. In view of Government Order no. Rev (NDK)90 of 1978 dated 19th April, 1978 transferring different properties, including Kashmir Nursing Home, as donation, the aforesaid transfer under Government order no.214-ME of 1976 dated 27th August, 1976 in respect of Kashmir Nursing Home lost its relevance. According to the petitioner, apart from the properties donated by the State, one Raj Sawhney, the then Secretary of the trust, had donated 60 kanals of land to the trust and one Beant Singh, owner of Palladium Cinema, also donated 40 kanals of land. The object of establishing a medical institute was a big project and it was not possible for the trust to establish it within its limited means and resources. The government was made aware of the charitable object and being satisfied with the same, the government agreed to construct Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences at Soura and in this background an agreement came to be executed between the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and the trust on 17th December, 1980. In terms of the agreement, the trust provided land measuring 292 kanals and 8 marlas, Sher-i-Kashmir Hospital and the Polyclinic along with land at Soura for construction and establishment of the Medical Institute. It was agreed that the site and properties made available to the government would continue to be the property of the trust without any change in its proprietary rights. The government agreed to the establishment of the Institute as per the terms and conditions contained in the agreement in view of the growing need of medicare among people in general, particularly those who could not afford to go out of State for specialized treatment, and to provide for post-graduate studies, research and training. In addition to the aforesaid fixed assets, the trust also agreed to give donations and contributions which it might receive in the name of the Institute for research works. As per the agreement further, the vice chairman of the governing body was to be one of the representatives of the trust. As per the agreement further, the executive power in relation to the Institute rests with the Government of Jammu and Kashmir through its Director. The vice chairman of the governing body has no executive power. He has to abide by the resolutions of the governing body which are required to be vetted by the Council of Ministers who are ex-officio members of the governing body. The vice chairman of the governing body has no executive power. He has to abide by the resolutions of the governing body which are required to be vetted by the Council of Ministers who are ex-officio members of the governing body. 6. Further case of the petitioner-trust is that the Kashmir Nursing Home along with land and appurtenances transferred to it under Government Order no. Rev.(NDK)90 of 1978 dated 19th April, 1978 was run by the trust as a nursing home till early 1990s. As the existing building was not sufficient for running a professional nursing home, need was felt to construct a new building near the old building site. The trust, accordingly, undertook construction of 40-bed nursing home with provisions for modern facilities. The entire construction expense was borne out of the trust fund. In order to raise fund for achieving the objects and purposes of the trust it constructed a shopping complex called Dr. Ali Jan Plaza at Moulana Azad Road on the land transferred to it by the government. On account of outbreak of militancy in the State, the construction work was discontinued. The construction of the new nursing home in the meantime was complete by early 2003 at a cost of Rs.2.00 crores. The staff of the nursing home who were not paid their salaries to the tune of Rs.94.00 lakhs from 1989 to 2003 was a heavy burden on the funds of the trust. On 16th April, 2003 decision was taken by the Board of Trustees to terminate their services with a golden handshake. As the trust did not have expert staff and infrastructure to manage the new nursing home on day-to-day basis and run it in accordance with the guidelines of Medical Council of India, and also to increase the corpus of the trust fund, it was decided to outsource the management. Several offers were received and the trust finally entered into contract with one of them. The trust had incurred an expenditure of Rs.3.00 crores in the construction of Dr. Ali Jan Plaza. It had also taken loan of Rs.1.40 crores from the Jammu and Kashmir Bank out of which Rs.1.25 Crores had been withdrawn in 1989. It had to repay the amount with interest amounting to Rs.1.10 crores to the Bank. The trust had incurred an expenditure of Rs.3.00 crores in the construction of Dr. Ali Jan Plaza. It had also taken loan of Rs.1.40 crores from the Jammu and Kashmir Bank out of which Rs.1.25 Crores had been withdrawn in 1989. It had to repay the amount with interest amounting to Rs.1.10 crores to the Bank. In the circumstances the shops and office accommodation available in the aforesaid shopping plaza were leased out to different persons in exchange of corpus donations and monthly rentals in order to supplement the trust income to be used for its objects and purposes. In this manner the trust raised a sum of Rs.30,12,453/- on account of rent. 7. Having noticed the foundational facts of the case, I may now refer to the grounds of challenge. According to the petitioner Shri Mufti Muhamad Syeed, the present Chief Minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has always been politically ill-disposed towards late Sheikh Abdullah and his family, in particular his son Dr. Farooq Abdullah. After taking over as Chief Minister of the State, in pursuit of his objective he hatched a conspiracy to usurp the assets and different trusts established as charitable and religious institutions on false and baseless grounds. The impugned action of take over of the nursing home at Gupkar and other properties was vindictive, biased and an act of political vendetta to harm the reputation of the Sheikh family. The petitioner learnt about the take over only from newspaper reports and enquiries made thereafter. No opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner in the matter and there was thus gross violation of rules of natural justice. The entire exercise was a colourable exercise of power and in violation of the provisions of the Trusts Act, 1977, the Transfer of Property Act and the Civil Procedure Code. Government Order dated 27th August, 1976 referred to in the impugned order whereby the nursing home was initially transferred to the trust was superseded by subsequent order dated 19th April, 1978 by which ownership in the properties was transferred to the trust as donation. Treating the transfer as such, the petitioner entered into agreement with the government providing 292 kanals and 8 marlas land at Soura to the government for construction of the institution. Treating the transfer as such, the petitioner entered into agreement with the government providing 292 kanals and 8 marlas land at Soura to the government for construction of the institution. If the trust allegedly did not take steps in the matter of execution of formal deed of transfer after 19th April, 1978, as stated in the impugned order, the government should have served notice and given opportunity to get the formal deed executed. The subsequent investments made by the trust to fund the construction of Dr. Ali Jan Plaza as well as nursing home at Gupkar were within the knowledge of the government. Indeed the government actively participated in the process. In the circumstances, the government is estopped from taking any stand that the trust was not the owner of the properties. The land over which Sher-i-Kashmir Hospital and the Poly-Clinic stood belonged to the trust and could not be taken over. The take over of possession of Dr. Ali Jan Plaza was also illegal. The shops had been leased in exchange for corpus donation and rent was being charged in accordance with paragraph 19 of the trust deed and, therefore, charging of rent cannot be said to be in violation of the trust deed. The transfer of the properties under government order dated 19th April, 1978 was without any condition as to representation of the government on the committee of the nursing home. The impugned action amounted to circumventing the procedure and remedy available under section 92 of Civil Procedure Code as well as the arbitration clause contained in the agreement. The agreement for all practical purposes was in force and it could neither be annulled nor its terms changed save as provided in clause 17 of the agreement. The trust had been taking all precautions to protect the properties and also to ensure that the objectives and purposes of the trust were carried out. However, in utter disregard of all norms, in order to settle scores and defame the family of Sheikh Abdullah and Dr. Farooq Abdullah, the properties were taken over. 8. The trust had been taking all precautions to protect the properties and also to ensure that the objectives and purposes of the trust were carried out. However, in utter disregard of all norms, in order to settle scores and defame the family of Sheikh Abdullah and Dr. Farooq Abdullah, the properties were taken over. 8. In reply affidavit the respondents have taken certain preliminary objections to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petition involved disputed questions of fact which could not be gone into in writ jurisdiction; that the petitioner had alternative remedy available under the general law and, therefore, could not invoke the remedy of writ petition; that the relief claimed in the writ petition amounted to seeking declaration of title to the property which cannot be done in writ jurisdiction and that none of the fundamental, legal or constitutional rights of the petitioner had been violated. Besides these legal objections, on facts after giving a resume of the factual background of the case which has been noticed above, it has been stated that government order dated 14th September, 1973 whereby sanction was accorded to transfer of 292.8 kanals of land on lease basis in favour of the trust envisaged execution of lease deed but no instrument of lease was executed. The government order dated 23rd May, 1974 by which drug research laboratory along with 7 kanals and 8 marlas land at Kothibagh was transferred to the trust on rent basis, contemplated that the terms of transfer would be decided separately which was never done. Similarly, the conditions laid down in government order dated 27th August, 1976 by which Kashmir Nursing Home at Gupkar along with land and building was transferred to the trust were not fulfilled by it and no transfer deed as required under law was ever executed. The respondents have denied the petitioner’s case that 292.8 kanals of land at Soura and Sher-i-Kashmir Hospital were properties of the trust. It took a stand that the statements to this effect in the agreement amounted to misrepresentation and fraud vitiating the agreement itself. It has been stated that from the time of acquisition of land and commencement of construction of the Medical Institute till July, 2003 the State government had incurred an expenditure - both plan and non-plan - of Rs.520,67,17,800. It took a stand that the statements to this effect in the agreement amounted to misrepresentation and fraud vitiating the agreement itself. It has been stated that from the time of acquisition of land and commencement of construction of the Medical Institute till July, 2003 the State government had incurred an expenditure - both plan and non-plan - of Rs.520,67,17,800. Abstract statements of expenditure incurred on construction, development and maintenance of the Medical Institute has been brought on record. According to the respondents the Institute was being run on total investment of the state exchequer right from the very beginning and inclusion of the representatives of the trust with virtual veto power in the governing body of the Institute had resulted in mismanagement. The management had deteriorated so much so that irregularities in selection and appointment of faculty members in the Institute had become a matter of public gossip and projected through various writ petitions. The government vide order no.902-GAD of 2001 dated 7th August, 2001 read with order no.930-GAD of 2001 constituted a committee under Chairmanship of Justice G. A. Kuchhai (retired). The committee found gross irregularities in selection of the faculty members of the Institute. The respondents have given details of the findings of the Kuchhai Committee which is not necessary to notice in this judgment. Suffice it to say that on the basis of the said findings the government has taken a plea that in the totality of facts and circumstances it was felt that the affairs of the institute were not being run in public interest and, therefore, in order to discharge its responsibility for the upkeep and management of the Institute it was compelled to take over the institute. The Institute but for the façade of agreement dated 17th December, 1980 should have been under the control of the government like any other department. The government order dated 19th April, 1978 did not vest any right or title in the properties in the trust. Section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act was not the source of power to transfer land or other immovable properties. It was only an enabling provision. Transfer of immovable property is governed by the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir and other laws on the subject. Section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act was not the source of power to transfer land or other immovable properties. It was only an enabling provision. Transfer of immovable property is governed by the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir and other laws on the subject. Mere issuance of a government order did not clothe the trust with any title to the property as the orders were not followed by deeds of transfer in accordance with law. Government order by itself cannot bring about any change in ownership of the property. The Institute is spread over a vast expanse of land measuring 977 kanals, 15 marlas and 158 sq.ft - all State land - and not confined to 292.8 kanals of land wrongly claimed by the petitioner as trust property. 9. As regards the nursing home at Gupkar Road, it has been stated that the trust deviated from the object for which the nursing home was transferred. It did not comply with the conditions of transfer as no representation was allowed to the government in its management. The government provided rupees ninety five lakh to the trust for renovation of the nursing home but the trust kept it closed since 1989. The Drug Research Laboratory at Moulana Azad Road was attached to the nursing home for purposes of rendering effective service to the patients in the nursing home and there could be no justification, muchless legal authority for raising a shopping complex at the site where drug research laboratory earlier stood. The order does not visualize or permit transfer of property to a third party. The proposed transfer of the nursing home to a third party was for extraneous consideration. The third party named in the agreement in question, enclosed with the writ petition, was a house-wife and related to Dr. Ali Mohd. Matoo, the present Chairman of the governing body which left no room for doubt about the mala fide of the proposed transfer. The accommodation available at Dr. Ali Jan Shopping Plaza has huge commercial value and persons to whom it has been leased out must have paid huge amounts as premium which aspect of the case was under investigation. 10. Matoo, the present Chairman of the governing body which left no room for doubt about the mala fide of the proposed transfer. The accommodation available at Dr. Ali Jan Shopping Plaza has huge commercial value and persons to whom it has been leased out must have paid huge amounts as premium which aspect of the case was under investigation. 10. As regards the agreement between the government and the trust, the respondents stated that the trust had managed the agreement by misrepresenting the facts which on proper examination were found to be contrary to records and the law as the land in question was never the property of the trust. The Trusts Act, 1977 has no application to the public trusts. 11. The respondents have also stated that before issuing the impugned order notice had been issued to the trust and copy of the impugned order was also made available to the petitioner. Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code in the facts and circumstances of the case was not applicable. Government had neither removed any trustees nor appointed any new trustee. The government had also not seized records of the trust. As regards the arbitration clause, it is stated that clause 18 of the agreement is not applicable. In any case, it was for the trust to take recourse to the arbitration clause which, as a matter of fact, was a ground to dismiss the writ petition. 12. The respondents have filed additional affidavit in which it has been stated that immediately after assuming the office of Chief Minister in 1975, late Sheikh Abdullah and his cabinet colleagues, who also happened to be trustees of the trust, contrary to the terms and conditions of the earlier government orders as also the law governing such transfer, initiated the process of transfer of all the properties including the land on proprietorship basis to the trust. On the insistence of the trust to transfer the properties in question which had earlier been given to it on lease on ownership basis, it was decided to obtain the approval of the cabinet to the proposal of transfer, and thereafter execute the transfer deed on behalf of the government by the Secretary, Revenue Department. On the insistence of the trust to transfer the properties in question which had earlier been given to it on lease on ownership basis, it was decided to obtain the approval of the cabinet to the proposal of transfer, and thereafter execute the transfer deed on behalf of the government by the Secretary, Revenue Department. On 19th April, 1978 the trust addressed a communication to the Revenue Secretary in that behalf and on the same day, government order purporting to be transfer of ownership as donation was issued. However, after the said order according sanction, no formal transfer as required under law ever took place. On 12th May, 1978 the Chief Minister’s Secretariat addressed a letter to the Secretary, Revenue Department requesting him to take immediate action in the matter of absolute transfer of properties to the trust. Another communication was issued on 12th June, 1978. The transfer was, however, never formalized by executing a deed. The official records disclose that in the year 1986 there was a move in the Revenue Department to rescind government order dated 19th April, 1978 as formal deeds of transfer had not been executed but the matter was not pursued. However, on 24th March, 1998 Secretary of the trust was requested to provide copy of the agreement relating to transfer of the said property to the trust. 13. Regarding mutations it is stated that mutation does not create or extinguish title in property, yet after issuance of the impugned government order the properties have been mutated in favour of the State by the Revenue Department. 14. The respondents have further stated that government had started construction of the 500-bed hospital at Soura, Srinagar, prior to the agreement dated 17th December, 1980 which vide government order dated 18th January, 1977 had been named as Institute of Medical Sciences Soura and declared as hospital run by government of Jammu and Kashmir in terms of Government order dated 1st February, 1979. Even after the execution of the agreement, in terms of government order dated 18th March, 1986 the Medical Institute was declared to be a government institution for all intents and purposes. The 500-bed hospital was merged with Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences, Soura which has all along been fully financed by the government. There was thus no logic or justification for continuing the trustees on the management of the Institute. The 500-bed hospital was merged with Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences, Soura which has all along been fully financed by the government. There was thus no logic or justification for continuing the trustees on the management of the Institute. Respondents further stated that from 1977 onwards most of the members including chairman and vice-chairman of the governing body of the Institute were from one family, and Dr. Ali Mohd Matoo had been Chairman of the Standing Academic Committee, Purchase Committee and Senior Selection Committee. In view of the irregularities detected, as decisions in all policy matters of the Institute were being taken by him in the aforesaid capacities, his removal from the management was considered necessary. 15. The petitioner has filed rejoinder to the reply affidavit as well as the additional affidavit of the respondents and brought certain documents on record. Before noticing the rival submissions of counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to briefly notice the findings of the learned Judges at one place. 16. In the opinion of V. K. Jhanji, J., mala fide was not proved by the petitioner. As regards the 1978 order he held that it did not create any title or interest in favour of the trust. It could not be construed as a grant under the Land Grants Act; at best it could be a gift under the Transfer of Property Act, and no transfer of immovable property thereunder is valid unless and until it is in writing and registered. There can be no grant or other mode of transfer to a non-permanent resident or non-juristic person. As regards the submission that all past actions stood superseded by the agreement of 17th December, 1980, the learned Judge held that contractual obligations cannot be enforced by writ petition and, accordingly, rejected the argument. The learned Judge further held that no case of promissory estoppel is made out in the absence of materials showing that the trust had altered its position pursuant to any unequivocal promise of the State. The learned Judge dwelt upon the acts of mismanagement / mal-administration and finally concluded that in view of overwhelming evidence brought on record by the State, the government should not be held bound by the promise if any. The learned Judge dwelt upon the acts of mismanagement / mal-administration and finally concluded that in view of overwhelming evidence brought on record by the State, the government should not be held bound by the promise if any. The learned Judge also rejected the submission that the State had acquiesced in the affairs of the trust and, therefore, should be estopped from taking any adverse action. The learned Judge concluded that it was in public interest to take over the properties. The petitioner was not able to run the nursing home on its own; the decision to lease out nursing home was for extraneous consideration; the construction of Dr. Ali Jan Plaza was also contrary to object of the trust guided by extraneous consideration. The learned Judge rejected the argument based on section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, observing that the trust had not been taken over; only the properties had been taken over. 17. Bashir-ud-Din, J., on the other hand held that by virtue of clause (c) of section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act the trust was eligible to acquire title and ownership rights in the properties donated to it by the government independent of sections 10 and 11 of the Land Grants Act. The donation was a non-testamentary grant of immovable property to which Section 17(2) (vii) of the Registration Act was not applicable and, therefore, it was not compulsorily registerable. Alternatively, if the 1978 order did not confer title, the trust acquired ownership rights by virtue of promissory estoppel and the government could not take back possession of the properties. By virtue of its majority representation in the Governing Body, the government had all-pervasive control over the affairs of the Institute and, therefore, it was open to it to manage its affairs. The extreme step of taking over was against the terms and conditions of the 1980 agreement. The record does not reveal there was any misrepresentation or fraud on behalf of the trust. Both parties were aware of the state of affairs; therefore, the absence of registered document was a mistake of law which did not render the contract void. The action of the State was violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India. The trust was within its rights to execute the agreement of lease in respect of Kashmir Nursing Home; the construction of Dr. The action of the State was violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India. The trust was within its rights to execute the agreement of lease in respect of Kashmir Nursing Home; the construction of Dr. Ali Jan Plaza was a bona fide act. No opportunity of hearing was given to the trust. The action was in violation of the rules of natural justice. Though there is no sufficient material regarding allegation of mala fide, there is “more than meets the eye” and the action was “not free from suspicion”. Existence of alternative remedy was no bar to exercise of writ jurisdiction when there is violation of rules of natural justice. 18. The correctness or otherwise of any action impugned in a case has to be judged on the basis of reasons assigned in the impugned order, if any. The impugned action cannot be justified by any additional reason except where in an appropriate case the Court is satisfied that the reasons were available in the record and had prompted the authority to act. The impugned order in the instant case is speaking one running into several paragraphs containing the factual background and the grounds / reasons of impugned action. The reasons may be culled out as under: i) No formal deed of transfer was executed in the light of government order dated 19th April, 1978; ii) The purported transfer of the properties by the 1978 order was without any legal authority and in disregard of the laws; iii) Kashmir Nursing Home was transferred to be used exclusively as nursing home; instead, the trust tried to create third party interest; iv) The trust failed to provide adequate representation to the government in the management of Kashmir Nursing Home; v) The trust converted the Drug Research Laboratory at Moulana Azad Road, Kothibagh into a commercial complex and transferred the properties to third parties in violation of the government order and the purpose for which the property was transferred to it; vi) The trust committed breaches despite notices and warning; vii) Complaints were received alleging neglect and irregularities in patient care and management of the affairs of the Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences, Soura; viii) The trust itself had approached the government in 1995-96 to take over the Kashmir Nursing Home; ix) It was in public interest to take over the properties and their management. 19. Mr. 19. Mr. M. A. Goni, learned counsel for the petitioner made the following submissions. The government order dated 19th April, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the 1978 order) created right and title in the properties covered by the order in favour of the trust and there was no necessity of executing a formal deed and getting it registered. The transfer of properties was as donation, and not gift or otherwise governed by the Jammu & Kashmir Transfer of Properties Act, 1977. It was a grant under section 10 of the Jammu and Kashmir Land Grants Act, 1960 to facilitate which amendment was made in the Transfer of Property Act by inserting clause (c) in section 140 making the provision of section 140 - restricting transfer of immovable property in favour of non-permanent residents of the State - inapplicable to transfer of immovable property in favour of the trust. If the 1978 order did not create any proprietary interest for want of a transfer deed the petitioner should have been given opportunity to get deed executed and registered. The petitioner having acted on the promise and altered its position, it is not open to the respondents to take a different stance on the principle of promissory estoppel. By an executive order the fundamental rights of the petitioner could not be taken away. The repeal of Articles 19(f) and 31 of the Constitution of India by the 44th amendment is not applicable in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the right to property continues to be a fundamental right in the State. If the government was of the view that the affairs of the trust were not being managed in a proper manner and the trust was committing acts of misfeasance, action should have been taken under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. If the government wanted to do away with the transfer, action could have been taken earlier. Finally, the order is mala fide made in colourable exercise of power at the instance of Shri Mufti Muhammad Sayeed, Chief Minister of the State of J&K Shri Muzaffar Hussain Beigh, State Finance and Law Minister; Shri Lal Singh, State Health Minister; and Shri Hakim Mohd. Yasin, State Revenue Minister, impleaded by name as respondents 5 to 8 in the writ petition. 20. Yasin, State Revenue Minister, impleaded by name as respondents 5 to 8 in the writ petition. 20. As regards mala fide, in the absence of notice to the said respondents it is futile to go into the question. On 1st September, 2003, when the petition was taken up for preliminary hearing, the Court observed that the materials on which mala fide is alleged are not found on record and deferred notice at that stage. Before the Division Bench, the plea of mala fide was pressed on behalf of the petitioner and V. K. Jhanji, J. did go into the question. He finally held after detailed discussion that mala fide was not proved and no case for issuance of notice to the said respondents is made out. Bashir-ud-Din, J. noticed the point towards end of the judgment but did not record any finding to the contrary. Counsel for the parties in course of hearing agreed that notice having not been issued to the respondents 5 to 8; it will be futile to go into the question of mala fide. Though Mr. Goni while stating facts of the case referred to the allegation of bias and vindictiveness on the part of the respondents generally, it is clear that without notice to respondents 5 to 8 the allegations of mala fide cannot be gone into and, accordingly, I refrain from making any comment on the point. 21. The point which was argued with emphasis was that ownership rights having been transferred as donation by the 1978 order, by an executive order, on whatsoever ground, the rights could not be taken away. Secondly, if the government wanted to act on the ground of mismanagement of the trust properties it could have acted in the manner provided under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. On behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, it was submitted that the transfer of properties was never complete as no transfer deed was executed and registered. The whole attempt was to confer undue advantage by bending rules and regulations at the cost of public interest. The materials on record would show that the petitioner-trust treated the properties as personal fiefdom of one family and not as properties of public trust. Being satisfied that the trust was acting against public interest, the government was left with no option but to intervene and take over the properties and their management. The materials on record would show that the petitioner-trust treated the properties as personal fiefdom of one family and not as properties of public trust. Being satisfied that the trust was acting against public interest, the government was left with no option but to intervene and take over the properties and their management. 22. The moot question for consideration is whether the 1978 order vested any title or interest in the petitioner-trust? Section 121 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir which embodies the executive power of the State provides: “(1) The executive power of the State shall extend, subject to any law made by the State Legislature, to the carrying on of any trade or business, and to the grant, sale, disposition or mortgage of any property held for the purposes of the State, and to the purchase or acquisition of property for those purposes and to the making of contracts. (2) All property acquired for the purposes of the State shall vest in the State.” 23. It is clear on a plain reading that the executive power of the State as to grant, sale, disposition or mortgage of any property has to be exercised subject to the law made by the State Legislature. Any grant, sale, disposition etc. by the State, not conforming to the mandate of the Constitution i.e. not in accordance with the law enacted by the State Legislature cannot be a valid or legal transfer. If the order making grant etc. is invalid or illegal, it goes without saying, the transaction if any pursuant thereto would be invalid and illegal too, and no right or interest can be said to have been created in favour of the person in whose favour the order was passed. 24. The Jammu and Kashmir Transfer of Property Act provides the modes of transfer of property, such as, sale, lease, mortgage, gift or exchange. Another permissible mode of transfer is as grant under the Jammu and Kashmir Land Grants Act which I shall refer later. Section 138 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down: “(1) No transfer of immovable property, except in a case governed by any special law to the contrary, shall be valid unless and until it is in writing registered and the registration thereof has been completed in accordance with sub-section (3) of section 61 of the Registration Act, 1977. Section 138 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down: “(1) No transfer of immovable property, except in a case governed by any special law to the contrary, shall be valid unless and until it is in writing registered and the registration thereof has been completed in accordance with sub-section (3) of section 61 of the Registration Act, 1977. (2) … (3) No person shall take possession of, or commence to build or build on, any land in the Province of Kashmir which has been transferred or has been contracted to be transferred to him unless and until such transfer becomes valid under the provision of sub-section (1). (4) No person who has obtained a transfer of immovable property referred to in sub-section (1) shall apply for and obtain from any Revenue or Settlement Officer or Court any alteration in any existing entry in any Settlement Record or paper, unless such person produces before such officer or Court a duly executed registered instrument, the registration whereof has been completed in the manner specified in sub-section (1). And no such officer or Court shall alter or cause to be altered any such entry except upon the production of an instrument registered in the aforesaid manner. Provided that nothing in this section applies to a lease of agricultural land for one year or to a lease of any other land for a period not exceeding seven years; … … …” 25. On a plain reading of the above it is clear that there cannot be a valid transfer of immovable property unless and until it is in writing and registered in accordance with section 61(3) of the J&K Registration Act. Further, the transferee cannot take possession of or commence construction on the land unless and until transfer is in writing and duly registered. He cannot also apply for mutation in revenue record. These provisions, however, do not apply where the transfer is “governed by any special law to the contrary”. In other words, except where the transfer is made under any special law, in all other cases transfer of immovable property can be effected only under a written instrument and such instrument has to be registered under the Registration Act. Land Grants Act is such special law and I shall advert to it soon hereafter. In other words, except where the transfer is made under any special law, in all other cases transfer of immovable property can be effected only under a written instrument and such instrument has to be registered under the Registration Act. Land Grants Act is such special law and I shall advert to it soon hereafter. I may first deal with submissions made in the context of clause (c) of section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act. 26. Admittedly, the transfer of properties by the 1978 order was made under section 140(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 140 of the Act provides for exemptions in certain cases from restriction imposed on transfer of immovable property. The section so far as relevant may be quoted as under: “Exemptions of certain instrument from Restriction imposed on transfer of immovable property. - Nothing contained in Irshad dated 29th Maghar, 1943 or any law, rule, order, notification, regulation, hidayat, ailan, circular, robkar, yadasht, irshad, State Council resolution or any other instrument having the force of law prohibiting or restricting the transfer of immovable property in favour of a person who is not a permanent resident of the State shall apply to: (a)… (b)… (c) a transfer of immovable property in favour of Sher-i-Kashmir National Medical Institute Trust, Srinagar.” 27. It is not in dispute that in the State of Jammu and Kashmir immovable properties cannot be transferred to a non-permanent resident of the State. As a matter of fact section 4 of the Alienation of Land Act, 1995 (1938 AD) prohibits transfer of land to a person who is not a ‘State subject’ as defined in the notification of the Judicial Department no.1-L/84 dated 20th April, 1927 - now ‘permanent resident, mutatis mutandis’ defined in Section 8 of State Constitution. It is also not in dispute that the Sher-i-Kashmir National Medical Institute Trust like all other body corporates, institutions etc. does not have a ‘permanent resident’ status and, therefore, no immovable property could be transferred to it without exemption under section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act. Clause (c) was inserted in section 140 by amendment vide Act no. IX of 1976. But for the amendment and exemption made thereby, no transfer of immovable property could be effected in its favour. However, it is only an enabling provision and it does not deal with the mode of transfer. Clause (c) was inserted in section 140 by amendment vide Act no. IX of 1976. But for the amendment and exemption made thereby, no transfer of immovable property could be effected in its favour. However, it is only an enabling provision and it does not deal with the mode of transfer. It is an independent provision which has nothing to do with section 138 of the Act. It is clear that it operates in a separate field and has no bearing on the question as to whether the transfer of properties purportedly made under the 1978 order required execution of a formal deed and its registration. 28. Besides section 138 of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act, section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that transfer of any immovable property by way of gift can only be made under a registered instrument. Section 123 runs as under: “Transfer how effected.- For the purpose of making a gift of immovable property, the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses. For the purpose of making a gift of moveable property, the transfer may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery. Such delivery may be made in the same way as goods sold may be delivered. Explanation.- The word ‘attest’ has the same meaning in this section as in section 59.” 29. It was submitted that under the 1978 order the properties were given to the trust as donation which is different from gift and, therefore, did not require registration. I do not find any merit in this submission. The term ‘donation’ in my opinion cannot be understood in a sense different from gift. Donation is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary to mean “the transfer of ownership as a free gift”. Black’s Law Dictionary (Seventh Edn.) defines the term to mean “A gift”, “a method of acquiring a benefit by deed of gift alone, without presentation, institution, or induction”. In the instant case the transfer of property was undisputedly without any consideration. Merely because the 1978 order mentioned the word ‘donation’, and not gift, it does not mean that the intention was different. No attempt was made to bring the transfer under any other mode permissible under the Transfer of Property Act. In the instant case the transfer of property was undisputedly without any consideration. Merely because the 1978 order mentioned the word ‘donation’, and not gift, it does not mean that the intention was different. No attempt was made to bring the transfer under any other mode permissible under the Transfer of Property Act. The argument as to the transfer being a government grant is separate argument to which I shall soon advert. At this stage, I may notice the relevant provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Registration Act, 1977 (1920 AD). 30. Section 17 of the Jammu and Kashmir Registration Act makes registration of instrument of gift of immovable property as well as other non-testamentary instruments purporting to create any right, title or interest in immovable property or acknowledging creation of such right, title or interest, compulsory and it would be useful for the sake of reference to quote the section so far as relevant as under: “Documents of which registration is compulsory. - (1) The following documents shall be registered, namely: (a) instruments of gift of immovable property; (b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, to or in immovable property; (c) non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge the receipt or payment of any consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any such right, title or interest; … … … … (2) Noting in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies to … … … … … … … … (vii) any grant of immovable property by Government; …” It would thus appear that whether it is a gift or a non-testamentary disposition creating right, title or interest in the property, the registration is a must except in case of documents of the nature specified in sub-section (2). One such exception is ‘grant of immovable property by government’ which is the alternative case set up by the petitioner-trust. 31. This takes us to the question whether the transfer purportedly made by the 1978 order can be construed as a ‘government grant’ so as to attract sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Registration Act. One such exception is ‘grant of immovable property by government’ which is the alternative case set up by the petitioner-trust. 31. This takes us to the question whether the transfer purportedly made by the 1978 order can be construed as a ‘government grant’ so as to attract sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Registration Act. However, even if the question were to be answered in the affirmative, it is doubtful if it would make the provisions of sections 123 and 138 of the Transfer of Property Act inapplicable. The grant of immovable property by the government is governed by the Jammu and Kashmir Land Grants Act, 1960. The object of the Act is to “provide for grant of lands by government”. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that notwithstanding the fact that the impugned order had been issued in terms of section 140(c) of the Transfer of Property Act - to facilitate the transfer of properties to a non-permanent resident - the transfer should be understood in the sense of grant under section 10 of the Land Grants Act to which the Transfer of Property Act would not be applicable. The submission appears to be attractive and deserves consideration. 32. Section 3(b) of the Act defines ‘land’ to mean “land which belongs to government and includes buildings standing thereon”. Section 4 deals with lease of land by the government and may usefully be quoted as under: “The Government shall determine the extent of land available for building purposes and may grant land on lease for such purposes on such conditions, including those relating to premium and ground rent as may be prescribed; Provided that no such land shall be granted on lease to a person who is not a permanent resident of the State; except where the Government for reasons to be recorded relaxes this restriction in the interest of industrial and commercial development; … … … …” Sections 10 and 11 of the Act read as under: “10. Other modes of grant or transfer. - Nothing contained in this Act shall preclude or be deemed ever to have precluded the Government from making any grant or other transfer of land or any interest therein other than a lease under this Act. 11. Transfer of Property Act, Svt. 1977 not to apply to Government grants: - Nothing contained in the Transfer of Property Act, Svt. - Nothing contained in this Act shall preclude or be deemed ever to have precluded the Government from making any grant or other transfer of land or any interest therein other than a lease under this Act. 11. Transfer of Property Act, Svt. 1977 not to apply to Government grants: - Nothing contained in the Transfer of Property Act, Svt. 1977 shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grant or other transfer of land or any interest therein heretofore made or hereafter to be made by or on behalf of the Government to or in favour of any person whomsoever; but every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act had not been passed.” 33. On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions it would appear that by virtue of section 4 of the Act, among other things, grant of government land can be made on lease basis (for such purpose and on such conditions as may be prescribed), but only to a permanent resident of the State. However, the ‘permanent resident’ clause can be relaxed by the State “in the interest of industrial and commercial development”. Section 10 over-rides the provisions of section 4 as indeed other provisions of the Act under which the government may make a grant or other transfer of land or any interest therein other than lease under the Act. But whereas under section 4 lease can be granted to a non-permanent resident subject to the State government relaxing the condition, a “grant or other transfer of land” (other than lease) can be made only to a permanent resident. The grant or other transfer of land or any interest therein is clearly independent of the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. Such grant and transfer are to be construed and take the effect as if the Transfer of Property Act had not been passed. Indeed, section 11 expressly makes the Transfer of Property Act inapplicable to such grants or transfer of interest under the Act. 34. It would thus appear that the Transfer of Property Act and Land Grants Act are mutually exclusive and cannot exist together. Indeed, section 11 expressly makes the Transfer of Property Act inapplicable to such grants or transfer of interest under the Act. 34. It would thus appear that the Transfer of Property Act and Land Grants Act are mutually exclusive and cannot exist together. The significance of this is that if the petitioner wants to bring its case within the ambit of the Land Grants Act, it cannot claim the benefit of exemption granted to it under clause (c) of section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act. Conversely, if it bases its claim on the exemption provided under clause (c) of section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act, it cannot claim the benefit of the Land Grants Act. Under section 4 of the Land Grants Act grant can be made only on lease basis and that too only to a permanent resident of the State which admittedly the petitioner-trust is not. The petitioner thus cannot afford to leave the umbrella of section 140(c) of the Transfer of Property Act because it is only by virtue of that exemption that the properties came to be transferred to it under the 1978 order. 35. It is true that under proviso to section 4 it is open to the government, for reasons to be recorded, to relax restriction as to grant of government land only to a permanent resident of the State, but that can be done only “in the interest of industrial and commercial development”. Creation and object of the trust to accomplish which the properties were transferred under the 1978 order, cannot be said to have any connection with industrial and commercial development and, therefore, its case cannot be brought under the exception contained in the proviso to section 4 of the Land Grants Act. As a matter of fact, there is nothing on the record to suggest that the government ever issued any order, recording reasons, for making grant to a non-permanent resident for the purpose of proviso to section 4 of the Land Grants Act. Indeed, the transfer was made in the light of and pursuant to the exemption provided under clause (c) of section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act. Indeed, the transfer was made in the light of and pursuant to the exemption provided under clause (c) of section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Transfer of Property Act not being applicable to “any grant or other transfer of land or any interest therein” under the Land Grants Act, the petitioner cannot claim the benefit of the provisions of Land Grants Act. The transfer of immovable properties under the 1978 order, therefore, cannot be held to be grant under the Land Grants Act. The transfer can only be construed as gift by the government under the Transfer of Property Act and since no transfer of immovable property under the Transfer of Property Act is valid unless and until it is in writing and registered in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act, in the absence of a written and registered document, the 1978 order cannot be construed and held to be a valid and complete transfer of land in terms of sections 123 and 138 of the Transfer of Property Act read with section 17 of the Registration Act. Consequently, no right, title or interest in the properties can be said to have vested in the trust. 36. Before I move on to the next limb of argument, though not relevant for the purpose of this case, it may not be out of place to mention that in course of hearing it was stated on behalf of the respondents that by Jammu and Kashmir Land Grants (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act no. XXX of 2002) material amendments were made in section 4 of the Act while section 10 was omitted. However, the amendment not being retrospective, counsel for the parties agreed that they have no bearing on this case. 37. Reliance was placed on the agreement dated 17th December, 1980 and it was submitted that all prior actions and orders stood superseded by the said agreement executed between the trust and the government, and it is the said agreement which would govern the rights of the parties. It was stated that the agreement provides the framework within which the trust is supposed to run the institute in terms of which the trust is entitled to representation on the governing body and standing committees in the matter of management of the Institute. It was stated that the agreement provides the framework within which the trust is supposed to run the institute in terms of which the trust is entitled to representation on the governing body and standing committees in the matter of management of the Institute. It was submitted that in terms of clause 17 of the agreement the terms thereof cannot be altered except by majority vote of the members of the Governing Body, and since by the impugned order the terms of agreement are sought to be altered, it would follow that the order amounts to breach of the agreement and violates the rights of the trust there-under. Shri V. K. Jhanji, J. while dealing with this branch of argument noticed that vide clause (e) of the relief portion of the reliefs the petitioner seeks direction upon the respondents to run affairs of the Institute in accordance with the terms of the agreement through the governing body constituted under clause 5 and other clauses of the agreement. The learned Judge took the view that the petitioner wants this Court to direct performance of the agreement. Observing that such a relief seeking in effect enforcement of contractual right cannot be granted by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction and remedy for which was available in the civil court, the learned Judge rejected the contention. I find no reason to take a different view. 38. Coming to the question of promissory estoppel, it was submitted that even if it is held that the petitioner did not acquire proprietary rights, the government is estopped from taking over possession of the properties. Where pursuant to promise made by the government the promisee alters his position the government must be held to be bound by the promise and the same would be enforceable against the government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there was no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution of India and Section 22 of the State Constitution. It was submitted that doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the government in the exercise of its governmental, public or executive functions and the doctrine of executive necessity cannot be invoked to defeat the applicability of this doctrine. It was submitted that doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the government in the exercise of its governmental, public or executive functions and the doctrine of executive necessity cannot be invoked to defeat the applicability of this doctrine. In support of this proposition, the counsel relied on Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v State of U. P. (1979) 2 SCC 409; Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd (1985) 4 SCC 369; and Indira Bai v Nand Kishore (1990) 4 SCC. These submissions, as seen above, found favour with Bashir-ud-Din J. while Jhanji J. held otherwise 39. The ingredients of promissory estoppel are that (a) there should be an unequivocal promise and assurance; (b) the promise or assurance must have been understood by the promisee; and (c) in reliance on such promise and assurance the promisee must have altered his position. 40. In the instant case, in December, 1972, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah approached the government for allotment of land measuring 230 kanals informing the Chief Minister that a trust had been created and Rs.1.5 lakhs had been donated to him for the purpose. He sought cooperation of the government in establishing the hospital. On 14th October, 1973 the government gave 292.8 kanals of land to the trust on lease for a period of forty years on a consolidated rent of Rs.101 per annum, though no lease deed was ever executed. Simultaneously, a government dispensary along with its structures and the land appurtenant thereto abreast of the said 292.8 kanals of land was also transferred to the trust. The government had also planned to construct a 500-bed hospital near the site. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah became Chief Minister of the State in 1975. Immediately thereafter, on 22nd May, 1975 the Secretary of the trust addressed a letter to the Chief Minister requesting him to amend the government order dated 14th October, 1973 and make an absolute grant of the land and properties in favour of the trust. The matter was processed at various levels. The Law Department opined that “the legal position in respect of transfer of immovable property, including the land to non-permanent residents (including non-juristic persons) is very tight and there is no exception about it provided for in any law for the time being in force. The matter was processed at various levels. The Law Department opined that “the legal position in respect of transfer of immovable property, including the land to non-permanent residents (including non-juristic persons) is very tight and there is no exception about it provided for in any law for the time being in force. In these circumstances, in case the Government decides to transfer the immovable property, including the land in the manner as suggested by the Trust to the Sher-i-Kashmir National Medical Institute, then an exception has to be provided for in Section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1977 as was done in the case of transfer of land in favour of Vishwayatan Yogashram, Jammu”. Acting pursuant to the advice of the Law Department, the Transfer of Property Act was amended by inserting clause (c) in section 140 of the Act to facilitate transfer of immovable property in favour of Sher-i-Kashmir National Medical Institute Trust, Srinagar. 41. The matter was thereafter processed by the Revenue Department. The contemporaneous record of the Revenue Department reveals that the Revenue Secretary vide paragraph 18 of the notes in the file stated, “now the question arises regarding the transfer of this whole property to the Trust. This has actually to be done by the General Department as it involves the property of many Departments. Besides this, we have to execute a transfer deed with the Trust for which sufficient court fees etc. has to be made available by the Trust. The case will, therefore, be returned to the Health Department with the request that the transfer of this whole property has to be made under Transfer of Property Act and a deed is to be executed in the Court of law for such transfer. Accordingly, the Health Department/General Department will issue necessary orders regarding such transfer.” A meeting of senior officers of the Housing and Urban Development Department, Health Department, General Administration Department and Revenue Department was held on 23rd June, 1976. In the minutes of the meeting circulated on 3rd July, 1976 it was, inter alia, stated, “the properties in question were proposed to be transferred to the Institute in proprietary right free of cost and would be by way of donation. In the minutes of the meeting circulated on 3rd July, 1976 it was, inter alia, stated, “the properties in question were proposed to be transferred to the Institute in proprietary right free of cost and would be by way of donation. The transfer of property Act has already been amended to allow transfer of State Property to the said Institute and it was agreed that the deed will eventually be signed on behalf of the Government by the Secretary to Government, Revenue Department after orders of the Cabinet on the proposal are obtained”. While the matter was pending thus, on 6th August, 1976 the Secretary of the trust addressed a letter to Secretary, Revenue Department which reads as under: “Kindly refer to my D. O. letter No.1288 dated 10th May, 1976, regarding the subject noted above, to which I have received no reply from you so far. I would request you to kindly intimate the steps that have been taken by you in this regard. A copy of my D. O. letter referred to above is enclosed herewith for your kind reference.” 42. On 23rd August, 1976 The Secretary of the trust wrote another letter as under: “The Additional Secretary to Government, Revenue Deptt. has, vide his letter No. Rev (NDK)73/35 dated 16-8-1976 (copy enclosed herewith for your kind reference) informed that the case regarding the above noted subject has gone to the General Department with all formalities having been completed, for issuing transfer orders under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. I would, as such, request you to kindly take very early action in the matter at TOP PRIORITY basis and issue necessary orders in the matter.” 43. At this stage on 27th August, 1976 the Kashmir Nursing Home was transferred to the trust alongwith its land, building and annexee as well as its assets and equipments on the condition that the trust will use the premises of the Nursing Home solely and exclusively for maintaining a nursing home. 44. While the matter relating to absolute transfer of the properties was still pending, the Secretary of the trust on 5th August, 1977 wrote a letter to the Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beigh, Deputy Chief Minister, who also was one of the trustees of the trust. 44. While the matter relating to absolute transfer of the properties was still pending, the Secretary of the trust on 5th August, 1977 wrote a letter to the Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beigh, Deputy Chief Minister, who also was one of the trustees of the trust. It would be useful to quote the letter too as under: “I would like to invite your kind attention to our discussions held in the Central Office of the Sher-i-Kashmir National Medical Institute Trust yesterday in the meeting of Board of Trustees, regarding transfer of (i) land measuring 292 Kanals at Soura, Srinagar, and (2) Drug Research Laboratory buildings at Kothibagh, to the Trust. As regards transfer of 292 kanals of land, I would like to inform you that the State Government, vide Government Order No.872-HB of 1973 dated 14.10.1973 sanctioned grant of the land situated at Zoonimar, Tehsil Srinagar on lease in favour of the Trust for a period of 40 years at a consolidated rent of Rs.101/- per annum. The then Chief Minister was approached vide this office letter No.723 dated 22.5.1975 (copy enclosed) to amend the Government Order to make absolute grant of the land in favour of the Trust. It was explained in the said letter that the Medical Institute is a charitable Institute set up in this backward State to help the poor and down trodden people of the State so that they get proper treatment of their ailment within the State without going to big cities where specialized treatments are available involving huge expenditure. Since then the matter has been with different administrative Departments of the State Government and presently with the Health and Family Planning Department. The Drug Research Laboratory buildings at Kothibagh, Srinagar, were allotted by the State Government to the Trust on rent basis; vide Government Order No.232-MD/G of 1974 dated 23.5.1974. The then Chief Minister of the State was requested vide this office letter No.729 dated 22.5.1977 (copy enclosed) to amend the said Government Order and make absolute grant of the buildings to the Trust. Syed Mir Qasim who was then the Chief Minister, had in principle agreed to transfer the buildings to the Trust. Since then the matter has remained under correspondence in different Administrative Departments of the State Government. Syed Mir Qasim who was then the Chief Minister, had in principle agreed to transfer the buildings to the Trust. Since then the matter has remained under correspondence in different Administrative Departments of the State Government. Meanwhile, we received a letter No.879-80 dated 25.4.1977 from the Executive Engineer Construction Division No. I, Srinagar, demanding payment of rent for these buildings at the rate of Rs.800/- per month tentatively till the final assessment was made, (copy of the letter enclosed). We approached Shri S. Baner Ji, the then Advisor to Governor of the State, vide this office letter No.2135/77 dated 9th May, 1977 (copy enclosed) informing him of the need of starting a properly equipped laboratory in the city of Srinagar for clinical investigations which has costed the Trust nearly rupees four lakhs to equip with most modern and sophisticated equipment. He was also informed that the Trust is very shortly planning to equip the laboratory for the latest and complicated investigations so that the people of the State are able to get thorough investigations done under one roof and do not have to go outside the State for higher clinical investigations. He was requested to take personal interest in the matter and favour us with necessary sanction to transfer of the said buildings to the Trust. In this connection, I would like to mention here that in the year 1962 the State Government vide Government Order No.lPW-2/Deb/62 dated 31.1.1962 (copy enclosed), sanctioned leasing out of the premises and buildings known as Revd. Biscoe’s and Revd. Barton’s Homes at Sheikh Bagh, Srinagar, to the C. M. S. School authorities for a period of 40 years at a nominal rent of Re.1/- per annum. The Board of Trustees would be highly grateful if you very kindly amend the relevant Government orders mentioned above and sanction absolute grant of the land and buildings in favour of the Trust.” 45. It is relevant to mention here that “the then Chief Minister” referred to in the letter “who was approached” by the office of the trust vide letter dated 22nd May.1975, referred to in the above said letter, was none else than Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. It is indeed curious that he also happened to be Chairman of the Sher-i-Kashmir National Medical Institute Trust and the letter heads prominently displayed his name on top, as chairman of the trust. It is indeed curious that he also happened to be Chairman of the Sher-i-Kashmir National Medical Institute Trust and the letter heads prominently displayed his name on top, as chairman of the trust. Be that as it may, the Deputy Chief Minister, Mr. Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beigh, on receipt of the said letter directed the General Secretary to take up the matter. Thereafter, the cabinet memorandum was prepared under the caption “transfer of state property to Sher-i-Kashmir National Medical Institute Trust” in paragraph 2 of which it was stated, “the trust for some time past has been requesting for transfer of the aforesaid property to it on proprietorship basis, free of costs and without any rider because the terms and conditions attached to the temporary transfer of the property will effect or is likely to effect the aim/object behind its establishment in the State, i.e., to serve the suffering humanity without any bureaucratic interference”. The cabinet vide decision no.577 dated 12th April, 1978 approved the proposal of the revenue department, subject to some modifications, transferring to the trust the properties in question “in ownership right as donation from J&K Government”. On 19th April, 1978, thereafter, the formal government order was issued transferring the properties to the trust in ownership right as donation from the government. 46. I fail to read any element of promise or assurance to the trust prompting it to act and alter its position. Indeed, instead of the government it is the petitioner on whose representation and influence, if I may say so, the government gave the properties to the trust. It is not a case where the government asked the trust to establish the Medical Institute or to accept its properties for running the Institute. In this factual background I do not find any element of promissory estoppel which could bind the government to let the petitioner to run the Institutes in the manner it liked. 47. According to the petitioner, Dr. Farooq Abdullah and his brother Tariq Abdullah, amongst other relatives, had donated land to the Institute. The respondents have produced attested photocopies of the statements showing details of the lands under possession of the Institute. At serial no.1 thereof the names of Dr. 47. According to the petitioner, Dr. Farooq Abdullah and his brother Tariq Abdullah, amongst other relatives, had donated land to the Institute. The respondents have produced attested photocopies of the statements showing details of the lands under possession of the Institute. At serial no.1 thereof the names of Dr. Farooq Abdullah and Tariq Abdullah have been mentioned and 7 kanals of land of khasra no.362 at Zoonimar are shown to have been “acquired against payment in terms of award” dated 25th May, 1978 i.e. after issuance of the 1978 order. At serial no.3 Ziarat Ahli Islam Syed Jaffar Sahib in the name of Sheikh Mohd Abdullah with respect to 6 kanals and 17 marlas of khasra no.268 is shown to have been ”acquired against payment in terms of award” dated 25th May, 1978. At serial no.6 of the statement 168 kanals and 8 marlas land similarly are shown to have been acquired in terms of award dated 28th January, 1982, after the agreement dated 17th December, 1980, from Sheikh Nazir Ahmad and Sheikh Mohd Iqbal and Mst. Nighat and Mst. Rahmat D/O Atiqa Begum Mohd Sadiq, Nasreen Kounsar Daughters and Fatima wife of Sheikh Abdul Rashid - all stated to be members of one family. The fact that the lands were acquired and payment made to the persons concerned under different awards demolishes the petitioner’s case of ‘donation’. As regards the so-called donation by Rajinder Kumar Sawhney and Anant Singh, the records reveal that land measuring 31 Kanals and 14 Marlas only (not 40 kanals and 4 marlas and 50 kanals and 15 marlas respectively, said to have been donated by them in favour of the Government for construction of Medical Institute) was really sold by them to the government, acting on their own behalf as well as on behalf of the trust as nominated representatives. The sale deed was executed on 15th March, 1979. V. K. Jhanji, J. in his judgment has made a detailed examination of the claim of the petitioner regarding the so called donations to the Government for benefit of the Institute and observed that the trust had managed to take possession of government property worth crores of rupees by making token donation. All transactions were tainted and off-shoot of fraud played with the State property and State exchequer. All transactions were tainted and off-shoot of fraud played with the State property and State exchequer. It is not necessary to refer to the findings which are based on record and to which no exception can be taken. Suffice it to say, to conclude the matter, the facts do not make out a case of promissory estoppel against the government. 48. The respondents have brought on record materials to show that over the years the management of the Institute had gone into shambles. The report of enquiry committee headed by Justice G. A. Kuchhai, a former Judge of this Court, has also been brought on record. The committee found allegations of irregularities to be true. It stated that the authorities of the Institute on the direction of Dr. Mohd. Ali Matoo tried to prevent them from verifying the irregularities. Reference has also been made to orders of the Court in different cases, some of which have also been brought on record. These materials firstly demolish the plea of promissory estoppel and secondly establish that the impugned action of the respondents was warranted in public interest. Promissory estoppel, it is well known, is founded on equity and an equitable doctrine and cannot be invoked to perpetuate something which is not good and correct. Another settled rule is that individual interest must yield to public interest when the situation so demands. 49. The Kashmir Nursing Home on the own saying of the petitioner, was not in a position to run on its own. It was not equipped with the required expertise, staff and other infrastructure to manage the nursing home on day-to-day basis in accordance with the guidelines of the Medical Council of India. The nursing home had been transferred to the trust to accomplish its professed object of rendering medical help to the needy. The government had invested rupees ninety-five lakh on its renovation. Most of the staff of the nursing home, however, was retrenched, and to cap it, it was sought to be handed over to one Sabia Tariq, a house-wife said to be related to Dr. Mohd Ali Matoo. The Drug Research Laboratory had received an even worse treatment. It was situated at Moulana Azad Road, Kothibagh in the heart of Srinagar. It was attached with the nursing home so that the patients admitted therein could get investigations done there. Mohd Ali Matoo. The Drug Research Laboratory had received an even worse treatment. It was situated at Moulana Azad Road, Kothibagh in the heart of Srinagar. It was attached with the nursing home so that the patients admitted therein could get investigations done there. At the time of its transfer, it was represented to the government by Secretary of the trust vide letter dated 5th August, 1977 that it would develop the laboratory in such a way that the people of the State would be able to get thorough investigations under one roof and thus do not have to go out of the State for clinical investigations. What ultimately happened was that it was converted into a shopping complex “to increase corpus donations of the trust” - an object neither envisaged in the government order nor even remotely connected with the professed object. The respondents have stated that the so called corpus donation was really in the nature of premium charged from the prospective tenants for pecuniary benefit of the persons managing the trust. 50. The submission that the respondents did not raise any dispute regarding transfer of ownership and/or management of the Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences and other properties transferred to the trust for over two decades has no merit whatsoever. It has been stated by the respondents that except for a brief spell between 2nd July, 1984 and 19th February, 1986, when Shri G. M. Shah was the Chief Minister, the state administration functioned under the shadow and influence of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah and his family members. During the tenure of Shri G. M. Shah, as a matter of fact, action for cancellation of the 1978 order was mooted but before it could be processed, Governor’s rule was imposed on 20th February, 1986. In November, 1996, Dr. Farooq Abdullah came in power. In the circumstances no inference as to acquiescence, estoppel or anything of the kind can be drawn against the respondents. 51. It was argued that if the respondents intended to take over properties belonging to the trust, they should have taken recourse to the provisions of section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. Farooq Abdullah came in power. In the circumstances no inference as to acquiescence, estoppel or anything of the kind can be drawn against the respondents. 51. It was argued that if the respondents intended to take over properties belonging to the trust, they should have taken recourse to the provisions of section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 92 of the Code provides that in case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, the Advocate General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust may institute a suit after obtaining leave of the court in the civil court for removal of any trustee and appointment of a new trustee; vesting any property in a trustee; directing accounts and inquiries and so on, for better administration of the trust. Heavy reliance was placed on Bishan Das v State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1570, and it was submitted that the action of the State in taking over the properties belonging to the trust by an executive order was deprecated as being violative of fundamental rights. 52. The facts of the case were completely different and the decision lends no help to the petitioner. The predecessor of the petitioners, Lala Ramji Das, had built a dharamshala, temple and shops out of funds of the joint family in or about 1909 on state land after obtaining permission of the State. He managed the dharmashala, temple and shops on behalf of the joint family during his lifetime. The dharmashala was meant for the benefit of the travelling public and used as rest house. In the temple deities were installed and members of public used to offer worship. The shops were let out on rent for the upkeep of dharmashala and the temple. After the death of Lala Ramji Das, the members of his family continued to manage the properties until 1958 when officials of the state government and the municipality, Barnala dispossessed them by force. In these facts, the Supreme Court held that if the State thought that the constructions should be removed or the condition as to resumption of the land should be invoked, it was open to the State to take appropriate legal action. In these facts, the Supreme Court held that if the State thought that the constructions should be removed or the condition as to resumption of the land should be invoked, it was open to the State to take appropriate legal action. If the State proceeded on the footing that the trust was a public trust, it should have taken appropriate legal action for removal of the trustees by a suit under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure against persons in possession of the trust property. They could not interfere with the rights of the petitioners without any authority of law. The action of the authorities was held to be violative of fundamental rights of the petitioners. 53. It would appear that except that the dharmashala, temple and the shops were built on the state land, with permission of the State, it was a family affair of Lala Ramji Das. Except providing land, the State gave no financial assistance and had no say in matters connected with the affairs of the dharmashala, temple and the shops. In the instant case the State apart from apart from providing a huge expanse of land which had been acquired for developing a housing colony and a 500-bed hospital complex is said to have spent a staggering amount of Rs. Rs.520, 67, 17, 800/- on the construction and maintenance of the Institute, besides the amount of Rs.95,00,000 spent on renovation of Kashmir Nursing Home. The alleged transfer of properties was also defective and incomplete. In these facts, ratio of the decision in Bishan Das v State of Punjab (supra) is of no help to the petitioner. 54. Another branch of submission made with vehemence related to the breach of rules of natural justice. On behalf of the respondents it was submitted that from the impugned order itself it would appear that before taking action notice had been served on the petitioner-trust and, therefore, the petitioner cannot complain of any violation of the rules of natural justice, and even if there was any such violation the facts of the case are not such as to justify interference on that ground. It was submitted that where interference results in revival of some wrong or illegality, the Court should desist from interference muchless on technical ground especially where the basic facts are not in dispute. It was submitted that where interference results in revival of some wrong or illegality, the Court should desist from interference muchless on technical ground especially where the basic facts are not in dispute. Reliance was placed, among other decisions, on M. C. Mehta v Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237. It would be useful to extract the relevant passages from the judgment as under: “It is true that in Ridge v. Baldwin it has been held that breach of the principles of natural justice is in itself sufficient to grant relief and that no further de facto prejudice need be shown. It is also true that the said principles have been followed by this Court in several cases but we might point out that this Court has not laid down any absolute rule. This is clear from the judgment of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan. After stating (at SCC p. 395, para 24) that ‘principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed’ and that ‘non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary’, Chinnappa Reddy, J. also laid down an important qualification as follows: (SCC p.395, para 24) ‘As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs’. (emphasis supplied) It is, therefore, clear that if on the admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of the principles of natural justice. Before we go into the final aspects of this contention, we would like to state that cases relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. Before we go into the final aspects of this contention, we would like to state that cases relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-law and literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of ‘real substance’ or that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is followed. … Thus in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a ‘real likelihood’ of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their ‘discretion’, refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma, Rajendra Singh v. State of M. P. that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived.” 55. In taking the aforesaid view the learned Judges referred to various decisions and legal treatises on the subject. On consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and materials on record, I am inclined to agree with the respondents that even if it is accepted that the opportunity of elaborate hearing should have been given, interference in the impugned order may not be in public interest. On consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and materials on record, I am inclined to agree with the respondents that even if it is accepted that the opportunity of elaborate hearing should have been given, interference in the impugned order may not be in public interest. The urgency of the action can be visualized from the fact that the transfer of Kashmir Nursing Home in favour of Sabia Tariq was imminent but for impugned action by the government which preempted the proposed action. It is well know that rules of natural justice are not like rigid formulae which can be put in straight jacket, their application depends upon facts and circumstances of the particular case. In the facts of the case I do not find any such breach of rules of natural justice as to justify interference on that ground. 56. Having thus given my anxious consideration to the facts of the case and the contentions raised, disagreeing with Bashir-ud-Din, J, and in agreement with V. K. Jhanji, J., I would dismiss the writ petition but without any order as to costs. Thus, ordered accordingly.