JUDGMENT R. Gogoi, J. 1. This order of ours will dispose of Civil Revision No. 7(K) of 1999, M.A.C. Appeal No. 21 (K) of 1999 and W.P. (C) No. 123(K) of 1999. 2. On 24.11.97, the Respondent-claimant, Ms. Alila Alias Nungsanglila Ao, was travelling in an auto rickshaw hearing Registration No. NLH-2814. A Maruti Car bearing Registration No, NL-01/2369 coming from the opposite direction and the auto rickshaw in which the Respondent-claimant was travelling, was involved in an accident, in the course of which the claimant sustained several injuries. Armed with the police report of the accident, the Medical Certificate issued by the doctor attending on the claimant and vouchers and cash memos evidencing incurring of expenses by the claimant in connection with her treatment along with the insurance policy of the Maruti vehicle involved in the accident, the Respondent-claimant approached the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nagaland at Dimapur for grant of compensation for mental and physical loss, loss of amenities as well as the earning capacity and the medical expenses incurred etc. On the basis of the claim petition filed, M.A.C. Case No. 13/1998 was registered before the learned Tribunal. 3. After receipt of summons issued by the learned Tribunal, the owner and the driver of the Maruti vehicle No. NL-01/2369 filed a joint written statement, wherein, though the claim made was contended to be excessive, the owner and the driver of the vehicle, in Para-5 of the written statement, had virtually admitted that the Maruti vehicle was driven at a high speed at the time when it collided with the auto rickshaw in which the Respondent-claimant was travelling. The owner and driver in the written statement filed, also stated that the vehicle in question was registered with the National Insurance Company i.e. the Opposite Party No. 3 and, therefore, the liability, if any, would be that of the insurer. It must be noticed that the aforesaid written statement was signed and filed by the owner of the vehicle personally on 10.8.98. In a like manner, on 8.9.98, the owner and driver of auto rickshaw bearing Registration No. NLH/ 2814, in which the Respondent-claimant was travelling, also filed a joint written statement to the effect that the accident took place on account of the rash and negligent driving of the Maruti vehicle bearing Registration No. NL-01/2369. 4. In a like manner, on 8.9.98, the owner and driver of auto rickshaw bearing Registration No. NLH/ 2814, in which the Respondent-claimant was travelling, also filed a joint written statement to the effect that the accident took place on account of the rash and negligent driving of the Maruti vehicle bearing Registration No. NL-01/2369. 4. After filing of the written statements was complete, the learned Tribunal fixed thecas for recording of evidence of the witnesses on 29.8.1998. However, no evidence was recorded on the date fixed and on the dates immediately thereafter. The owner and driver of the Maruti vehicle as well as the owner and driver of the auto rickshaw, after filing their written statements in the manner noticed above, did not appear in Court. Eventually, on 14.5.1999, the claimant examined herself as P.W. 1 and she was cross-examined on behalf of the Opposite Party No. 3 i.e. the Insurance Company, only. There was no cross-examination of R.W. 1 on behalf of the other opposite parties in the case i.e. the owners and drivers of the two vehicles in question. Thereafter, on 27.5.1999, the Insurance Company filed a petition under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') praying for leave to contest the proceeding on grounds other than those specifically allowed to an insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act. In the application filed under Section 170 of the Act, the insurance company had stated that as the owners and drivers of the two offending vehicles had not appeared in Court to contest the proceedings, leave may be afforded to the insurance company, to contest the claim on merits. No order on the application filed by the Insurance Company was passed by the learned Tribunal and on the next date fixed i.e. 29.5.99, P.W. 2 was examined in support of the claim and after the cross-examination of the said P.W. No. 2 by the Insurance Company only, the witness stood discharged. Thereafter, on 7.6.1999, the learned Tribunal rejected the petition filed by the insurance company under Section 170 of the Act on the ground that the owners and drivers of the two vehicles involved in the accident had contested the proceeding by filing written statements and, therefore, there could have not been any occasion for the learned Tribunal to grant leave to the Insurance Company to contest the claim on merits. The learned Tribunal by the order dated 7.6.99 reiterated that the defence witnesses will be examined on 30.6.99 as fixed earlier by order dated 29.5.1999. No defence evidence having been adduced, the learned Tribunal, thereafter, passed an award dated 26.7.1999 holding the claimant to be entitled for compensation under different heads to the extent of Rs.3,56,353/-. 5. Civil Revision No. 7(K) of 1999 has been filed by the Insurance Company against the order dated 7.6.99 passed by the learned Tribunal rejecting the petition of the Insurance Company under Section170 of the Act, whereas, M.A.C. Appeal No. 21(K) of 1999 and W.P. (C) No. 123(K) of 1999 have been filed against the award dated 26.7.99. 6. After noticing the facts leading to the passing of the award dated 26.7.99 and the specific challenge made in the different sets of cases instituted by the Insurance Company, this Court is of the view that civil Revision No. 7(K) of 1999 should receive consideration of the Court at the first instance as a decision in the said case is capable of providing an answer to the two other cases instituted i.e. M.A.C. Appeal No. 21(K) of 1999 and W.P. (C) No. 123(K) of 1999. 7. We have heard Shri B.N. Sarmah, learned Counsel appearing for the Insurer and Shri T.B. Jamir, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent-claimant. 8. Under Section 170 of the Act, power has been vested in a Claims Tribunal to allow an insurer to contest a claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to a person against whom the claim has been made in the event of either of the two contingencies, arising, as contemplated by Section170 of the Act. Firstly, in a situation where there is a collusion between the party making a claim and the person against whom the claim is made and alternatively, in a situation, where the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, leave maybe granted to the Insurer to contest the claim on merits. In either of the aforesaid situations the rights of the insurer to contest the claim, which is otherwise restricted by the provisions of Section 149(2) of the Act, could, for reasons to be recorded by the learned Tribunal, be enlarged to extent of any ground that may be available to a person against whom the claim has been made. In either of the aforesaid situations the rights of the insurer to contest the claim, which is otherwise restricted by the provisions of Section 149(2) of the Act, could, for reasons to be recorded by the learned Tribunal, be enlarged to extent of any ground that may be available to a person against whom the claim has been made. The provisions contained in Section 149(2) of the Act limiting the right of an insurer to contest a claim made is based on public policy and the permissible departures, for which Section 170 of the Act has been enacted, is guided by the necessity by ensuring that in situations contemplated by Section 170 of the Act, the insurer should be allowed to contest a claim on merits. A clear legislative recognition that Insurance Companies deal with public money and, therefore, should be permitted to contest a claim on merits in certain situations, as contemplated by Section 170 of the Act, is clearly discernible. The Tribunal in whom power has been vested by Section 170 of the Act, therefore, has a sacrosanct duty to exercise the power conferred after a full scrutiny to satisfy itself as regards to the existence of the contentions precedent contemplated by Section 170 of the Act. 9. In the present case, the owners and drivers of the two offending vehicles had filed their written statements, in person, on 8.8.1998 and 10.8.1998. While in the written statement filed by the owner of the auto rickshaw, the stand taken is that the accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the Maruti vehicle, in the written statement filed by the owner of the Maruti Vehicle there is a clear admission of the fact that the vehicle was driven at a high speed at the time when the accident had occurred. The owner, thereafter, had tried to shift his liability to the insurance company by stating that the vehicle was insured with the opposite party No. 3 i.e. the National Insurance Company. After the written statements, as aforesaid, were filed, no steps were taken by the owners of the two vehicles for their representation before the Tribunal and after P.W. 1 was examined on 14.5.99, there was no cross-examination of the aforesaid witness on behalf of the owners of the two vehicles. After the written statements, as aforesaid, were filed, no steps were taken by the owners of the two vehicles for their representation before the Tribunal and after P.W. 1 was examined on 14.5.99, there was no cross-examination of the aforesaid witness on behalf of the owners of the two vehicles. In such a situation, the insurer had filed a petition under Section 170 of the Act contending that as the owners of the two vehicles had not appeared to contest the proceeding, the insurer should be granted leave to contest the claim on merits. The Tribunal, however, proceeded with the examination of P.W. No. 2 on 29.5.1999 without passing any order on the petition filed by the insurer under Section 170 of the Act. On the said date, P.W. No. 2 was cross examined on behalf of the insurer and there was no cross examination of the said witness by the owners of the two vehicles. Thereafter, by order dated 7.6.1999, the application filed by the insurance company was dismissed on the ground that as the owners had already filed their written statements and, therefore, had contested the proceedings, permission to contest the proceeding on merits cannot be granted to the Insurer. 10. The failure to contest a claim, which is one of the grounds on which the Tribunal has been empowered to grant leave to the Insurer to contest the claim on merits, does not necessarily mean a failure to file a written statement only. A written statement may be filed, where after, no attempt may be made by the party filing the written statement to participate any further in the proceeding. In the present case, after the written statements were filed in the month of August, 1998, the owners of the two vehicles had done nothing to contest to claim of the Respondent-claimant by actually participating in the proceeding before the Tribunal. The tenor of the stand taken in the written statement filed by the owner of the Maruti vehicle has already been noticed. In such a situation, it is our considered view that the Tribunal ought to have come to the conclusion that there is some material on record to suggest a possible collusion between the claimant and the owner of the Maruti vehicle and further, that the owner of the aforesaid Maruti vehicle, after filing his written statement, had failed to contest the claim. The vehement argument advanced on behalf of the Respondent-claimant that the learned Tribunal having fixed 30.6.1999 for examination of the defence witnesses, the assertion of the Insurance Company that the owners of the vehicles had failed to contest the claim, was premature, cannot have our approval and acceptance inasmuch as the aforesaid contention advanced has to be necessarily viewed in the context of the stand taken by the owner of the Maruti vehicle in the written statement filed. Further, the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the Respondent-claimant that in a situation where the owner of an off ending vehicles admits negligence, it would amount to a failure to contest the claim for which leave under Section170 of the Act must necessarily be afforded to the Insurer, in our considered view, is a hypothetical argument with which the Court would not be concerned. It is in the facts of the present case, as unfolded by us, that we are required to decide as to whether the rejection of the petition under Section 170 of the Act was correctly made by the learned Tribunal and we do not intend to lay down any such law of general application, which the learned Counsel for the Respondent-claimant has contended, may arise from the conclusion reached by us. 11. On the basis of the discussions that have preceded, we, therefore, consider it proper to take the view that the rejection of the petition filed by the Insurer under Section 170 of the Act by order dated 7.6.1999 cannot have our approval. As the order dated 7.6.99 reveals a clear jurisdictional error on the part of the learned Tribunal below, we deem it appropriate to exercise our powers under Article227 of the Constitution to interfere with the order dated 7.6.99 and that for that purpose, the civil revision proceeding is treated as an application under Article 227 of the Constitution. On the view that we have taken little persuasion will be now required to take the further view that the award dated 26.7.99 passed by the learned Tribunal cannot be sustained in law. We, therefore, set aside the aforesaid award dated 26.7.99 by answering M.A.C. Appeal No. 21(K) of 1999 and W.P. (C) No. 123 (K) of 1999 accordingly. On the view that we have taken little persuasion will be now required to take the further view that the award dated 26.7.99 passed by the learned Tribunal cannot be sustained in law. We, therefore, set aside the aforesaid award dated 26.7.99 by answering M.A.C. Appeal No. 21(K) of 1999 and W.P. (C) No. 123 (K) of 1999 accordingly. The inevitable consequence of the interference made by us would be that the Tribunal will now be required to re-adjudicate the claim of the Petitioner by permitting the Insurer to contest the claim on merits. 12. All the above cases i.e. Civil Revision No. 7(K) of 1999, M.A.C. Appeal No. 21(K) of 1999 and W.P. (C) No. 123(K) of 1999 shall stand allowed to the extent indicated above. As the accident, out of which this claim had arisen, occurred in the year 1997, we further deem it appropriate to require the learned Tribunal to complete its adjudication within an outer limit of 6(six) months from the date of receipt of the records from the Registry of this Court, which records shall be transmitted forthwith.