JUDGMENT K.C. Sood, J.—This is one of those cases which exhibits how process of law/Court can be used, misused, abused and hijacked to obtain undue personal gain at the cost of public at large. It shows how a litigant can indulge "forum hunting" to perpetuate illegitimate gains by practising fraud on the Courts. 2. The story starts in the year 1990 when the respondent No. 4 Shakuntla Devi having encroached on Government land, moved an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Bilaspur (respondent No. 2) for regularization of the land comprised in Khasra Numbers 137/123/1 (new Khasra Numbers 184/137/123) measuring 0-9 bighas situate in village Bagh Theru in the District of Bilaspur, encroached by her. This land undoubtedly is a public path. She claimed in her application that she was in possession of this land prior to 1980 as the possession of the applicant was old, therefore, it should be regularized. Notwithstanding the objections of the Forest Department that the land was a "forest land" and the encroachment over this land could not be regularized in view of the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, the Deputy Commissioner, in utter disregard to the Encroachment Policy, regularized the encroachment saying that the land encroached by the applicant falls under the purview of the Encroachment Policy framed by the State Government. The Deputy Commissioner conveniently, for reasons other than merits, shut his eyes to the fact that the land in question being a public path "Gair Mumkin Sarak" could not be regularized even under the Encroachment Policy. 3. Mahila Mandal Bagh Theru, having come to know about the regularization of the encroached public path, moved Divisional Commissioner Mandi in appeal. The Divisional Commissioner set aside the orders of the Deputy Commissioner observing that the encroachment of the land in question being "Share-am-gair Mumkin Sarak" could not be regularized. Dissatisfied, Shakuntala Devi respondent No. 4 carried an appeal/revision before the Financial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh which too was decided on October 16, 1993. The Financial Commissioner observed that under the Encroachment Policy, the land in question could not have been regularized. He reproduced the relevant para regarding regularization of the encroached land: "4(iv). Dissatisfied, Shakuntala Devi respondent No. 4 carried an appeal/revision before the Financial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh which too was decided on October 16, 1993. The Financial Commissioner observed that under the Encroachment Policy, the land in question could not have been regularized. He reproduced the relevant para regarding regularization of the encroached land: "4(iv). Encroachment on land of common village use including properties belonging to temples, mosques, gurdwaras, land used for common village purposes such as Mela grounds, cattle-shelter ground, ground where religious and other ceremonies are normally held, recorded and recognized paths both for human beings and cattle and land under burning ghats, cemeteries, graveyards, village ponds/tanks and water harvesting facilities/check dams". (Emphasis given) 4. The Financial Commissioner also noticed that the grant was objected to by the Forest Department, in view of the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act and for that reason too, it was not open to the Deputy Commissioner to have regularized the encroachment of the land in question. He observed: "It is not understood as to on what basis the Deputy Commissioner has ignored the objection of the Forest Department. Moreover his observation that the land is charand dehati is also not borne out from the court record. The present respondents/objectors were not given an opportunity of being heard". 5. Un-deterred, the respondent No. 4, filed a writ petition in this Court on January 2, 1994 (civil writ petition No. 66 of 1994). She made Mahila Mandal Bagh Them as respondent No. 5 in addition to the Government of Himachal Pradesh and other authorities as respondents. She set up a case that regularization of the encroachment of 9 biswas of land by the Deputy Commissioner was legal as the grant of this land was made to her on payment of "Nazrana" which she deposited. She maintained that the orders made by the Deputy Commissioner making grant of the encroached land was final and not subject to any appeal or revision. 6. Respondent No. 4 obtained ex-parte interim orders on January 18, 1994 by which the operation and implementation of the orders passed by the Divisional Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner setting aside the grant made to her by the Deputy Commissioner of the encroached land in question was stayed. The order dated 18.1.1994 reads: "18.1.1994: Present: Shri Tarlok Chauhan Advocate for the petitioner. Shri M.S. Guleria, Deputy Advocate General, for respondents No. 1 to 4. The order dated 18.1.1994 reads: "18.1.1994: Present: Shri Tarlok Chauhan Advocate for the petitioner. Shri M.S. Guleria, Deputy Advocate General, for respondents No. 1 to 4. List the petition for admission before an appropriate Bench on March 15, 1994. Objection raised by the Registry is not sustainable. CMP No. 168 of 1994. Allowed. CMP No.l67_of 1993. Notice to the respondents returnable within four weeks. Notice need not be issued to respondents No. 1 to 4 since the learned Deputy Advocate General, waives service of notice on their behalf. Reply, if any, be filed within four weeks. Meanwhile, operation and implementation of orders contained in Annexures PH and PJ passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Mandi Division dated December 20, 1991 and confirmed by the Financial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh on October 26, 1993, are stayed, till further orders. It is further directed that the petitioner shall not be evicted from the disputed land". This order was confirmed on 11.8.1994. 7. In the year 1995, having armoured herself with the stay order, the respondent No. 4 started raising construction on the land in question without taking any permission from this Court even though the writ petition was pending and she was served with the notice dated May 12, 1995 by the Assistant Engineer, Ghumarwin Sub Division of the Public Works Department that she was raising illegal and unauthorized construction on the public path and should stop the construction to avoid legal action (Annexure-PH). A complaint was also made by the residents of the village and the President, Mahila Mandal to the District Magistrate, Bilaspur (Annexure-PJ) that Shakuntla Devi was raising construction over the land which is a public path and she should be stopped immediately by the District Administration and if this was not done, the residents would suffer most as there is no alternate path to the general public and villagers to go to their respective lands and adjoining areas. 8. When this writ petition came up for final hearing on May 20, 2002, the Petitioner, knowing the impending fate of the petition, withdrew the petition which was dismissed as withdrawn on that date. This was done to avoid adverse orders from this Court. 9. We may take notice that on September 16, 1997, this Court in Civil Writ petition "Ra; Kumar Singla v. State of Himachal Pradesh" struck down the encroachment policy. This was done to avoid adverse orders from this Court. 9. We may take notice that on September 16, 1997, this Court in Civil Writ petition "Ra; Kumar Singla v. State of Himachal Pradesh" struck down the encroachment policy. It was only after realization that the respondent No. 4 would no longer be able to hoodwink or mislead this Court any further that she withdrew the writ petition. 10. Respondent No. 4 determined, as she was, to perpetuate her illegitimate advantage and encroachment on the public path, after having withdrawn the writ petition, laid a suit before the Senior Sub Judge, Bilaspur on August 21, 2002 under Sections 34, 36 and 37 of the Specific Relief Act for declaration that she was owner in possession of the land in question and the mutation attested on July 17,2002 in favour of the State of Himachal Pradesh was wrong, illegal and against the factual position and not binding on the rights of Shakuntala Devi and in the alternative, she had become owner by adverse possession. 11. Shakuntala Devi, respondent No. 4, fraudulently concealed material facts by not disclosing that the grant made to her of the land in question was set aside by the Divisional Commissioner and the cancellation of the grant was affirmed by the Financial Commissioner. She also concealed that she had filed a writ petition before this Court regarding the same land which petition was withdrawn by her without taking leave to file suit or any other proceedings. 12. Respondent No.4 did not implead either Mahila Mandal or the residents of the area or other members of this Mandal whom she had made party in the writ petition before this Court as noticed earlier. By concealing all these material facts, she was successful in obtaining ex-parte interim orders from the Court of Ld. Sub Judge 1st Class, Ghumarwin on January 8, 2003 directing the parties to maintain status quo in respect of possession and nature of the land in question. The Sub Judge in his order dated January 8,2003 recorded that there was a note in the remarks column of the Jamabandi that the land has been transferred in favour of the defendants, i.e., State of Himachal Pradesh but the land in question still is recorded in the ownership and possession of respondent No. 4. The Sub Judge in his order dated January 8,2003 recorded that there was a note in the remarks column of the Jamabandi that the land has been transferred in favour of the defendants, i.e., State of Himachal Pradesh but the land in question still is recorded in the ownership and possession of respondent No. 4. The ad-interim relief was given on the submission of the counsel for the plaintiff that this land was allotted as Nautor to the respondent No. 4 but subsequently it was wrongly cancelled. The order reads : "8.1.2003: Present: Shri PD. Gautam, Advocate for plaintiff. Shri K.S. Verma, Id. ADA, for defendants. File taken up today at the instance of the application moved by the applicant for early hearing. Learned counsel for the applicant prayed for the ad-interim injunction. I have heard both the parties and gone through the record carefully. From the perusal of record it is clear that in the copy of jamabandi on record suit land is recorded in the ownership and possession of the applicant, but at the same time there is note in the remarks column that suit land has been transferred in favour of the defendants i.e. State of H.P As per learned counsel for plaintiff suit land was allotted as Nautor to applicant but subsequently it was wrongly cancelled. Therefore taking into consideration all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case at this stage better course is to maintain status quo. Therefore parties are directed to maintain status quo qua possession and nature of the suit land comprising khasra No. 184/137/ 123 khata/khatoni No. 21 min/23 min measuring 0-9 bigha situated in village Bagh-Theru, Pargana Tiun, Tehsil Ghumarwin, Distt. Bilaspur, H.P. till further orders. For consideration put up on 11.3.2003". 13. This order was confirmed on August 6,2003 by the then Sub Judge. Again learned Sub Judge, to confirm orders relied on the grant made by the Deputy Commissioner, Bilaspur on March 26, 1990 unmindful of the fact that this grant was cancelled by the Divisional Commissioner and cancellation was confirmed by the Financial Commissioner. The question raised by the State that there was a public path on the suit land was rejected on the ground that this allegation is required to be substantiated on merits. The operative para of the order reads : "......I have heard Id. The question raised by the State that there was a public path on the suit land was rejected on the ground that this allegation is required to be substantiated on merits. The operative para of the order reads : "......I have heard Id. counsel and have perused the entire case file with minute care. The applicant has invited the attention to the copy of order dated 26-3-90 passed by Deputy Commissioner Bilaspur, whereby the suit land was sanctioned to the applicant. Consequently, the land revenue entry in respect of the suit land has appeared in the name of the applicant. The perusal of jamabandi shows that the land is shown as Bagicha Barani, hence the contention of the respondents that there is a public thorough fare in the suit land is required to be substantiated on merits. The applicant has constructed three shops in the suit land and photographs bear testimony to the same. It has averred by the applicant that her possession dates back to more than 40 years. Once she has made improvement in the suit land, the respondents certainly cant take shelter behind the plea that the applicant is responsible for such acts. The existence of public thorough fare is required to be substantiated on-merits and in case she is ejected without affording her an opportunity to substantiate her case on merits, she is bound to suffer irreparable loss and injury. It is, therefore, a fit case where both the parties should be asked to maintain status quo qua possession and nature of the suit land. Accordingly, order dated 8-1-2003 is made absolute till the disposal of the main suit. The observations made herein above are strictly for the disposal of the present application and have no bearings on the merits of the main suit. The file after completion, be tagged with main suit". 14. This order was untenable in the facts of the case. 15. Unfortunately, the Assistant District Attorney, Incharge of the case, for unknown reasons did not file an appeal against these orders. No steps whatsoever were taken to prevent this gross mis-use of the process of law and Court. 16. This suit was filed on August 20, 2002 but made little headway till March 22, 2005 when it was last taken by the trial Court. No steps whatsoever were taken to prevent this gross mis-use of the process of law and Court. 16. This suit was filed on August 20, 2002 but made little headway till March 22, 2005 when it was last taken by the trial Court. Learned Sub Judge in his order dated April 19,2003 noticed that the written statement was filed in January, 2003 by the defendants but replication was not filed and adjourned the case for May 20, 2003 for filing the replication. On that date again, replication was not filed and the case was adjourned for about five months and directed to be listed on October 16, 2003. When this case came up on October 16, 2003, the trial Court noticed that an application has been filed under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Perusal of the record shows that this application was filed by Mahila Mandal Bagh Theru for impleadment as party in the suit taking a plea that the suit land was a public path and so recorded in the revenue record which is in use as such by the applicant and the public in general. The case was listed before the trial Judge on December 20, 2003. Trial Judge, without application of mind, adjourned the case to March 10, 2004 for reply to the application. On April 30, 2004, when the case came up before the learned Sub Judge, he noticed that an application, under Order 1 Rule 10, C.P.C. has been filed and directed to list the case on July 14, 2004 for reply. When the case came up before the learned Sub Judge on September 8, 2004, he again oblivious to his previous orders adjourned the case at the asking of the learned counsel for the plaintiff, respondent No. 4 for consideration of the application. The application without any justifiable reasons was not taken up and the case was adjourned from time to time. The application remained un-decided to the illegitimate and fraudulent advantage obtained by the respondent and that is how the matter stands. 17. Heard Mr. Vinay Kuthiala, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. M.S. Chandel, learned Advocate General with Mr. R.M. Bisht, Dy. Advocate General for respondents No. 1 to 3 and Mr. T.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for respondent No. 4. 18. Mr. 17. Heard Mr. Vinay Kuthiala, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. M.S. Chandel, learned Advocate General with Mr. R.M. Bisht, Dy. Advocate General for respondents No. 1 to 3 and Mr. T.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for respondent No. 4. 18. Mr. Kuthiala, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that this is a petition in public interest where a public path has not only been encroached upon but construction made on it under the shelter of various judicial orders obtained by concealing material facts and practising fraud on the Courts by the petitioner. He submits it would only be in the larger public interest to put an end to these unending proceedings and the orders of the Financial Commissioner are directed to be implemented and encroachment on public path removed. 19. Learned Advocate General candidly submits that unfortunately, no appeal was filed by the concerned Assistant District Attorney against the orders of the learned Sub Judge granting interim relief to respondent No. 4 and an appropriate action would be taken against the concerned Officer. Learned counsel for respondent No. 4 contends that this Court would stay its hands off as the matter is pending before the learned Sub Judge. 20. We hardly need to emphasize that fraud vitiates all proceedings including the judicial proceedings. When any un-deserved advantage is gained by a party by abusing the process of law or the Court, it cannot and should not be allowed to continue. 21. The Apex Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others, 1994 (1) SCC 1 observed that a judgment or decree obtained by fraud on the Court is a nullity and non-est in the eyes of law. Quoting Chief Justice Edward Coke of England that "Fraud-avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" held that such an advantage gained by litigant can be challenged in any Court even in collateral proceedings. Their Lordships observed : "Fraud-avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree-by the first court or by the highest court-has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree-by the first court or by the highest court-has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings". 22. In Chengalvarya Naidu, the respondents/plaintiffs filed an application for final decree, for partition and separate possession of the properties subject-matter of dispute and for mesne profits. The appellant-defendants contested the application on the ground that preliminary decree was obtained by fraud and as such, the application was liable to be dismissed. Trial Judge accepted the contention and dismissed the application for grant of final decree. The respondent/plaintiffs filed an appeal before the High Court. A Division Bench of the High Court took a view that there was no legal duty on a litigant to approach the Court with true facts and prove it by true evidence, allowed the appeal and set-aside the order of the trial Court. The Supreme Court in para 5 of the judgment noticed that the short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the Court, the High Court made following observations : "There is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence.......". Their Lordships in para 5 observed : "7. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the Court, The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that "there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence. The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often that not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation". (Emphasis given) 23. In the later part of the judgment, their Lordships observed: "Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial tantamounts to playing fraud on the court". 24. In the present case, admittedly, as noticed earlier, respondent No. 4 obtained illegal gain and advantage by concealing and misrepresenting the material facts of the case hoodwinking the Courts. The following observations in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Para 6) are apposite. ".....A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by anothers loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage.....A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to take advantage on the other side, then he is guilty of applying fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party". (Emphasis given) 25. There is no scope for dispute that the respondent No. 4 practised fraud, deceived the Court by concealing material facts and with-holding the orders of the Divisional Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner which would have shown that the grant made in her favour was set aside and having invoked writ petition of this Court, she was not successful. She secured interim injunction in her favour by deceiving the Court and with-holding the relevant information and documents. 26. She secured interim injunction in her favour by deceiving the Court and with-holding the relevant information and documents. 26. The Supreme Court in Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 5 Supreme Court Cases 550 observed that fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of court, the Courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practiced upon that Court. In Chittaranjan Das v. Durgapore Project Ltd., (1995) 99 CWN 897, it was held : "Suppression of a material document which affects the condition of service of the petitioner, would amount to fraud in such matters. Even the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with in such a situation". 27. The Supreme Court in Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education and others, (2003) 8 Supreme Court Cases 321 (Para 13) observed thus : "Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. Although negligence is not fraud but it can be evidence on fraud. 14. In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley the Court of Appeal stated the law thus: (ALL ER P. 345C-D)). "I cannot accede to this argument for a moment. No court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud. No judgment of a court, no order of a minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything. The court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever". 28. In Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi and others, (2003) 8 Supreme Court Cases 319, Their Lordships ruled: "An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous". 29. In Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi and others, (2003) 8 Supreme Court Cases 319, Their Lordships ruled: "An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous". 29. Their Lordships further observed: ......"Fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata". (Emphasis given) 30. In Vice Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and another v. Girdharilal Yadav, (2004) 6 Supreme Court Cases 325, the Apex Court in para 15 of the judgment held : "15. Commission of fraud on court and suppression of material facts are the core issues involved in these matters. Fraud as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. (Emphasis given) In para 16, it was observed : "Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by word or letter". 31. In the present case, we are more than convinced that respondent No. 4 obtained the orders from the trial Court in the civil suit to her advantage by practising fraud and deception and therefore, she is not entitled to claim any equity. Public path was not only encroached upon but construction raised over it preventing the user of the public path by the public at large for whom this path was meant. 32. Mr. T.S. Chauhan, took pains to impress upon us that as the civil suit is pending, therefore, this Court would not, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India interfere and set at naught the proceedings pending before the trial Court in a civil suit filed by the respondent No. 4. As already observed by us, fraud avoids all judicial acts and any advantage gained by playing fraud on the Court is nullity and non-est in the eyes of law, as observed in Chengalvaraya Naidu, and such judgment/decree/proceedings cannot but be treated as nullity by civil courts and it can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings. No other point was urged before us. 33. No other point was urged before us. 33. In result, the writ petition is allowed in the following terms: (a) The interim orders passed by learned Sub Judge Ghumarwin in Civil Suit No. 268-1/04/02 dated 8.1.2003 confirmed on 6.8.2003 shall stand vacated; (b) The proceedings in civil suit being fraudulent, the suit shall stand dismissed; (c) The Deputy Commissioner/Collector Bilaspur is made responsible to ensure that encroachment of the public path, made by the respondent No. 4, is removed immediately, in accordance with law but not later than six months from today. A compliance affidavit shall be filed by the Collector/Deputy Commissioner, Bilaspur by December 15, 2005; (d) Looking to the conduct of the Respondent No. 4, the advantage gained by her by practicing fraud and deception on the courts and with a view to deter such acts in future, we impose exemplary costs of Rs. 30,000/- on respondent No. 4 Smt. Shakuntla Devi. Out of the cost imposed, respondent No. 4 shall deposit rupees 15,000/- with the H.R High Court Legal Services Committee and the remaining 15,000/- with the Advocates Welfare Fund within four weeks from today. In the event of non-deposit of the costs by the Respondent No. 4 in stipulated time, the Secretary, H.R High Court Legal Services Committee shall move an application before this Court for appropriate directions. 34. A copy of the judgment shall be immediately sent by the Registrar General to the Secretary H.R High Court Legal Services Committee and Deputy Commissioner/Collector, Bilaspur. 35. The records of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No. 2, Ghumarwin be remitted back immediately. The petition is accordingly disposed of. Petition disposed of.