JUDGMENT V.K. Gupta, CJ.—Reply and rejoinder have been filed. 2. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 3. Undoubtedly the allegation against the petitioner about his encroachment on the Government land related to a period of time much prior to the holding of the election. The gravamen of the allegation was that he encroached upon the Government land in the year 1980 whereas the election was held in the year 2001. A reading of the operative part of the impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Una, on 12th June, 2004 makes it manifestly clear that he had passed the order disqualifying the petitioner as well as removing him from the office in purported exercise of power under Section 122(2)(ii) of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, of course read with also the power purportedly vesting in him under sub-section (2) of Section 131 of the said Act. 4. Sub-section (2) of Section 131 is more in the nature of a procedural law because the substantive law is contained in sub-section (1) of Section 131. Actually, the proviso to sub-section (2) is equally important because it is in the proviso that the Legislature has stipulated that no order declaring that a person has ceased to be an office bearer and also declaring that such an office has consequently fallen vacant can be passed without giving such a person reasonable opportunity of being heard. Actually, the proviso to sub-section (2) is equally important because it is in the proviso that the Legislature has stipulated that no order declaring that a person has ceased to be an office bearer and also declaring that such an office has consequently fallen vacant can be passed without giving such a person reasonable opportunity of being heard. To appreciate the true application, scope and ambit of sub-section (2) of Section 131, read in conjunction with sub-section (1), the relevant extract of Section 131 of the Act is reproduced hereunder, which reads thus:— "131.(1) If any person having been elected as an office bearer of a Panchayat— (a) subsequently becomes subject to any of the disqualification mentioned in Section 122 and such disqualifications is not removable or being removable is not removed; (b) absents himself from three consecutive meetings of the Panchayat or its Committee or does not attend half the number of meetings held during the period of six months without the leave of the Panchayat; he shall subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), cease to be such office bearer and his office shall become vacant : Provided that where an application is made by an office bearer to the Panchayat for leave to absent himself under clause (b) and the Panchayat fails to inform the applicant of its decision on the application within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the application, the leave applied for, shall be deemed to have been granted by the Panchayat. (2) In every case the authority competent to decide whether a vacancy has occurred under sub-section (1) shall be the Deputy Commissioner in respect of Gram Panchayat and Panchayat Samiti and the Director in respect of Zila Parishad who may give his decision either on an application made to him by any person or on his own motion. Until the Deputy Connissioner or the Director, as the case may be, decides that the vacancy has occurred, the person shall not cease to be an office bearer : Provided that no order shall be passed under this sub-section against any office bearer without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (3) to (5)..................................................................................................." 5. Until the Deputy Connissioner or the Director, as the case may be, decides that the vacancy has occurred, the person shall not cease to be an office bearer : Provided that no order shall be passed under this sub-section against any office bearer without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (3) to (5)..................................................................................................." 5. Sub-section (1) of Section 131 clearly stipulates that a person "having been" elected as an office bearer of a Panchayat, if "subsequently" becomes subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 122, shall cease to be such an office bearer etc. etc. On the face of it, therefore, and without any doubt or ambiguity, sub-section (l)(a) of Section 131 clearly caters to a fact situation where the person after having been elected as an office bearer of a Panchayat becomes subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 122. The word "subsequently" used in clause (a) of sub-section (1) leaves no manner of any doubt in any ones mind that a person who before or at the time of his election was subject to any disqualification is not covered by this provision because this provision applies to only such person who after his election as an office bearer becomes subject to any disqualification. The word "subsequently", therefore, is very relevant to understand the true scope, ambit and applicability of Section 131 of the Act. 6. In the present case it is the undisputed stand of the respondents that allegation against the petitioner related to his disqualification at a period of time starting from 1980 onwards, whereas admittedly the election took place in the year 2001. The petitioner, therefore, bad allegedly become subject to the disqualification not after his election but much before the election date. Therefore, Section 131 had no application at all to this case. The petitioner, therefore, bad allegedly become subject to the disqualification not after his election but much before the election date. Therefore, Section 131 had no application at all to this case. Only Section 122, if at all, could be attracted or held applicable in this case but in view of the ratio iaia down in the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Surinder Singh Banolta v. State of H.P. and others, reported in Latest HLJ 2003 (HP) (DB) 782, the issue whether the petitioner was suffering from the disqualification or not before the date of the election could not have been decided by the Deputy Commissioner while exercising his jurisdiction or power under clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 122 of the Act, as this question could have been decided through the mechanism and medium of an election petition alone. Looking from either angle, therefore, the Deputy Commissioner did not have the jurisdiction to pass any order adverse to the petitioner either under Section 122(2)(ii) or under Section 131 (2) of the Act. The order, therefore, passed by the Deputy Commissioner on 12th June, 2004 suffered from a patent error of jurisdiction and deserves to be set aside, lock, stock and barrel. 7. The order passed by the Appellate Authority on 9th November, 2004 even though states in its operative part that the Deputy Commissioners order dated 12th June, 2004 was being set aside, it creates some confusion when at the same time it mentioned that it was being set aside only to the limited extent in declaring the casual vacancy. This order did not in so many words specify that it was setting aside the Deputy Commissioners order lock, stock and barrel, (as it deserved to be) even though in the body of the appellate order there is a mention of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Surinder Singh Banolta (supra). Despite having taken notice of the ratio in the aforesaid Division Bench judgment of this Court the Appellate Authority did not act properly in completely setting aside the Deputy Commissioners order. To that extent the order of the Appellate Authority also suffers from an error apparent on the face of the order and it also deserves to be appropriately set aside. 8. To that extent the order of the Appellate Authority also suffers from an error apparent on the face of the order and it also deserves to be appropriately set aside. 8. The Appellate Authority in the body of the order has made a passing reference to Section 146 of the Act relating to the exercise of the power by the State Government. What would be the scope and applicability of Section 146 to the facts of this case is an issue which has not arisen for my consideration in this case in as much as this power has so far not been exercised by the State Government under this provision of law. I, therefore, refrain from expressing any opinion on the applicability or scope of Section 146 to the facts of this case or the issue involved herein, or otherwise, and leave all questions relating thereto open. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed. The two orders, one passed by the Deputy Commissioner on 12th June, 2004 and the other passed by the Appellate Authority on 9th November, 2004, are both set aside with all the consequences. There shall be no order as to costs. CMP No. 637/2004 9. In view of the disposal of the main petition, the present application is also disposed of. Petition disposed of. -