Judgment :- P.K. Misra, J. The plaintiffs have filed present appeals against the common Order Application Nos.237 of 2002, 238of 2002,1364 of 2002 and 3954 of 2003 in C.S.No.450 of 1999 dated 23.2.2004. 2. The appellants filed the aforesaid suit partition and for appointment of Receiver take possession of the suit properties and business and for directing the first defendant give accounts of 3 family businesses descry in 'B' Schedule as well as 3 house property indicated in 'A’ Schedule of the plaint. 3. During pendency of such suit, the appellants filed Application No.237 of 2002 for I pleading one Mrs. S. Devisri, the wife of 4th defendant. On the same day, they filed Application No.238 of 2002 for amendment of the plaint schedule. For the purpose of this appeal, it only necessary to state that the plaintiffs, as stated in third paragraph of the detailed amendment, sought to include a property purchased in the name of S. Devisri, the wife of 4th defendant, after filing of the suit. They also filed Application No. 1364 of 2002 praying for impleading S. Devisri as Respondent No.6 in Application 238 of 20021. They flied another Application No.3954 of 2003 for amendment of Application No.238 of 2002 by addition of certain paragraphs as 11 -A and 11 -B in Judge's Summons in Application No.238 of 2002. 4. Notice in the applications had been issued to S. Devisri. She had filed a counter in Application No.237 of 2002 contending that she is not a necessary party to the suit. In a separate Winter affidavit filed in Application No.3954 of 2003, she had contended that the property sought to be included by way of her amendment has been purchased by her father after tiling of the suit and such application should be rejected. A similar counter affidavit has been 'tiled by her in Application No, 1364 of 2002. 5. A reply affidavit was filed by the plaintiffs in Application No.237 of 2002. 6. A similar counter affidavit has been 'tiled by her in Application No, 1364 of 2002. 5. A reply affidavit was filed by the plaintiffs in Application No.237 of 2002. 6. Learned single Judge while partly allowing Application No.238 of 2002 by permitting amendment relating to item No.3 of 'A' Schedule property, rejected other amendment as well as other applications, viz., Application No.237 of 2002, which had been filed for impleading S. Devisri as a defendant in the suit, Application No. 1364 of 2002 and Application No.3954 of 2003 and also rejected a portion of the amendment sought for in Application No.238 of 2002. 7. O.S.A.No.102 of 2005 has been filed against of rejection of Application No.237 of O.S.A.No.103 of 2005 has been filed 33 against the rejection of Application No. 1364 of 2002, O.S.A.No.104 of 2005 has been filed against the rejection of Application No.3954 of 2003 and 0.S.A.No. 105 of 2005 has been filed against the part of the order party rejecting Application No.238 of 2002, so far as it related to inclusion of property purchased in the name of Mrs. Devisri. 8. All the appeals have been heard together and shall be disposed of by this common judgment. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents have raised the question of maintainability of the appeals by contending that the order refusing to implead a particular party or the order refusing to amend the plaint cannot be considered as a judgment' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, and, therefore, the appeals are not maintainable. On merits, it is contended that admittedly the property was purchased after, filing of the suit for partition and even assuming that such property had been purchased by the erstwhile Kartha of the joint family even by utilizing the funds available to him as Kartha before filing of the suit, such property cannot be considered as a joint family property or as an acquisition from joint family nucleus, as filing of the suit for partition itself amounted to severance of joint family status and, therefore, any property purchased by erstwhile Kartha after such suit, cannot be considered as a joint family property. 10. This last contention of the contesting respondents had been accepted by the learned single Judge by relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in M.N. Aryamurthi v. M.L. Subbaraya Setty and others, A.I.R.1972 S.C. 1279. 11. 10. This last contention of the contesting respondents had been accepted by the learned single Judge by relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in M.N. Aryamurthi v. M.L. Subbaraya Setty and others, A.I.R.1972 S.C. 1279. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the proposed Defendant No.6 in the suit while supporting the orders has also in addition, submitted that the contentions raised by the plaintiffs/appellants cannot be countenanced in view of the of the decision and observed that certain a - provisions contained in the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. 12. The, main question is whether the applica­tion for impleading S. Devisri as a defendant in the suit should have been allowed or not. How­ever, such a question can be decided in the present appeals only if it is found that the order refusing to implead such a party as a defen­dant is a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the con­testing defendants and the proposed defendant have placed reliance upon the decision of the Madras High Court reported in A.S. Manavala Chettiar v. T V. Selvarajan, (1993)] 1 L.W. 127. In the said decision, the Division Bench held that an order impleading a new party and the consequential amendment prayed will be purely procedural and interlocutory and does not in either manner decide the right of the parties or determine the proceedings finally, in so far as the Court is concerned, and there­fore, it cannot be said that such order is a judg­ment' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 14. The aforesaid view of the Division Bench was based on the earlier Division Bench deci­sion of this Court reported in Ramaswam iChettiar v. Kanniappa Mudaliar, 60 MLJ 237: 32 L.W 766, which was again followed by another Division Bench decision reported in Selvam Mudaliar v. Raja Mudaliar (1952) 2 M.L.J 653 :65 L.W.1000. However, a discordant note seems to have been ex­pressed in Lingam, B.C., (died) v. Mrs. Statesenko Larissa and two others, (1993)] 1 L.W l77, wherein an ' other Division Bench by placing reliance upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in Gurmauj Saran v. Joyce C. Satim, A.LR.1990 Delhi 130, has expressed some doubt regarding correctness of the decision and observed that certain as pets of law require consideration. 15. Statesenko Larissa and two others, (1993)] 1 L.W l77, wherein an ' other Division Bench by placing reliance upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in Gurmauj Saran v. Joyce C. Satim, A.LR.1990 Delhi 130, has expressed some doubt regarding correctness of the decision and observed that certain as pets of law require consideration. 15. In our opinion, if the teamed single Judge simply rejects an application for impletion of a defendant and thereafter refuses to amend the plaint by inclusion of a property of such pro­posed defendant without expressing any final opinion in the matter and only on a prima facie view, such order may not be a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letter Patent as rights of the parties are not finally decided and the applications are rejected merely on the basis of prima facie expression of some opinion., 16. Ho ever since in the present case the learned single Judge while rejecting the application for impletion of a defendant and inclusion of the property purchased in the name of such proposed defendant has practically purported to decide the rights of the parties b making a final observation, it would not proper to hold that such order of the team single Judge would not come within the meaning of the Judgment'. 17. In the particular facts of the present ca in view of the categorical observation made the learned single Judge on the particular aspect, in our opinion, the order can be taken to be a judgment' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Therefore, the a peals can be held to be maintainable in the peculiar facts and circumstances. 18. Next comes the question relating to validity of the order. In our opinion, the question to whether a party should be impleaded as defendant under 0.1, Rule 10, is not an Order which goes to the jurisdiction of the Court. If discretion is exercised, normally the appellate Court should be slow to interfere with such discretion. 18. Next comes the question relating to validity of the order. In our opinion, the question to whether a party should be impleaded as defendant under 0.1, Rule 10, is not an Order which goes to the jurisdiction of the Court. If discretion is exercised, normally the appellate Court should be slow to interfere with such discretion. In the present case, the addition a party and the consequential addition of property, which in its wake would require delving into many matters which are not essential or necessary for deciding the main dispute in to suit, can be left out of the present proceedings, leaving it open to the plaintiffs, if so advised, to file a fresh suit to establish their alleged right in the property purchased in the name of the defendant sought to be added. It was not necessary for the learned single Judge to finally decide about the matter in a proceedings under 0.1, Rule 10 or in an application under 0.6, Rule 17, we can only observe that the observation made by the learned Single Judge may not be construed as a final observation in the matter and such matter is left open to be decided if at all and when a suit is, filed by the plaintiffs for establishing their alleged right in such property purchased in the name of the party sought to be impleaded. 19. In view of the aforesaid opinion expressed by us, we do not feet it necessary to consider whether the views expressed in M.N. Aryamurthi v. M.L. Subbaraya Setty and Others, AIR 1972 S.C. 1279 been modified to any extent in the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Bhagwant P. Sulakhe v. Digambar Gopal Sulakhe and Others A. I. R. 1986 S.C. 79. 20. For the aforesaid reasons, we dispose of At appeals by upholding the order of the learned single Judge rejecting the applications for impleading Mrs. 20. For the aforesaid reasons, we dispose of At appeals by upholding the order of the learned single Judge rejecting the applications for impleading Mrs. S. Devisri as a defendant in the suit and by rejecting the connected applications for amendment or amendment of other connected application with a further observation that the order passed by the teamed single Judge ld not be taken to be any final opinion expressed on the point and such question relating to any alleged right of the plaintiffs in the property purchased by or in the name of the party t to be impleaded as a defendant can be considered at the appropriate stage, if at all any such fresh suit is filed by the appellants. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on that aspect. 21. Subject to the aforesaid observations, all the appeals are disposed of No costs.