RM. Palaniappan v. The Transport Commissioner Chepauk & Others
2005-11-07
P.SATHASIVAM, S.K.KRISHNAN
body2005
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- S.K. Krishnan, J. Aggrieved by the orders of the Transport Commissioner in R.No.29298./V4/91 (E.O.No.294 of 2000) dated 6.6.2000 and the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Chennai, passed in O.A.No.4144 of 2002 dated 27.6.2002, the petitioner has filed this writ petition for issuing a writ of certiorari. 2. The case of the del inquest/petitioner is as follows: (a) The petitioner was appointed on 15.11.1983 as Motor Vehicles Inspector Grade II in the, Transport Department through the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission. The petitioner was served with a charge memo, dated 22.11.1995 by the first respondent alleging that while the petitioner was working as Motor Vehicles In specter Grade II Saidapet at Meenambakkam Unit Office, he abused his official position to got bribe, The said charge has been framed against the petitioner under Rule 17(b) of Tamil Nadu Civil Services Rules (D&A) Rules. In the charge memo, three charges were framed and the petitioner was asked to submit his ex plantation within 15 days. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 1.8.1996. After conducting enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report stating that the charge against the petitioner was proved. Thereafter a copy of the enquiry report was furnished to the petitioner on 21.2.2000 by the Deputy Transport Commissioner asking the petitioner to submit farther representation if any. On 3 1.3.2000, first respondent furnished a copy of the additional report of the Enquiry Officer to the petitioner and also asked him to submit further representation, if any. The second respondent also sent a letter to the petitioner in Lr.No.Confdl.22/97 dated 11.3.2000. The petitioner filed his explanations dated 12.4.2000 and 24.4.2000. As the Transport Commissioner did not (sic) satisfy with the explanation offered by the petitioner, on the basis of the findings of the Enquiry Officer, he passed an order dated 6.6.2000 dismissing the petitioner from service. 3. As against the order passed by the Transport Commissioner dated 6.6.2000 the petitioner approached the Tribunal for quashing the same. 4. The Tribunal, after analyzing the entire facts relating to the three charges against the petitioner, has come to the conclusion that the finding of the Enquiry Officer as well as the impugned order was justified. 5. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the petitioner has filed this writ petition for the above said relief. 6.
4. The Tribunal, after analyzing the entire facts relating to the three charges against the petitioner, has come to the conclusion that the finding of the Enquiry Officer as well as the impugned order was justified. 5. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the petitioner has filed this writ petition for the above said relief. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the Transport Commissioner has merely and mechanically followed the report of the Enquiry Officer without any application of mind and has failed to exercise his jurisdiction. 7. Further, the learned counsel would emphasize that the statement of the official witnesses, which are said to have been recorded during the course of preliminary enquiry and which have been relied on in the enquiry report of the second respondent, were not furnished to the petitioner along with the charge memo by violating the principles of natural justice and hence the entire proceedings are vitiated. 8. Further, the learned counsel would emphasise that though the independent witnesses did not support the case put forth by the authorities, the first respondent Transport Commissioner based on the statements of the officials and of the report of the Enquiry Officer concluded that the charges framed against the petitioner are proved and imposed a punishment of dismissal, which is against law. 9. In this regard, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on the following decisions in support of his contention: (a) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mokit Sharif (Dead) through Legal Representatives, A.I.R. 1982, S. C. 937; (b) The State of Punjab v. Bhagat Ram, A.I.R.1974 S.C.2335; (c) State of Tamil Nadu represented by its Secretary to Government, Home (Police) Department and others v. S. Mahalingant and Others, C.D.J. 2005 M.H.C. 826. 10. Per contra, it is emphasised by the learned Government Advocate that the case on hand cannot be ignored on the ground of non-furnishing of the statements during the course of enquiry considering the serious nature of the charges framed against the petitioner. 11.
10. Per contra, it is emphasised by the learned Government Advocate that the case on hand cannot be ignored on the ground of non-furnishing of the statements during the course of enquiry considering the serious nature of the charges framed against the petitioner. 11. It is pointed out that the petitioner, being a Motor Vehicles Inspector has to issue licenses to persons, who are fit to drive the vehicles and also the vehicles and in such circumstances, the petitioner engaging a person, viz., Palani to collect money from the person, who need a licence, and on the recommendation of the said Palani, the issuance of licence is not only a grave offence but also the consequences are unthinkable. 12. Moreover, at the time of surprise raid conducted by the vigilance Officials, the said Palani was caught red handed and some incriminating piece of evidence and money which he collected from the applicants, were also recovered by the Vigilance Officials. This fact has been categorically stated by the first witness M.P. Natarajan and the same has been corroborated by the said Palani. In such circumstances, considering the evidence and the preponderance of the probabilities, the Disciplinary-Authorities passed suitable orders dismissing petitioner from service. 13. In such circumstances, considering the preponderance of probabilities found in the decision arrived at by the Enquiry Officer as wells the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the Tribunal did not find any valid reason to interfere with the decision of the authorities dismissing the petitioner from service. 14. Further, the reasons stated by the petitioner for arriving at a decision in favour of the petitioner before the Tribunal were not considered) for the reason that a prima facie case of receiving money illegally by the petitioner through the said Palani is made out. In such circumstances, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Disciplinary Authority. 15. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner strongly relied on the decisions reported' in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Sharif (Dead) through Legal Representatives, A.I.R 1982 S.C. 937 and State of Punjab v. Bhagat Ram, AJR 1974 S.C 2335 for non-furnishing of necessary particulars during the course of enquiry conducted by the authorities, thereby the entire proceedings are vitiated; 16. The principles laid down in the above decisions are as follows: "7.
Sharif (Dead) through Legal Representatives, A.I.R 1982 S.C. 937 and State of Punjab v. Bhagat Ram, AJR 1974 S.C 2335 for non-furnishing of necessary particulars during the course of enquiry conducted by the authorities, thereby the entire proceedings are vitiated; 16. The principles laid down in the above decisions are as follows: "7. The meaning of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken is that the Government, servant is afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against charges on; which inquiry is held. The Government servant should be given an opportunity to deny,, his guilt and establish his innocence. He can do so when he is told what the charges against him are. He can do so by cross examining the witnesses produced against him. The object of supplying statements is that the Government servant will be able to refer to the previous statement of the witnesses proposed to be examined against the Government servant. Unless the statements are given to the Government servant he will not be able to have an effective and useful cross-examination." 17. On a perusal of the materials available on record, we do not find anything that the petitioner asked for any material or particulars re lied on by the Disciplinary Authority and it is also not a case of the petitioner that such non supplying of materials or particulars deprived him of an opportunity from defending his case. In such circumstances, we am of the view that unless and until the petitioner is proved that due tog non-supplying of documents or materials or particulars required by him or relied on by the authorities, the opportunity of defending his case is deprived of, the above contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 18.
In such circumstances, we am of the view that unless and until the petitioner is proved that due tog non-supplying of documents or materials or particulars required by him or relied on by the authorities, the opportunity of defending his case is deprived of, the above contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 18. Further, the learned counsel would contend that no evidence is available for coming to the conclusion that the charges framed against the petitioner is proved and more or less, all the independent witnesses are not sup porting the case of the authorities and in such circumstances, what was held by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu, represented by its Secretary to Government, Home (Police) Department and others v. S. Mahalingam, CDJ 2005 M.H.C. 826 following the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police and Others, (1998) 9 Supreme 452 , is squarely applicable to the case of the petitioner and that the writ petition may be allowed. 19. The Supreme Court says in Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police and others, (1998) 9 Supreme 452 that, "it is no doubt true that the High Court under Art.226 or this Court under Art.32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the Disciplinary Authority or the Enquiry Officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the Appellate Authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictate of the superior authority. The findings, recorded in a domestic enquiry, can be characterized as perverse if it is shown that such a finding is not supported by any evidence on record or is not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of that evidence.
The findings, recorded in a domestic enquiry, can be characterized as perverse if it is shown that such a finding is not supported by any evidence on record or is not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of that evidence. Normally, the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with". 20. The principles laid down in the above decisions are not applicable to the case on hand for the reason that there. is clear and categorical evidence against the petitioner. However, in the case referred above, which was dealt with by us, there is no independent witness and that too one official witness did not support the case of the authorities and in such circumstances, we followed the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and accordingly, we allowed the, writ petition. Here, the facts and face of the case are different. 21. As far as the case on hand is concerned, the first witness M.P. Natarajan, who was the head of the unit, in which the, petitioner was working as Motor Vehicles Inspector. At the time of surprise raid conducted by the Vigilance Officials, the said Natarajan accompanied with the Vigilance Officials. The person, by name Palani, who acted as a tout on behalf of the petitioner, was in the office at the relevant point of time. On seeing the Vigilance Officials the said Palani threw a piece of paper under the bureau, which was noticed by the vigilance officials and thereafter, he handed over the same to the Inspector of Police.
The person, by name Palani, who acted as a tout on behalf of the petitioner, was in the office at the relevant point of time. On seeing the Vigilance Officials the said Palani threw a piece of paper under the bureau, which was noticed by the vigilance officials and thereafter, he handed over the same to the Inspector of Police. Further, for keeping the amount a sum of Rs.380, the said Palani has categorically narrated the entire facts relating to the collection of the amount from the applicants illegally. These facts have been categorically admitted by the said Palani himself during the enquiry proceedings. Whatever stated by the said M.P.Natarajan, the Motor Vehicles Inspector Grade I, with regard to the involvement of the petitioner in collecting the illegal amount through the said Palani, was categorically corroborated by other witnesses, including the said Palani, who acted as a tout. 22. Further, the Tribunal also in its order stated "Even admitting that the evidence of the Palani cannot be relied upon, the evidence of two witnesses viz., M.P. Natarajan the Vigilance Inspector K. Bhakthavatchalam before whom the said Palani has given statement has corroborated the same. statements given before them by the said Palani cannot be eschewed from consideration, on account of the fact that he has denied the same statement in the cross-examination, after reiterating it in the chief examination." 23. In such circumstances, the ratio laid by the Supreme Court as well as by us in the decision referred to above, would not be applicable the case on hand for the reason that the findings of the Enquiry Officer as well as the Order of the first respondent are -not perverse. 24. The following delineation of the Supreme Court with regard to the word '-'perverse" makes us to confirm the finding of the Enquiry Officer as well as the order of the first respondent. "A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with". 25.
But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with". 25. Further, we do not find any inconsistencies or infirmities in rejecting the case of the petitioner. Therefore, we have no hesitation in affirming the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the order of the first respondent and the order of the Tribunal in so far as proving of the charge. However, we are disinclined to agree with the extreme punishment imposed by the first respondent, dismissing the petitioner from service and the confirmation of the same by the Tribunal as the extreme punishment imposed on the petitioner is disproportionate when comparing the gravity of the charge. 26. No doubt, the shameful act committed by the petitioner is so serious in nature. However, the extreme punishment e of dismissal from ser vice imposed on the petitioner, in our view, is disproportionate for the reason that the main object and thrust behind awarding of a punishment to an offender is only to mend him and not to strangulate. Otherwise, the very purpose of awarding punishment would not be served. 27. Further, when most of the unemployed educated youth are searching for any kind of work for their livelihood even for a meager salary irrespective of their educational qualifications, the attitude of the petitioner, who is in Government Service, abusing of his official position by engaging a tout to grab money illegally and in a shameful way from all walks of people, is really the worst disturbing feature. 28. Moreover, when the petitioner is vested with the power of issuing licenses to the persons and the vehicles as well, it cannot be expected of him that he would give licence to the persons who are eligible in all aspects or the vehicles fit for running on the road, when he has decided to mint money by engaging a tout. This is not a good omen to the civilized and democratic Society, when especially, the nature of work of the petitioner directly plays a vital role with the lives of the people moving on the road. 29.
This is not a good omen to the civilized and democratic Society, when especially, the nature of work of the petitioner directly plays a vital role with the lives of the people moving on the road. 29. Considering the above aspects, though we are disinclined to impose extreme punishment of dismissal from service, we are of the view that the imposition of stringent punishment on the petitioner would meet the ends of justice. 30. Accordingly, the first and the second respondents are directed not to give any effect to and, pay Annual Increments, Dearness allowance, Bonus, if any, and any other monetary benefits alike, due after the date of this order with cumulative effect and also any service benefits like considering his name for promotion etc., for five years from the date of this order. In other words, the petitioner has to go home with his monthly salary alone i.e., what is drawing as on date for five years from the date of this order. The orders of the first respondent as well as the Tribunal with regard to punishment are set aside. 31. The imposition of such kind of punishment, in our view, would make realise not only the petitioner but also the persons one and all in Government Services, which are generally thought of as vulnerable to corruption. 32. With the above direction, the writ petition is partly allowed. No costs.