R. GURURAJAN, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER is before me challenging the award dated 24-2-1999 passed by the Labour Court, Bangalore in ID. No. 138 of 1994. ( 2 ) RESPONDENT-WORKMAN according to the petitioner gained employment in the Corporation by fraudulent means i. e. , by making a false declaration and producing forged documents. On investigation it was reported by the Central Security Branch that the 1st respondent had gained employment by fraudulent means. It is further stated that the respondent made a claim for appointment in the Corporation claiming himself to be one of the displaced employees of M/s. Halagur express whose Vehicles Nos. MON 3737 and MOA 5757 were acquired by the K. S. R. TC. To gain employment in the Corporation, the 1st respondent had produced employment certificate dated 15-10-1976 claiming to 'lave been issued by Sri M. I. Shamshuddin, owner of the said acquired vehicles and also managed to get 'a pro forma bearing No. HTC 7/76, dated 4-11-1976 sponsoring his name and routed it through the Commissioner of Police (Transport), Bangalore, belatedly on 4-11-1976. Petitioner by virtue of the documents produced by the 1st respondent offered employment to the respondent. He was directed to report himself for duty. Subsequent verification would reveal these fraudulent acts on the part of the respondent-workman. In those circumstances articles of charge was issued to the respondent-workman by the management for having committed a fraud on the Corporation by illegally gaining appointment to the post of Assistant Traffic Inspector by fraudulent means, i. e. , by making a false declaration and producing forged documents and thus hood-winked the authorities and cheated the corporation; that by virtue of the same, he had illegally received payment of heavy sums of money from the Corporation by way of salary and allowances to which he was otherwise not entitled and thus put the corporation into monetary loss; therefore, he was not eligible for absorption to be continued in the employment of the Corporation, much less to become an employee of the Corporation. Domestic enquiry was conducted. Enquiry proceedings ended against the respondent. Dismissal order was issued to the respondent-workman. He thereafter, filed an appeal. Appeal stood dismissed. He also approached this Court by way of two writ petitions viz. Domestic enquiry was conducted. Enquiry proceedings ended against the respondent. Dismissal order was issued to the respondent-workman. He thereafter, filed an appeal. Appeal stood dismissed. He also approached this Court by way of two writ petitions viz. , W. P. No. 11180 of 1982 and W. P. No. 2975 of 1987 Both the writ petitions were disposed of reserving liberty to the workman to work out his remedies against the order of the appellate Authority. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER, respondent/workman initiated proceedings under section 10 (4-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before the Labour court. He filed a claim petition on 8-8-1998. The said claim petition was contested and a plea of limitation was raised. Evidence was recorded by the Labour Court. Labour Court ruled that the enquiry was not fair and proper. Thereafter, parties let in evidence on merits. Labour Court after appreciation of evidence has chosen to order reinstatement with 60% back wages in terms of its order dated 24th February, 1999. This award is challenged in this petition. ( 4 ) HEARD the learned Counsels for the respective parties and perused the award passed by the Labour Court. ( 5 ) SRI Arun, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner would argue that the Labour Court is wrong in ordering reinstatement in the given circumstances. He would invite my attention to the material facts to say that a case is made out by the Corporation. He also would argue in terms of the plea of limitation. Claim petition ought to have been rejected by the Labour Court. He finds fault with the findings of the labour Court in this regard. He strenuously relies on a recent judgment of this Court in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation u Abdul azeez , to say that termination order issued prior to 7-10-1988 cannot be entertained by the Labour Court in terms of Section 10 (4-A) of the Act. He wants the petition to be allowed. ( 6 ) PER contra, Sri Narasimhan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/workman apart from contesting the case on merits would say that the Division Bench judgment would not apply to the facts of the case on hand. He invites my attention to the judgment of the supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay u B. E. S. T. Workers' Union '. He invites my attention to the judgment of the supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay u B. E. S. T. Workers' Union '. That judgment would show that time as referred to in section 10 (4-A) is only directory and not mandatory. He therefore, says that in the light of the ruling in Municipal Corporation of Greater bombay's case, the limitation plea has to be rejected. On merits the learned Senior Counsel supports the award. ( 7 ) I have carefully perused the material on record and the impugned award. ( 8 ) LET me first take the limitation issue. Section 10 (4-A) was introduced in terms of an amendment to the I. D. Act. The said section reads as under:"notwithstanding anything contained in Section 9-C and in this section, in the case of a dispute falling within the scope of section 2-A, the individual workman concerned may, within six months from the date of communication to him of the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination or the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later, apply, in the prescribed manner, to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute and the Labour Court shall dispose of such application in the same manner as a dispute referred under sub-section (1)". ( 9 ) THE Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Azeez's case, has referred to various judgments including the judgments of the supreme Court and thereafter in para 17 the Division Bench has noted as under:"therefore, the effect of Section 10 (4-A) can be stated as follows.- (i) In regard to termination orders communicated on or after 7-4-1988, the outer limit for making an application under section 10 (4-A) is six months from the date of communication of the order. (ii) In regard to termination orders communicated during a period of six months prior to 7-4-1988, the period of limitation would be upto 7-10-1988 even though the six months period from the date of communication may actually expire between 7-4-1988 to 7-10-1988. (iii) In regard to termination orders communicated prior to 7-10-1987, no claim petition under Section 10 (4-A) could be filed, as there is no provision for such claims. (iii) In regard to termination orders communicated prior to 7-10-1987, no claim petition under Section 10 (4-A) could be filed, as there is no provision for such claims. The intent of section 10 (4-A) is to give a right to the aggrieved workman to challenge the termination order within six months from the date of accrual of cause of action and not to furnish an one time revival in regard to stale and non-existing claims". Insofar an termination order communicated prior to 7-10-1987 the division Bench has ruled that no claim petition can be entertained under Section 10 (4-A ). I must also notice that the Division Bench judgment was not available to the Labour Court in the case on hand. Be that as it may Even then the Division Bench judgment is binding on me. In the circumstances, I find no substance in the argument of the learned Counsel for the workman that this petition is not barred by time. The finding of the Labour Court in this regard requires to be set aside in the light of the Division Bench judgment. ( 10 ) HOWEVER, I must notice the argument of the Sri Narasimhan with regard to the judgment in terms of Municipal Corporation of Greater bombay's case Though there is a reference in the said judgment with regard to six months time being directory, the said judgment is not available to the workman in the light of the latest judgment of the division Bench of this Court which after considering later judgments of the Supreme Court in Nedungadi Bank Limited v K. P. Madhavankutty and Others; Balbir Singh v Punjab Roadways and Sapan Kumar pandit v Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board, has ruled that limitation is against the workman. In the circumstances, I am unable to persuade myself to agree with Sri Narasimhan, the learned Senior counsel with regard to limitation being in his favour. Since I have come to a conclusion that the petition is barred by time, I do not want to go into the merits of the matter. In the circumstances, no opinion is expressed on the merits of the matter as argued by the learned Counsel on either side. In the result, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned award is set aside solely on the ground of limitation in terms of the decision in Abdul azeez's case. In the circumstances, no opinion is expressed on the merits of the matter as argued by the learned Counsel on either side. In the result, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned award is set aside solely on the ground of limitation in terms of the decision in Abdul azeez's case. Liberty is reserved to the workman to avail any other remedy available to him in accordance with law. Ordered accordingly. No costs. --- *** --- .