Judgment :- (Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to call for the records of the first respondent relating to G.O.No.SR.I/1326-12/2004 Public (SC) Department, dated 23.11.2004, and quash the same, and direct the respondents to produce the body of the detenu Sulthan Kayas, son of Sulthan, now detained in the Central Prison, Chennai, under Section 3(1)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, before this Court and set him at liberty forthwith.) P. Sathasivam, J The petitioner by name Rabiyathul Basharia challenges the detention order dated 23.11.2004 imposed on her husband Sulthan Kayas under Section 3(1)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (Central Act 52 of 1974). 2. Heard learned Senior Counsel for petitioner, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for R-1 and R-3 and learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel for R-2. 3. In the light of the order to be passed hereunder, we are of the view that it is unnecessary to refer all the factual matrix as stated in the grounds of detention and argued by the counsel on either side. 4. According to Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, the impugned detention order was passed mechanically by the Detaining Authority without applying his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. He also contended that the Detaining Authority erred in invoking Section 123 of the Customs Act and that the burden of proving licit nature of goods is on the detenu. According to him, Section 123 of the Customs Act is not at all applicable to the goods alleged to have been seized and therefore invoking Section 123 renders the entire detention order illegal and invalid. In support of his contention, he heavily relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 2003-2-L.W.(Cri)884 (Gunasundari vs. State of Tamil Nadu, etc. & another) and another decision dated 18.04.2005 rendered by us in H.C.P. No.1465 of 2004. 5. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor would contend that merely because a wrong provision, viz., Section 123 of the Customs Act, has been quoted in the grounds of detention, the detention order cannot be quashed on the said ground. & another) and another decision dated 18.04.2005 rendered by us in H.C.P. No.1465 of 2004. 5. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor would contend that merely because a wrong provision, viz., Section 123 of the Customs Act, has been quoted in the grounds of detention, the detention order cannot be quashed on the said ground. By relying on paragraph No.12 of the counter affidavit, he further contended that the said mistake was due to “computerised oversight”, which does not materially affect or vitiate the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority as required under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. 6. With reference to the contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, it is relevant to note that in paragraph No. (v) of the grounds of detention, the Detaining Authority, after referring the factual details, has stated thus: - “ ... In view of the above legal provisions, the baggage containing the above goods of foreign origin in trade quantity do not correspond to a bonafide passenger baggage and the goods under seizure are liable to confiscation under Section 111(d) 111(l) and 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962 read with Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962....” In the light of the specific reference made above, it cannot be contended that it is only ‘a computerised error’. In this regard, it is useful to refer the Judgment reported in 2003 (2) L.W. (Cri) 884 (cited supra). The Division Bench, after noting similar averments made in the grounds of detention and following the Constitution Bench Judgment of the Supreme Court in Collector of Customs v. Sampathu Chetty ( AIR 1962 SC 316 ) and also the decision in Shalini Soni v. Union of India ((1980) Crl.L.J. 1487), quashed the detention order. The conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench in Paragraph Nos.11 & 14 of the Judgment are relevant and they are extracted hereunder, “ 11. The said provision has not been incorporated in the COFEPOSA so as to invoke the jurisdiction for detention by applying the provisions of Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962. The conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench in Paragraph Nos.11 & 14 of the Judgment are relevant and they are extracted hereunder, “ 11. The said provision has not been incorporated in the COFEPOSA so as to invoke the jurisdiction for detention by applying the provisions of Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962. Therefore, on the failure of the detenu to discharge his burden that the goods seized are not smuggled goods or that the seizing officer had a reasonable belief that they were smuggled goods are matters that cannot be applied in the case of preventive detention. The detaining authority cannot import the reasonable belief of the seizing officer for the purpose of holding the detenu liable. The finding of the detaining authority by invoking Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 and proceeding on that basis for passing the detention order without even giving an opportunity to the detenu is in violation of Articles 21 and 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. 12... 13... 14. In Shalini Soni v. Union of India (1980 Crl.L.J. 1487), it was held by the Supreme Court that the Constitution and the statute cast a duty on the detaining authority to communicate the grounds of detention to the detenu. The grounds communicated to the detenu must reveal the whole of the factual material considered by the detaining authority and not merely the inferences of fact arrived at by the detaining authority. It also means that the detenu is to be informed not merely of the inferences of fact but all the factual materials which have led to the inferences of fact. If the detenu is not to be so informed, the opportunity so solemnly guaranteed by the Constitution gets reduced to an exercise in futility. In this case, the inference drawn by the seizing officer cannot be imported to that of the detaining authority and the burden of proof will not be available and cannot be invoked while passing the order of detention without any materials whatsoever.” 7. It is also brought to our notice that in the decision dated 18.04.2005 rendered in HCP No.1465 of 2004, we had an occasion to consider similar contention and identical grounds raised in the grounds of detention. It is also brought to our notice that in the decision dated 18.04.2005 rendered in HCP No.1465 of 2004, we had an occasion to consider similar contention and identical grounds raised in the grounds of detention. After extracting the relevant portion from the grounds of detention, the earlier Division Bench Judgment as well as the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Sampathu Chetty’s case, we concluded thus: - “ 8. It is relevant to note that Section 178A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, which was considered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, is in pari materia with Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962. In such circumstances, the earlier Division Bench has rightly applied the principle laid down in the said decision. In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court has, in the case of Shalini Soni v. Union of India, (1980 Crl.LJ 1487), held that the inference drawn by the seizing officer cannot be imported to that of the detaining authority and the burden of proof will not be available and cannot be invoked while passing the order of detention without any materials whatsoever.” After saying so, the detention order challenged therein was set aside by us, allowing the Habeas Corpus Petition. 8. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in, (a) AIR 1970 SC 1173 (J.K. Steel Ltd. vs. Union of India) (b) 2005 SCC (Cri) 17 (Kirti Kumar Nirula vs. State of Maharashtra). In view of the specific assertion in the grounds of detention vide ground No (v), viz., reference to Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962, and in view of the categorical pronouncement of the two Division Bench Judgments referred above, we are of the view that the decisions relied on by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor are not helpful to the stand taken by him. 9. In the light of the legal position as mentioned above and in view of the categorical assertion made in the grounds of detention, we hold that the order of detention impugned in this Habeas Corpus Petition is liable to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. The Habeas Corpus Petition is allowed. The detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith from the custody unless he is required in some other case or cause.