BILAL NAZKI, J. ( 1 ) APPELLANT/accused was charged with offences under Sections 302, 495 and 498-A IPC. He has been acquitted of the offences under Sections 495 and 498-A IPC. However, he has been convicted of the offence under Section 302 ipc and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. He has also been fined rs. 500/- in default he has to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months. ( 2 ) THE allegations against the accused were that on 11. 9. 1997 at about 8. 00 a. m. at his house at Loyapalli Village he poured kerosene over his wife-E. Mallamma and set fire to her. She died on 14. 9. 1997 at 0055 hours in Osmania General Hospital, hyderabad. On the basis of these allegations, a charge was framed. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Prosecution examined 17 witnesses and exhibited 18 documents. ( 3 ) PWS. 1 to 9 and 11 did not support the prosecution case and were declared hostile. PWs. 10 and 13 are the doctors who conducted post-mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased. P. W. 12 is the inquest panch witness. P. W. 14 was the Sub-Inspector of Police who did investigation. P. W. 15 was the Magistrate who recorded dying declaration of the deceased. PWs. 16 and 17 are also investigating Officers. ( 4 ) THE case mainly revolves around the dying declaration of the deceased. There are two dying declarations, one being ex. P14 recorded by P. W. 14 and another being Ex. P18 recorded by P. W. 15. The first in point of time is the statement of the deceased-Ex. P14 recorded by P. W. 14, which reads as under :"my name is Eramolla Mallamma W/o eramolla Srinu, aged 22 years, caste: gowda, r/o Loyapalli Manchal Mandalam. My native village is Loyapalli. I am the daughter of Gouralla Mallayya. Our caste is Kurma. Since about three years 1 had connection with Eramolla Srinu of our village. Last year after Dasara Festival, my marriage was performed with Eramolla Srinu in the Mallesam Temple. After marriage, srinu left me and went away. He returned three months back and living in the house of Nelapatla Parvathamma. Three months back he married another lady (I do not know her name ). Since then he was asking me to go away and beating me. This morning at about 8. After marriage, srinu left me and went away. He returned three months back and living in the house of Nelapatla Parvathamma. Three months back he married another lady (I do not know her name ). Since then he was asking me to go away and beating me. This morning at about 8. 00 a. m. while I was lying in the house, he poured kerosene on me and lit fire and ran away. Immediately I ran to my parents -in-1aws house, trying to put out flames. Then my brother-in-law Yadaiah, my co-daughter-in-law Ramanujamma and katike Ramachandraiah joined me in osmania Hospital. What I have stated is written and read over to me and it is true and correct. I affixed my right thumb mark. " ( 5 ) THE second dying declaration is ex. P18 which was recorded by P. W. 15. The relevant portion of this dying declaration" reads as under:"1. How burn injuries are there on your body? my husband poured kerosene on my body. 2. What happened next? he lighted the match stick and threw upon me when I was laying down. 3. What next? i ran to my parents in-laws house. We married each other out of love for each other. My brother-in-law brought me here in a zeep. 4. Is there anything more to say? 5. No. " ( 6 ) THE first dying declaration was recorded on 11. 9. 1997 at 2000 hours and the second dying declaration was also recorded on the same day at 9. 52 p. m. In the light of these dying declarations, we consider the statements of PWs. 14 and 15. ( 7 ) P. W. 14 stated that he was Sub- inspector of Police. He received a message through VHF set at 1500 hours on 11. 9. 1997. He noted the message in General diary and proceeded to Osmania General hospital where he found the deceased earmalla Mallamma in burns ward. He recorded her statement and obtained her thumb mark on it. He exhibited the statement of the deceased as Ex. P1 4. He stated that he read over the contents of ex. P14 to the deceased who accepted them to be correct. He gave a requisition to the special Judicial Magistrate of First Class, excise-Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad for recording dying declaration of the deceased. The requisition is Ex. PI5. He exhibited the statement of the deceased as Ex. P1 4. He stated that he read over the contents of ex. P14 to the deceased who accepted them to be correct. He gave a requisition to the special Judicial Magistrate of First Class, excise-Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad for recording dying declaration of the deceased. The requisition is Ex. PI5. He returned to the police station and registered the case on the basis of Ex. P14. In his cross-examination he stated that he did not mention in Ex. P14 that he had enquired from the doctor about the condition of the patient. He had also not obtained the signature of doctor on Ex. P14. Soon after recording Ex. P14, he issued the requisition to the Magistrate for recording dying declaration of the deceased. He had not mentioned in Ex. P15 that he had already recorded a statement of the deceased. He denied the suggestion that he had not obtained the thumb impression of the deceased on Ex. P14. He had also denied the suggestion that the right thumb of the deceased had burnt and she could not put her right thumb impression Ex. P14 and the thumb impression on Ex. P14 was not of the deceased. ( 8 ) P. W. 15 is the Magistrate who stated that on 11. 9. 1997 at 9. 15 p. m. he received a requisition from Sub-Inspector of Police, manchala Police Station for recording dying declaration of one Mallamlla who was admitted in Osmania General Hospital with burn injuries. He also exhibited the requisition as Ex. P15. He proceeded to the burns ward in Osmania General Hospital. He ascertained from the doctor as to whether the patient was in a fit condition to make a statement. After such certification he put preliminary questions to the patient to ascertain her condition and after satisfying himself, he recorded her statement. He exhibited her statement as Ex. P18. He also stated in examination-in-chief that he obtained the right leg toe impression on the statement since her both hands had burnt and she was not in a position to put her thumb mark on the statement. ( 9 ) TIME mentioned in Ex. P18 is 9. 52 p. m. After completion of the statement of the deceased the Magistrate put the time as 10. 05 p. m. which shows that he started recording the dying declaration at 9. ( 9 ) TIME mentioned in Ex. P18 is 9. 52 p. m. After completion of the statement of the deceased the Magistrate put the time as 10. 05 p. m. which shows that he started recording the dying declaration at 9. 52 p. m. and completed it at 10. 05 p. m. Certain discrepancies in the dying declarations are pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant/accused. He submits that in the beginning of the first dying declaration where the name and other descriptions of the deceased are given, the deceased is shown to be Gowd, whereas in the body of statement, she stated her caste was Kurma, secondly she gave the reason for the occurrence as her husband had married another woman and he wanted her to go away and no such reason was given in the second dying declaration and thirdly he contends that whereas P. W. 14 was emphatic in his statement that he obtained the right hand thumb impression of the deceased on the statement, the Magistrate stated that both the hands and fingers of the deceased had burnt and it was not possible for him to obtain the thumb impression of the deceased lady, therefore he obtained the impression of her toe. The first two contentions raised are not, in our view, material, one relating to statement of the deceased about her caste and the other that she had not given reasons in the second dying declaration as to why the accused burnt her. But the third contention raised deserves a serious consideration because, according to the learned Counsel for the appellant/accused, this makes both the dying declarations doubtful. In the inquest report Ex. P13 the injuries are noted. With respect to the injuries on hands, it is stated:"both the hands were burnt from shoulder to wrist. Left hand palm was also burnt. " ( 10 ) THE doctor who conducted post-mortem examination observed in Ex. P12- post-mortem certificate:"the bums are present over head, face, neck, chest, abdomen, both upper limb right lower limb, back of left lower limb, front and back of left leg except lower part of front of left thigh, both feet and soles. Left hand palm was also burnt. " ( 10 ) THE doctor who conducted post-mortem examination observed in Ex. P12- post-mortem certificate:"the bums are present over head, face, neck, chest, abdomen, both upper limb right lower limb, back of left lower limb, front and back of left leg except lower part of front of left thigh, both feet and soles. " ( 11 ) NEITHER the panchayatdars who conducted inquest were able to locate any injury on the fingers of the deceased nor the doctor who conducted post-mortem examination found any injury on the fingers of the deceased, but the Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration of the deceased took the impression of the toe on the ground that her fingers had burnt. The learned Counsel for the appellant/accused submits that there is a reasonable doubt whether the fingers of the deceased had burnt or not, therefore both these dying declarations cannot be relied upon. He submits that it is doubtful whether the magistrate recorded the dying declaration of the person who is alleged to have died of burns in fact and whether the statement recorded by Sub-Inspector of Police was taken of the same person and whether the dead body of the same person was sent for post-mortem examination and whether the inquest was held of the same person s body. ( 12 ) ON the other hand, the learned public Prosecutor submits that even if the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate is eschewed, there is a dying declaration recorded by the police officer being Ex. P14 which is consistent with other evidence relating to the injuries suffered by the deceased. He submits that during the inquest and also in the post-mortem examination no injury was found on the fingers of the deceased, therefore if the police officer obtained the thumb impression of the deceased on the dying declaration, that should clinch the issue. The learned Counsel for the appellant asserts that the whole thing becomes doubtful and is shrouded in mystery. The Magistrate s testimony cannot be brushed aside, he was categorical in his statement that he took the impression of toe as the thumb of both hands had burnt, therefore there is reasonable doubt whether the Magistrate recorded the statement of the deceased or somebody else. The Magistrate s testimony cannot be brushed aside, he was categorical in his statement that he took the impression of toe as the thumb of both hands had burnt, therefore there is reasonable doubt whether the Magistrate recorded the statement of the deceased or somebody else. There is also a doubt whether the police recorded the statement of the deceased or not and there is also no certification of the doctor on ex. P14 that the deceased was in a fit condition to make a statement. He submits that since there is no corroboration, therefore it would not be safe in this case to rely on the dying declarations for convicting the accused. He submits that PWs. l to 9 and 11 have not supported the case of the prosecution, therefore it would be dangerous to convict the accused on the basis of doubtful dying declarations. The learned counsel relies on a judgment of the Supreme court reported Jai Karan v. State of Delhi (NCT), (1999) 8 SCC 161 . In this judgment the Supreme Court made reference to its earlier judgment reported in Paniben v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474 = 1992 SCC (Cri.) 403, in which it was observed:"though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. " ( 13 ) THE learned Public Prosecutor relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Munnu Raja v. State of M. P. , (1976) 3 scc 104 = 1976 SCC (Cri) 376, which laid down:"there is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. " ( 14 ) REFERENCE is also made to judgment of the Supreme Court reported in State of u. P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, (1985) 1 SCC 552 = 1985 SCC (Cri) 127, which laid down:"if the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary, it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. " ( 15 ) BUT the learned Counsel for the appellant submits that these judgments would apply in case dying declaration was believed to be true, and since there was a doubt with respect to the dying declarations, these judgments cannot be relied upon. ( 16 ) FOR the reasons we feel that there was a reasonable doubt about the culpability of the accused. However, the learned Public prosecutor relies on a judgment of the supreme Court reported in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai and others, 2004 Cri. L. J. 36, to suggest that there was no doubt about the culpability of the accused if the first dying declaration is taken into consideration. In para 24 the Supreme Court held:"doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an over emotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt it not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt: but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. A reasonable doubt it not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt: but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. " ( 17 ) IF we apply the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in this judgment, we come to the only one conclusion that both the dying declarations are doubtful. ( 18 ) FOR the reasons given hereinabove, we allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant/accused by the Trial Court and acquit him. The appellant/accused shall be released from custody forthwith, if not needed in any other case.