( 1 ) THE petitioner before this court is the employer Maharashtra State electricity Board while respondent No. 1 is its employee. Respondent No. 2 is the Labour court, Akola, which has delivered the impugned award dated 7-2-1994 holding that the act of present petitioner of removing the name of respondent No. 1 from its muster from 9-11-1985 in terms of its Service Regulation 34 (c) constituted retrenehment and granting relief of reinstatement with continuity and 50 percent back wages to respondent No. 1. This court has, while admitting writ petition for final hearing, granted stay of back wages only. With the result respondent No. 1 is presently in employment of petitioner since last more than 11 years. ( 2 ) IT was the case of respondent no. 1 that he joined the services with petitioner in 1975 as Peon and was permanent employee at Akola. In 1985 he was transferred to washim Pole Factory where he could not shift his family as he could not get any accommodation. He was therefore maintaining two establishments which was difficult for him. He fell ill and took leave for recovery and was admitted in hospital. According to him, he forwarded leave applications by post mentioning that certificate of Doctor would be submitted later on. He stated that he also submitted replies to the communications of his employer and his employer did not consider his position and terminated him by strinking off his name from muster role with effect from 9-11-1985. He was not given any chance to submit explanation or to substantiate his illness and justify absence from duty. He was not paid retrenchment compensation or salary in lieu of one months notice and provisions of section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter REFERRED TO as the Act) were violated. After failure of conciliation, the matter was REFERRED TO Labour Court. The petitioner in written statement denied this. It specifically denied that respondent No. l forwarded any letters for medical leave by post. It also denied that they have not followed mandatory provisions of law or no one months notice was given or no compensation was offered. Respondent No. 1 applied for a days leave on 8-11-1985 mentioning private work as icason and he was to join his duties on 9-11-1985. He did not report for duty and also did not submit any application. Respondent No. 1 applied for a days leave on 8-11-1985 mentioning private work as icason and he was to join his duties on 9-11-1985. He did not report for duty and also did not submit any application. Deputy executive Engineer, Washim, therefore sent notice to respondent No. 1 on his permanent home address but there was no response. Hence another letter was sent calling upon him to resume his duties within three days. Thereafter third notice was sent but it was refused by respondent No. 1. Hence action under M. S. E. B. Service Regulation No. 34 (c) was taken and vide communication dated 17-1-1986 he was informed that his name was struck off from the muster role with effect from 9-11-1985. ( 3 ) THE Labour Court after appreciation of evidence of parties found that if an employee who was granted leave, overstayed, the same amounted to misconduct and was also covered by Regulation No. 34 (c ). It found that employer would have taken action after following the procedure prescribed under said clause and did not accept that there was abandonment of service by employee. It held that the act of striking off name amounted to retrenchment and relied upon the judgment of honble Apex Court reported at 1977 LIC 1695 between Delhi Cloth and General Mills corporation Ltd. Vs. Shambhunath mukherji and Anr. = AIR 1978 SC 8 . It also found that employee was absent from duties for more than 30 days without obtaining leave or even without informing to his superiors about his leave and hence it constituted indiscipline. Hence, it declined him 50% back wages and ordered his reinstatement with continuity and 50% back wages only. From the order of this court dated 31-7-1995 passed upon Civil Application No. 1891 of 1995, it appears that respondent No. l was reinstated on 18-10-1994. Thus, he has been awarded 50% back wages from 9-11-1985 till 18-10-1994. ( 4 ) I have heard Advocate R. K. Deshpande for Petitioner, Advocate Mrs. Chandekar for respondent No. l and learned agp for respondent No. 2. ( 5 ) PETITIONER has stated the facts and contended that due opportunity was given to respondent No. l to join duties and to explain reasons for his absence but he failed to use it. Chandekar for respondent No. l and learned agp for respondent No. 2. ( 5 ) PETITIONER has stated the facts and contended that due opportunity was given to respondent No. l to join duties and to explain reasons for his absence but he failed to use it. It is the contention of Advocate R. K. Deshpande that the employer was therefore justified in taking action under its Regulations which form conditions of service and in view of Section 2 (00) (bb) of Industrial Disputes Act, termination in terms thereof does not constitute retrenchment. It is also argued that there is no breach of principles of natural justice in the matter. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of this court reported at 1987 mh. L. J. 925 between Managing Director, panchganga Sahakri Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. Vs. Babasaheb Devgonda Patil, to demonstrate this and also to state that the ruling of Honble Apex Court reported at AIR 1978 sc 8 - Delhi Cloth and General Mills corporation Ltd. Vs. Shambhunath mukherji and another (supra) has been distinguished by said ruling. Respondent No. 1, on the other hand, argued that striking off name in this mode and manner constitutes retrenchment and view taken by Labour Court does not call for any interference. It is stated that the judgment of Honble Apex Court between Delhi Cloth and General Mills corporation Ltd. Vs. Shambhunath mukherji and another (supra) covers the controversy and judgment of this court in case of Panchganga Sahkari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. does not correctly appreciate it. Advocate Mrs. Chandekar has invited attention to judgment of Honble Apex Court in 1993 (II) CLR 116 = 1993 AIR SCW 1995 = 1993 (3) SCC 259 between D. K. Yadav Vs. J. M. A. Industries ltd. to show that provisions of Section 2 (00) (bb) are not attracted when such termination takes place under Standing Orders or Service Regulations. The decision of allahabad High Court in Arun Kumar mathur Vs. Labour Court reported in 1993 (I) CLR 467, is also cited by her for same purpose. The judgment of Honble Apex Court in H. D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India reported at AIR 1986 SC 132 is also cited to show that striking of name of workman from rolls amounts to retrenchment. Labour Court reported in 1993 (I) CLR 467, is also cited by her for same purpose. The judgment of Honble Apex Court in H. D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India reported at AIR 1986 SC 132 is also cited to show that striking of name of workman from rolls amounts to retrenchment. ( 6 ) BEFORE proceeding to consider the various judgments relied upon, it will be apt to first find out what are the provisions of service Regulations under which the petitioner has taken action against present respondent no. 1. Section 79 of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, confers power upon Board to make regulations by notification in Official Gazette not inconsistent with the Act. Board means state Electricity Board constituted under section 5 and it is not in dispute that petitioner is said Board. Clause (c) of section 79 permits board to make regulations on matters relating to the duties of officers and other employees of the Board, and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service. It is also not in dispute that Maharashtra State Electricity board Employees Service Regulations are framed in exercise of this power. Regulation 34 which is relevant for present purposes reads as under :-"34 (a ). The period of overstay of leave or joining time, without the specific prior sanction of the Competent Authority will ordinarily be looked upon as a breach of discipline and dealt with accordingly. Such overstay or absence from duty without prior permission, unless condoned by specific orders of Competent Authority with approval of the next higher authority or the chairman as the case may be shall be treated as extra-ordinary leave without pay and such period shall not count for increments. (b ). Continued absence from duty or overstay in spite of warning to return to duty, shall render the employee liable to be summarily discharged from service without the necessity of proceeding under maharashtra State Electricity Board employees Conduct Discipline and Appeal regulations. Note : In no case shall the service of an employee be terminated for continued absence or overstay without the warning being issued to him to resume duty within a specified date. (c ). Note : In no case shall the service of an employee be terminated for continued absence or overstay without the warning being issued to him to resume duty within a specified date. (c ). In the case of an employee who remains absent from duty or overstays his sanctioned leave or joining time without any intimation in writing to his immediate superior officer for a period of more than 30 days from the date on which he was due to report for duty, he shall be treated as "having left the service" of his own accord from the date on which he was due to return to duty and his name will be "struck off from the muster roll. " ( 7 ) IT will be appropriate to first consider the judgment of Honble Apex Court relied upon by Labour Court in impugned award. In AIR 1978 SC 8 - Delhi Cloth and general Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. Shambhunath mukherji (1977 Lab. I. C. 1695), the workman recruited as a labourer in the Store in 1951, after about six months he was promoted as a fitter-Helper and after about one and a half years he was promoted to the post of Motion-Setter till 1964. Subsequently because of reorganisation in establishment said post was abolished. As a settlement the management offered to the workman the job of a trainee on probation for the post of Assistant Line-Fixer (Assistant Grade I) without loss of wages but found him unsuitable for this post even after extending the period of probation upto nine months and, therefore, offered him the post of a fitter on the same pay which he as a Motion-Setter used to get. This offer was made by the management by a letter dt. July 31, 1965 and it closed with the following paragraph : "in case you agree to the above proposal, then your acceptance should reach my office within two days of the receipt of this letter otherwise it will be presumed that the above proposal is not acceptable to you and as a consequence you can be retrenched from the service of the mills". The workman on leave received this letter on August 12, 1965. He worked as a trainee (Assistant Grade I) upto August 14, 1965. The workman on leave received this letter on August 12, 1965. He worked as a trainee (Assistant Grade I) upto August 14, 1965. August 15 being a public holiday, on 16th August, 1965, the workman wrote to the management to give him a further chance to show his efficiency in his job and if he failed to improve he would voluntarily tender his resignation. The management did not reply to this letter and the workman also did not report to the management Only reply which workman received was letter of management dated January 19, 1966 that - "your name has been automatically struck off from the rolls under the provisions of the Standing Orders with effect from 24-8-65, for continued absence without any intimation". Observations made by Honble Apex Court in paragraphs 13 and 14 are as under -"13. On the face of it, the order striking off the name of the workman from the rolls on August 24, 1965, is clearly erroneous. No order, even under S. 27 (c) of the Standing Orders, could have been passed on that date The clause in the standing Orders reads as follows: -"it any workman absents for more than eight consecutive days his service shall be terminated and shall be treated having left the service without notice. "the workman last attended work on 14th august, 1965. 15th August was a public holiday He was, therefore, absent from work only from 16th of August. So even under the Standing Orders the workman was not absent for "more than eight consecutive days" on 24th August, 1965. The order is, therefore, clearly untenable even on the basis of the Standing Orders it is not necessary to express any opinion in this appeal whether "eight" consecutive days" in the Standing Orders mean eight consecutive working days. 14. Striking off the name of the workman from the rolls by the management is termination of his service. Such termination ot service is retrenchment within the meaning of S. 2 (oo) of the Act. 14. Striking off the name of the workman from the rolls by the management is termination of his service. Such termination ot service is retrenchment within the meaning of S. 2 (oo) of the Act. There is nothing to show that the provisions ot S 25-F (a) and (b) were complied with by the management in this case The provisions of S. 25-F (a), the proviso apart, and (b) are mandatory and any order of retrenchment, in violation of these two peremptory conditions precedent, is invalid " ( 8 ) THIS ruling is considered by this court in its ruling 1987 Mh. LJ. 925 between managing Director, Panchganga Sahakri sakhar Karkhana Ltd. Vs. Babasaheb devgonda Patil. An accountant against whom there was charge of mis-appropriation and a dispute for recovery ot that amount was pending before Co-operative Tribunal absented without prior sanction tor continuous period of about three years and hence petitioner sugar factory struck off his name from the roll. Said accountant approached Labour Court but failed However, Industrial Court allowed his appeal holding that though there was voluntary abandonment, removal ot name trom muster amounted to retrenchment and as the sugar factory did not follow proper procedure he was entitled to reinstatement without back wages in this background, the above mentioned observations in paragraphs 13 and 14 of New delhi Cloth and General Mills (supra) were looked into and it is mentioned in paragraph 6 that "this observation at the fag end of the judgment cannot be read in isolation particularly when the said observations refer to the fact that there is nothing to show that the provisions of Section 25-F (a) and (b) were complied with by the management Their lordships were certainly referring to the facts of that particular case In view of the tacts before Honble Apex Court, in paragraph 8 this court observed that "it is in the light of these facts and circumstances that the Supreme Court held the act of management to be malafide, hasty and without following proper procedure inasmuch as by the earlier letter they had already threatened to retrench him Moreover it was also not the case of voluntary abandonment of service by the workman" In paragraphs 9 and 10 this court observed -"9 The Supreme Court had occasion to deal with abandonment or relinquishment of service in case Buckingham and Carnatic co. Ltd Vs Venkatiah, AIR 1964 SC 1272 gajendragadkar, J (as he then was) speaking for the Benchobserved :"the certified Standing Orders represent the relevant terms and conditions of service in a statutory form and they are binding on the parties at least as much, if not more, as private contracts embodying similar terms and conditions of service. It is true that under common law an inference that an employee has abandoned or relinquished service is not easily drawn unless from the length of absence and from other surrounding circumstances an inference to that effect can be legitimately drawn and it can be assumed that the employee intended to abandon service. Abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention, and, normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate evidence in that behalf. ""10. Also in the case of National Engineering industries Ltd. Vs. Hanuman, AIR 1968 SC 33 the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 6 of the judgment :"but it seems to us clear that when "the standing order provides that a workman will lose his lien on his appointment in case he does not join his duty within 8 days of the expiry of his leave, it obviously means that his services are automatically terminated on the happening of the contingency. We do not understand how a workman who has lost his lien on his appointment can continue in service thereafter. Where therefore a standing order provides that a workman would lose his lien on his appointment, if he does not join his duty within certain time after his leave expires, it can only mean that his service stands automatically terminated when the contingency happens". This court therefore upheld the findings arrived at by both the courts below that respondent accountant voluntarily relinquished his job and his removal from muster was mere formality. The defence of said accountant that he was under the impression that he would not be taken in service until the dispute filed against him is decided was found to be untenable and not substantiated. With the result the impugned order of Industrial Court was set aside and petition filed by sugar factory was allowed. The defence of said accountant that he was under the impression that he would not be taken in service until the dispute filed against him is decided was found to be untenable and not substantiated. With the result the impugned order of Industrial Court was set aside and petition filed by sugar factory was allowed. It is thus apparent that this court found the view taken by Honble Apex Court in case of New Delhi Cloth and General Mills (supra) to be in peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. Later portion of the said observations of Honble Shri. Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) not reproduced in paragraph 9 of the judgment of this court above read - "but where parties agree upon the terms and conditions of service and they are included in certified Standing Orders, the doctrines of common law or considerations of equity would not be relevant. It is then a matter of construing the relevant term itself. Therefore, the first part of Standing Order 8 (ii) inevitably leads to the conclusion that if an employee is absent for eight consecutive days without leave, he is deemed to have terminated his contract of service and thus relinquished or abandoned his employment. In the above referred two rulings the Honble Apex Court was not called upon to consider whether such termination constitutes retrenchment or not. This court distinguished AIR 1978 SC 8 (supra) and held that termination of accountant in the facts of case before it and because of abandonment was not retrenchment. ( 9 ) THIS court has again considered similar issue in us judgment reported at 1997 (3) Mh. L. J. 580 : [1997 (3) ALL MR 606] between Blow Plast Ltd. Vs. Nafisa shabbir Hussain. There Labour Court had found that workman Nafisa had remained absent without giving bonafide reasons and there was no evidence to show that the Officer of company had exercised undue influence. Nafisa had also not disclosed any particulars regarding family matters which prevented her from challenging the alleged letter of termination after 2nd October, 1984 when she returned to India. It found that Nafisa did not prove the contents of the Medical certificate given by Dr. (Mrs.) Taher Khalil and no reasons have been given by Nafisa for challenging the termination letter dated 4th september, 1984 for three months. It found that Nafisa did not prove the contents of the Medical certificate given by Dr. (Mrs.) Taher Khalil and no reasons have been given by Nafisa for challenging the termination letter dated 4th september, 1984 for three months. It was clear that Nafisa remained absent without leave after 26th July, 1984 without any bonafide reasons and she came to the Court with unclean hand. Inspite of all this Labour Court granted her relief of reinstatement without back wages as it found that provisions of Section 25-F of industrial Disputes Act were not complied with. Nafisa also filed separate petition and claimed back wages. In these circumstances, this court has held that the Labour Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the above excuses are trotted out as an after thought and that there was no termination by the Company by any overt act and the present matter is a case of relinquishment of service. Therefore, this court found merit in the very first contention of petitioner that the matter involved relinquishment of service by the employee. It held in para 6 that in case of Buckingham carnatak Vs. Venkat reported in AIR 1964 sc 1272 (supra), the Apex Court has laid down that an inference of relinquishment of service can be drawn from various circumstances, one of them being length of the period of absence. Relinquishment of service is a question of intention. In the said judgment, it is further laid down that relinquishment can be inferred on the basis of the evidence on record and similarly, it can be inferred from the terms of a contract of employment between the parties. In cases where termination follows automatically from the terms of contract of employment by virtue of the employee remaining absent or in cases where termination follows on account of stipulation in the contract, and not on the basis of the Company enforcing the Standing Orders against the workman, then it is a case of relinquishment and not a case of termination. In the above circumstances, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that where termination follows relinquishment, it is a case of automatic/deemed termination and, therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F are not attracted. There is one more way of looking at the above problem. In the above circumstances, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that where termination follows relinquishment, it is a case of automatic/deemed termination and, therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F are not attracted. There is one more way of looking at the above problem. On 18th August, 1984, the legislature amended Section 2 (oo) of the industrial Disputes Act by introducing an exception to Section 2 (oo) of the said Act by inserting a new sub-section. Accordingly, the law has been amended. Under Section 2 (oo) (bb) there is no retrenchment if retrenchment is on account of stipulation in the contract. It also held that there is no termination on the ground of misconduct and the company proved relinquishment of services. Thereafter this court has pointed out various judgments (1961 Factory Law Reports 180; 1995 (1) CLR 598 and Vishwas Dhumal Vs. Kopargaon Nagarpalika decided on 22nd april, 1988 in Writ Petition No. 1642 of 1986) of this Court laying down that in certain cases, notwithstanding violation of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Industrial tribunal may refuse reinstatement and may award only compensation for breach of section 25-F of the said Act on the ground that the action of the Company, though illegal, was justified. This principle of law was applied to the facts of this case. Having noted that the labour Court found that the employee was guilty of misconduct, she had come to court with the unclean hands, erroneous conclusion that there was breach of Section 25-F of the industrial Disputes Act, this court observed that even assuming that Section 25-F of the industrial Disputes Act was breached, the employee was not entitled to be reinstated. It mentions that in this country, where millions are unemployed and where deserving persons do not get employment on account of economic forces at work, it would not be fair to reinstate an undeserving employee who has no intention of rejoining at the appointed date and who has not given any admissible reasons for not reporting to work and who sits quiet for almost six months, cannot be given the benefit of reinstatement only on the ground of alleged breach ot Section 25-F of the Industrial disputes Act. The facts already indicate that reinstatement was not warranted, particularly when the Labour Court has found that Nafisa has come to Court with unclean hands. The facts already indicate that reinstatement was not warranted, particularly when the Labour Court has found that Nafisa has come to Court with unclean hands. This court found it ironical that the workman not only sought reinstatement, but claimed wages which, according to her, were Rs. 10 lakhs only on the ground that the Company breached section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. For the reasons given hereinabove, this court has held that Section 25-F was not attracted and the employee was not entitled to be reinstated in the circumstances. Accordingly, writ Petition filed by the Employer Company was allowed and Writ Petition filed by Nafisa was rejected. But as company had already reinstated Nafisa from 1st March, 1998 and she was working, the High Court did not disturb her service. ( 10 ) IN AIR 1986 SC 132 i. e. H. D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India, (1985 lab. I. C. 1733), the appellant/employee was a tikka Mazdoor with the first respondent, the reserve Bank of India. He was so selected on daily wages of Rs. 3/- as per appointment letter dated 30-4-1974. As per the appointment order, he used to report to the bank regularly at 9. 30 A. M. to ascertain whether he could get work every day. On days when no work was given to him, he had to wait till noon to be told by the authorities concerned that no work was available on such days. Thus, he was given work only for four days in 1974, one hundred and fifty four days in 1975 and one hundred and five days in 1976. At the time he was selected for employment, he was not a matriculate He passed the matriculation examination in 1975. At the time he was selected he was not told that his name would be struck off the list of Tikka Mazdoors if he passed the matriculation examination. On 23-7-1976, he received a letter from the bank asking him to state within a week (latest by 29-7-1976) as to what his educational qualification was. He was also informed that his name would be struck off since he had concealed his educational qualification and that his services would be terminated without any notice and compensation from the bank. On 23-7-1976, he received a letter from the bank asking him to state within a week (latest by 29-7-1976) as to what his educational qualification was. He was also informed that his name would be struck off since he had concealed his educational qualification and that his services would be terminated without any notice and compensation from the bank. It appears that Tikka Mazdoors were placed in list-II maintained by the bank A confidential circular seems to have been issued by the bank on 27-6-1976 to the effect that matriculates would not be retained in this list. The appellant sent a reply stating that he was not a matriculate in 1974 when he was selected and that he passed the examination only in 1975. He enclosed the certificate and the mark-sheet to prove that he passed the examination only subsequent to his selection as Tikka Mazdoor. The appellant was not given any work after july, 1976. There was no written order terminating his services. In this background the Honble Apex Court observed :- "7. It is clear from the pleadings and from the documents noted above how the respondent-Bank managed to get rid of the appellant. The disclosures made in the confidential circular make our task easy in holding that the Bank was determined to adopt methods to terminate the services of the employees like the appellant. The appellant was not told that he would be struck oft the rolls if he passed the matriculation. He was not given any order in writing either refusing work or informing him that his name would be struck off the rolls. The case of the bank is that he was orally informed that his name has been struck off. Striking off the name of a workman from the rolls by the employer amounts to termination of service and such termination is retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Act if effected in violation of the mandatory provision contained in S. 25-F. and is invalid. In this case the facts, need only to be stated to hold that the petitioners name had been struck off the list contrary to the mandate contained in S. 25-F, This Court has held in Delhi Cloth and General Mills ltd. Vs. Shambhunath Mukherjee. In this case the facts, need only to be stated to hold that the petitioners name had been struck off the list contrary to the mandate contained in S. 25-F, This Court has held in Delhi Cloth and General Mills ltd. Vs. Shambhunath Mukherjee. (1978)1 scr 591 ( AIR 1978 SC 8 ) that striking off the name from the rolls by the management is retrenchment within the meaning of S. 2 (oo) of the Act. While reading Ss. 25-F. 25-B and Section 2 (oo ). Krishna Iyer. J. in State Bank of India Vs. N. Sundara Money. (1976)3 SCR 160 : ( AIR 1976 SC 1111 ) has observed that the words for any reason whatsoever occurring in S. 2 (oo) are very wide and almost admitting of no exception. It was made clear that a comprehensive definition has to be effected to protect the weak against the strong in construing the ambit of the words contained in S. 2 (oo ). Pithily he observed that"without further ado, we reach the conclusion that if the workman swims into the harbour of S. 25-F. he cannot be retrenched without payment, at the time of retrenchment, compensation computed as prescribed therein read with S. 25-B (2 ). "it will have to be noted that there was no provision like Section 2 (oo) (bb) in Industrial disputes Act when appellant/employee Tikka mazdoor was terminated and also termination was not in pursuance of any service condition regulating his employment. On the contrary termination was brought about for no fault on employees part by employer. ( 11 ) ADVOCATE Smt. Chandekar for employee has relied upon the judgment of honble Apex Court in 1993 (II) CLR 116 = 1993 AIR SCW 1995 = 1993 (3) SCC 259 between D. K. Yadav Vs. J. M. A. Industries ltd. On the contrary termination was brought about for no fault on employees part by employer. ( 11 ) ADVOCATE Smt. Chandekar for employee has relied upon the judgment of honble Apex Court in 1993 (II) CLR 116 = 1993 AIR SCW 1995 = 1993 (3) SCC 259 between D. K. Yadav Vs. J. M. A. Industries ltd. The Honble Apex Court considered provisions of clause 13 (2) (iv) of Standing orders which read :- "if a workman remains absent without sanctioned leave or beyond the period of leave originally granted or subsequently extended, he shall lose his lien on his appointment unless (a) he returns within eight calendar days of the commencement of the absence or the expiry of leave originally granted or subsequently extended as the case may be; and (b) Explains to the satisfaction of the manager/management the reason of his absence on his inability to return on the expiry of the leave, as the case may be. The workman not reporting for duty within eight calendar days, as mentioned above, shall be deemed to have automatically abandoned the services and lost his hen on his appointment. His name shall be struck off from the Muster Rolls in such an eventuality". The respondent/employer by letter dated 12-12-1980 received by employee on 19-12-1980 intimated that he wilfully absented from duty continuously for more than 8 days from 3-12-1980 without leave or prior information or intimation or previous permission and therefore was "deemed to have left the service of company on his own account and lost his lien and the appointment with effect from 3-12-1980". In paragraph 6, the Honble Apex court negated the argument that termination of appellant was automatic, that the right of employer under the Standing Orders gets affected by statutory operation. It relied upon its judgment in case of L. Robert Dsouza vs. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway, 1982 (1) SCC 645 and further pointed out that striking off the name from rolls for unauthorised absence from duty amounted to termination of service and absence from duty for eight consecutive days amounted to misconduct and termination of service on such grounds without complying with minimum principles of natural justice would not be justified. It pointed out AIR 1978 SC 8 - Delhi cloth and General Mills Corporation Ltd. Vs. It pointed out AIR 1978 SC 8 - Delhi cloth and General Mills Corporation Ltd. Vs. Shambhunath Mukherji to state that striking off name of workman for absence itself amounted to retrenchment and also H. D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India, reported in AIR 1986 SC 132 striking off the name from the rolls amounts to an arbitrary action. State bank of India Vs. Workmen of State Bank of India reported at 1991 (1) SCC 13 is also considered to point out that discharge by giving one months notice or pay in lieu thereof was not discharge simplicitor but one camouflaged for serious misconduct and court can lift veil and look beyond the apparent tenor of the order and its effect. In paragraph 14, it is observed that right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution would include right to livelihood. The order of termination of service of an employee/workman visits him with Civil consequences of jeopardising not only his/her livelihood but also career and livelihood of dependants. It laid down that before taking any action putting an end to the tenure of employee/workman fair play requires that a reasonable opportunity to put forth his case is given and domestic inquiry conducted complying with principles of natural justice. It found that appellant before it was not given such opportunity and his plea was that he reported for duty on 3-12-1980 and on all subsequent days and was ready to join his duty but was not permitted. It found that the tribunal did not record a conclusive finding about it and only recorded that employer had power under clause 13 of certified Standing order to terminate services of appellant. The honble Apex Court therefore read principles of natural justice into the Standing Order number 13 (2) (iv) observing that otherwise it would be arbitrary, unjust, and unfair and violating Article 14. It held that impugned order was violative of principles of natural justice. In paragraph 4 Honble Apex Court found that the definition of retrenchment in section 2 (oo) was comprehensive one intended to cover any action of management to put an end to the employment of an employee for any reason whatsoever. However Honble Apex court did not rest its decision on this point as it found that case could be decided on other contentions. ( 12 ) D. K. Yadav Vs. However Honble Apex court did not rest its decision on this point as it found that case could be decided on other contentions. ( 12 ) D. K. Yadav Vs. J. M. A. Industries Ltd. (supra) is considered by honble Apex Court in its ruling AIR 2000 sc 2198 i. e. Syndicate Bank Vs. General secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff association. The delinquent bank employee absented himself from work for a penod of 90 or more consecutive days. The Bank sent show cause notice to delinquent for his continued absence and to report back for work before mentioned date failing which he would be deemed to have been voluntarily retired from the services of the Bank for his continued absence. The said notice was sent by registered post but it was returned with the report of the postal authority that he refused to receive the same. The Bank by virtue of Clause 16 of the bipartite Settlement treated the delinquent as having voluntarily abandoned his services. This order of the Bank was similarly sent to delinquent under registered cover but was returned with the endorsement of the postal authority "not found during delivery time". Industrial dispute was raised by the union which led to the reference by Government to the Tribunal for adjudication. The Tribunal was of the view that since the Bank did not examine the postman that delinquent in fact refused to receive the notice, it could not be said that there was service of notice to him. Therefore, the Bank could not in the circumstances invoke the provisions of Clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement and on that score alone reinstatement of delinquent was ordered. The High Court upheld the order of Tribunal. The Honble Apex Court has held that the notice was sent on the correct address of delinquent and it was received back with the postal endorsement "refused". A clear presumption arose in favour of the Bank and against delinquent. Yet the Tribunal held that no notice was given to him as postman was not produced by the Bank. This would be rather an incongruous finding by the Tribunal. Bank followed the requirements of Clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement. It rightly held that delinquent had voluntarily retired from the service of the Bank Under these circumstances it was not necessary for the bank to hold any inquiry before passing the order. This would be rather an incongruous finding by the Tribunal. Bank followed the requirements of Clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement. It rightly held that delinquent had voluntarily retired from the service of the Bank Under these circumstances it was not necessary for the bank to hold any inquiry before passing the order. An inquiry would have been necessary if delinquent had submitted his explanation which was not acceptable to the Bank or contended that he did report for duty but was not allowed to join by the Bank. Nothing of the like had happened in this case. Assuming that inquiry was necessitated, evidence led before the Tribunal clearly showed that notice was given to delinquent and it was he who defaulted and offered no explanation of his absence from duty and did not report for duty within 30 days of the notice as required in clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement. Thus, undue reliance on the principles of natural justice by the Tribunal and even by the High court has certainly led to miscarriage of justice as far as Bank was concerned. There was no occasion for the Tribunal to direct that delinquent be reinstated in service or for the high Court not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution to set aside the Award. Honble apex Court further held the requirements of principles of natural justice, required to be observed are : (1) workman should know the nature of the complaint or accusation; (2) an opportunity to state his case; and (3) the management should act in good faith which means that the action of the management should be fair, reasonable and just. There is no point in laying stress on the principles of natural justice without understanding their scope or real meaning. There are two essential elements of natural justice which are : (a) no man shall be judge in his own cause; and (b) no man shall be condemned, either civilly or criminally, without being afforded an opportunity of being heard in answer to the charge made against him. There are two essential elements of natural justice which are : (a) no man shall be judge in his own cause; and (b) no man shall be condemned, either civilly or criminally, without being afforded an opportunity of being heard in answer to the charge made against him. In course of time by various judicial pronouncements these two principles of natural justice have been expanded, e. g. , a party must have due notice when the Tribunal will proceed, Tribunal should not act on irrelevant evidence or shut out relevant evidence; if the Tribunal consists of several members they all must sit together at all times; Tribunal should act independently and should not be based against any party; its action should be based on good faith and order and should act in just, fair and reasonable manner. These in fact are the extensions or refinements of the main principles of natural justice stated above as observed by the Honble apex Court. ( 13 ) HONble Allahabad High Court in arun Kumar Mathur Vs. Labour Court reported at 1993 (I) CLR 467 has taken the view that termination on account of abandonment is not excluded from definition of retrenchment in Section 2 (oo) of Industrial disputes Act. The case of employee was that he was not given any charge-sheet nor was any inquiry held against him and he also denied any abandonment. He produced medical certificates in support of his illness and also pointed out that notice alleged to have been sent to him was returned undelivered on account of his non-availability. From noting on file of employer, it became apparent that already mind was made up to terminate his service and bring his case within the expression "abandonment of service". From facts it appears that the services were terminated with effect from 15-7-1981 while after recovery from illness employee was reported to have joined duty on 8-4-1981. No enabling standing Orders or any other similar provision resulting in automatic termination of service appears to have been pressed into service in this case. In such circumstances this ruling is of no assistance to decide present controversy. ( 14 ) IN Viveka Nanda Sethi Vs. Chairman, J. and K. Bank Ltd. and Ors. No enabling standing Orders or any other similar provision resulting in automatic termination of service appears to have been pressed into service in this case. In such circumstances this ruling is of no assistance to decide present controversy. ( 14 ) IN Viveka Nanda Sethi Vs. Chairman, J. and K. Bank Ltd. and Ors. reported at 2005 (II) CLR 527 the Honble apex Court has considered provision of bipartite settlement and observed that the same is clear and unambiguous and therefore should be given literal meaning. In the facts of the case when the employee/appellant before it did not submit any explanation in spite of repeated opportunities and only continued to file applications for grant of medical leave without proper medical certificates, it has been held that the Bank was justified in concluding that appellant had no intention to join duties. It is also observed that impugned order was dated 17-5-1984 and appellant moved for its reconsideration on 31-7-1987. In paragraph 20 Honble Apex Court has stated that principles of natural justice were required to be complied with but a full-fledged departmental proceeding was not warranted. In paragraph 25 D. K. Yadav Vs. J. M. A. Industries Ltd. (supra) is considered and it is noticed that in that case no opportunity was given to workman This judgment states that a limited inquiry as to whether employee concerned had sufficient explanation for not reporting to duties after the period of leave had expired or failure on his part on being asked so to do. amounts to sufficient compliance of the requirements of principles of natural justice. AIR 2000 SC 2198 i. e. Syndicate bank Vs. General Secretary, Syndicate bank Staff Association (supra) has been relied upon in this respect. ( 15 ) THIS High Court has recently in bhimrao Rambhau Abhang Vs. Kohinoor engineering Co. , 2005 (II) CLR 952 : [2005 (4) ALL MR 376] considered this issue it found that employee/petitioner before it was called after lunch by one Mr. Gandhi and asked to resign and was threatened with arrest by police otherwise Employee did not resign and he was not permitted to join. Kohinoor engineering Co. , 2005 (II) CLR 952 : [2005 (4) ALL MR 376] considered this issue it found that employee/petitioner before it was called after lunch by one Mr. Gandhi and asked to resign and was threatened with arrest by police otherwise Employee did not resign and he was not permitted to join. No charge-sheet was issued to him and there was no inquiry he did not receive letters allegedly sent by employer and employer also could not produce envelopes returned by postal authorities or under certificate of posting before Labour court to substantiate its stand that these letters were in fact sent by post and employee refused to accept them. It was found that Labour Court erred in accepting this evidence of employer to conclude that there was voluntary abandonment. This court also noticed that the labour Court failed to consider the issue of compliance with principles of natural justice as required in D. K. Yadav Vs. J. M. A. Industries Ltd. (supra) and L. Robert dsouza Vs. Executive Engineer, Southern railway - 1982 (1) SCC 645 . ( 16 ) IT therefore appears that where employer possesses power either under standing Orders or under Service Regulations or under Settlements to treat absentee/ absconding employee as having voluntarily left the service and therefore to strike off his name from muster role, if the employee has been given opportunity to return to duty within reasonable time and also a show cause to explain his unauthorised absence from duty; principles of natural justice are satisfied. The honble Apex Court has read principles of natural justice into the such provisions observing that otherwise it would be arbitrary, unjust, and unfair and violating article 14. Otherwise order of employer will be violative of principles of natural justice. Employer has to show that he has acted fairly with bonafides and never intended to victimise employee undue emphasis on the principles of natural justice may lead to miscarriage of justice as far as employer is concerned. A full-fledged departmental inquiry is not necessary and if there is no response/reply/explanation from employee and he fails to join within stipulated time, employer can pass appropriate orders in accordance with powers given to him by the relevant provision. A full-fledged departmental inquiry is not necessary and if there is no response/reply/explanation from employee and he fails to join within stipulated time, employer can pass appropriate orders in accordance with powers given to him by the relevant provision. If such employee submits his explanation which is not acceptable to the employer or he contends that he did report for duty but was not allowed to join by the employer, inquiry to ascertain truth or otherwise of such claim/defence becomes essential. Evidence led before the Tribunal by parties may also clearly show that notice was given to delinquent and it is he who defaulted and offered no explanation for his absence from duty and did not report for duty within requisite time/days of the notice as required by relevant provision In paragraph 4 [d. K. Yadav Vs. J. M. A. Industries Ltd. (supra)] honble Apex Court found that the definition of retrenchment in Section 2 (oo) was comprehensive one intended to cover any action of management to put an end to the employment of an employee for any reason whatsoever. However Honble Apex court did not choose to rest its decision on this point as it found that case could be decided on other contentions From these rulings of Honble apex Court and of this High Court it appears that if delinquent employee was given reasonable opportunity by the Employer before exercising the powers available to him either under Standing Orders, Service Regulations, settlements then relief of reinstatement has not been granted only because there is technical violation of Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes act. However, when said power is contended to have been exercised by employer to victimise the employee without their being any occasion for its use, violation of principles of natural justice as also truth in his version has been tested on the basis of material available with the employer before the impugned action and also on the basis of material which has become available before the Tribunal in which said action is challenged by employee. Section 25-F has not been taken into consideration independent of such material. ( 17 ) COMING to the facts of present case, the employee/respondent No. 1 on 8-11-1985 sought leave for only one day with permission to leave headquarters which came to be granted He was therefore supposed to resume his duties on 9-11-1985. Section 25-F has not been taken into consideration independent of such material. ( 17 ) COMING to the facts of present case, the employee/respondent No. 1 on 8-11-1985 sought leave for only one day with permission to leave headquarters which came to be granted He was therefore supposed to resume his duties on 9-11-1985. As he did not turn up petitioner forwarded him a communication dated 22-11-1985 mentioning that he was absent without permission and without getting the leave extended He was given a direction to join within three days and also to submit explanation as to why his leave from 9-11-1985 should not be treated as leave without pay. It was also stated that he was earlier warned about such frequent absence. On 2-12-1985 he was communicated that he failed to join duty inspite of communication dated 22-11-1985 and was again called upon to resume his duty within three days and was warned that otherwise action as per Rules would be taken against him. On 10-10-1985 he was given a show cause as to why action under regulation 34 (c) of Regulations should not be taken against him. After waiting for more than one month and precisely on 17-1-1986, the order removing name from muster roll came to be issued In said order it is mentioned that he acknowledged all the letters but did not join duty. The last letter dated 10-12-1985 forwarded to him by Registered Post acknowledgment Due was returned back with postal endorsement "refused". It was mentioned that he did not send any intimation to the office inspite of all these communications and opportunities. The stand taken by respondent No 1 in this respect was before Labour Court in which he mentioned that after transfer to Washrm he was maintaining double establishment and because of monetary loss, physical loss and mental tension he got ill and took leave for recovery from illness. He stated that he was admitted in Main Hospital at Akola and forwarded leave applications mentioning that doctors certificate would be submitted later on. In evidence he stated that he was admitted in hospital for three days and he produced medical certificate. He stated that letters issued by the petitioner were replied by him by postcard and by postcard only he was asking for extension of leave. In evidence he stated that he was admitted in hospital for three days and he produced medical certificate. He stated that letters issued by the petitioner were replied by him by postcard and by postcard only he was asking for extension of leave. There is no such plea in his statement of claim filed before Labour court and he has not disclosed any letters communications forwarded by employer to him and also the fact ot his sending replies to the same. On the contrary, he specifically pleaded therein that his employer did not give any chance to explain his position or submit representation about illness and absence from duty. He only stated that he forwarded reply to official letters. Thus improvement made by him in his evidence is apparent In his cross-examination he had admitted that after 8-11-1985 he did not join at washim at all and he was dismissed. He admitted receipt of communication dated 22-11-1985, 2-12-1985. Envelope having postal endorsement "refused" is also accepted by him and he explained that after putting signature he told postman to give it at his house but he did not receive that letter at his house. He denied that he refused the envelope. However, the version is more than sufficient to hold that he refused the same. He stated that he does not have any documentary evidence to show that he replied to those letters. It is thus clear that all letters forwarded by employer were in fact served upon him and he refused the last communication. He deliberately chose not to reply. In this background, he got one more opportunity to justify his absence before Labour Court but the only document he produced was of hospitalisation for three days. The Labour court has in its award reached finding that it was difficult to accept that respondent No. 1 abandoned the service. Labour Court has treated that his absence constituted misconduct and was also covered under regulation 34 (c) and in view of the clear provision in Service regulation it reached this finding. Why and how it is misconduct, it is misconduct under which regulation and how it is to be dealt with is not at all disclosed in the award. It has been thereafter held that it constituted retrenchment and relief as mentioned above came to be granted. Why and how it is misconduct, it is misconduct under which regulation and how it is to be dealt with is not at all disclosed in the award. It has been thereafter held that it constituted retrenchment and relief as mentioned above came to be granted. ( 18 ) REGULATION 34 (a) deals with overstay or absence without prior permission. Normally it is to be viewed as a breach of discipline and dealt with accordingly. It clarifies that such period may be treated as extraordinary leave without pay and shall not count for increments Regulation 34 (b) deals with cases of continuous absence from duty or overstaying inspite of warning of return to duty and render the employee liable for summary discharge without necessity of proceeding under Maharashtra State Electricity Board employees Conduct Discipline and Appeal regulations. It is however specified that he shall not be terminated without the warning being issued to him to resume duty within a specified date. Thereafter comes the provision under which petitioner has acted in his matter. Regulation 34 (c) deals with continuous absence from duty or overstaying sanctioned leave for a penod of more than 30 days and it authorises petitioner to treat such employee as "having left the service" of his own accord from the date on which he was due to return to duty. In that event his name can be "struck off" from the muster roll. The petitioner Employer has given first communication/warning to respondent No. 1 employee on 22-11-1985 after 12 days of the date on which employee was due to return. About 10 days thereafter second letter dated 2-12-1985 was forwarded. After one month from the date on which respondent No. 1 was due to return to duty, a show cause notice for action under regulation 34 (c) was given on 10-12-1985. The order removing the name has been issued after one month and one week from show cause notice and about two months and 8 days from the date on which respondent No. 1 was supposed to return for duty. Contents of these letters show that adequate opportunity to return to work with warning of consequences was served upon respondent No. 1 and he did not even bother to send reply to it. He could not even justify his absence by producing relevant material for consideration before Labour Court. Contents of these letters show that adequate opportunity to return to work with warning of consequences was served upon respondent No. 1 and he did not even bother to send reply to it. He could not even justify his absence by producing relevant material for consideration before Labour Court. From the law as explained by Honble Apex court in Viveka Nanda Sethi Vs. Chairman. J. and K. Bank Ltd. and others (supra) and D. K. Yadav Vs. J. M. A. Industries Ltd. (supra) as also in Syndicate Bank Vs. General secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff Association (supra) it is apparent that respondent No. 1 was given adequate opportunity to place his defence by the employer and also before the labour Court. He could not produce any material to show that he was really concerned about his duty and corresponded with his employer to save his job. There is absolutely no explanation for his absence for such long period and also there is no explanation as to why he did not avail of the opportunity extended to him by his employer or before the labour Court. The finding of Labour Court that he did not abandon the service is therefore perverse and reveals non application of mind. The same is therefore liable to be quashed and set aside. ( 19 ) HOWEVER, it cannot be forgotten that petitioner has already reinstated respondent No. l on 18-10-1994. Thus, he is in service for past more than 11 years. He has put in total service of about 30 years and thus at present he is on the wrong side of his career. Considering these facts, I am not inclined to disturb the service or continuity therein awarded by Labour Court. However, Labour court has granted him 50% back wages from 9-11-1985 till 18-10-1994. In view of findings reached above, the public body like State electricity Board cannot be burdened with such amount for no fault on their part or when the fault is entirely on part of present respondent no. 1. Hence the impugned award is modified only to that extent. In view of findings reached above, the public body like State electricity Board cannot be burdened with such amount for no fault on their part or when the fault is entirely on part of present respondent no. 1. Hence the impugned award is modified only to that extent. The award to the extent it set aside termination order dated 9-11-1985 and order of reinstatement of present respondent No. 1 with continuity in service on his original post is only maintained and its remaining portion granting him 50% back wages from the date of termination till reinstatement is hereby quashed and set aside. His claim for wages from date of termination till reinstatement stands rejected. ( 20 ) WRIT petition is thus partially allowed. Rule is made absolute in above terms. No. costs. Petition partly allowed.