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2005 DIGILAW 177 (GAU)

Debabrata Koloi v. State of Tripura

2005-03-02

A.B.PAL

body2005
JUDGMENT A.B. Pal, J. 1. Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (for short, 'the District Council') is a constitutional body formed under Sixth Schedule of the constitution of India with a view to provide local self rule for the tribals. Under sub para (6) of Para 2 of the said Schedule, the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (Constitution, Election and Conduct of Business) Rules, 1985 (for short, rules) have been framed and election to the District Council under the said Rules is held every five years. The last election was held in May, 2000 and the first meeting of the District Council following that election was held on 19th May, 2000. Therefore, its term of 5 years shall expire on 18.5.05 before which fresh election to the District Council is to be conducted to install an elected body. All the 15 Petitioners are the elected Members of the District Council and by this writ petition, they have challenged the impugned notification issued by the Governor on 29.12.04 in exercise of powers under sub para (2) of Para 16 of the Sixth Schedule assuming to himself all the powers and functions vested in or exercisable by the District Council. 2. BRIEF FACTS: The short facts leading to the present writ petition are that the Petitioners under the leadership of Petitioner No. 1 Sri Debabrata Koloi being 15 in number gained absolute majority on 26th December, 2004 in the house of 29 members. Though the District Council consists of 28 elected and 2 nominated Members, at the relevant time, only 29 Members were in position. After gaining majority they moved a "No Confidence Motion" against the Executive Body headed by Sri Budhu Debbarma who was the Chief Executive Member and they also met the Governor apprising him of this development and demanding that an opportunity should be given to them to form an Executive committee headed by the Petitioner No. 1. All the Members assembled before the Raj Bhavan on 27.12.04 and submitted an application along with the letter of No Confidence and the Governor after due consideration decided that the No Confidence Motion should be tested on the floor of the Council after convening a meeting as per provisions of the Rules and this decision of the Governor was communicated by issuing a Press Release on 27.12.04. The grievance of the Petitioners is that on 29.12.04, the Council of Ministers held a Cabinet meeting and on the basis of the Cabinet decision, the Governor surprisingly, without giving them opportunity to form Executive committee acted on the same date under sub para (2) of Para 16 read with Para 20 BB of the Sixth Schedule assuming to himself all the powers of the District Council. According to the Petitioners, this action of the Governor was not taken in his discretion but at the behest of the State Government, which is contrary to the principle of autonomy and democracy. Their further grievance is that the Governor had actually acted in his discretion on 27.12.04 when he decided that the "No Confidence Motion" would be tested on the floor of the House, but the decision to assume the powers of the District Council taken on 29.12.04 was not in his discretion and, therefore, is not sustainable in law. They have prayed for quashing the impugned notification dated 29.12.04 and a direction to Respondents Nos. 4 and 5, the Chairman and Secretary of the Council to convene a meeting of the Council for consideration of the No Confidence Motion. 3. STAND OF RESPONDENTS: Respondent No. 3 is the Secretary to the Governor who filed the counter affidavit contending that the Governor acted in his discretion after consulting the Council of Ministers as is required by Para 20 BB of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. Explaining the action of the Governor under Para 16(2) it is contended that Sri Rabindra Debbarma, MLA, General Secretary, INPT (the party in opposition) and Vinay Debbarma, Member of the District Council (MDC) who is the Petitioner No. 4 herein submitted a memorandum to the Governor on 2.12.04 (Annexure R/2) expressing serious concern over the ongoing impasse in the administration of the District Council, rampant corruption including serious economic offences by the Chief Executive Member Sri Budhu Debbarma (Respondent No. 7) and Sri Hirendra Kumar Tripura, MDC, Petitioner No. 15 herein and urged that a situation had arisen in which the administration of the District Council could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Sixth Schedule. They demanded that the Executive committee should be dismissed immediately and powers of the District Council should be taken over by the Governor under Para 16(2). They demanded that the Executive committee should be dismissed immediately and powers of the District Council should be taken over by the Governor under Para 16(2). Again, on 9.12.04, another letter was issued to the Governor by the Petitioner No. 1 Sri Debabrata Koloi and the Petitioner No. 4 Sri Vinay Debbarma bringing specific charge against the Members of the Executive committee including Sri Hirendra Kumar Tripura (Petitioner No. 15) demanding that a situation had arisen which calls for immediate action by the Governor for dissolving the District Council and directing fresh election in view of the serious corruption and economic offences. As both these communications came from very responsible persons like Leader of the Opposition and General Secretary of the INPT and elected Member of the District Council, the Governor thought it appropriate to consult the Council of Ministers and sent both the communications to the State Government. While the matters were in the process of consultation, the Petitioners gained majority on 26.12.04 by winning over Sri Upendra Reang (Petitioner No. 2), Sri Sri Charanjoy Reang, (Petitioner No. 3), Sri Mulukchand Debbarma (Petitioner No. 5) and Sri Hirendra Kumar Tripura (Petitioner No. 15) against whom serious charges of corruption were raised in the aforesaid two communications. After gaining strength of majority, the Petitioners met the Governor on 27.12.04 demanding that the No Confidence Motion should be tested in the House and they should be given an opportunity to constitute Executive committee. The Governor expressed the view that the "No Confidence Motion" should be tested on the floor of the House in accordance with the provisions of the Rules. But, thereafter, on 29.12.04 when the Governor received the views of the State Government on the circumstances involving serious corruption and economic offences decided to take over the administration of the District Council under Para 16(2) of the Sixth Schedule. This action of the Governor being in his discretion after consulting the Council of Ministers cannot in any way be assailed in a Court of law. The allegation of mala fide against the Governor is nothing but a personal mala fide which is prohibited under Article 361 of the Constitution. This apart, "Article 163(2) of the Constitution clearly provides that the decision of the Governor in his discretion cannot be challenged before the Court". Almost in the same tune, the State Respondents No. 1 and 8 and the Respondent Nos. This apart, "Article 163(2) of the Constitution clearly provides that the decision of the Governor in his discretion cannot be challenged before the Court". Almost in the same tune, the State Respondents No. 1 and 8 and the Respondent Nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6 being officials of the District Council have raised same contention that a situation had arisen in which the administration of the District Council could not be carried on in accordance with the Sixth Schedule because of high corruption involving economic offences and therefore the Governor after consulting the State Government had acted legally by assuming to himself all the powers of the District Council. Further contention is on the same line that the discretionary powers of the Governor cannot be questioned in a Court being unassailable by provisions of Articles 163(2)(3) and 361 of the Constitution. 4. I have heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. M. Debbarma, learned advocate, Mr. T.K. Roy, learned Advocate General along with Mr. S. Chakraborty, learned advocate for the State Respondents and Mr. B. Das, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Ms. S. Das, learned advocate for the official Respondents of the District Council. 5. Powers of the governor under para 16(2) of the sixth Schedule and that of the president under Article 356 of the constitution-Whether Similar: Several issues have been raised in relation to the circumstances leading to the impugned notification which calls for the careful examination in the light of the constitutional position of the Governor in relation to the District Council and the decisions of the Apex Court laying down the ratios on the subject to address such a situation. The first submission of Mr. Bhowmik is that Governor's powers under Para 16(2) of the Sixth Schedule is exactly same as that of the President under Article 356 of the Constitution which has been controverted by the learned Counsels on the other side and proceeding from this position, he unwrapped his submission that the principles laid down by the Apex Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India reported in AIR 1994 SC 1918 shall squarely apply in the case in hand to find an answer to the present situation. Article 356(1) of the Constitution is reproduced below: 356. Article 356(1) of the Constitution is reproduced below: 356. Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in States-(1) If the President, on receipt of report from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by proclamation: (a) Assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or any body or authority in the State other than the Legislature of the State. The words "on receipt of report from the Governor of a State or otherwise" in this provision are significant by their absence in Para 16(2) of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution which is quoted below: If at any time the Governor is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the administration of an autonomous district or region cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Schedule, he may, by public notification assume to himself all or any of the functions or powers vested in or exercisable by the District Council or, as the case may be, the Regional Council and declare that such functions or powers shall be exercisable by such person or authority as he may specify in this behalf, for a period not exceeding six months. The satisfaction of the Governor thus, does not depend on any report from any source unlike that of the President. This power of the Governor is to be exercised in a manner provided in Para 20 BB of that Schedule which provides that the Governor shall, while exercising powers under Para 16(1)(2), consult the Council of Ministers and if he thinks it necessary, the District Council and, thereafter, take such action as he considers necessary in his discretion. These two provisions read together makes it amply clear that though consultation with the Council of Ministers is mandatory, the Governor is not bound to go by their advice and again, if he acts on their advice this alone cannot be interpreted that he has not acted in his discretion. These two provisions read together makes it amply clear that though consultation with the Council of Ministers is mandatory, the Governor is not bound to go by their advice and again, if he acts on their advice this alone cannot be interpreted that he has not acted in his discretion. There is no difference of opinion that while exercising the powers under Article 356the President shall act on the advice of the Council of Ministers only, not in his discretion because of the pervasive effect of Article 74 which provides that the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers. It may be noted that there is no similar provision like 20 BB for the President Article 74 reads as under: 74. Council of Ministers to aid and advice President-(1) There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President who shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice: Provided that the President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwise and the President shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration. (2) The question whether any and if so what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the President shall not be inquired into any Court. The proviso to Clause (1) entitles the President only to require the Council of Ministers to reconsider their advice and after such reconsideration whatever advice is tendered by the Council of Ministers the President shall act accordingly. The position of the Governor is quite different in relation to his powers with the Council of Ministers which reads: 163. Council of Ministers to aid and advise Governor: (i) There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion. Council of Ministers to aid and advise Governor: (i) There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion. (ii) If any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion, the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final, and the validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion. (3) The question whether any, and if so what, advise was tendered by Ministers to the Governor shall not be inquired into in any Court. The words "except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion" makes a sharp distinction from that of the powers of the President under Article 74 by entitling the Governor not to act in accordance with the advice of Council of Ministers in matters of the Constitution requires him to exercise his function in his discretion. Para 16(2) read with 20BB of the Sixth Schedule create such an area in relation to the administration of the District Council when the Governor though required to consult the Council of Ministers is not required to go by their advice and is enjoined to act in his discretion. The powers of the Governor under Para 16(2) of the Sixth Schedule and that of the President under Article 356 are not in pari materia and the width of Governor's power is much wider. In D. Uphing Maslai v. State of Assam reported in AIR 2002 Gau 70, the important observation of Justice M. Hidaytullah, former Chief Justice of India has been quoted for placing reliance which expressly viewed that Sixth Schedule of the Constitution is outside the rest of the Constitution and one cannot drag in the provisions of the Constitution or rely on the convention which has been built up in interpreting the provisions of Sixth Schedule unless it is in keeping with the provisions of that Schedule. The Court accordingly held that it would be safe to say that discretionary powers of the Governor under Para 16 has not been curtailed in any manner by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1995 by providing for consultation with the Council of Ministers and the concerned District Council. Such consultation does not include within its fold the concept of primacy of the Council of Ministers. Justice Hidayatullah further observed: The Governor is the final decision making authority in relation to the Autonomous District Council. If one examines the whole of the Schedule, no duty appears to be cast on the State Governments as such, every matter goes to the Governor himself. In view of this legal position, Mr. Bhowmik is not found to be correct when he submits that the powers of the Governor under Para 16(2) of the Sixth Schedule are similar to those of the President under Article 356 of the Constitution. The sweep and width of Governor's power is much stronger and wider. 6. Extent of Judicial Review: This being the constitutional position of the Governor where much focus is on his discretionary powers in relation to the District Council completely doing away with the primacy of the Council of Ministers, the next question this Court is confronted with is the scope and ambit of Judicial review in this high prerogative sector which has been designed to ensure autonomy in the administration of the tribal areas. To understand the law and find an answer, S.R. Bommai (supra) again lends the light dealing with the area of justifiability in so far as the subjective satisfaction of the President under Article 356(1) of the Constitution is concerned, the Apex Court made following observations in Para 33: Article 352 provides that 'if the President is satisfied' that a grave emergency exists threatening the security of India of any part thereof, whether by war or external aggression or armed rebellion, the President may make a declaration to that effect specifying the area of its operation in the proclamation. Notwithstanding the use of the language "if the President is satisfied" which suggests that the decision would depend on the subjective satisfaction of the President, counsel agreed that such a decision cannot be made the subject-matter of judicial scrutiny for the obvious reason that the existence or otherwise of a grave emergency does not fall within the purview of judicial scrutiny since the Courts are ill-equipped to undertake such a delicate function. Again in Para 59 the Supreme Court held: The object of Article 74(2) was not to exclude any material or documents from the scrutiny of the Courts but to provide that an order issued by or in the name of the President could not be questioned on the ground that it was either contrary to the adv ice tendered by the Ministers or was issued without obtaining any advice from the Ministers. Its object was only to make the question whether the President had followed the advice of the Ministers or acted contrary thereto, non-justifiable. What advice, if any, was tendered by Ministers to the President was thus to be beyond the scrutiny of the Court. (Emphasis supplied) The underlined portion goes to show that even an order issued by or in the name of the Governor cannot be questioned on the ground that it was issued without obtaining any advice from the Ministers. Thus, in the case in hand applying the above ratio, it can be held that even though the Governor is required to consult the Council of Ministers, before acting in his discretion under Para 16(2), such action cannot be questioned in the Court of law on the ground that there was no consultation at all. To what extent the Judicial review can run has been examined by the Apex Court in the context of S.R. Bommai's case (supra). The law laid down in Para 60 reads: 60. What is further, although Article 74(2) bars judicial review so far as the advice given by the Ministers is concerned, it does not bar scrutiny of the material on the basis of which the advice is given. The Courts are not interested in either the advice given by the Ministers to the President or the reasons for such advice. What is further, although Article 74(2) bars judicial review so far as the advice given by the Ministers is concerned, it does not bar scrutiny of the material on the basis of which the advice is given. The Courts are not interested in either the advice given by the Ministers to the President or the reasons for such advice. The Courts are, however, justified in probing as to whether there was any material on the basis of which the advice was given, and whether it was relevant for such advice and the President could have acted on it. Hence when the Courts undertake an enquiry into the existence of such material, the prohibition contained in Article 74(2) does not negate their right to know about the factual existence of any such material.... Even if Mr. Bhowmik's contention that ratio in S.R. Bommai (supra) with regard to the extent of Judicial review is accepted to have full application in matters of Governor's power under Para 16(2) of the Sixth Schedule, then also it can be held that such review extends only to probing as to whether there was any material on the basis of which the advice was given and whether it was relevant for such advice and whether the Governor could have acted on it. 7. Consultation-Meaning and import: This takes me to the next question what consultation appearing in Para 20 BB of the Sixth Schedule really means. From the foregoing discussions, it is clear that consultation does not mean to have any binding effect but connotes view or advice of the Council of Ministers on a situation, which may arise when the administration of the District Council cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Sixth Schedule. Mr. Bhowmik submits that the impugned notification of the Governor issued on 29.12.04 under Para 16(2) does not mention that the Governor had any kind of consultation with the Council of Ministers as required by Para 20 BB. On a perusal of the impugned notification it is found that the word "consultation" is missing. But the Petitioners themselves in Para 10 of the writ petition averred that the Governor acted on the basis of the decision of the Council of Ministers taken on 29.12.04. On a perusal of the impugned notification it is found that the word "consultation" is missing. But the Petitioners themselves in Para 10 of the writ petition averred that the Governor acted on the basis of the decision of the Council of Ministers taken on 29.12.04. The relevant portion is quoted below: Your Petitioners state that on the basis of a cabinet decision of council of ministers of state government dated 29th December, 2004 the Respondent No. 8 met His Excellency the Governor of Tripura on 29th December, 2004 at Rajbhavan, Agartala several times and on the persuasion of the state government and at the behest of the state government. His Excellency the Governor of Tripura changed his earlier independent decision and issued the aforesaid notification. This statement apparently precludes the Petitioners from raising the point that the impugned notification was issued without consulting the Council of Ministers. However, having a look to the counter affidavit by the Secretary to the Governor (Respondent No. 3) and that of the State Respondents 1 and 8 it becomes evident that the two representations dated 2.12.04 and 9.12.04 by two of the Petitioners and the General Secretary of the INPT were sent by the Governor to the State Government for views and in both the representations much focus was on the rampant corruption and economic offences by the Chief Executive Member and other executive Members claiming that a situation had arisen calling for action by the Governor under Para 16(2) of the Sixth Schedule. Such a situation alleged by Leader of the Opposition and other important elected Members of the District Council could not be examined, for offering views to the Governor, by any authority lesser than the Council of Ministers which is the only authority contemplated by Para 20BB of the Sixth Schedule to offer views or advice to the Governor on such a grave situation. The process of consultation ended on 29th December when Cabinet communicated its views. This Court is not interested to know what advice was actually given as it is not a subject matter for Judicial review. According to Mr. Bhowmik, Governor did not seek views of the Council of Ministers on the representations dated 2nd December and 9th December for the reason that addressing a letter to the Secretary of Tribal Welfare Department to express views on those representations cannot be termed as consultation process. According to Mr. Bhowmik, Governor did not seek views of the Council of Ministers on the representations dated 2nd December and 9th December for the reason that addressing a letter to the Secretary of Tribal Welfare Department to express views on those representations cannot be termed as consultation process. Seeking support to this contention he refers to Rule 3(1) of the rules which permits application of Tripura General Clauses Act for the purpose of interpretation of the rules. In Section 3(10) of the General Clause Act "State Government" has been defined to mean the "Governor". Therefore, according to Mr. Bhowmik the Governor should have referred the matter to State Government for consultation instead of forwarding the representations to the Commissioner-Secretary to the Tribal Welfare Department. While canvassing such a point, Mr. Bhowmik overlooked the definitions of "Governor" given in Rule 2(XXVI) and 2(XXV) of the rules. No aid of the General Clause Act is, therefore, necessary. It is to be noted that Governor has framed rules of Executive Business under Article 166 of the Constitution which provides that for referring a matter to the State Government the Secretary of the concerned department has to be addressed. Rules of Executive business further provides which matters are to be submitted to the Minister and which matter to the Council of Ministers. The Secretary accordingly submitted the matters to the appropriate authority. "State Government" does not mean Council of Ministers only. It may mean a Minister also. In the present case, Council of Ministers being "State Government" Secretary obtained its views. The contention of Mr. Bhowmik that there was no consultation is not, therefore, acceptable. 8. Governor's Discretionary powers do not include summoning of district Council. The next contention of Mr. Bhowmik is that the Governor did not act in his discretion but only toed the line of action suggested by the Council of Ministers which is violative of the provision of the Sixth Schedule designed to keep at bay the primacy of the Council of Ministers with a view to secure autonomy in the administration of the tribal areas. Bhowmik is that the Governor did not act in his discretion but only toed the line of action suggested by the Council of Ministers which is violative of the provision of the Sixth Schedule designed to keep at bay the primacy of the Council of Ministers with a view to secure autonomy in the administration of the tribal areas. In support of his contention, he referred to the letter addressed by the 15 Petitioners who were all elected Members of the District Council claiming an opportunity to form an Executive committee to be headed by the Petitioner No. 1 and in response thereto a Press Release was issued (Annexure-3) by the Department of Information, Cultural Affairs and Tourism. According to that Press Release issued on 27.12.04, the Governor told Debabrata Koloi and Mulukchand Debbarma (Petitioners Nos. 1 and 5) that the matter of "No Confidence Motion" should be tested only after convening a meeting of the District Council. Mr. Bhowmik argued that this decision to convene a meeting of the District Council for determining the fate of the "No Confidence Motion" was taken by the Governor on 27.12.04 in his discretion and that what the Governor decided on 29.12.04 to impose his Rule under Para 16(2) of the Sixth Schedule was at the behest of the State Government. This volte face was clearly an abuse of power, mala fide and a severe blow to the democratic values and principles of autonomy for the tribal areas. Mr. B. Das, learned Sr. counsel for the official Respondents of the District Council pointed out that under the rules it was not within the jurisdiction of the Governor to decide about summoning of the District Council for considering "No Confidence Motion". Rule 165 of the Rules provides that the Chairman shall summon the meeting of the District Council from time to time at such place and time as the Chairman may appoint. This legal position advanced by Mr. Das does not appear to be in dispute as the Petitioners themselves have made a prayer in the writ petition to direct the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 (the Chairman and the Secretary of the District Council) to convene a meeting of the District Council admitting thereby that it is the power of the chairman and not of the Governor to summon the meeting. Mr. 4 and 5 (the Chairman and the Secretary of the District Council) to convene a meeting of the District Council admitting thereby that it is the power of the chairman and not of the Governor to summon the meeting. Mr. Das clarifies that what the Governor pointed out to the Petitioners who met him on 27.12.04 was that such a "No Confidence Motion" should be decided in the meeting of the District Council. While saying so he was only referring to the correct procedure prescribed by rules and did not, as he could not, give any decision or commitment about convening a meeting of the District Council. I entirely appreciate the submission of Mr. Das which shows hollowness of the argument canvassed by Mr. Bhowmik that the Governor acted in his discretion while deciding to convene a meeting of the District Council. A mere perusal of the Press Release makes it clear that no such decision was at all taken by him and that he can never take such decision in view of the provisions of Rules 159 and 165 of the Rules. The fallacy of Mr. Bhowmik's submission becomes more clear when he says in one breathe that the Governor cannot decide in his discretion without consulting the Council of Ministers and claims in another breathe that the decision of the Governor taken on 27.12.04 (obviously without consulting the Council of Ministers) to convene a meeting of the District Council was in his discretion. Mr. Bhowmik could not say under what provision of the Sixth Schedule or the rules framed thereunder the Governor could take such decision to convene a meeting of the District Council. His entire argument on this score is absolutely baseless and misplaced. The allegation of volte face, abuse of power and mala fide are completely prohibited by Article 361 of the Constitution, though Mr. Bhowmik tries to plead that the Petitioner's grievance was not for personal mala fide but for legal mala fide. It could not be shown how the allegation of acting "at the behest of the State Government" could be said to be a legal mala fide as a legal mala fide can only be raised when there is only a violation of any specific legal provision. It could not be shown how the allegation of acting "at the behest of the State Government" could be said to be a legal mala fide as a legal mala fide can only be raised when there is only a violation of any specific legal provision. In para 194 of S.R. Bommai (supra), the Supreme Court observed that douse of power by high constitutional functionaries cannot be assumed but must be strictly proved. The exercise of discretionary satisfaction may depend on diverse, varied and variegated circumstances. It is impermissible to attribute bad faith to the President in the face of constitutional prohibition of answerability by Article 361. Several other decisions have been cited on 'mala fide' confirming the views in S.R. Bommai (supra) which I refrain from quoting for the sake of brevity. I, therefore, reject the contention that the Governor did not act in his discretion and there was any mala fide, personal or legal on the part of the Governor in issuing the impugned notification under Para 16(2) of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. 9. Materials. Available for the Governor to act under para 16(2): It is, thus, clear that the process of consultation started on 10.12.04 when the Governor forwarded the representations dated 2.12.04 and 9.12.04 to the State Government of their views. As I have already observed whoever may be addressed in the forwarding letter, the views on such important aspects like a situation calling for intervention by the Governor under Para 16(2) of the Sixth Schedule can not be taken up by any authority other than the Council of Ministers who are only empowered to do so under Para 20 BB of the Sixth Schedule. The process had ended on 29.12.04 when the Chief Secretary (Respondent No. 8) met the Governor with the views or advice of the Council of Ministers and this process had nothing to do with the claim of the Petitioners, who claimed to have gained majority on 26.12.04 and met the Governor on 27.12.04, for a floor test for their "No Confidence Motion". This meeting with the Governor on the subject matter of the No Confidence Motion and loss of majority by the Chief Executive Member Sri Budhu Debbarma cannot be said to have precluded him from acting under Para 16(2) if it appeared to him that a situation had arisen calling for his intervention. This meeting with the Governor on the subject matter of the No Confidence Motion and loss of majority by the Chief Executive Member Sri Budhu Debbarma cannot be said to have precluded him from acting under Para 16(2) if it appeared to him that a situation had arisen calling for his intervention. The functional areas are different under how different authorities, the Governor and the Chairman, Learned Advocate General pointed out that it is the Petitioner No. 1 Debabrata Koloi and the Petitioner No. 4 Vinay Debbarma, who wrote the letter dated 9.12.04 making serious allegation of corruption and economic offences against the Chief Executive Member, Sri Budhu Debbarma and other executive Members including Sri Hirendra Kumar Tripura (Petitioner No. 15) who later switched over to their side. Rampant corruption, economic and criminal offences at highest places were the iriaiih grounds taken in their letter urging the Governor to dissolve the District Council and direct for the fresh mandate without loss of time. Before that on 2.12.04, the said Vinay Debbarma and the general secretary of his party, Sri Rabindra Debbarma addressed a similar memorandum to the Governor alleging rampant corruption against the Chief Executive Member and others demanding immediate dissolution of the District Council and to take action under Para 16(2) of the Sixth Schedule. At the time of making such allegation, the said two Petitioners had no majority. But when some of the allegedly corrupt Members who were in the Executive body headed by Budhu Debbarma (Respondent No. 7) and targeted in the above mentioned representations, namely, Upendra Reang (Petitioner No. 2), Charanjoy Reang (Petitioner No. 3) and Mulukchand Debbarma (Petitioner No. 5) along with Hirendra Kumar Tripura (Petitioner No. 15) joined them making to the magic number of 15, the grave situation of high corruption had suddenly disappeared for them and they made a volte face claiming that they should be allowed to rule the roost once again. Mr. Roy further argues that according to the Petitioners, the corrupt Members no longer remained corrupt when they supported them and this outstrips their design behind the veil mongering for power and power only. It is a strange somersault by the Petitioners who expected the Governor to dance in their tune and accept whatever did they say about the situation prevailing in the District Council. It is a strange somersault by the Petitioners who expected the Governor to dance in their tune and accept whatever did they say about the situation prevailing in the District Council. The changed faces of the Petitioners might have reinforced the satisfaction of the Governor that a situation had really appeared in which it was not possible to carry on the administration of the District Council in accordance with the provisions of the Sixth Schedule. Mr. Roy continues his robust submission that a bare reading of the impugned notification shows change of guards in the District Council so frequently that it cannot be in the interest of the people of the autonomous district. The Petitioner No. 1 Sri Debabrata Koloi was the first Chief Executive Member who was replaced by Sri Kripa Mohan Reang followed by Sri Debabrata Koloi again and then Sri Hirendra Kumar Tripura and the Sri Budhu Debbarma within a period of less than five years highlighting the practice of horse trading for power only. This is undoubtedly a situation which alone could have been a strong reason for intervention under Para 16(2). Coupled with the frequent change of guards, was the situation of rampant corruption, serious economic offences in highest places leading to issue of warrant of arrest by Courts in connection with the criminal cases against the Chief Executive Member. The different version of the Petitioners in the writ petition notwithstanding, the fact remains that they themselves urged the Governor that due to high and rampant corruption it became necessary for the Governor to interfere under Para 16(2) of the Sixth Schedule. This being the position, it can safely be asserted that the Petitioners Nos. 1 and 5 themselves invited Governor's intervention in their memorandum to the Governor on 2.12.04 and 9.12.04 which prompted the Governor to take a decision in his discretion after consultation with the Council of Ministers and this process was set in motion by the Petitioners themselves. Had there been no switch over of support by some of the Petitioners charged with corruption, there would not have been any occasion for them to file this case. Had there been no switch over of support by some of the Petitioners charged with corruption, there would not have been any occasion for them to file this case. After articulating concerns for democracy and autonomy the cry for fresh mandate and Governor's intervention was converted into a cry for own rule when some of the allegedly corrupt members extended support and such quick change of face does not speak well about Petitioners' democratic credentials. Applying the ratio of S.R. Bommai (supra) it can be held that Governor had enough material to consider the course of action under Para 16(2) of the Sixth Schedule and on those materials, the Council of Ministers was called upon to give their views which ultimately came on 29.12.04. As already held, sufficiency or otherwise of all those materials or what advice, if any, was given by the Council of Ministers are beyond the scope of Judicial review. 10. As already discussed above, first and fifth Petitioners in their representations dated 2nd and 9th December urged the Governor to dissolve District Council and impose Para 16(2) on grounds of high corruption. Taking a reverse view Mr. Bhowmik, learned Counsel for the Petitioners now submits that corruption alone can not be a ground for imposing Governor's rule under Para 16(2). He derives support from the situation illustrated in the report of Sarkaria Commission quoted in para 58 of S.R. Bommai (Supra). The tenth illustration of the report states: This power cannot be invoked, merely on the ground that there are serious allegations of corruption against the Ministry. But this was only recommendation of Sarkaria Commission. The law laid down by the Supreme Court is, however, available in para 154 which states that corruption or abuse of power may be a situation to justifiably infer constitutional breakdown: 154. While it is not possible to exhaustively catalogue diverse situation when the constitutional breakdown may justifiably be inferred from, for instance (i) large scale breakdown of the law and order of public order situation; (ii) gross mismanagement of affairs by a State Government; (iii) corruption or abuse of its power; (iv) danger to national integration or security of the State or aiding or abetting national disintegration or a claim for independent sovereign status and (v) subversion of the Constitution while professing to work under the Constitution or creating disunity or disaffection among the people to disintegrate democratic social fabrics. For the Governor whose position in relation to the District Council is that of a final authority had the materials of not only high corruption but frequent change of guards by horse trading to enable him to decide imposition of the rule under Para 16(2) whatever may be the advice of the Council of Ministers and Court's power of review does not reach to scrutiny, adequacy or otherwise of such materials even applying the above ratio in S.R. Bommai (supra). As already noted, the width and sweep of Governor's power under Para 16(2) is much wider and stronger than that of the President under Article 356. The next question raised by Mr. Bhowmik that the Governor did not consult with the State Government on frequent change of guards which found prominent place in the impugned notification is also bound to fail for the reason that Governor is not bound to consult on all situation which may come for his consideration for applying Para 16(2). The apex Court has made it clear in Para 365(7) of S.R. Bommai (supra) in the following lines: The Court will not go into the correctness of the material or its adequacy. Its enquiry is limited to see whether the material was relevant to the action. Even if part of the material is irrelevant, the Court cannot interfere so long as there is some material which is relevant to the action taken. Mr. Bhowmik's further contention is that the impugned notification refers to charge of corruption only but does not say whether those charges have been found to be true. Viewed from the discretionary powers of the Governor to act on his subjective satisfaction only which cannot be put to objective test. I am of the considered view that the word "satisfaction" mentioned in the notification is enough for the purpose and he is not required to give his findings on such charges. 11. Mr. Roy, learned Advocate General wants this Court to take judicial notice of the fact that the general election to the District Council has been announced to be held on 5th March, 2005 and, therefore, both parties should wait for people's mandate and shun polemics. 12. 11. Mr. Roy, learned Advocate General wants this Court to take judicial notice of the fact that the general election to the District Council has been announced to be held on 5th March, 2005 and, therefore, both parties should wait for people's mandate and shun polemics. 12. In my considered view following legal and factual positions emerge from the above discussions: (i) The width and sweep of Governor's power under Para 16(2) of the Sixth Schedule which excludes primacy of the Council of Ministers in consultation process are much wider and stronger than that of the President under Article356 of the constitution which finally stand on primacy of Council of Ministers; (ii) Judicial reviews extend to only probing whether there was any material for consultation and advice. It does not extend to what advice, if any, was given by the Council of Ministers to the Governor. Forwarding letter to the Secretary to the State Government by the Secretary to the Governor seeking his views on the grave situations depicted in the representations dated 2nd and 9th December by first and fifth Petitioners amounts to seeking views of the State Governments in the consultation process. It was not necessary for the Governor to consult on every situation noted in the impugned notification. Above two representations of first and fifth Petitioners were the materials for the Governor to act, adequacy or otherwise of which cannot be scanned by Judicial review: (iii) The Governor acted in his discretion after consulting the Council of Ministers under Para 16(2) read with 20 BB of the Sixth Schedule. Acceptance of the advice of Council of Ministers does not, ipso facto, mean he did not act in his discretion; (iv) Governor cannot and so did not decide on 27.12.04 to convene meeting of the District Council for a floor test of the "No Confidence Motion". Such powers lies with the Chairman; (v) Abuse of power by high constitutional authority like the Governor cannot be assumed but must be strictly proved. Petitioners have failed to prove abuse of powers by the Governor while acting under Para 16(2). There is no evidence of legal mala fide. Allegations of personal mala fide are rejected in view of constitutional prohibition under Article 361; (vi) In a notification issued under Para 16(2) Governor is not bound to disclose reasons and findings on charge of corruption. Petitioners have failed to prove abuse of powers by the Governor while acting under Para 16(2). There is no evidence of legal mala fide. Allegations of personal mala fide are rejected in view of constitutional prohibition under Article 361; (vi) In a notification issued under Para 16(2) Governor is not bound to disclose reasons and findings on charge of corruption. His subjective satisfaction noted in the notification is enough which cannot be put to objective test; 13. For the above reasons the writ petition deserves to be dismissed which I hereby do. No cost.