Judgment :- (Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 23.4.2004 passed in Writ Petition No.11668 of 1996.) F.M.Ibrahim Kalifulla,J This writ appeal arises under the Land Acquisition Act. 2. The challenge in the writ petition was to the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act dated 9.8.1978 and Section 6 declaration dated 23.12.1981. 3. The writ petition came to be dismissed solely on the ground of delay and laches because after the 4(1) notification and 6 declaration, the award came to be made in Award No.7 of 1986. Pursuant to the said award, possession was also taken over by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board as early as on 30.10.1986. Thereafter, it is stated that the Tamil Nadu Housing Board handed over the lands to Chennai Metro Water Supply and Sewerage Board on 17.5.1994. The appellants, who slept over the matter, suddenly woke up in the year 1996 and came forward with the abovesaid writ petition contending that though the name of the writ petitioner Tmt. Rajeswari was specifically mentioned in Section 6 declaration, the appellants were not issued with necessary notice by the acquisition officer prior to the passing of the award. In fact, when the writ petition was taken up for hearing, we find that the learned Judge seemed to have called upon the writ petitioners/appellants to produce the necessary records to show that after the purchase of the land mutation was carried out in the Revenue Records and that the appellants were in possession of any such document in support of the said claim. Unfortunately, in spite of three opportunities extended to the appellants, the appellants were not able to substantiate with necessary records to show that the name of the appellants were incorporated in the Revenue Records in order to find fault with the acquisition authorities for not having issued necessary notice to the appellants. The learned Judge, therefore, held that at the highly belated point of time i.e. nearly after 15 years, it would be wholly unjustifiable to interfere with the acquisition proceedings when much water had flown after the passing of the award in the year 1986. The learned Judge, therefore, held that at the highly belated point of time i.e. nearly after 15 years, it would be wholly unjustifiable to interfere with the acquisition proceedings when much water had flown after the passing of the award in the year 1986. The learned Judge, relying upon the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu vs. L.Krishnan ( 1996 (1) SCC 250 ) holding that after a period of five years any challenge to the acquisition proceedings would be hit by laches, ultimately, dismissed the writ petition. 4. Even before us, Mr. Vijayaraghavan, learned counsel for the appellants was only attempting to place the very same contentions which were raised before the learned Judge. Inasmuch as the appellants failed to be diligent in challenging the acquisition proceedings, we also fully concur with the conclusions of the learned Judge in holding that at this belated pointed of time, the challenge to the notification under Section 4(1) as well as Section 6 declaration cannot be entertained. Though the learned counsel relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Lakshmanan vs. The Government of Tamil Nadu represented by its Secretary to the Government, Adi Dravidar and Tribunal Welfare Department, Chennai-9 ( 2000 (I) CTC 382 ) wherein a Full Bench decision of this Court in P.C.Thanikavelu vs. Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, Madras ( A.I.R. 1989 Mad. 222) has been extracted in support of his contention that when once the acquisition authorities were aware of the ownership of the subsequent owners due notices should have been sent to such subsequent owners, we are not in a position to apply the ratio of the said decision inasmuch as we find that even in the Full Bench decision while the notifications were of the year 1989, the challenge came to be made immediately thereafter. Similarly, in the Division Bench judgment which followed the Full Bench judgment also, challenge was made immediately after the passing of the relevant notifications. Therefore, the ratio of the Full Bench decision referred to in the above referred to Division Bench judgment would be of no avail to the appellants. Similarly, in the Division Bench judgment which followed the Full Bench judgment also, challenge was made immediately after the passing of the relevant notifications. Therefore, the ratio of the Full Bench decision referred to in the above referred to Division Bench judgment would be of no avail to the appellants. On the other hand, we are supported by a recent decision of a Division Bench of this Court in S.Harshavardhan vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2005 (3) CTC 691) wherein the Division Bench has relied upon the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court to the effect that once the award is passed, no writ petition should be entertained challenging the acquisition proceedings. One such judgment of the Supreme Court is Municipal Council, Ahmednagar vs. Shah Hyder Beig ( AIR 2000 SC 671 ) which has been referred to in the present Division Bench judgment. Paragraph 3 of the Division Bench judgment would be relevant for our purpose which reads as under: " It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court in Tej Kaur v. State of Punjab, 2003 (4) SCC 485 , that writ petition challenging the land acquisition proceedings should not be entertained after the award has been passed. In that case, the award was passed on 15.3.1994 whereas the writ petition was filed on 12.4.1994 i.e. after the award was given. Hence the writ petition was dismissed as belated. Similarly in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar vs. Shah Hyder Beig, AIR 2000 671, the Supreme Court observed vide paragraph 17: "In any event, after the award is passed, no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceedings thereunder." The Supreme Court also observed in that decision that this has been the consistent view of the Court e.g., in C.Padma and others vs. Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu and others, 1997 (2) SCC 627 ; Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. The Industrial Development Investment Co. Ltd., AIR 1997 SC 482 , etc. Hence, without going into the merits of the case, we are of the opinion that the writ petition was rightly dismissed on the ground of laches. The writ appeals are, therefore, dismissed." 5. Ltd., AIR 1997 SC 482 , etc. Hence, without going into the merits of the case, we are of the opinion that the writ petition was rightly dismissed on the ground of laches. The writ appeals are, therefore, dismissed." 5. Having regard to the said settled legal position, the present challenge made by the appellants to the age old notifications of the year 1978 and 1981 cannot be permitted to be interfered with at this belated point of time. We find no infirmity in the order of the learned Judge. The writ appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.